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Abstract: Policy makers of most developing countries and international organisations in-creasingly un-
derline the importance of skills for economic development and transformation. In fact, many of the
industries in economically less developed countries have, in the face of accelerated economic globalisa-
tion, become more technology intensive; skill formation processes, both inside and outside the firms, are
therefore changing. This study scrutinises such transformations by comparing the skill formation regimes
of the garment industries in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh from a historical-institutionalist perspective. It
emphasises that the trajectories notably of the in-firm skill formation regimes differ consid-erably between
the two countries, an important reason being the different paths of educational development. At the same
time, the study shows how, in both countries, state-led skill formation regimes have been trans-formed
by market forces, the growing importance of corporate business interests but also by the social demand
for educational credentials.
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1.1 The problem 
Among policy makers, the larger public and most social scientists, there is little de-
bate about the importance of skills for economic development and transformation, 
both in highly industrialised and less industrialised countries; to remain competitive in 
the era of globalisation, its is being assumed, nation states need to prepare their citi-
zens for the requirements of the knowledge economy and to increasingly strive for 
“high skills”.1 In the last decade, these concerns have also been taken up by interna-
tional organisations, for instance by the World Bank and by the International Labour 
Organization (ILO), by development economists and – subsequently – by govern-
ments of many developing countries.2 In this context, authors have pointed out that 
the classical rationale for the global division of labour, according to which the abun-
dant supply of cheap labour was considered to be a major comparative advantage for 
developing countries, needed to be substantially revised:3 Lall, a leading develop-
ment economists, argues that the global economy has been undergoing sweeping 
changes which would make it vital for industries in developing countries to become 
more “technology intensive”, to improve productivity and to embark on a strategy to 
foster the skills of their labour force. The “new technological paradigm”, Lall writes, 
“calls for more skills, for higher levels of skills and for different kinds of skills”.4 In a 
globalised economy, goods can be produced anywhere, as long as firms are in a po-
sition to recruit skilled employees. This “newer international division of labour”, as it is 
being called by Hutchinson, seems to provide tremendous opportunities to develop-
ing countries, but it mainly implies that the industries in these countries need to be-
come more competitive and thus require a highly skilled and productive workforce, 
even in traditionally low-skill industries such as the garment industry.5 
                                            
1  For the concept of high skills see Brown et al. (2001); for elaborations on the knowledge econ-
omy from an economic perspective see Brown et al. (2003), Neef et al. (1998), Powell and 
Snellman (2004). 
2  For World Bank publications on the requirements of the knowledge economy see Cuadra and 
Moreno (2005), Riboud et al. (2007); for comments by the ILO on the need for further invest-
ments into training see International Labour Organization (1999). 
3  For an important study on the political economy of the global division of labour see Wood 
(1994). 
4  Lall (1999), p. 3 
5  Hutchinson (2004), p. 21; on rising competition in the global garment trade see Joshi (2002). 
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But how should this happen? How should developing countries, where industrialisa-
tion has started to be characterised by labour-intensive production processes that 
engage a high number of hardly formally trained employees on fordist shop floors, 
manage this transition towards higher skills? Representatives of the development 
community were fast to give advice; their counsels were, however, heterogeneous 
and reflected the different schools within economics of education which had evolved 
since World War II: the World Bank, which argued along the lines of neo-classical 
human capital theory, emphasised that governments should continue to place their 
priorities in primary and secondary education whereas vocational education and 
training was supposed to be left to the private sector, which may be motivated to in-
vest into training through tax-incentives. Not only, the World Bank argued, were the 
rates of return for vocational education and training lower than for general education 
but also, its studies suggested that technological change was rather facilitated by 
open-door economic policies that attracted foreign investors, which would then bring 
in the technology and train the generally educated workforce on-the-job.6 
In contrast to the World Bank, the ILO argued more along the lines of what had 
come to be known as manpower-planning theories in the 1950s and 1960s and 
pointed out that the formation of technical and vocational skills should not be left to 
the market, as its failures would result in underinvestment into skills. Public invest-
ment into vocational education and training was thus vital for far-reaching economic 
and structural change.7 This position was backed by much research on the economic 
success of the East Asian Newly Industrialising Economies (NIEs), which was con-
sidered to be at least partly rooted in the respective governments making invest-
ments into training an integral part of their development strategies.8 Governments in 
developing countries should therefore invest in “high skills” by expanding vocational 
education and training instead of leaving training to the private sector.9 Others again, 
such as representatives of the Organisation for Economic Development and Coop-
                                            
6  For early writings by human capital theorists see Becker (1962), Schultz (1961); for publications 
de-legitimising investments into vocational education and training by applying rates of return 
analyses see Psacharopoulos and Loxley (1985), Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004); for re-
spective publications by the World Bank see World Bank (1991), World Bank (1995), World 
Bank (1999); for studies emphasising the link between general education, FDI and technological 
change see De Ferranti and Perry (2003); for the World Bank’s emphasis on tax incentives for 
training firms see, for instance, Adams (2007, p. 27). 
7  International Labour Organization (1999), p. 67; on manpower planning theory see Hinchliffe 
(1994, p. 370), Psacharopoulos (1991). 
8  Ashton et al. (1999), Green (2007), Morris (1996) 
9  For the application of the “high skills” concept in, for instance, South Africa and Pakistan see 
Amjad (2005), Ashton (2005). 
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eration (OECD) pleaded for more pragmatic solutions and thus started to promote 
public-private partnerships in vocational education and training. In contrast to earlier 
periods, when international organisations such as the ILO made a case for appren-
ticeship training in developing countries, this new discourse on public-private partner-
ship in training underlined the value of training centres, which were jointly funded and 
managed by representatives of the public and the private sector, and thereby often 
pointed to best practices in Southeast Asia.10 
The dilemma of how best to prepare workers’ skills for the changes in the global 
economy was thus addressed by either referring to universal models that narrowly 
assessed the rates of returns for different types of education and training pro-
grammes or by analysing “developmental state” skill formation strategies that rely on 
the role of strong, coordinating states – which is what is exactly lacking in most de-
veloping countries. But do these models, which emerged in contexts that – in fact – 
have very little in common with the political realities in many developing countries, 
contribute to an assessment of realistic strategies for “high skills”? This, to say the 
least, can’t be taken for granted. What was and is lacking thus are studies which ana-
lyse how skill formation regimes in developing countries have evolved in changing 
contexts of the global division of labour. In fact, though many of the respective ex-
port-oriented manufacturing industries that were relocated over the course of the last 
couple of decades are highly labour-intensive and require few investments in tech-
nology, all industries know institutions that regulate – both within and outside firms – 
skill formation processes, which have often resulted from interactions between gov-
ernments and representatives of the industry and are strongly interrelated with the 
education and training systems of the respective countries. For this reason, it might 
be equally important to analyse how governments and industrialists in developing 
countries have interacted to enhance the skills in traditionally low-skill industries and 
whether there were differences between countries that had strongly invested into 
general education and those which had done so to a lesser extent. In short, an un-
derstanding of how institutions have evolved might be helpful in order to judge how 
they may react to different proposals for reform. 
                                            
10  One of the most cited examples of best practice in training-related public-private partnership is 
the Penang Skills Development Centre (PSDC), which is jointly funded by employers and the 
Malaysian government. For respective reports by the OECD, the World Bank and the ILO see, 




One of the few theoretical elaborations on the evolution of skill formation systems in 
developing countries is provided by Ashton et al., who argue that many of these 
countries would – as a result of the pressure by the IMF for more economic liberalisa-
tion – have experienced the emergence of a neo-market model of skill formation. 
Previously established public skill formation systems, these authors argue, were 
marginalised by private training organisations catering to some of the labour-
intensive firms backed by foreign direct investment (FDI) whereas locally owned fac-
tories would find it hard to attract formally trained, highly skilled employees, as the 
public training organisations started to be geared towards socio-political goals, e.g. to 
mainly train unemployed school leavers.11 These authors thus suggest that, as a re-
sult of exogenous pressures and increasing economic globalisation, skill formation 
regimes in developing countries would increasingly converge along the lines of a 
neo-market model. This hypothesis may be plausible given the fact that there has 
been massive influx of FDI to many developing countries; but if one considers the 
evidence from the comparative literature on education and training we may doubt that 
convergence would be that pervasive and that exogenous social forces have been 
determining the trajectories of skill formation regimes to such a considerable extent.12 
As, however, Ashton et al.’s hypothesis is far more comprehensive and concise 
than any other contribution to the literature on skill formation in developing countries, 
it will be the aim of this study to assess these authors’ model by conducting a histori-
cal-comparative case study on the skill formation regimes of the garment industries in 
Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. It thus traces the institutional development of out-of-firm 
and in-firm skill formation arrangements and scrutinises their interrelations with the 
growth of the garment industries and with the expansion of the respective education 
and training systems, whose trajectories have been much more country-specific than 
those of the garment industries. It analyses the two cases in order to elaborate both 
case-specific and common paths, on the basis of which the hypothesis formed by 
Ashton et al. will be qualified by a set of contingent generalisations that underline the 
need to take the dynamics of the two very different education and training systems 
into account. The study will serve as a contribution to render reflections on the inter-
relation between education and training and economic change in developing coun-
tries more informed in times of tremendous transformations in the global economy. 
                                            
11  Ashton et al. (2000), pp. 20f 
12  See, for instance, Gonon (2004), Green (1999), Schriewer (2004). 
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Selecting two cases from South Asia is an important aspect of this study, as it aims 
at understanding dynamics which can be found in other developing countries; it is, 
thus, not its intention to develop a best-practice model. Such models have been pro-
moted far too often, even though the political, economic and social context of the 
original practices may be very different from the context to where the models are be-
ing transferred. More often than not, the implementation of idealised models was thus 
riddled with tremendous difficulties, or failed entirely. Analysing skill formation proc-
esses in contexts that aren’t characterised by a high degree of industrialisation and 
that lack coordination by strong state agencies may be quite useful in this regard.  
1.2 Theoretical perspective 
The research interest of this study is in line with the key problems addressed by the 
comparative education literature on developing countries, which has, for long, been 
engaged in systematically analysing the social dynamics underlying the historical tra-
jectories of the respective education and training systems by looking at their endoge-
nous development in specific national contexts, i.e. by studying their interrelation with 
other spheres of these societies, and by scrutinising the effects of exogenous forces 
on these systems. Much of the theoretically grounded comparative education litera-
ture on education and training in developing countries developed in the first decades 
after World War II and was rooted in grand sociological theory; reflecting the ration-
ales of international organisations and the aspirations of many postcolonial govern-
ments, a considerable part of the early comparative literature on education and train-
ing systems was written from the perspective of functionalism and modernisation 
theory that regarded education as a sine-qua-non condition of social and economic 
development.13Much of this optimism was, however, curbed when governments, do-
nor agencies and researchers had to realise that educational development had in 
most cases not resulted in rapid economic growth; this paved the way for depend-
ency theories – partly in conjunction with sociological theories on social reproduction 
– to become an important backdrop for theoretical reasoning.14 
                                            
13  For early studies written from the perspective of modernisation theory see, for instance, Adams 
(1965), Hunt and McHale (1965); for a prominent complement from a socio-psychological per-
spective see Inkeles (1974). This optimism with regard to the overall effects of education is, as 
Oelkers (2003, p. 34) points out, inherent to educational theories more generally. 
14  On what was called the “world education crisis” see Coombs (1968); for texts from the perspec-
tive of dependency theory see Berman (1978), Irizarry (1980). 
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Over the course of the decades, however, and namely after the demise of socialism 
in the post-1989 era, these grand theories saw their foundations eroded in what had 
become to be known as development studies and also disappeared, to a consider-
able extent, from the comparative education literature; thereafter, it was mainly au-
thors writing from a world-systems theory and postcolonial theory perspective, who 
continued to scrutinise some of the concerns of dependency theorists.15 The demise 
of modernisation and dependency theories in the comparative education literature 
was followed by a relative decline in the interest in the overall relationship between 
education and societal and economic development. What became more important 
were, on the one hand, analyses of specific reforms and aspects of education sys-
tems in developing countries that were more pragmatic and lacked a historical-
comparative perspective and, on the other hand, a surge of more theoretically in-
clined contributions which provided detailed analyses of the effects of increasing 
globalisation and internationalisation in the spheres of education and training sys-
tems. 
Some of the major contributions have, thereby, emanated from a group of Stanford-
based sociologists of education who write from a neo-institutionalist perspective and 
argue that the world-wide spread of mass education and of a global educational ide-
ology resulted from the diffusion of institutionalised myths on the organisational fea-
tures of nation states and that this process would, in the long run, lead to increasing 
convergence of education and training systems.16 These writings generally don’t 
delve into an analysis of intra-societal dynamics and economic dependencies – em-
phasised by modernisation and dependency theorists respectively – and thus chal-
lenge a tradition within comparative education that tends to emphasise nation-
specific development paths or key characteristics of education and training systems 
following similar trajectories.17 Even though many contributions to the comparative 
education literature indeed acknowledge the effects of globalisation and internation-
alisation, the neo-institutionalist arguments have sparked tremendous criticism: some 
                                            
15  On the demise of modernisation and dependency theories see Kincaid and Portes (1994), 
Menzel (1991); on studies from a world systems perspective see Clayton (1998), Robertson 
(2005), Tikly (2004); for writings from a postcolonial perspective see Nieuwenhuis (1997), 
Roldán-Vera and Caruso (2007). 
16  For early theoretical texts from the neo-institutionalist perspective see Fiala and Lanford (1987), 
Meyer and Rowan (1977); for later important contributions see Meyer et al. (1997), Chabbott 
(2003), Meyer and Ramirez (2000). 
17  For a classical contribution that emphasises the persistence of historical trajectories of educa-
tion systems see Green (1997); for a contribution that emphasises this persistence in the field of 
vocational education and training see Greinert (2005). 
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authors have criticised the core hypothesis – that global discourses and the diffusion 
of globalised models would increasingly lead to converging education and training 
systems – for ignoring processes of indigenisation and hybridisation of global models 
at the national and at the local level.18 Others have argued that any analysis of the 
diffusion of global models in the field of education and training necessarily needs to 
scrutinise the political agendas and material interests of actors engaged in lending 
and borrowing these models.19 
These are important points indeed. In line with these critics of neo-institutionalist 
reasoning, this study will argue that the trajectories of national education and training 
systems are generally strongly influenced by global models but are also highly path-
dependent. It will demonstrate that even in the case of skill formation oriented to-
wards an export-oriented, labour-intensive industry, whose industrial units operate in 
a global production regime, trajectories may be highly country-specific. In contrast to 
many critics of neo-institutionalist reasoning, however, the study is built on the as-
sumption that endogenous forces shape education and training systems in ways that 
share many similarities across societies world-wide. It will argue that path-dependent 
processes are not entirely idiosyncratic and that these processes are often character-
ised by similar regularities that don’t result from the impact of global level forces but 
rather from effects of the institutional structures of education and training systems. It 
is in this way that the study aims at analysing the complex interrelationship between 
education, training and industrial development. 
In contrast to many macro-sociological theories of social change, this perspective, 
however, does not assume any evolutionary logic to underlie the development of 
education and training systems, even if there are regularities across societies.20 It is 
rooted in historical institutionalism, a theoretical approach to social change which in-
fluenced the writings by historical sociologists and political scientists alike and em-
phasises that social processes can only be analysed if one scrutinises the multi-
causal interrelationships between actors and institutions and the respective con-
texts.21 In line with these theoretical rationales, I assume that historical trajectories of 
political economies are highly path-dependent and that as institutions in the various 
                                            
18  See, for instance, Schriewer (2004), Silova (2005). 
19  On the politics of borrowing and lending in general see Jones (2004), Steiner-Khamsi (2004), 
Steiner-Khamsi and Quist (2000); on the “international argument” in reforms of vocational edu-
cation and training systems see Gonon (1998). 
20  This argument has been brought forward by Archer (1982, p. 58). 
21  Pierson and Skocpol (2002), pp. 696f 
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spheres of political economies and the actors operating therein are interdependent 
and involved into positive feedback mechanisms; I will, accordingly, regard skill for-
mation regimes as outcomes of social agency and, at the same time, as institutional 
bases of further agency. As a further parallel with historical institutionalism, this study 
starts from an empirical puzzle: the differences between industry-specific skill forma-
tion regimes of developing countries which had invested into general education at an 
early point and of others which had done so to a later point, is a tremendously under-
researched topic. It will, therefore, be through explorative and qualitative means that 
this historical-comparative case study aims at assessing the model suggested by 
Ashton et al. and at formulating an alternative set of contingent generalisations that 
explain the genesis and change of industry-specific skill formation regimes in devel-
oping countries.22 
1.3 Case selection 
A historical-comparative case study necessarily needs to specify its focus. This is 
no easy task given the fact that there are many industrial sectors which are undergo-
ing the changes described in the first paragraphs of this introduction. At the same 
time, there are many potentially interesting regions and countries which such a study 
could scrutinise. Why, thus, study the skill formation regimes of the garment indus-
tries in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh? There are several reasons for this: 
First, the garment industry is one of the most classical examples of a labour-
intensive manufacturing industry, which was the starting point of industrialisation in 
many countries in the period after World War II, out of which some moved on to 
higher value-added industrial production. This labour-intensive industry has typically 
been associated with a low-skill workforce, but in the last couple of years, the impor-
tance of skill formation at various occupational levels of this industry has increasingly 
been emphasised in the literature. Several experts have pointed out that it will be im-
portant to overcome the skills shortage in this industrial sector, especially following 
the phasing out of the Multi Fibre Agreement (MFA) in 2005.23 The focus on the gar-
ment industry will, obviously, enable me to posit the findings of this study into a 
broader historical horizon of economic development and of continuities and transfor-
                                            
22  This argument is in line with Thelen’s (2002, p. 95) plea to engage in regionally and historically 
specific middle-range theories that can, indeed, add up to something. On contingent generalisa-
tions, which – in contrast to theories – include an identification of their “scope conditions” see 
George and Bennett (2005, p. 77). 
23  See, for instance, Gereffi and Memedovic (2003), Joshi (2002), Palpacuer et al. (2005). 
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mations in the skill structure of the global division of labour. This will, furthermore, 
open up this study to similar research in other countries. 
Second, the garment industry has become one of the most important economic 
sectors in developing countries in terms of total export earnings and strength of the 
total labour force, and this is especially so in the case of South and Southeast Asia.24 
From the perspective of policy makers and economic planners, this industry has not 
only crucial economic weight, but is strongly interrelated with numerous political and 
social concerns. Thus, concentrating on this industry will help to point out the strong 
interrelationship of skill formation for a specific industrial sector with other spheres of 
the respective political economies. 
Third, following from both the global interconnectedness and the size of the gar-
ment industry, comes the strong tendency for its employers and employees to en-
gage in collective action at the national level. This will not only make it easier to iden-
tify key actors, but will also facilitate linking this study to other academic work in the 
field of the political economy of skill formation and training in more industrialised 
economies, in which the importance of employers’ associations and labour unions 
has been analysed in order to understand the respective processes of institutional 
genesis and change. 
The cases, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, were chosen along the lines of the method 
of “controlled comparison”, i.e. the comparison of most similar cases “which, ideally 
are cases that are comparable in all respects except for the independent variable.”25 
This method thus required two cases whose export-oriented manufacturing sector 
has become similarly dominated by one particular industry. In order to increase the 
similarities of the two cases, these countries furthermore needed to be located in a 
similar geographical region and to share – as the focus is on developing countries – 
a similar colonial past. To elaborate on the empirical puzzle outlined above, the 
cases had, however, to strongly differ in terms of educational development at the 
time of the main expansion of the industry. Sri Lanka and Bangladesh meet these 
requirements in an exemplary way: 
First, the industrial structure of both countries is, to a considerable extent, domi-
nated by the garment industry. Both countries not only belong to the 20 largest gar-
ment exporting economies in the world but are also among those whose garment 
                                            
24  Joshi (2002), p. 11 
25  George and Bennett (2005), p. 81 
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industries account for more than 50 percent of their economies’ total merchandise 
exports.26 Nowhere else in South Asia, which is one of the most important garment 
export regions in the world, is dependence on garments as high as in Sri Lanka and 
Bangladesh, which underlines that they are still peripheral economies dependent on 
imports of technology and capital from more industrialised countries.27 In both coun-
tries, the export-oriented garment industry started to expand roughly from the same 
years, i.e. from the end of the 1970s and from the beginning of the 1980s respec-
tively, which was mainly a consequence of the low labour costs but also of the quota 
regime that was imposed on the garment exports from East Asia.28 This quota system 
would also contribute to the industries’ lack of diversification, as they mainly exported 
comparatively simple and low value-added items.29 Even though the garment industry 
became the most important export-oriented industry in terms of the total value of ex-
ports, both in Sri Lanka and in Bangladesh, its importance with regard to the labour 
market needs to be put into perspective: certainly, it became – especially for women 
– by far the most important employer in the manufacturing sector, but the garment 
industry’s share in the total labour force of both countries has never exceeded 6 per-
cent and 2.5 percent respectively.30 
Second, both countries are located in the same geographical region – South Asia – 
and have a historical past that is similar with regard to one important aspect: both Sri 
Lanka, then Ceylon, and Bangladesh, then East Bengal, were administered by the 
British since 1796 and 1757 respectively, which led to the development of a dual 
economy and of a centralised administration that supported the colonial rulers in con-
trolling economic activities and public life more generally.31 In the aftermath of the 
colonial period, both countries started to suffer from increasing political and adminis-
trative fragmentation and are thus characterised by important features of what Migdal 
                                            
26  In Sri Lanka, the respective share of the garment industry is at 51.7 percent; in Bangladesh it is 
at 75.9 percent; see United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2005, pp. 3f). 
27  Kelegama (2006), Sobhan (2002a) 
28  In 1993, when the garment industry had become the most important export-oriented manufactur-
ing sector in both countries, the average hourly labour costs in the garment industry were at US 
$ 0.35 in Sri Lanka and at US $ 0.16 in Bangladesh; see Joshi (2002, p. 14). 
29  In 2001, four years before the abolition of the quota regime, quota-based exports accounted for 
95 percent of all garment exports from Bangladesh; in Sri Lanka, the respective share was at 
62; see Joshi (2002, pp. 13 & 16). 
30  In 2002, the garment industry’s share in total employment was at 6 percent; in Bangladesh, the 
respective figure was as low as 2.5 percent; see Kelegama and Wijayasiri (2004, p. 15), Saha 
(2003, p. 182). 
31  On the beginnings of the colonial period see Baxter (1997, p. 27), De Silva (1981, pp. 210ff); on 
the development of colonial society and administration see the respective chapters in this study. 
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has labelled a weak state:32 Bangladesh has emerged from the disintegration of Paki-
stan, which, prior to the war in 1971, encompassed East Pakistan – today’s Bangla-
desh – and West Pakistan; today, the country suffers from the government’s incapa-
bility to effectively implement administrative and economic reforms, to reduce patron-
clientelism and thus to convince the entire population of its legitimacy.33 Sri Lanka, 
which has been suffering from civil war since 1983, has been similarly described as a 
weak state in which patronage, clientelism and populist policies prevail.34 Even those 
parts of the country, where the public sphere has been less affected by the ethnic 
conflict, have experienced breakdowns of the social order, following incidents of 
youth unrest in the early 1970s and the late 1980s.35 In the war zone, the central 
state has, for many years, lost most of its ordering functions altogether.36 
 Sri Lanka Bangladesh 
Adult literacy rate 1995-2005 (in %) 90.7 47.5 
Children reaching grade five 2005 (in %) 92 65 
Table 1: Adult literacy and children reaching grade five in Sri Lanka and Bangla-
desh37 
These similarities of the two cases stand in contrast with regard to one major differ-
ence: the timing and the extent of educational expansion. Sri Lanka invested strongly 
into the expansion of its educational system in the aftermath of the departure of the 
British in 1947, thus becoming one of the first postcolonial countries to achieve uni-
versal primary education. In East Pakistan and, subsequently, in Bangladesh, state-
sponsored educational expansion not only gained momentum much later but, so far, 
has never reached Sri Lankan standards, as table 1 amply demonstrates. Thus, by 
2005, Sri Lanka’s adult literacy rate was still close to double that of Bangladesh, 
whereas the drop-out rate at the primary level in Sri Lanka was close to 30 percent 
lower than in Bangladesh. The details can be seen in table 1. 
Against the backdrop of these similarities and differences, this historical-
comparative study on two cases will analyse how the skill formation regimes of the 
garment industries in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh have evolved over time. Given the 
                                            
32  Migdal (1988), p. 5 
33  Lewis (2004), p. 299, White (1999), p. 10 
34  Dunham and Kelegama (1997) 
35  Hettige (1995), Hettige and Mayer (2002), Richards and Goonaratne (1980) 
36  Korf (2005), p. 213 
37  United Nations Development Programme (2005), pp. 266-271 
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fact that the two countries differed strongly in terms of educational development at 
the time of the early expansion of their garment industries, we will, thereby, particu-
larly scrutinise, in which way the different roles of the state in public education have 
affected the development of the skill formation regimes and whether these regimes 
converged, despite these tremendous differences, along the lines of what Ashton et 
al. have termed the neo-market model of skill formation. 
1.4 Outline for the study 
This study is organised around two extensive case studies on the skill formation re-
gimes of the garment industries in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. The remainder of Part 
A will provide more information on the framework of the case studies. It starts with a 
review of the literature on skill formation in developing countries that draws from a 
number of different disciplines and will then, in the next chapter, enter into an elabo-
ration on theory and methods of this study. This chapter includes a heuristic model, 
which outlines the key concepts of this study, and formulates, on the basis of the 
model elaborated by Ashton et al., a set of hypotheses which will serve as a back-
drop of within-case and cross-case analyses. Part A is succeeded by a brief, descrip-
tive overview of the development of the textile and the garment industry – Part B –, 
which allows me to place the developments in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh in a larger 
historical and global context. 
The case studies – included in the parts C and D – are structured around the analy-
sis of the regimes under study. As the expansion of the garment industry in Sri Lanka 
preceded that in Bangladesh by a few years, the Sri Lankan case comes first. Chap-
ters 5 and 9 provide an account of the evolution of the political and administrative 
regimes of the respective country since independence from the British in the late 
1940s and thus include an overview of the broad lines of the postcolonial historical 
development. Chapters 6 and 10 delve into the development of the education and 
training regimes. The main focus is, thereby, on the postcolonial development of 
general, vocational and university education, although some remarks will be made on 
the colonial period as well. In these chapters, I address the differences in the trajecto-
ries of the two countries and thus prepare readers for the analysis of dissimilarities in 
the domain of skill formation. Chapters 7 and 11 examine the formation of the gar-
ment production regimes and thereby contribute to an important aspect of South 
Asian economic historiography, as, in fact, the historical trajectories of the industry, 
particularly with regard to the political-economic aspects, have hardly been studied in 
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the past. In order to underline the similar historical conditions under which these pro-
duction regimes emerged, I use three different phases in the development of the 
global garment industry as landmarks in this process. These phases are defined by 
the timing of the imposition and of the removal of garment quota. A first section of this 
part is thus concerned with the development of the garment industry prior to the 
quota era, a second one with the quota era itself and a third with the time after 1995, 
when it was decided, in the context of the Uruguay Round process, that quotas would 
be gradually phased out by the year 2004. The chapters 8 and 12 scrutinise the his-
torical development of the skill formation regimes. The first sections will focus on in-
firm skill formation, the next ones on out-of-firm skill formation and will thus look at 
the skill formation programmes that began to be provided by various education and 
training organisations both in the public and the private sector. 
Part E starts with a chapter that compares the empirical evidence from a stringently 
historical-institutionalist perspective. It will be here that the cases are analysed and 
compared by referring to the theoretical concepts elaborated in the chapter 3 of this 
study. The next chapter aims at assessing the model formulated by Ashton et al. A 
first section – again along the lines of historical-institutionalist reasoning – mainly fo-
cuses on country-specific trajectories and documents why there developed, in Sri 
Lanka, a comparatively high-skill formation regime whereas Bangladesh experienced 
the emergence of a comparatively low-skill formation regime. A second section then 
scrutinises common paths; it will be here that I will contrast the findings from the em-
pirically grounded, historical-institutionalist elaborations with Ashton et al.’s hypothe-
sis but also with theories of educational change from the comparative education lit-
erature in order to formulate a more confined set of contingent generalisations that 
theorise on the social dynamics underlying industry-specific skill formation regimes in 
developing countries more generally. To conclude, I will point to the major findings of 
the study and its contributions both to the literature on skill formation and to the larger 
debate on education, training and economic development. 
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2 Literature review 
The literature on education and training in developing countries is broad and can be 
segmented along the lines of two different research foci: a first part of the literature is 
dedicated to analysing various aspects of general education at different levels, albeit 
from very different perspectives; the most prominent perspectives are rooted either in 
different fields of the education literature – e.g. in comparative education or curricu-
lum studies – or in the economics of education, but the literature has also been tre-
mendously enriched by sociology, psychology and anthropology. A second, much 
less extensive part of the literature on education and training in developing countries 
focuses on technical and vocational education and training (TVET), i.e. on the formal-
ised transmission of skills for specific occupations, trades and technical professions, 
and has mainly profited from contributions both from comparative education and from 
economics. Most of the respective literature thereby scrutinises school-based voca-
tional education and training at the secondary level that prepares students for spe-
cific trades and occupations at the craft level; much less prominent is research on 
different types of technical education that are aimed at preparing students for em-
ployment at the technician and at the professional level in industry. A further aspect 
of this second part of the literature focuses on training within firms. 
The following literature review gives a brief overview of the second part of the litera-
ture on education and training in developing countries. Thereby, it does not delve into 
an analysis of the very heterogeneous conceptionalisations of technical and voca-
tional education and training and the respective alternative terms, and uses the term 
“skill formation” in a narrow sense, i.e. to describe the formation of technical and vo-
cational skills, and in alternation with the term “TVET”. Further explanations on the 
conceptionalisation of skill formation for the purpose of this study will be made in 
chapter 3, which deals with theory and methods. The literature review starts with an 
elaboration on the contributions made by economists, which dominate the literature 
on skill formation in developing countries, and goes on with contributions from a 
comparative education perspective. The chapter concludes with a section on the po-
litical-economic perspective, which will be an important part of the theoretical and 
methodical foundations of this study. 
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2.1 Economic literature on skill formation in developing countries 
Given the fact that skill formation has become an important topic in development 
economics, on the basis of which both donor organisations and the respective gov-
ernments legitimise their development strategies, the economic literature on skill for-
mation in developing countries is more visible than that produced by comparative 
educationists. Certainly, much of this literature is not engaged in theorising on 
changes of skill formation regimes but still its insights have been politically highly in-
fluential and have become an important starting point for the writings on training by 
political economists which will be discussed in the last part of this chapter. 
The economic literature on skill formation in developing countries can be segre-
gated into a human capital perspective and a manpower planning perspective. The 
first perspective focuses on a model of private and social rates of return to education 
and training, which is rooted in the tradition of the neo-classical human capital theory 
and thus assumes that individuals, households or firms would behave under the con-
ditions of “perfect information, freedom of movement, individual choice, optimi[s]ing 
and rational decision-making”.38 The model is, on the one hand, being applied in or-
der to analyse the efficiency of different forms of schooling, for instance general sec-
ondary education and vocationalised secondary education. One of the most impor-
tant respective studies is Psachoropoulos’ and Loxley’s work on vocationalised sec-
ondary education in Colombia and Tanzania, which was to legitimise the World 
Bank’s withdrawal from the vocational education sector after the Bank had long re-
garded this type of education to be a means of boosting economic growth.39 Since 
then, in fact, the larger part of the literature based on rate of return analyses has em-
phasised that both private and social returns to general education are higher than 
those to vocational or vocationalised secondary education and is thus very critical of 
further expansion of school-based vocational education.40 Rate of return analyses 
are, however, also applied in order to scrutinise in-firm training in developing coun-
                                            
38  Scott and Marshall (2009a), p. 507; for the foundations of human capital theory see Schultz 
(1961). 
39  Psacharopoulos and Loxley (1985); the World Bank’s support of vocational education and train-
ing was reflected in several policy papers; see World Bank (1974, pp. 21f), World Bank (1980); 
later policy papers documented the World Bank’s withdrawal from the vocational education and 
training sector; see World Bank (1991), World Bank (1995); these writings were subsequently 
bolstered by further studies, for instance by Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004). 
40  For literature on education in developing countries applying the rate of return model see Asadul-
lah (2006), Söderbom et al. (2006), Teulings and van Rens (2008); for critique of the rate of re-
turn analyses as applied by the World Bank, see, e.g. Bennell (1995), Kahyarara and Teal 
(2008), Klees (2002), Lauglo (1996), Moenjak and Worswick (2003). 
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tries. This school’s perspective on training has been tremendously influenced by 
Becker, who discussed the different types of investment into human capital by putting 
the supposedly rational behaviour of individual firms and their employees, operating 
in a competitive market environment, at the centre stage of his elaborations.41 Ac-
cording to Becker’s model, employers, under ideal market conditions, are prepared to 
invest into work-specific skills, as the rates of return are highest for this type of in-
vestment. Consequently, basic general skills would have to be provided by the public 
general education system, whereas employees would invest in higher education and 
training, for which the respective private returns are highest. Again, it is the World 
Bank and professionals closely interacting with this organisation, which – on the ba-
sis of Becker’s findings – have executed and evaluated country-specific tracer stud-
ies and industry surveys and have used them to underline the need for sound aca-
demic general education and for incentives for more comprehensive on-the-job train-
ing.42 
The neo-classical human capital approach to education and training contrasts with 
the more static manpower planning theories, whose elaboration was strongly influ-
enced by the rationales of socialist economic planning and was underlying the skill 
formation strategies of many developing countries in the early postcolonial period. 
These theories assume that one of the central aspects of economic planning is to 
match economic demand for skills with respective supply and that the absence of 
planning efforts would lead to imbalances.43 Even though the theoretical base of this 
approach eroded following the spread of neo-classical models in the economics of 
education and training from the 1970s onwards, it still influences country-specific 
studies on the training needs of entire economies or of specific industrial sectors in 
developing countries.44 It is this type of studies, which have addressed training as-
pects of the textile and garment industries in both Sri Lanka and Bangladesh.45 
                                            
41  Becker (1962), Id. (1964) 
42  For Business Climate Surveys, in which the evidence produced by such studies was published 
see World Bank (2005c), World Bank and Asian Development Bank (2005), World Bank and En-
terprise Institute (2003). On the link between education, training and the labour market see Psa-
charopoulos and Patrinos (2004), World Bank (1999). 
43  Hinchliffe (1994), p. 370 
44  For training needs analyses in developing countries see Debrah and Ofori (2001), Debrah and 
Ofori (2006); on more recent approaches to manpower planning see Richards (1994, pp. 4f). 
45  For training needs analyses on Sri Lanka see Tertiary and Vocational Education Commission 




2.2 Comparative education literature on skill formation in developing 
countries 
Whereas the economic literature contains little evidence on the dynamics of skill 
formation regimes in developing countries, some contributions to the comparative 
education literature have produced theoretical and empirical evidence in this regard. 
This body of literature, however, is small compared to the comparative education lit-
erature on general education and to the economic literature on skill formation, and it 
generally reflects the more overarching debates in comparative education. 
The comparative education literature on skill formation in developing countries 
gains, on the one hand, from studies that concentrate – partly from a historiographic 
perspective – on the idiosyncratic features of specific training systems, for instance in 
South Asia.46 On the other hand, there are a number of contributions that have been 
written from a more theoretical or programmatic perspective, one strand concentrat-
ing on the exogenous factors of change, and another strand focusing more on en-
dogenous factors. The literature scrutinising exogenous factors was, in its early days, 
strongly influenced by dependency theory and thus studied the implications of colo-
nial and postcolonial education and training policies for the development of skills by 
underlining centre-periphery relationships and the hegemonic role of global capital 
from the West.47 The more contemporary literature that underlines the effects of ex-
ogenous factors on colonial and postcolonial education and skill formation policies 
has also been enriched by postcolonial perspectives that deconstruct the policy dis-
courses and scrutinise their indigenisation by particularly emphasising the legacy of 
colonial structures.48 Whereas these contributions focus on the impact of exogenous 
forces on specific countries, there also emerged, given the fact that the direct control 
by states in the West over the political development of developing countries has de-
clined since de-colonisation, a high number of contributions on TVET that underline, 
though from different theoretical perspectives, the important role of international or-
                                            
46  For literature on the structure of technical and vocational education and training systems see the 
respective series by UNESCO, e.g. Rafique (1994b), UNESCO Regional Office for Education in 
Asia and the Pacific (1984), UNEVOC (1996); for historiographic literature on Bangladesh see 
Jalil (1998), Peshkin (1963); for respective literature on Sri Lanka see De Silva (1969), Dore 
(1973); for respective literature on India see Crane (1965), Mookerjee (1944). 
47  See, for instance, King (1971); for a more recent contribution from a dependency theory per-
spective see Singh (2001); for literature on general and higher education from a dependency 
theory perspective see Altbach (1989), Berman (1978); for an overview of comparative educa-
tion literature by dependency theorists see Noah and Eckstein (1988). 
48  For studies from a postcolonial perspective that also delve into vocational education and training 
see Burnett (2004), Madeira (2005). 
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ganisations, particularly of the World Bank, in discourse formation and their impact on 
policy-related decision making.49 
One of the most radical accounts of the encompassing effect of exogenous factors 
on education and training systems, the neo-institutionalist school in comparative edu-
cation, however, hardly focuses on the influence of specific national or global actors 
as such; representatives of this school argue that the increasing convergence of 
education and training systems world-wide is neither the result of economic changes 
nor – in developing countries – of subjugation by Western powers but of the diffusion 
of Western organisational myths and of world-wide ideological currents that leave 
very little scope to nation states for autonomous educational planning and that thus 
undermine the legitimacy of idiosyncratic features of education and training sys-
tems.50 When it comes to change of TVET systems as such, this perspective has 
been less prominent; in one of the few neo-institutionalist analyses of vocational edu-
cation and training systems, Benavot, however, suggests that converging trends in 
the development of such systems do not mainly reflect the distribution of power be-
tween different countries but rather result from the world-wide ideological currents 
described by neo-institutionalists. In his study on trends in vocational education be-
tween 1950 and 1975, this author documents a word-wide decline of enrolments into 
diversified secondary education and, thus, into vocational education, a decline that 
was particularly prominent in Africa, the Middle East, Latin America and Western 
Europe; this trend he relates to the central role of individualism as a normative pre-
scription of both highly industrialised and developing countries that stands in strong 
contrast to diversified secondary education and its vocational tracks and that thus 
furthers the development of non-tracked, academic secondary education systems.51 
In contrast to these contributions which focus on the influence of exogenous fac-
tors, other strands within the comparative education literature scrutinise the effects of 
                                            
49  For detailed accounts on the evolution of the World Bank’s education and training policies see 
Jones (1997), King (2003); on training policies of further donor organisations see the compre-
hensive literature on the diffusion of the German model in skill formation, e.g. Greinert (2001), 
Kempner et al. (1993), Mayer (2001). For literature on international organisations written along 
the lines of dependency theory see Punchi (2001), Tabulawa (2003); for a critical analysis of the 
discourse on the knowledge economy and its effects in the field of education and training see 
Dale (2005), Robertson (2005); on the diverging policies of different donor organisations in a 
specific national context – South Africa – see McGrath et al. (2006, p. 87). 
50  For literature on developing countries inspired by neo-institutionalist reasoning see Chabbott 
(2003), Inkeles and Sirowy (1983), Meyer and Ramirez (2000), Nagel and Snyder (1989), Res-
nik (2006). 
51  Benavot (1983), p. 73; for a similar perspective emphasising the spread of Western paradigms 
in vocational education see Watson (1994). 
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endogenous factors on the development of skill formation regimes. Many of the re-
spective arguments have developed in the context of the debate on the vocationali-
sation of education in developing countries in which authors assessed a strategy that 
aims at enriching secondary education curricula with practical, vocationally oriented 
contents. Many governments introduced such reforms with the proclaimed aim of 
making education more relevant for the needs of the labour market, increasing the 
skills of young people and lowering their high occupational aspirations – and often 
failed in doing so.52 Some of the more theoretically inclined contributions to compara-
tive education have interpreted both government policies and the difficulties of im-
plementing them from the perspective of sociological theories on the role of educa-
tion in the reproduction of societies, in short, theories which are generally influenced 
by neo-Marxist writings on social change.53 These contributions underline that the 
dominant classes in developing countries have used vocationalisation of secondary 
education as a means to channel the lower classes to the lower segments of the la-
bour market and to thus restrict entry to the more elitist educational programmes that 
prepared students from the socio-economically more privileged social strata for the 
upper echelons of the world of work. 
In contrast to these neo-Marxist writings, other writers have analysed the implemen-
tation of vocationalised secondary education and of its difficulties from a distinctively 
structural-functionalist perspective that considers the emergence of education and 
training systems as resulting from technological change and from – what Foster, the 
key representative of this strand of research, calls – “increasingly complex occupa-
tional differentiation.”54 Accordingly, this author states that the problems related to 
vocationalised secondary education, i.e. the “vocational school fallacy”, are rooted in 
the fact that the function of education is perceived by both students and their parents 
to be a gateway to the modern sector of the economy and that, therefore, vocational 
education has less social status and thus struggles with creating social demand for 
                                            
52  For an early, very prominent text that underlines the advantages of vocationalising education 
see Balogh (1969); on the different rationales behind the vocationalisation of education see 
Bacchus (1988, pp. 35f), Dore (1973), Lauglo and Närman (1988). 
53  For governments trying to hinder lower classes in becoming socially mobile through vocationali-
sation of education see Bacchus (1988, p. 35); for a neo-Marxist analysis of a respective reform 
in Sri Lanka see Lewin and Little (1982); for an analysis of Education for Self-Reliance in Tan-
zania that is rooted in neo-Marxist reproduction theory see Ergas (1982); for a seminal neo-
Marxist study on US education policy, which has tremendously influenced research on educa-
tion in developing countries, see Bowles and Gintis (1976). 




the respective credentials.55 In conjunction with the then very prominent sociological 
and economic literature on credentialism and the signalling effects of educational 
qualifications, he therefore suggests that the ever increasing social demand for edu-
cation and the respective credentials has become one of the key endogenous factors 
underlying educational development in developing countries.56 
Over the course of the next decades, these two macro-sociological approaches to 
social change – neo-Marxism and structural functionalism – would lose considerable 
ground in the comparative education literature on skill formation, a process which 
was pervasive in comparative education more generally and reflected an overall 
trend in sociological and political science literature on developing countries.57 Fur-
thermore, many of the more recent theoretical contributions to comparative education 
from post-modern, post-structuralist and postcolonial perspectives have hardly had 
any impact on the comparative education literature on skill formation in developing 
countries.58 Certainly, endogenous factors underlying change of skill formation sys-
tems went on to play an important role in this body of literature. But with the reces-
sion of the grand sociological theories, research began to focus more on specific as-
pects of TVET. Linkages between vocational education and training and the labour 
market continued to figure prominently within the literature. Notably the arguments by 
Foster would be taken up by a high number of authors, some of which have also 
shown that, depending on the structure on the labour market, social demand for cre-
dentials from vocational education could also increase.59 Other studies more prag-
matically focus on the technical aspects of vocational education and training, for in-
stance on the development and implementation of curricula.60 
                                            
55  Foster (1965); this argument would, later on, become important for many advocates of the World 
Bank’s withdrawal from vocational education; see, for instance, Psacharopoulos (1987). On cre-
dentialism in the vocational education systems of more industrialised countries see Grubb 
(2008, p. 121). 
56  For literature on credentialism in developing countries and on what became labelled as over-
education see Foster (1992), Irizarry (1980); for sociological and economic literature on creden-
tials see Bedard (2001), Keep and Mayhew (1996), Lange and Topel (2006), Spence (1973), 
Van Der Ploeg (1994). 
57  On the crisis of macro-sociological theories in research on developing countries see, for in-
stance, Kincaid and Portes (1994), Menzel (1991); for a review of macro-sociological theory 
building in comparative research on education in developing countries see Ball (1981). 
58  On post-structuralist, post-modernist and postcolonialist approaches in comparative education 
see Crossley and Tikly (2004), Ninnes and Burnett (2003), Tikly (2001). 
59  King and Martin (2002), p. 24, Lauglo and Närman (1988); on the importance of Foster’s argu-
ments in the debate on vocationalised secondary education see Tilak (1988). 
60  For studies on curricular reforms see, for instance, Osei (2003), Powell (2001).  
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The decline of macro-sociological theories in the comparative education literature 
on skill formation was paralleled by the decreasing visibility of this literature in the 
overall debate on skills formation in developing countries. Today, the literature on 
skill formation in developing countries is thus mainly influenced by the neo-classical 
models of economists of education. The reasons for this marginalisation are mani-
fold. Two of them are particularly crucial: first, economists have developed coherent 
models which are fairly well established within the discipline itself and were easily 
communicated to the larger community of development experts. Second, compara-
tive educationists have largely focused on formal technical and vocational education 
and training and thereby neglected firm-based skill formation, the analysis of which 
was largely entrusted to economics. 
The first problem, the lack of coherent models, is rooted in the fact that many of the 
earlier macro-sociological models on educational change have proved to be far too 
static to explain the dynamics of education and training systems and that there have 
been – at least with regard to the literature on skill formation in developing countries 
– only sparse, if not to say deficient attempts to fill this void. For this reason, I will 
briefly introduce readers to Archer’s elaborations on the social origins of educational 
systems, which systematically analyse temporal processes as critical factors in the 
evolution of education and training systems and thus represent a viable alternative to 
more static, functionalist or teleological explanations. The second problem, the fact 
that much of the comparative education literature on skill formation in developing 
countries has, in the last decades, mainly concentrated on school-based vocational 
education, reflects a tendency in the comparative education literature on skill forma-
tion more generally.61 Therefore, I will briefly delve into the systems theory inspired 
contributions to the Germanophone vocational education literature, which analyse 
more comprehensively than any of the before-mentioned strands of research both in-
firm and out-of-firm skill formation processes. 
In her writings on the social origins of educational systems, Margaret S. Archer de-
velops a model of educational change on the basis of an empirical study of educa-
tional expansion in England and France and traces the patterns of interaction be-
tween human agency and social structure in different phases of the system’s genesis 
and transformation, each of which is characterised by different constellations of key 
                                            
61  For prominent contributions to the comparative education literature on vocational education and 
training in more industrialised contexts see Finlay (1998), Green (1995), Green et al. (1999a). 
  
 24 
actors and pre-structures the institutional context of further educational expansion.62 
The first phase of educational development is characterised by an initial supply of 
educational opportunities, i.e. schools, which are opened by competing group actors 
– for instance religious groups – that aim at increasing their political influence.63 
Whereas in this phase, private actors, i.e. students and their parents, react atomisti-
cally on educational opportunities, social demand for education increases in the next 
one, the growth phase, which is thus characterised by increasing co-agency of pri-
vate actors. Social demand, Archer argues, is driven by the fact that educational cre-
dentials become important for social mobility, which in turn further spurs supply of 
educational opportunities at the secondary and at the tertiary level and subsequently 
leads to the state becoming a key supplier of educational opportunities.64 In this 
phase, political pressure emanating from lower classes and their political representa-
tives leads to existing restrictions for educational expansion being further reduced.65 
The third phase is characterised by the inflationary value of educational credentials: 
acquiring such credentials has become necessary to enter the labour market but, 
now, the socially more prestigious employment opportunities are increasing their 
educational entry barriers.66 Group actors which call for less rapid expansion of edu-
cational opportunities will find it difficult to make their voices heard, as students and 
their parents but also the teaching profession will press for further educational ex-
pansion; furthermore, these actors, namely the representatives of the profession, will 
influence the contents of education and will thus make it increasingly difficult to orient 
curricula towards aims that reflect non-educational criteria that used to be important 
in the first phase of educational expansion. 
In contrast to neo-Marxist or structural-functionalist theories of educational change, 
the expansion of educational systems is not being ascribed to changes in political-
economic structure but to the dynamics which have been sparked by the genesis of 
the system itself. The growth of educational system, Archer writes, does thus not 
embody logic but it still displays regularities.67 Similarly to functionalist and neo-
Marxist theories, Archer’s studies have influenced the comparative literature on edu-
                                            
62  Both empirical findings and theoretical elaborations can be found in Archer (1979); the following 
citations will, however, refer to an article, which condenses the evidence from the book of 1979. 
63  Archer (1982), p. 9 
64  Ibid., pp. 37f 
65  Ibid., p. 31 
66  Ibid., p. 39 
67  Ibid., p. 58 
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cational change, i.e. notably the writings of those authors who were placing high em-
phasis on the importance of endogenous factors for educational change but were 
looking for alternatives to the two above-mentioned, more static macro-sociological 
approaches. Archer has, in fact, also inspired studies on education in developing 
countries but has, so far, not been referred to by studies on skill formation on TVET 
in these social contexts.68 
Whereas Archer’s approach points to the structural elaboration of education sys-
tems over time, the systems theory inspired contributions to the Germanophone 
comparative vocational education literature, brings in one further important element: 
a comprehensive theoretical approach to both in-firm and out-of-firm skill formation 
processes. In fact, whereas much of the comparative education literature on skill for-
mation concentrates on school-based vocational education, this confinement is less 
pronounced in this body of literature. One important reason for this particularity is 
certainly the dual system of apprenticeship in Germanophone countries, which re-
quires researchers to comprehensively scrutinise different sites of learning and their 
respective societal contexts. A further important reason lies, however, in the un-
abated importance of macro-sociological approaches to vocational education and 
training, notably of the systems theory perspective inspired by Niklas Luhmann; in the 
tradition of structural functionalism and thus partly in line with the above-mentioned 
arguments by Foster, this strand of research assumes that social change in modern 
societies needs to be understood as related to a complex process of differentiation of 
social subsystems that are defined by their functions for the overarching social sys-
tem.69 
According to this perspective, skill formation within production units would thus be 
governed by the aims and rules of the economic system, whereas skill formation tak-
ing place within schools would follow the aims and rules of educational systems; 
necessarily, respective changes would be influenced by dynamics within both sys-
tems.70 Moving beyond the sites of learning, authors arguing from a systems theory 
perspective point out that national policy making in the field of vocational education 
and training similarly occurs in the intersecting realm of education and economic pol-
                                            
68  Green (1990), pp. 67-75, Schriewer (1999), pp. 100f; for a study on educational change in a 
developing country – Sri Lanka – that refers to Archer see Little (1999). 
69  Luhmann (2002), pp. 13f; much of the literature on vocational education and training inspired by 
the systems theory perspective often refers to Luhmann and Schorr (1979). 
70  For a systems theory perspective on firm-based and school-based training see Kell (2006). 
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icy and that it is being influenced by actors operating in both policy domains.71 These 
latter contributions are – even though their influence on the comparative education 
literature on skill formation in developing countries is very limited – an important 
complement to the comparative education literature on TVET, as they systematically 
analyse the interdependence between training and the educational and economic 
systems from an overarching theoretical perspective. In this regard, they are akin to 
political-economic writings, which have, in the last few years, considerably contrib-
uted to a better understanding of the historical development of skill formation regimes 
in more industrialised countries. In contrast to the latter contributions to the literature, 
however, this body of research, which is going to be delved into in the remainder of 
the literature review, generally does without a reference to macro-sociological models 
of social change and thus might be more readily applicable for an analysis of indus-
try-specific skill formation regimes in developing countries. 
2.3 Political economists on skill formation 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, the literature on the development of skill forma-
tion regimes has been tremendously enriched by political economists. Interested in 
understanding the effects of national economic and political strategies on economic 
development, these authors began to analyse the institutional context of production 
systems and thus increasingly emphasised the important role played by country-
specific skill formation regimes.72 
One of the political-economic approaches which have already found their way into 
the comparative education literature is the literature produced by Ashton et al. on the 
political economy of skill formation that relates the respective social processes to 
their geo-political context.73 The main focus of this work is on East Asian NIEs, i.e. on 
Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore, which, as Ashton et al. argue, 
have been able to ensure the constant supply of human resources necessary for 
rapid industrialisation because the respective national level agencies in these coun-
tries could retain a high degree of “relative autonomy” vis-à-vis capital and labour. 
                                            
71  For an analysis of vocational education policy from a systems theory perspective see Münch 
(2006); for historical-comparative research on TVET from a systems theory perspective see De-
issinger (1992), Harney and Schriewer (1998), Harney and Zymek (1994); for reflections on the 
position of the systems theory perspective in the Germanophone literature on TVET see Lange 
(1999); other contributions to the Germanophone education literature on TVET that refer to other 
theoretical traditions similarly analyse the interaction of actors from the economic and the edu-
cational spheres of specific societies; see, for instance, Gonon (2001), Greinert (2006). 
72  For a review of some major contributions see Lauder et al. (2008). 
73  Ashton et al. (2000), p. 21 
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This developmental state model skill formation is, the authors suggest, distinct both 
from the market model of skill formation – in the US and Great Britain – and from the 
corporatist model of skill formation – e.g. in Germany – which places more emphasis 
on consensus between labour, capital and state agencies.74 
The developmental state model of skill formation is, however, also distinct from a 
model of skill formation that is, according to Ashton et al., prevalent in many develop-
ing countries that had to undergo – upon pressure by the IMF – far-reaching struc-
tural adjustment programmes and to thus open their economies to foreign capital. 
Many of these countries, Ashton et al. argue, had previously invested in public skill 
formation organisations which were interrelated with the growth of import-substitution 
oriented industries. With the advent of economic liberalisation, the basis of these lat-
ter industries and thus of state-funded skill formation eroded and there emerged a 
new model of skill formation that reflected the disjuncture within the economies of 
these countries: On the one hand, the growth of export-oriented, FDI-backed indus-
tries led to a market for private training organisations which catered to the upper 
echelons of the foreign-owned companies; on the other hand, public training organi-
sations were geared more towards socio-political goals and thus were aimed at train-
ing unemployed school leavers and those in the informal labour markets.75 
As the pressure by IMF was enormously pervasive, these writings thus suggest that 
there would be an increasing convergence of skill formation systems in developing 
countries towards the neo-market model of skill formation, which makes it increas-
ingly difficult for these states to coordinate skill formation processes and thus to move 
towards a high-skill economy more generally. It is these texts which, on the one 
hand, are some of the few which do indeed theorise on the emergence of skill forma-
tion regimes in developing countries from a historical-comparative perspective. On 
the other hand, the writings by Ashton et al. have inspired a few studies on the de-
velopment of skill formation regimes in developing countries, one such example be-
ing the relatively recent but growing body of literature on vocational education in 
South Africa. In these texts, historical analysis, though contextualised, is, however, 
hardly aimed at further developing theories on genesis and change of skill formation 
regimes but rather at using the development state model of skill formation – as por-
trayed by Ashton et al. – as an ideal blueprint for skill formation strategies in develop-
                                            
74  Ashton (2002), p. 137; for further contributions from this body of literature see Ashton (2002), 
Ashton and Green (1996), Ashton et al. (1999), Ashton et al. (2000), Green et al. (1999b). 
75  Ashton et al. (2000), pp. 20-22 
  
 28 
ing countries and thus at demonstrating the political need for higher state involve-
ment in skill formation so that South Africa could move towards a high-skills regime.76 
The writings by Ashton et al. on skill formation regimes, particularly those on the 
developmental state model of skill formation, have been criticised for being overtly 
static and for not taking institutional change sufficiently into account. Ritchie, in his 
study on the skill formation regimes of Southeast Asian NIEs, for instance, empha-
sises that the focus on the isolation of governments from other societal forces cannot 
explain the emergence of strong developmental states and thus of comprehensively 
coordinated skill formation regimes. Rather, he argues, the analysis needs to focus 
on alliances between state agencies and both capital and labour which lie at the bot-
tom of developmental states. Furthermore, Ritchie criticises Asthon et al. for lumping 
all developmental states into one homogeneous category and for thus neglecting dif-
ferences in developmental strategies and institutional structures. For this reason, 
Ritchie analyses the critical junctures that have enabled the formation of different 
kinds of alliances between the state, entrepreneurs, labour and academia.77 
Ritchie’s critique is in line with the Varieties of Capitalism (VOC) literature, which 
has become one of the most important approaches to the development of skill forma-
tion regimes in highly industrialised economies and aims at theorising on “the institu-
tional foundations of comparative advantage” of a number of highly industrialised 
economies and resonates with earlier work on the institutional conditions of different 
production regimes.78 In contrast to Ashton et al.’s writings, these authors attribute, as 
do the neo-classical economists, firms a central role in their model but argue that 
their successful performance and competitive behaviour in the market depend on 
institutions that are specific to national political economies, which tend to be oriented 
towards one of two poles that are represented by liberal market economies (e.g. 
United States and Great Britain) and by the coordinated market economies (e.g. 
France and Germany). These two types of political economies basically differ with 
regard to the coalitions that state agencies have entered with representatives of both 
capital and labour: whereas in the coordinated market economies, the state has 
                                            
76  See, for instance, Ashton (2005), Lauder et al. (2006), Mc Kay (2005), McGrath et al. (2004); for 
an analysis of the skill formation regime of the South African clothing and textile sector see Mor-
ris and Reed (2009); for reservations with regard to the transferability of the developmental state 
skill formation model see, for instance, Kuruvilla et al. (2002). 
77  Ritchie (2001), pp. 35f 
78  Hall and Soskice (2001), p. 4; for the literature on the institutional foundations of production re-
gimes see Boyer (2005), Hollingsworth and Boyer (1997), Streeck (1991). 
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comparatively strong leverage over capital and labour, its leverage is weaker in the 
liberal market economies.79 
In fact, early texts of this body of literature engaged in an analysis of skill formation 
processes from a comparative perspective and thereby refined Becker’s theories on 
firm-based training, which were considered to be lacking reference to institutional 
contexts even by those neo-classical economists who agreed with his basic assump-
tions. Sokice, for instance, points out that investment into training raises, when em-
ployers are lacking information with regard to the skill level of new potential employ-
ees: hiring individuals trained by other firms may be risky as employers would as-
sume that these are of lower quality, which makes employers invest more into train-
ing their own workforce.80 Soskice concludes that, obviously, the institutional context 
of firms tremendously influences their training behaviour. Subsequent to Soskice’s 
writings, an increasing number of authors have started to analyse national level insti-
tutions that underlie skill formation in OECD-countries. Culpepper, for instance, 
shows how the institutional framework of the political economies in Germany and 
France, two coordinated market economies, influences the role of employers’ asso-
ciations with regard to vocational training. He concludes that the existence of asso-
ciations are not a sufficient condition for cooperation in the field of training but that 
public policy plays a supportive role by making investments in “building up the power 
of private associations”, even though they are not able to fully control them.81 
The VOC literature on the institutional foundations of skill formation has, in many 
ways, been complemented by Thelen’s analysis of the historical development of dif-
ferent skill formation regimes in both coordinated and liberal market economies. The 
basic interest of her study on Great Britain, Germany, the United States and Japan is 
to analyse how, in these four political economies, apprenticeship systems have been 
transformed over time. Thelen, arguing from a historical-institutionalist perspective, 
shows that the institutions underlying skill formation have indeed evolved very differ-
ently in coordinated and liberal market economies; at the same time, however, she 
challenges some of the theoretical assumptions that implicitly underlie much of the 
VOC literature: taking Germany’s vocational training as an example, she holds that 
its long-standing continuity cannot be explained, as is commonly done by most politi-
cal economists, by functionalist-utilitarian equilibrium models that assume that both 
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low and high-skill equilibria are being sustained since they reflect the interests of key 
actors.82 The origins of the German apprenticeship system, she argues, were in fact 
formally institutionalised by an authoritarian government at the end of the 19th century 
in order to strengthen the conservative Handwerk-sector and to contain the labour 
movement;83 however, over the course of the years, this system was sustained by a 
national level coalition between the representatives of the industry and the unions, 
both of which were interested in a solidary skill formation system to avoid impending 
skill shortages.84 Thelen thus argues that the skill formation regime in Germany is 
indeed strongly path-dependent but that it has been sustained by other political and 
social forces than the ones which laid its foundation and that its functions at the time 
of initiation have been replaced by new ones over time.85 
As we see, the political-economic body of literature has become highly important in 
order to understand the evolution of skill formation regimes. The writings by Ashton et 
al., which are some of the few that comprehensively theorise on the development of 
skill formation regimes in developing countries, serve as backdrop against which a 
set of hypotheses will be formulated to be assessed over the course of the study. 
Furthermore, the VOC literature provides a theoretical basis for the path-dependent 
analysis of alliances between governments and representatives of capital and labour. 
Nevertheless, the study will show that a conventional political-economic perspective 
that focuses on governments, employers and the representatives of labour as the key 
actors of change will not be sufficient to explain the evolution of the skill formation 
regimes of the garment industries in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. In fact, educational 
expansion creates new actors. For this reason, it will be important for this study to 
duly take the evidence from the comparative education literature into account. 
                                            
82  On low-skill and high-skill equilibria see Acemoglu and Pischke (1999), Finegold and Soskice 
(1988), Green et al. (1999b), Redding (1996). 
83  Thelen (2004), p. 7 
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3 Theory and methods 
In the literature review, it was demonstrated that research on the genesis and trans-
formation of skill formation regimes in developing countries is sparse; it also became 
evident that the literature analysing skill formation regimes in these contexts is 
strongly segregated and lacks consensus on theoretical and methodical aspects of 
research: on the one hand, economists analyse rates of return of vocational educa-
tion and training, on the other hand, educationists mainly scrutinise the pedagogical 
and sociological aspects of vocational education and training – and they primarily 
focus on vocational schools. The more comprehensive theoretical elaborations on 
skill formation regimes in developing countries have, so far, been contributed by 
Ashton et al., who, writing from a political-economic perspective, suggest that skill 
formation regimes in developing countries would converge along the lines of a neo-
market model of skill formation. In order to prepare the assessment of this hypothe-
sis, I will, in the first part of this chapter, elaborate a heuristic model that brings to-
gether the analytical key concepts of this study and thereby draws from historical in-
stitutionalism.86 In the second section of this chapter, the heuristic model is specified 
in more detail in view of those social processes which are at the core of the empirical 
study and thereby mainly refers to the political-economic and the comparative litera-
ture on skill formation. The third section outlines the methods applied in this study. 
3.1 The heuristic model 
3.1.1 A historical-institutionalist approach to political economy 
The writings on political economy are certainly no coherent body of literature, and I 
will therefore point to some of the features of this study’s political-economic ap-
proach. Originally, political economists were, in the tradition of Adam Smith, inter-
ested in analysing the institutional conditions of economic growth of specific socie-
ties, an orientation, which had gone lost with the classical economists, who started to 
abstract economic processes from their societal contexts.87 In the 20th century, there 
emerged two main economic approaches that particularly focused on developing 
                                            
86  The historical-institutionalist approach has, so far, hardly been applied in the comparative edu-
cation literature; there are, however, notable exceptions, for instance Walter’s (2006) study on 
the development of the Bologna process and Busemeyer’s (2007) – political science – thesis on 
the development of spending in education in the US. 
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countries: on the one hand, the so-called radical political economists, inclined to-
wards dependency theories that were en vogue in the 1970s, were interested in ex-
plaining economic dependence of developing countries and social inequalities of 
specific societies on the grounds of Marxist theory.88 
On the other hand, neo-classical economists used political economy as a theoreti-
cal framework to explain human behaviour outside the economy such as public policy 
and were, thereby, focusing on rents exerted by economic interest groups; this body 
of literature, in fact, achieved at integrating the concept of political economy into a 
more neo-liberal view on political-economic processes at work in developing coun-
tries.89 Increasingly, however, political scientists appropriated political economy as a 
rationale underlying their own studies on processes in various domains of public pol-
icy; this is particularly true for research on skill formation regimes that has been dis-
cussed in the literature review above. In line with this strand of literature, I assume 
that the interrelationship between actors and institutions and their broader political 
and economic context need to be at the centre of such a study on skill formation re-
gimes and argue that social processes are driven by purposeful actors. The study 
thus abstains from applying any macro-sociological theory on societal differentiation 
but rather aims at – ultimately – developing a middle-range theory that explains spe-
cific social processes in specified national political economies. I herewith also follow 
a tradition in comparative studies on education in developing countries, which use 
the rationale of political economy in a similar way.90 
Whereas the literature on political economy includes a great variety of disciplinary 
approaches, historical institutionalism is primarily rooted in political science but is 
also applied by sociologists, namely by historical sociologists.91 The key features of 
its methodological rationale are the main reasons for me to apply historical institu-
tionalism in this study: first, historical institutionalists assume that actors and institu-
tions are mutually – and not unidirectionally – interrelated. Second, historical institu-
tionalists analyse macro contexts and they theorise about combined effects of institu-
tions and processes rather than examining just one institution or process at a time. 
Third, historical institutionalists integrate time as a separate factor into their analyses 
                                            
88  See, for instance, Mahler (1980), Wilber (1979); the political-economic tradition has tremen-
dously influenced nation-specific literatures on economic development in developing countries; 
for Bangladesh see Sobhan (2002b). 
89  See, for instance, Krueger (1993). 
90  See, for instance, Küster (2007), Little (1999). 
91  On the debate on historical institutionalism in historical sociology see Mahoney (2000, p. 507). 
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and have developed the respective theoretical tools. In contrast to other approaches 
to political economy, namely by game theorists, historical institutionalists thus focus 
on time-bound processes rather than on equilibria.92 As we will see, such a historical-
institutionalist framework allows to closely trace the historical processes at work in Sri 
Lanka and Bangladesh and to finally demonstrate both the differences and similari-
ties between the two trajectories. At the same time, the framework presented on the 
next pages also includes a number of deviations from some of the more recent writ-
ings by historical institutionalists on skill formation, namely with regard to their con-
ceptualisation of institutions. These divergences are, however, not in conflict with the 
basic assumptions of the historical-institutionalist tradition. 
Before I enter into a discussion of historical institutionalism’s core focus, its concep-
tualisation of institutional stasis and change over time, I will now elaborate on the 
three sociological key concepts of this study – regimes, institutions and actors. 
3.1.2 Regimes and institutions 
The main aim of this study is to analyse the evolution of two regimes or of two in-
dustry-specific skill formation regimes respectively. Using the regime concept implies 
referring to a growing body of literature that adopted a term originating from the study 
of international relations and subsequently applied it to describe a broad framework 
of rules and norms that govern a particular issue, such as security, intellectual prop-
erty, or the environment.93 The term skill formation regime or training regime is in-
creasingly used in the literature on skill formation.94 The applications of the term is 
often based on differing theoretical and methodological assumptions but they share a 
perspective which focuses on the interrelations between institutional arrangements of 
skill formation and their economic and political contexts. Following these previous 
uses of the term, this study denotes industry-specific skill formation regimes as those 
country-specific institutional arrangements which govern the formation of industry-
specific skills. These institutional arrangements encompass institutions both inside 
and outside firms operating in a specific industry, which leads to two sub-regimes, the 
in-firm and the out-of-of firm skill formation regimes. In order to better understand the 
nature of regimes, I will now turn to a definition of institutions, which draws from the 
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literature on actor-centred institutionalism and can thus be easily integrated into the 
overall analytical framework of the study. 
In the institutional literature, there exists a wide range of definitions of what institu-
tions actually are. Most institutionalists would, however, agree on institutions being 
understood as enduring and regulatory entities that cannot be changed instantane-
ously or easily.95 Institutions are thus ensuring stability within specific organisations 
and societies. Authors writing from a cultural-sociological perspective tend to concep-
tualise institutions in very broad terms: Meyer and Rowan, for instance, see institu-
tions as broad cultural understandings and overarching cultural scripts in different 
societal domains.96 Others, namely political scientists, tend to prefer a more restric-
tive definition of institutions. Streeck and Thelen, for instance, define institutions as 
formal regulations that are being socially sanctioned and collectively enforced in the 
political arena.97 Whereas the broad definition limits the scope for the analysis of so-
cial agency – as agency is in fact virtually determined by institutions –, the more re-
strictive definition obviously excludes less formalised and less encompassing social 
norms, which, for instance, stabilise social processes within particular organisations, 
such as training organisations or firms, which will be at the centre of this study. 
I therefore define institutions as binding informal or formal regulations which stabi-
lise social processes within organisations and are being agreed upon by those key 
actors who either operate within these organisations or have direct leverage over 
them. 
The definition allows for enough flexibility to analyse regulations that are character-
ised by different degrees of formalisation and scope. An institution may be consid-
ered highly formalised and having a large scope if it has been formally agreed upon 
by the key actors within an entire national political economy and is in fact being en-
forced both at the national and at the local level by actors explicitly referring to the 
formal institution. An institution may be considered less formalised if it has only in-
formally been agreed upon by key actors at the national level and it may be consid-
ered having a minor scope if it has only been formally agreed upon by the key actors 
within one single organisation operating at the local level.98 
                                            
95  Bidwell (2006), p. 35, Mahoney (2000), p. 512 
96  Meyer and Rowan (1977) 
97  Streeck and Thelen (2005), pp. 10f 
98  This definition is partly inspired by Mayntz (2002, p. 34) and also resonates with the statement 




The above-mentioned definition of institutions stated that they are to be viewed as 
strongly interrelated with actors. Following Schimank, this study distinguishes three 
different types of actors: corporate, collective and individual.99 
 
1. Individual actors are at the core of social agency but as their individual agency 
generally has only small social effects, individual actors are of interest to this 
study as representatives of corporate and collective actors. 
2. Corporate actors are formal organisations such as firms, associations, and or-
ganisations of the public administration with a defined aim that is being com-
municated towards the in- and outside of these organisations. 
3. Collective actors are social movements comprising individual actors at a highly 
aggregate level, e.g. the totality of workers in the garment industry, which have, 
for instance, common and thus aggregately effective strategies to seek em-
ployment and to acquire skills. 
Social agency is strongly influenced by a number of actors’ characteristics, notably 
by actors’ rationales for agency, actor constellations and the situations actors are 
operating in.100 In line with Schimank, I assume that rationales for agency consist of 
cognitive, motivational and relational orientations of specific actors. Cognitive orienta-
tions include the factual and causal knowledge of actors, which also encompasses 
perceptions, interpretations and expectations with regard to the behaviour of other 
actors. Cognitive orientations are thus the instruments of actors that render their 
agency informed. Motivational orientations are the impetus for agency. This impetus 
may follow from internalised norms of appropriate behaviour, from the institutions 
themselves, but also from the actors’ interests and historically contingent prefer-
ences. Relational orientations pre-structure interaction between actors and describe 
the mode of relation specific actors have established to other actors in the field.101 
                                                                                                                                        
value or interest. On the different degrees of institutional formalisation see Farrell and Héritier 
(2003); on differing degrees of institutional scope see Knill (1998); the consideration of power in 
institutional analysis is being emphasised in Thelen (1999, p. 393); for a critique of institutionalist 
studies on developing countries that don’t take into account the central role of politics see 
Sangmpam (2007). 
99  Schimank (2004), p. 294 
100  The description of actors’ characteristics again largely follows Schimank (2004, pp. 295-299), 
who writes from the perspective of actor-centred institutionalism. These notions can easily be 
applied in a theoretical framework based on historical institutionalism. For the relatedness of the 
concepts see Mayntz (2002, pp. 27f). 
101  Schimank (2004), p. 295f 
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In order to understand institutional development, it is particularly important to ana-
lyse actor constellations. Such constellations are being characterised by the number 
of respective actors, the homo- and heterogeneity of actors and their respective re-
sources. At the national level such constellations may be political coalitions and pol-
icy networks of varying breadth, whereas at the local level, e.g. at the level of specific 
firms, such constellations may consist of key individuals such as entrepreneurs and 
managers that reproduce or transform skill formation institutions.102 Furthermore, so-
cial agency occurs in specific situations that affect the distribution of resources and 
the involvement of actors into social change.103 
3.1.4 Institutional genesis, reproduction and change over time  
Institutional development is, as I have pointed out, strongly interrelated with social 
agency. Different strands of research on institutions have developed specific notions 
that theorise on the nature of this interrelation. Representatives of sociological institu-
tionalism, dedicated to a fairly broad conceptualisation of institutions, argue that insti-
tutions, i.e. broad cultural understandings and overarching cultural scripts in different 
societal domains, virtually determine formal organisational structures, from which so-
cial agency or the day-to-day work activities within these organisations often is de-
coupled.104 In contrast, representatives of rational choice institutionalism regard insti-
tutions to be a result of the rational calculus of purposeful actors.105 Historical institu-
tionalists avoid assuming any such unidirectional interrelation between institutions 
and actors; they have developed concepts, on the basis of which the mutual relation-
ship between actors and institutions can be analysed in order to better understand 
institutional genesis, reproduction and change over time. 
The studies by most historical institutionalists focus on critical junctures and on 
subsequent path-dependent development and basically challenge the functionalist 
assumption that specific institutions are being reproduced because they are relatively 
more efficient than alternative institutions.106 One prominent strand of historical-
institutionalist research focuses on critical junctures and thus analyses the genesis of 
                                            
102  On different dimensions of constellations see Schimank (2004, pp. 297f); on coalitional breadth 
see Leftwich (2005), Ritchie (2001, p. 11); on policy networks see Meyer-Stamer (1999, pp. 40-
42); on coalitions see Hall and Soskice (2001, p. 15), Miller and Cook (1998, p. 71). 
103  Schimank (2004), pp. 297f 
104  Meyer and Rowan (1977) 
105  Elster (1989), p. 13, Lovett (2006), p. 40 
106  Pierson (2000a), p. 264; for an elaboration on the differences between functionalist and histori-
cist models of explanations, which is widely accepted among historical institutionalist, see 
Stinchcombe (1968, pp. 101-107). 
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institutions. Such studies attempt to explain institutional variations between countries 
or organisations by scrutinising the sequencing and timing of historical events in or-
der to causally explain „how temporal ordering of, and interactions among, processes 
influences outcomes“.107 Ertman, for instance, in his study on state building in 
Europe, has shown how the relative timing of the expansion of literacy and of the be-
ginnings of military competition influenced the institutional structures of nation states 
until today.108 Since the mid-1980s, similar analyses of historical legacies were under-
taken by new institutional economists, who started to coin the concept of path-
dependent institutional development; David and Arthur, for instance, scrutinise how 
specific technological innovations, such as the QWERTY key board, narrowed down 
the alternatives for future technological innovations as these critical junctures pro-
duced positive feedbacks and increasing returns for all those technological innova-
tions that adapted to the former.109 
These writings from the new institutionalist economic literature on path-dependent 
development were taken up by historical institutionalists. A second strand within this 
body of literature now started to concentrate on institutional reproduction by scrutinis-
ing self-reinforcing positive feedbacks resulting from institutions that have emerged 
from critical junctures. According to this view, self-reinforcing positive feedbacks exist 
where actors in a social system gain from operating in accordance with a given insti-
tutions. These feedback mechanisms have a distributional effect with regard to the 
distribution of power between various actors and create a status quo bias from which 
those in power would gain more than others.110 Thus, institutions are being stabilised. 
Furthermore, institutional reproduction is being buttressed by different institutions 
complementing each other: Such institutional complementarities exist when the pres-
ence of one institution increases the returns from the other, complementary institu-
tion, which may occur between different institutions within one single organisation or 
between institutions within different but strongly interrelated organisations or even 
within different spheres of specific political economies.111 
The concepts of critical junctures and subsequent self-reinforcing positive feed-
backs will be central to this study, and they will be used – in contrast to studies by 
political scientists who tend to exclusively focus on formal institutions – to analyse the 
                                            
107  Thelen (1999), p. 388; for respective studies see, for instance Ertman 1997. 
108  Ertman 1997 
109  Arthur (1989), David (1985) 
110  Pierson (2000a), p. 262 
111  Hall and Soskice (2001), pp. 17f 
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evolution of both formal and informal institutions. This implies analysing self-
reinforcing positive feedbacks and institutional complementarities at different levels of 
political economies but also within single organisations. Encompassing informal insti-
tutions into the analysis will not only facilitate institutional reproduction but also en-
able me to better scrutinise institutional transformations and to demonstrate – in line 
with Pierson and Thelen – that institutional evolution is a dynamic, not a locked-in 
process and that institutional transformation can also take place in absence of exter-
nal shocks.112 Depending on the circumstances, institutional transformation can take 
distinct forms that have been described in the literature. The following may be re-
garded as the most crucial ones:  
Institutional conversion occurs – as Thelen notes – when institutional arrangements 
are being reproduced even though the actor constellations underlying these ar-
rangements change over time.113 
Institutional layering takes place when – as Schickler describes in his study on the 
evolution of the US Congress – new arrangements emerge on top of pre-existing in-
stitutions, which have been established to serve different purposes. Thus, there de-
velops a tense layering of arrangements which are inspired by competing motives.114 
Institutional decoupling occurs when there emerge strong disjunctions between in-
stitutions at different levels of organisations. This phenomenon is particularly de-
scribed in neo-institutionalist studies on the development of education systems, 
which point out that educational practices in the classrooms may be only very loosely 
coupled to the formal regulations agreed upon by education policy makers and the 
respective administrators.115 In this context, this study will – in contrast to the major 
part of the political science literature on institutional change – not only focus on for-
mal institutions, which are generally the outcome of comparatively transparent inter-
actions between actors operating in public. Rather, it will also consider informal insti-
tutions and institutional arrangements, which may be openly contradictory with formal 
institutions that officially regulate social agency in these organisations. These infor-
mal institutions may – as Farrell and Héritier write – be influenced by more formal 
institutions but they will not be determined by them as they “may emerge from re-
                                            
112  Pierson (2000a), p. 265, Thelen (1999), p. 387 
113  Thelen (2002), p. 103; the idea that institutions can be caused by one set of factors and be re-
produced by another one has also been purported by Stinchcombe (1968, p. 103). 
114  Schickler (2001), p. 15. 
115  For neo-institutionalist elaborations on decoupling see Meyer et al. (1997, pp. 154f), Meyer et al. 
(1993, p. 468), Meyer and Rowan (1977, pp. 356f). 
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peated interactions” and, in some instances, also by default.116 In any event, some of 
these loosely coupled informal institutions start to change the institutional status quo 
and to themselves influence the evolution of more formal institutions.117 
3.2 Specification of the heuristic model 
3.2.1 Skill formation institutions and skill formation regimes 
Having outlined the theoretical key concepts of the study – institutions, regimes and 
actors – and having heuristically elaborated their interrelation from a historical-
institutionalist perspective, I now turn to the specification of the model in order to fa-
cilitate its operationalisation for the analysis of the skill formation regimes in Sri Lanka 
and Bangladesh. Against the backdrop of the previous notes on institutions, skill for-
mation institutions of garment industries may be defined as formal or informal regula-
tions that routinise and stabilise social processes, both within and outside firms, 
through which individuals acquire the capacity to perform specific tasks within the 
garment industry. Within a specific organisation, a firm or a training centre, there may 
exist many interrelated skill formation institutions, the total of which we will call the 
skill formation arrangement of this organisation. At the level of national political 
economies, the aggregation of the skill formation arrangements of all the respective 
organisations may be called the skill formation regime of the garment industry of the 
respective political economy. Obviously, such a regime consists of a very heteroge-
neous conglomerate of institutions, which, however, may be characterised by trace-
able regularities that underlie their development and allow for a comparison of skill 
formation regimes across different political economies. 
As the key characteristics of skill formation arrangements are strongly dependent 
from their immediate institutional context, the skill formation regime may be parted for 
heuristic purposes in two separate sub-regimes – the in-firm skill formation regime 
and the out-of-firm skill formation regime of the garment industry –, which can be 
considered two distinct social contexts of skill acquisition.118 The following paragraphs 
provide a more detailed overview of the institutions that are being scrutinised in this 
study. 
                                            
116  Farrell and Héritier (2003), p. 580 
117  Loc. cit. 
118  This argument is in line with Kell (2006, p. 461), who distinguishes – though with regard to the 




Institutions regulating in-firm skill formation 
With regard to the in-firm skill formation regimes, the study focuses on four dimen-
sions of regulations. Three of them refer to the firm level whereas one of them refers 
to institutions at the national level. Table 2 summarises the different institutions sub-
sumed under the different institutional dimensions on the left and specifies the key 
aspects in the right column. 
Institutional dimensions Key aspects of institutional dimensions 
A Institutions regulating recruitment and 
promotion of new and existing em-




1. recruitment criteria for specific positions in the firm 
(e.g. educational background, job-specific skill level, 
gender, family background, ethnicity) 
2. promotion criteria for specific positions in the firm 
(e.g. educational background, job-specific skill level, 
performance, gender, family background, ethnicity) 
B Institutions regulating skill formation of 




1. characteristics of the skills being transmitted (degree 
of specification / breadth) 
2. location and timing of skill formation  
3. position of the instructors 
4. real and opportunity costs of skill formation 
C Institutions regulating decision-making 
with regard to skill formation proc-




1. decision-making with regard to recruitment and pro-
motion criteria 
2. decision-making with regard to the contents of skill 
formation 
3. decision-making with regard to the coordination of 
recruitment, skill formation and promotion processes 
D Institutions formally regulating in-firm 
skill formation processes at the na-
tional level 
1. prescriptions by national laws and regulations for in-
firm skill formation 
 
Table 2: In-firm skill formation institutions 
A. Institutions regulating recruitment and promotion of new and existing em-
ployees in a given firm 
These institutions regulate entry and promotion of employees into and within firms 
respectively and thus define firm-specific career paths. In order to staff vacant po-
sitions and to subsequently promote their employees, firms may consider educa-
tional backgrounds and skill levels of potential recruits or – when it comes to pro-
motions – the seniority and the performance of potential promotees; in both 
cases, gender or family backgrounds and other what could be assumed to be less 
production-related criteria may be relevant as well. The respective skill arrange-
ments may either be oriented towards a strategy that aims at poaching job-
specifically skilled employees from other firms or towards a strategy that tries to 
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recruit comparatively highly educated school leavers and to then provide them 
with comprehensive on-the-job training.119 
B. Institutions regulating skill formation of individual employees in a given firm 
These institutions regulate the skill formation processes of individual employees 
as such; firms may particularly differ with regard to the breadth of skill formation, 
namely during the induction period: some firms may tend to provide mainly nar-
row, industry-specific training (e.g. training on one particular machine), whereas 
others also provide broader industry-specific general training (e.g. traineeships 
covering several departments in a given industrial unit). Depending on the charac-
teristics of the firm, some of this training may be very firm-specific and thus inte-
grated into segmentalist labour markets. Some firms may also provide general 
training outside the workplace, which necessarily increases both opportunity and 
real costs of training.120  
C. Institutions regulating decision-making with regard to skill formation proc-
esses in a given firm 
These institutions regulate decision-making processes with regard to recruitment, 
promotion and skill formation processes within a given industrial unit and are thus 
at the core of in-firm skill formation arrangements. Entrepreneurs may delegate 
the respective responsibilities to a separate department, for instance to human 
resources or to production departments, or may decide to retain strong direct con-
trol over these processes. If the institutions regulating these processes are unsta-
ble, there may emerge strong conflict within firms.121 
D. Institutions formally regulating in-firm skill formation processes at the na-
tional level 
These institutions are more formal and generally result from political processes at 
the national level that define labour and training policies. In some political econo-
mies, institutions formally regulating in-firm skill formation processes may not exist 
                                            
119  On recruitment strategies and criteria from a human resources management perspective see 
Schultz (2001c, pp. 219-221); on the importance of credentials in recruitment see Brown (2001, 
pp. 26f); on staffing strategies and promotional criteria see Schultz (2001a, p. 261). 
120  On the distinction between firm-specific, industry-specific and general skills see Estevez-Abe et 
al. (2001); on firm-specific, segmentalist training see Thelen and Busemeyer (2007, pp. 3f); on 
different approaches to framing induction periods see Schultz (2001a, pp. 251-263); on the 
learning dimensions of in-firm skill formation processes see Bremer (2005). 
121  On the formulation of firm-based human resources strategies see Schultz (2001a, p. 253). 
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at the national level or have a very limited scope and thus only define the status of 
trainees within firms, such as their remuneration and the maximal length of the 
training period. In other political economies, there may exist – such as in the case 
of the dual system of apprenticeship – more comprehensive regulations that pre-
scribe the details of learning processes within firms. These institutions may not be 
enforced by the government, which leads to decoupling between institutions at 
the national and at the firm level.122 
Typologies of in-firm skill formation regimes 
Firms within a specific industrial sector may adopt very different skill formation 
strategies. Still, it can be assumed that in-firm skill formation regimes of specific 
countries may rather gravitate towards one of the extremes of a bipolar spectrum. 
Depending on whether firms in a specific industrial sector aim at reducing costs into 
skill formation by abstaining from training outside production or whether they tend to 
make specific investments of financial and temporal resources, the following typology 
in table 3 distinguishes between production-oriented skill formation regimes and in-
vestment-oriented skill formation regimes respectively. 
Type of in-firm skill formation re-
gime 
Dimension-specific characteristics of respective types 
 






A. skilled employees being poached from other firms 
B. investments into training limited to brief and produc-
tion-related on-the-job training 
C. responsibility for training left in the hands of produc-
tion-related personnel 
D. no incentives for firms investing into training 






A. recruitment of recruits with comparatively accom-
plished educational backgrounds 
B. formalised traineeships and considerable investment 
into training 
C. separate departments in charge of skill formation 
D. incentives for firms that invest into training 
Table 3: Typologies of in-firm skill formation regimes123 
Institutions regulating out-of-firm skill formation 
With regard to out-of-firm skill formation regimes, the study focuses on institutions 
that regulate social processes in organisations which offer skill formation pro-
grammes explicitly catering to the garment industry at the craft, technician or at the 
                                            
122  On nation-specific training and labour policies see Gill et al. (1999) and Hall and Soskice (2001, 
pp. 25 & 30), Steedman (2008). 
123  On the distinction between production-oriented and investment-oriented training systems see 
Dionisius et al. (2009, p. 20). 
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professional level.124 Table 4 summarises the different institutions subsumed under 
the different institutional dimensions on the left and specifies the respective key as-
pects in the right column. 
Institutional dimensions Key aspects of institutional dimensions 









1. enrolment and employment criteria for trainees and 
instructors respectively (e.g. educational background, 
industry-specific skill level, family background, ethnic-
ity) 
2. contents of the programme (depth / breadth) 
3. location and timing of skill formation 
4. status of the credential 
5. actors bearing the costs of the skill formation pro-
gramme 
B Institutions regulating skill formation 








1. actors deciding about criteria for enrolment and em-
ployment of trainees and instructors respectively 
2. actors deciding about the introduction, adaptation or 
phase out of training programmes 
3. actors deciding about the contents of skill formation 
programmes and about the status of the credentials 
4. actors deciding about absorption of trainees 
5. actors bearing recurrent and investment costs of the 
skill formation organisation 
C Institutions regulating skill formation 
organisations at the national level 
 
1. mechanisms to monitor and coordinate the different 
skill formation organisations 
2. implementation of these mechanisms 
Table 4: Out-of-firm skill formation institutions 
A. Institutions regulating skill formation programmes 
These institutions regulate programmes offered by different skill formation organi-
sations that explicitly cater to the garment industry (e.g. training centres, voca-
tional schools and university departments). Programmes may strongly vary in 
terms of the enrolment criteria for students. Technical education programmes on 
the one hand, particularly those offered at the university level, may have highly 
elitist enrolment criteria and thus – as it has been often reported for developing 
countries – serve as a means for the socio-economically more privileged sections 
of society to seek employment in the upper echelons of the labour market, a phe-
nomenon which has been called “aristocratic seclusion.” On the other hand, skill 
formation programmes at the vocational level may have less elitist enrolment cri-
teria and accordingly enjoy less social prestige. Skill formation programmes may 
vary with regard to their contents, which are generally spelled out in curricula and 
syllabi. The contents of programmes may differ with regard to curricular depth and 
                                            
124  This notion of skill formation programmes encompasses courses that are commonly termed as 
providing vocational education, vocational training, technical training and technical education; 
the study thus doesn’t apply any strict distinction between education and training programmes. 
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breadth and can either be taught in a practical mode in industrial settings or in a 
more academic mode in classrooms. Skill programmes generally lead to creden-
tials, which are formally related to the enrolment criteria of further skill formation 
organisations.125 
B. Institutions regulating skill formation organisations at the local level 
These institutions regulate the administrative and financial aspects of skill forma-
tion organisations and are at the core of the out-of-firm skill formation regime. The 
key features of these institutions are ownership and the degree to which they al-
low representatives of the private sector to engage in the respective decision 
making process. There may be skill formation organisations, which are owned by 
governmental organisations and don’t allow for this type of participation; they are 
thus entirely under the control of representatives of state-owned organisations. 
Some public skill formation organisations, e.g. vocational training centres operat-
ing at the local level, may be owned by the state and are controlled with regard to 
all these aspects by a national level agency. Other state-owned skill formation or-
ganisations may be more autonomous in this regard, so they may independently 
introduce, adapt and abolish skill formation programmes, as in fact public univer-
sities do in many countries. Private, i.e. privately owned skill formation organisa-
tions may need or need not to meet certain national standards, for instance with 
regard to the contents, enrolment and employment criteria. Representatives of the 
private sector and those of public agencies may strongly cooperate in several of 
these domains and thus enter what have been labelled public-private partner-
ships. In some cases, both types of actors bear the recurrent and investment 
costs of the skill formation organisation, whereas in others the funding of these 
costs remains the sole responsibility of state agencies and the private sector may 
be involved into managing the organisation or into decision making processes.126 
                                            
125  On changes in the access to technical education programmes in Europe and the US see Kael-
ble (1981, p. 259); on stratified access to higher education in developing countries see Naidoo 
(2003, p. 252); for comments on the aristocratic seclusion of technical education organisations 
in India see Chitnis (1993, p. 25); on curricula, syllabi and the respectively varying degrees of 
curricular specialisation in TVET see Grubb and Achtenhagen (2001), Wolf (1995, p. 142). On 
assessment in vocational education and educational mobility through the respective credentials 
see, for instance, Shaw and London (2001), Pandey (2005, pp. 34f), Wolf (1995). 
126  For a definition of public-private partnership see McQuaid (2000, p. 11); on different dimensions 
of privatisation in education see Belfield and Levin (2002, pp. 19-22). For reports on the Penang 
Skills Development Centre (PSDC), one of the most cited examples of best practice in training 
related public-private partnership see, for instance, Marchese and Sakamoto (2008, p. 16), te 
  
 45 
C. Institutions regulating skill formation organisations at the national level 
These institutions regulate the institutional arrangements of skill formation organi-
sations, e.g. the type of programmes and the respective curricula, the entry re-
quirements and the conditions of employment of instructors, at the national level. 
Countries may adopt a centralised or a decentralised approach to the coordina-
tion of skill formation organisations. A centralised approach to skill coordination 
requires the governments to forecast – generally from a distance of several years 
– the manpower and skill needs of specific economic sectors and to have the lev-
erage to introduce, adapt or abolish skill formation programmes offered by public 
training organisations. The decentralised approach to the coordination of skill for-
mation does without long-term forecasting but still governments engage in the co-
ordination of the national skill formation regime by funding specific programmes 
that correct skill shortages and by regulating the skill acquisition process more 
generally, which may require – as with the corporatist training strategies of Ger-
many and Switzerland for instance – strong cooperation with representatives of 
employers’ associations and labour unions. Governments may also decide to con-
centrate their efforts in general education and to abstain from coordinating the 
acquisition of skills for specific economic sectors altogether and to more rely – as 
the US and Great Britain tend to do in this regard – on market forces in this re-
gard. In those cases, where – as in many developing countries – governments 
have originally been engaged in centralised coordination of skill formation but 
were, in the course of economic liberalisations, faced with the emergence of a la-
bour-intensive private sector and the subsequent formation of segmentalist labour 
markets in large, FDI-backed firms, there may emerge a hybrid approach to the 
coordination of skill formation programmes, which has been termed – by Ashton 
et al. – the neo-market approach to skill formation and will be further detailed in 
section 3.2.4.127 
                                                                                                                                        
Velde (2002, p. 28), World Bank (2006b, pp. 59f); on public-private partnerships at the university 
level see Etzkowitz (2008, p. 71). 
127  On centralised and decentralised approaches to the coordination of skill formation organisations 
see Richards (1994, pp. 4f); on the corporatist, market and neo-market models of skill formation 
see Ashton et al. (2000, pp. 14-21); on the role of associations in the process of coordinating 
skill formation see Culpepper (2001, pp. 279ff), Soskice (1994, p. 34). On the different types of 
national level skill formation arrangements in liberal and coordinated market-economies see par-
ticularly Thelen (2004). 
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Typologies of out-firm skill formation regimes 
Out-of-firm skill formation institutions of specific political economies are never a co-
herent body of social phenomena; rather, there may be different institutional ar-
rangements for the varying levels of skill formation and governments may combine 
centralised approaches to the coordination of skill formation with more market-
oriented strategies. Still, out-of-firm skill formation regimes of specific countries may 
rather gravitate towards one of the extremes of a bipolar spectrum, one pole being 
represented by state-driven and state-coordinated skill formation regimes and the 
other pole being represented by market-driven skill formation regimes. Table 5 sum-
marises the key features of the two types of out-of-firms skill formation regimes by 
referring to the institutional dimensions outlined above. 
Type of out-of-firm skill formation 
regime 
Dimension-specific characteristics of respective types 
 








A. customised, occupation-specific courses that are be-
ing financed by trainees or employers 
B. decisions with regard to enrolment criteria and con-
tents of programmes taken by the private providers of 
training programmes who orient these programmes 
towards the social demand for specific courses 
C. no mechanisms to monitor and coordinate the different 
skill formation organisations 
State-driven and state-coordinated 






A. both customised and more general courses, whose 
costs are being borne either by the state, the trainees 
or the employers 
B. decisions with regard to enrolment criteria and con-
tents of programmes taken by state agencies 
C. mechanisms to monitor and coordinate the different 
skill formation organisations 
Table 5: Typologies of out-of-firm skill formation regimes 
3.2.2 Intersecting regimes 
Having outlined – from a heuristic perspective – the different institutions governing 
in-firm firm and out-of-firm skill formation processes, we now turn to the institutional 
context of these institutions. These elaborations start from the assumption that most 
social processes underlying institutional genesis and change are of multi-causal na-
ture.128 Accordingly, the development of in-firm and out-of-firm skill formation institu-
tions is interdependent with institutions in other spheres of the political economy. 
Similar to skill formation institutions, institutions in other spheres of the political econ-
omy are grouped in institutional arrangements, which regulate the operations of spe-
                                            
128  Mayntz (2002), p. 21 
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cific organisations. At an even more aggregate level, at the level of national political 
economies, institutions may be grouped into sphere-specific but strongly interrelated 
and partly interdependent regimes. In our case, we will concentrate on the interrela-
tions of industry-specific skill formation regimes with the education and training re-
gimes and the garment production regimes of the two countries. For the purpose of 
this study, I define both regimes as follows: 
 
Education and training regimes encompass all those institutions regulating social 
processes through which the skills of individuals are purposefully fostered.129 
Garment production regimes encompass all those institutions regulating social 
processes within organisations that are either directly involved into the production of 
garments or which perform tasks that are explicitly interrelated with the garment in-
dustry.130 
The institutional dimensions of the intersecting regimes 
The following figure helps to better understand the interrelations between these two 














skill formation regime of
the garment industry  
Figure 1: The skill formation regime of the garment industry 
The skill formation regime of the garment industry in a specific political economy 
thus lies in the intersecting realm of the education and training regime and the gar-
ment production regime and I assume the skill formation regime of the garment in-
                                            
129  The concept of “education and training regimes” has been applied by Buechtemann and Verdier 
(1998, p. 291), who described such regimes as parts of „national institutional frameworks”. The 
notion that purposeful agency is at the core of education has been underlined, for instance, by 
Brezinka (1995), p. 197, Luhmann (2002), p. 15. 
130  The concept of “production regimes” has been used frequently in the literature on the varieties of 
capitalism; for an early text see Rubery (1994). 
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dustry to be dependent from social processes within these two regimes.131 As we 
have noted above, the skill formation regime is segregated into two parts and I as-
sume these two parts to be dependent from their respective institutional contexts. On 
the one hand, the in-firm skill formation regime is indeed a part both of the garment 
production regime and of the education and training regime, because its institutions 
are part of the regulations underlying the social processes within garment factories 
and are also aimed at purposefully fostering the skills of individuals. However, the 
institutional context of the in-firm skill formation regime is more strongly interrelated 
with the garment production regime and with the key actors involved in this regime’s 
reproduction and transformation. On the other hand, the out-of-firm skill formation 
regime is similarly a part of both regimes. But its institutional context is more strongly 
interrelated with the education and training regime and with the key actors involved in 
this regime’s reproduction and transformation. The characteristics of the skill forma-
tion regimes are thus obviously interdependent with the characteristics of specific 
education and training regimes and garment production regimes. 
Following the arguments outlined in the introduction and the comparative literature 
on education systems, we assume that the key characteristic of any education and 
training regime is the role of the state in the expansion of this regime, whose aspects 
are summarised in Table 6. The most important aspect in this regard is the role of the 
state in terms of providing funds for the provision of educational programmes at dif-
ferent levels. Another important aspect is the role of the state in terms of coordinating 
the educational programmes offered both by different government and private or-
ganisations. Necessarily, the respective bipolar typology consists of education and 
training regimes, which either gravitate towards state-driven, thus state-financed and 
state-coordinated educational expansion or towards more market-driven educational 
expansion. For obvious reasons, we can assume that a more state-driven education 
and training regime may result in the emergence of comparatively state-driven out-of-
firm skill formation regimes, whereas more market-driven education and training re-
gimes rather lead to comparatively market-driven out-of-firm skill formation regimes. 
                                            
131  The application of the term “intersecting realms” in this study differs from applications in 
Luhmann’s and Schorr’s (1979, pp. 53ff) appropriation of systems theory, which theorises more 
generally on processes of functional differentiation; on intersecting realms see also Harney and 




Institutional dimension Key aspects 






1. role of the state with regard to financing the provision 
of education at the primary, secondary and at the 
university level 
2. role of the state with regard to the coordination of 
educational programmes offered by both public and 
private organisations 
Table 6: Dimensions of education and training regimes132 
Whereas we concentrate on one single aspect of education and training regimes – 
the role of state in educational expansion –, our analysis of industry-specific produc-
tion regimes needs take into account a broader set of institutional dimensions, which 
puts – in line with the VOC literature – institutions at the firm level at the centre of 
analysis and relates them to institutions both at the national and at the global level.133 
These key aspects of the garment production regime are summarised in table 7. 
Institutional dimensions Key aspects of institutional dimensions 





1. regulations concerning technical and social aspects 
of production processes (use of technology / division 
of labour) 
2. regulations concerning labour conditions (wage / 
holiday / training / workplace safety and decency) 




1. tax, customs and financial market regulations 
2. labour market regulations (minimal wage / working 
hours and holidays / training / workplace safety and 
decency) 
C Institutions at the global level 
 
1. international trade agreements 
2. internationally agreed labour standards 
Table 7: Dimensions of industry-specific production regimes134 
The institutional characteristics of specific production regimes strongly differ both 
between specific industries and specific political economies. The literature on produc-
tion processes suggests that these differences are particularly prominent between 
labour-intensive industries on the one hand and more technology-intensive industries 
on the other hand. As this study concentrates on a labour-intensive, export-oriented 
industry, table 8 outlines the features of the institutional key aspects of this type of 
industry. 
                                            
132  For a discussion of the role of the state in educational change see Green (1997), Green et al. 
(1999); on different dimensions of privatisation in education and the respective role of govern-
ments see Belfield and Levin (2002, pp. 19-22). 
133  See the respective comments on the “relational view of the firm”, which also considers the global 
context of firm behaviour, by Hall and Soskice (2001, pp. 6f & 54-60). 
134  For elaborations on different dimensions of production regimes see Hollingsworth and Boyer 




The literature suggests that labour-intensive, export-oriented industries are often 
based on exploiting low-cost and hardly formally trained labour and thus tend to be 
interrelated with a comparatively production-oriented in-firm skill formation regime, 
where employers tend to keep investments into skill formation at a low level.135 This 
suggestion needs further analysis in the thesis and will be outlined in more detail in 
the brief section on the central argument of this study (3.2.4). 
Institutional dimensions Key aspects of institutional dimensions 
A 




1. regulations stabilising the labour-intensive use of 
technology 
2. regulations assuring the labour conditions (e.g. 
wages, holidays, training, workplace safety and de-
cency) 








1. regulations providing incentives for the establishment 
of export-oriented industrial units by (1) allowing im-
ports of the respective machinery and/or the raw ma-
terials and by (2) providing local investors with ac-
cess to capital or allowing the influx of FDI 
2. labour regulations that allow employers to pay low 
wages in order to compete on the global market and 
that lack regulations with regard to in-firm training 





1. international trade agreements providing investors 
with incentives to dislocate labour-intensive produc-
tion to less industrialised, low-wage countries 
2. internationally agreed labour standards that allow 
buyers to source from low-wage countries 
Table 8: Institutional characteristics of labour-intensive, export-oriented produc-
tion regimes in developing countries136 
Before that, we, however, need to know more about the actors influencing both the 
education and training regimes and the production regimes and also need to elabo-
rate on the overall institutional context of country-specific skill formation regimes, i.e. 
on the political and administrative regimes 
Actors influencing intersecting regimes 
In any given political economy, the evolution of the garment production regime and 
the education and training regime and thus of the skill formation regime of the gar-
ment industry are related with individual, collective and corporate actors that operate 
at different levels of political economies. Most of the respective formal institutions 
                                            
135  Lall (1998), p. 60; on low-skill production regimes in more industrialised countries see, for in-
stance, Taplin et al. (2003, p. 1029). 
136  On the technological and social aspects of labour-intensive production see Alcorta (1999, p. 
153), Kaplinksky (1989, p. 12); on global trade agreements in the garment industry and on the 
emergence of internationally agreed labour standards see Chan and Ross (2003), Gereffi and 
Memedovic (2003), p. 12, Sengenberger (2002). 
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result from the social agency of purposeful actors, who are either entering coalitions 
with other actors or have enough leverage to create formal institutions on their own. 
As noted above, informal institutions may emerge as a result of purposeful agency 
but also by default or as a result of the aggregate effects of the behaviour of collec-
tive actors. At the same time, formal institutions particularly at the national and at the 
global level have strong aggregate effects as they change the behaviour of collective 
and corporate actors and often create new collective and corporate actors that will 
themselves start to influence the further evolution of both formal and informal institu-
tions. These aggregate effects need not necessarily be line with the material interests 
of the actors who were previously involved into introducing the respective formal 
regulations.137 Table 9 provides an overview of the main actors influencing the evolu-
tion of regimes.138 







representatives of education and training organisa-
tions and of the profession 
Collective 
 
students/trainees and their parents (i.e. social de-






























administrative units in the public service 




































administrative units in the public service 
education and training organisations 
employers’ associations 
trade unions 
buyers as part of international production networks 
international organisations 
Table 9: Actors interrelated with education and training regimes and production 
regimes of specific national political economies139 
                                            
137  For details on aggregate effects of institutions see Mayntz (2002, p. 31). 
138  The list of actors concentrates on the most important ones and is not exhaustive. Employers and 
labour union representatives, for instance, may influence the education and training regime as 
well. 
139  For the distinction between individual, collective and corporate actors see section 3.1.3 that 
largely follows Schimank (2004, p. 294); on different actors influencing education and training 
regimes see the section on the different theories of educational change in the literature review 
(2.2); for notes on key actors influencing the development of production regimes see 
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In reality, the segregation of actors into two regimes is not as strict as suggested by 
table 9, as the two regimes are partly intersecting. However, this segregation of ac-
tors reflects the segregation of the skill formation regime into two distinct sub-
regimes, each of which is more strongly interrelated with one of the two intersecting 
regimes. We will see that coalitions of politicians and administrators may have a 
strong influence on, for instance, the initial development of formal institutions in the 
education and training regime but that these formal regulations may create aggregate 
effects with regard to the behaviour of collective actors, whose agency is beyond the 
direct control of the original actors and will result in the development of informal but 
similarly crucial institutions.140 Vice versa, formal institutions, for instance government 
regulations on customs procedures, may be the result of informal but “institution-
ali[s]ed channels for the continual negotiation and re-negotiation of goals and poli-
cies” that exist between politicians, administrators and representatives of the busi-
ness elite.141 In any event, the interrelations between actors and institutions both of 
the education and training regime and of the garment production regime are charac-
terised by self-reinforcing positive feedbacks but will also undergo transformations 
that result from external shocks, changing actor coalitions and less transparent 
changes of informal institutional arrangements. 
3.2.3 Political and administrative regimes 
The evolution of skill formation regimes is not only interrelated with the develop-
ment of education and training regimes and production regimes but also influenced 
by the larger societal context of these regimes, most particularly by the organisational 
characteristics of nation states. In fact, many authors have attributed the develop-
ment of these characteristics a key role with regard to the evolution of skill formation 
regimes.142 In this study, I assume that the development of nation states is indeed is 
strongly interrelated both with the development of the education and training regime 
and the production regime of specific political economies. The interrelationship be-
tween state formation and the evolution of skill formation regimes is, however, not 
straightforward and its analysis requires in-depth process tracing. 
                                                                                                                                        
Hollingsworth and Boyer (1997); for literature on employers’ associations in developing coun-
tries see Doner and Schneider (2000), Haggard et al. (1997); on international production net-
works and on buyers operating as important actors in the global garment production regime see 
Felker (2003, p. 268), Gereffi (1999, pp. 38 & 44f). 
140  See Mayntz (2002, pp. 31f). 
141  Evans (1995), p. 12 
142  See, for instance, Ashton et al. (1999), Green (1995). 
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The state will – in order to avoid what Migdal calls „a mystification of the state and 
its capabilities“ – not enter this study as an actor as such.143 Rather, I will concentrate 
on institutions that can be subsumed under the political and administrative regime of 
a specific political economy, which I define as regulating the internal and external 
operations of organisations that are formally under the control of a national govern-
ment. In line with Migdal’s heuristic elaborations on state institutions, I argue that this 
regime encompasses constitutional principles and laws but also ”the written and un-
written laws, regulations, decrees, and the like, which state officials indicate they are 
willing to enforce through the coercive means at their disposal”.144 Table 10 summa-
rises the different institutional dimensions of political and administrative regimes and 
the different types of actors interrelated with these. 
Institutional dimensions of political and administrative regimes 
Level  Dimensions 
local level institutionalised appropriation of national level regulations 
national level 
 
formal regulations (constitution / acts / government orders) 
informal regulations underlying the workings of government 
global level 
 
international agreements on trade, human rights, education 
etc. 
Actors influencing political and administrative regimes145 
























governments of other countries 
Table 10: Institutional dimensions and actors of the political and administrative 
regime 
Similar to the education and training regime and the production regime, the devel-
opment of the political and administrative regime of a specific political economy is 
strongly path-dependent and results from competition and struggle between different 
                                            
143  Migdal (2001), p. 235 
144  Migdal (1988), p. 14; for the application of the term political and administrative regime see Orren 
and Showronek (1999, p. 35). 
145  For key actors influencing the political and administrative regimes of many developing countries 
see Migdal (1988, pp. 259-269). 
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actors “over resources and services, values and political power“.146 The interrelation 
between the institutions of political and administrative regimes and different actors 
may vary strongly between different political economies; I will therefore focus on a 
few aspects which have been elaborated by scholars writing on politics and admini-
stration of weak states in developing contexts. I expect these characteristics to fea-
ture prominently in the political and administrative regimes both of Sri Lanka and 
Bangladesh, both of which have been described as weak states in the literature.147 
First, weak states may be characterised – as Migdal writes – by the politics of sur-
vival.148 The stability of political power is constantly threatened by changing coalitions 
of political parties and by centripetal societal forces, and is thus being defended by 
those in top-ranking political and administrative positions with the means of extrajudi-
cial measures and other strategies to obtain non-constitutional control over the judici-
ary, the administration and the military. Second and strongly related to the politics of 
survival, weak states are characterised by the politicisation of the administration, 
which is often being used as an instrument by the executive to maintain its political 
power. Subsequent governments may foster specific government agencies and staff 
them with their own partisans.149 This not only furthers administrative fragmentation 
but also leads to the increasing political leverage of government agencies and de-
partments, which themselves strife for survival – if not enlargement – without being 
held accountable by parliamentary forces.150 The capacity of the public service to ini-
tiate and implement reforms is thus necessarily limited. 
Third, weak states often have comparatively little political leverage over other states 
and their governments, many of which aim at integrating weak states into their own 
spheres of influence by the means of foreign aid and trade agreements.151 In many 
cases, overseas, i.e. Western governments and multilateral organisations have been 
in a position to considerably influence overall economic and social policies of such 
states, one of the more important examples being the global diffusion of structural 
adjustment programmes in many developing countries that had been prominently 
advocated by the World Bank and the IMF and been backed by most governments of 
                                            
146  Sangmpam (2007), p. 204 
147  Dunham and Kelegama (1997), Lewis (2004) 
148  Migdal (1988), p. 206 
149  On the practice of such non-merit appointments see Migdal (1988, p. 217). 
150  Atkinson and Coleman (1989), p. 55, Sangmpam (2007), p. 206 
151  Burnell (1997), Morgenthau (1962) 
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the more industrialised countries.152 Necessarily, such programmes have a direct in-
fluence on the development of both education and training regimes and on garment 
production regimes. However, the development of specific organisations is often in-
fluenced by less comprehensive projects for infrastructure or staff development, 
many of which often fail to meet their original goals.153 In any event, such projects 
often further add to the organisational fragmentation of the administration.154 
3.2.4 A causal model of the political economy of skill formation regimes in de-
veloping countries 
In the previous paragraphs, different typologies for in-firm and out-of-firm skill for-
mation regimes, for education and training regimes and for production regimes have 
been outlined. It has been suggested that higher state intervention into education 
may lead to more state intervention in the field of out-of-firm skill formation and that 
the emergence of a labour-intensive production regime may result in a more produc-
tion-oriented in-firm skill formation regime. So far, we have, however, neither theo-
rised about the interrelation between the two regimes in the context of developing 
countries nor have we considered the factor time into our analysis. As documented in 
the literature review, the only comprehensive theoretical perspective on the political 
economy of skill formation in developing countries has, so far, been elaborated by 
Ashton et al., who argued that there would be increasing convergence of skill forma-
tion systems in developing countries towards a neo-market model of skill formation.155 
On the basis of our elaborations above and the suggestions by Ashton et al. we 
may, as outlined in figure 2, assume that the growth of export-oriented, FDI-backed 
industries in developing countries – an outcome of global political and economic 
pressures – led to a market for private training organisations, which were catering to 
the upper echelons of the foreign-owned firms and thus started to marginalise public 
training organisations, which were originally established in line with import substitu-
tion strategies but were now rather geared towards socio-political goals. The private 
out-of-firm skill formation organisations thereby started to be strongly interrelated with 
comparatively more investment-oriented in-firm skill formation arrangements of the 
foreign-owned companies, whereas the locally owned garment companies would 
                                            
152  Burnell (2003), Deacon (2000) 
153  On the difficulties to implement donor-funded projects in education see, for instance, Steiner-
Khamsi (2005). 
154  On the effects of donor projects on administrative fragmentation see Nagel and Snyder (1989). 
155  Ashton et al. (2000) 
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adapt comparatively more production-oriented in-firm skill formation arrangements 
and find it more difficult to attract the graduates of private training organisations. This 
hypothesis thus suggests that it will not make any difference whether governments 
have – previous to the expansion of the respective industry – invested into education 
and training or whether they have done so to a lesser extent. This causal model will 
be assessed by analysing both Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, which tremendously differ 
in terms of the intervention of the state into the expansion of the education and train-








































































Neo-market model of skill 
formation: 
1. Disjuncture between 
a) FDI-backed firms adopt-
ing comparatively invest-
ment-oriented in-firm skill 
formation arrangements that 
are interrelated with private 
training organisations  
b) Locally owned firms 
adopting comparatively pro-
duction-oriented in-firm skill 
formation arrangements that 
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Figure 2: Model suggesting convergence of skill formation regimes of labour-




The study engages in theorising on the evolution of skill formation regimes of la-
bour-intensive industries in developing countries; it thereby starts from a heuristic 
model – elaborated in sections 3.2.1 to 3.2.3 – that sketches the different aspects of 
skill formation regimes and their interrelation with their social context and aims at as-
sessing a causal model – discussed in section 3.2.4 –, which suggests that the skill 
formation regimes of the garment industries in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh would in-
creasingly converge along the lines of a neo-market model of skill formation. The as-
sessment of the model occurs through a comparative case-study that places its me-
thodical emphasis on within-case analysis and process tracing, which will enable me, 
if necessary, to reformulate the hypotheses and the causal model outlined above.156 It 
is only through this type of empirical grounding that the complex interrelations of skill 
formation processes can be understood and potentially crucial, multiply interrelated 
regularities within the respective evolutionary processes can be discovered, which 
are beyond the reach of high-N comparative studies.157 In order to, however, not only 
assess the model as such but also to eventually engage in a well-grounded re-
formulation or qualification of the model, the study analyses two cases and engages 
in cross-case analysis.158 The following paragraphs will now describe the methods, 
notably the processes of data collection and analysis, in more detail. 
3.3.1 Data requirements 
In the sections 3.2.1 to 3.2.3, we saw that the mainstay of data collection needed to 
concentrate on in-firm and out-of-firm skill formation arrangements in firms and train-
ing organisations and that additional information needed to be gathered on other 
types of organisations, namely associations, government agencies and donor organi-
sations. There, I have also elaborated on the institutions subsumed under the differ-
ent regimes and on the actors, which these institutions are interrelated with; these 
notes can be considered as a sufficient outline of data requirements. I will, therefore, 
                                            
156  On grounded theory see Glaser and Strauss (1967). 
157  This methodological approach is in line with historical-comparative research in comparative 
education that systematically analyses the complex interdependencies between education and 
its societal context and thus contributes to the reconciliation of history and comparative re-
search; see Schriewer (2000, p. 322); on the limitations of theoretically ungrounded quantitative 
studies see Ebbinghaus (2005, p. 149), Mjöset (2006, p. 351). 
158  On a critique of descriptive single case studies that add little to the accumulation of theoretical 
knowledge on social processes see George and Bennett (2005, pp. 69f). 
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not reiterate these details here but will rather point to some silent features of the data, 
which were needed for this study. 
First, the data had to provide information on the historical development of charac-
teristics of and of interrelations between institutions and actors over the time since 
the early phase of the expansion of the respective regimes. These data were needed 
both with regard to the in-firm and with regard to the out-of-of firm skill formation re-
gimes and had to be complemented by data on the education and training regimes, 
on the production regimes and on the actors interrelated with these regimes respec-
tively. 
Second – and strongly related to this first point –, the data providing the information 
on the historical evolution of the respective institutions and actors had to be of quali-
tative nature. Based on our specifications elaborated in section 3.2.1, the analysis of 
out-of-firm skill formation regimes in both countries required information on the key 
characteristics of specific skill formation programmes – curricula, selection criteria 
etc. – and their interrelationships had to be described in qualitative terms. The analy-
sis of the development of in-firm skill formation regime needed to be similarly based 
on qualitative data. In contrast to economic and industrial sociological research on 
firm-behaviour, this study thus didn’t gather quantitative information through a survey 
but followed historical paths by tracing qualitative information from the respective 
critical junctures forwards to the present. 
Third, in order to gather evidence on in-firm and out-of-firm skill formation, it was 
important to combine, i.e. to triangulate a number of qualitative methods. The most 
important data gathering methods were to conduct qualitative interviews and to col-
lect documentary evidence, e.g. project reports, curricula and statistical data pub-
lished by government agencies. These methods were complemented by tracing 
documentary evidence, but also by taking fieldnotes, for instance on visits to firms 
and training organisations, and by gathering highly structured information on educa-
tional and occupational biographies of employees, instructors and trainees. The tri-
angulation of data which were produced through these means then allowed studying 
“the same phenomenon”, e.g. the skill formation arrangements of a given training 
organisation, from different perspectives.159 The process of data collection and data 
analysis will be explained in more detail further below. Before I turn to these elabora-
                                            
159  Denzin (1978), p. 291 
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tions, I will, however, make some brief remarks on the overall context of data collec-
tion in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. 
3.3.2 Data collection 
Context of data collection in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh 
The data for this study were collected through fieldwork in the countries between 
August 2006 and May 2008. In total, 6 months of fieldwork were conducted in Bang-
ladesh (August 2006 / September 2007 – February 2008) and 7 months in Sri Lanka 
(January – May 2007 / February – May 2008). Due to the concentration of the gar-
ment industry in the urban areas, I mainly operated from Colombo and Dhaka, the 
capitals of the two countries. In order to get access to data, it was vital to establish 
the necessary contacts to government officials and representatives of the industry. 
Many of the early meetings were facilitated by contacts established to research or-
ganisations both in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh but also by invitations issued by the 
Swiss embassies in the two countries and by the support of a Zurich-based consul-
tancy company that provides its services to manufacturers all over the world. In Sri 
Lanka, contacts to important gatekeepers had already been established during previ-
ous fieldwork that was conducted in 2002/03.160 On some occasions, I was also 
asked by government ministries, research and training organisations and donor 
agencies to share my knowledge by giving formal presentations. 
The political situation was highly volatile in both countries during the time of re-
search. A few months after a first part of fieldwork in Bangladesh, the so-called care-
taker government backed by the outgoing prime minister in 2006 was urged to step 
down in January 2007 by the army, which installed a new interim government.161 The 
beginning of the second part of fieldwork in Bangladesh was, therefore, postponed to 
the latter part of 2007. The situation in Sri Lanka was dominated by increasing war-
fare in the northern and eastern parts of the country, which also had its repercussions 
in the capital.162 These events made me cut short the first visit to Sri Lanka in 2007. 
Apart from political instability, Bangladesh was also affected by large demonstrations 
and riots organised in the aftermath of lethal accidents in the garment industry.163 
                                            
160  Gould (2006), p. 80, Neuman (2006), p. 387, Willis (2006), p. 147 
161  Hagerty (2008), p. 177  
162  De Silva (2006), De Silva (2007), Wickramasinghe (2008), Wickramasinghe (2009) 
163  Khan (2008), Staff Correspondent (2008) 
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Sampling of organisations and interviewees 
As can be seem from Annex 1, data was collected from 8 administrative units, 5 as-
sociations, 49 firms, 2 donor organisations and 49 training organisations. Whereas 
the number of potentially critical administrative units, associations and donor organi-
sations was relatively small, that of firms and training organisations was much higher 
so that the sampling process had to be more theoretically grounded. This process 
was thus modelled along the lines of the concept of theoretical sampling and was, 
therefore, aimed at constantly increasing the theoretical knowledge about the respec-
tive historical trajectories of the two in-firm and out-of-firm skill formation regimes.164 
Particularly with regard to the selection of firms, representative sampling would 
have been tremendously complicated by the fact that accurate statistical data on key 
characteristics of garment factories units was lacking and that access to firms cru-
cially depended on respective contacts; particularly in Bangladesh, such gatekeepers 
– mainly representatives of employers’ associations – were normally readily available 
to provide access to the more compliant firms but were virtually absent when it came 
to organising visits to the less compliant ones. Even though sampling of firms was not 
strictly guided by defined categories, some categories such as size, geographical 
location and type of capital invested were – in the course of data analysis – applied in 
order to relate the qualitative data to structural features of the firms. In Annex 2.1, an 
overview of all firms visited for the purpose of this research is given; it distinguishes 
between firms based within Free Trade Zones (FTZ) and those outside (Non-FTZ) 
and shows that in Sri Lanka, 10 of the firms were within the zones and 9 outside. In 
Bangladesh, 5 were in the zones and the remaining 10 outside. Once allowed to visit 
a firm, those were interviewed who were appointed by the senior management to 
provide me with the respective information. Often, these were human resources and 
production managers. In smaller firms, I normally interviewed the owners themselves. 
When it comes to training organisations, the sampling procedure was guided by the 
rationale to list, through documentary analysis and a high number of informal inter-
views, the earliest garment-related skill formation programmes and to subsequently 
trace, on the basis of documents provided by the respective government agencies 
and donor organisations, all those which emerged over the course of the years. Both 
at the technician and at the professional level, all public skill formation organisations 
catering to the garment industry were included. At the vocational level, I mainly relied 
                                            
164  On theoretical sampling see Glaser and Strauss (1967, pp. 45-77). 
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on theoretical sampling, which meant, at first, randomly selecting a small number of 
training organisations and to subsequently include some more, in case basic informa-
tion with regard to the evolution of these programmes was still lacking. Annex 2.2 
provides an overview of all training organisations visited for the purpose of this re-
search; it distinguishes between training organisations offering programmes at the 
craft, technician and at the professional level. It demonstrates that, in Sri Lanka, 18 of 
the visited training organisations were at the craft level, 2 at the technician level and 
3 at the professional level; in Bangladesh, 17 training organisations visited for this 
research were providing programmes at the craft level, 4 at the technician level and 5 
at the professional level. Most organisations, particularly the public ones at the craft 
level, had to be contacted through the headquarters of the respective government 
agencies, most of which were either based in Colombo or Dhaka; most of these 
agencies generally had the intention to partly influence the selection process and of-
ten pre-informed the organisations under their purview. At the level of training organi-
sations, I generally interviewed the head of the respective departments and, if possi-
ble, some instructors and students. 
To understand how national level skill formation arrangements had originated and 
changed, agency of actors at the national level had to be analysed by either using 
primary documents or qualitative data collected through interviews with the respec-
tive individuals. One main group of individual actors interviewed at the national level 
consisted of representatives of administrative units in the public service, i.e. of high-
ranking officials working for the ministries in charge of education, textile, industrial 
development and labour, or for government agencies working under the umbrella of a 
specific ministry. Another important group of individual actors at the national level 
were representatives of employers’ associations and, to a limited extent, of trade un-
ions.165 The selection of all these individuals normally resulted from information con-
tained in archived documents (e.g. newspaper articles, curriculum documents, project 
reports etc.) and from contacts established through interviews with individuals operat-
ing either at the local or the national level. 
Conducting the interviews  
The qualitative interviews were conducted with individuals whom I generally met 
only once. It was, therefore, necessary to build up trust, especially in view of me au-
                                            
165  Trade unions both in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh are hardly involved into the formulation and 
implementation of training programmes. 
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dio-recording the interviews.166 One of the most important strategies was to adapt the 
overall atmosphere of the interviews to the respective rules of everyday conversa-
tion.167 It thus proved to be an advantage, particularly for interviews held with repre-
sentatives of associations, firms and training organisations, that through the process 
of research I became an expert on training for the garment industry, who was not 
only familiar with many key persons in the trade but also with its “idiolects”.168 On 
many instances, trust building was facilitated by the fact that I had been introduced to 
entrepreneurs by some of their business colleagues. Building up trust within a com-
munity of industrialists, many of which were strongly interrelated with each other, also 
meant strictly refraining from entering into any discussion on potentially sensitive is-
sues, e.g. on labour conditions and labour relations. 
Interviews with representatives of firms and training organisations were generally 
guided by a structured questionnaire, which was, however, used as a checklist for 
much more open interviews that were all audio-recorded.169 In fact, engaging interview-
ees in less structured, more narrative forms of interviewing improved the interview 
atmosphere, contributed to building trust and, therefore, generally resulted in much 
richer data.170 Many semi-structured interviews were conducted with senior entrepre-
neurs, academics and public servants and thus contained rich data on past produc-
tion and training practices but also on the development of employers’ associations 
and administrative units. Particularly in Bangladesh, many interviews with employees, 
instructors and trainees were short, targeted interviews that followed – as we will see 
below – the taking of biographical notes. As documented in Annex 3, in total 165 in-
terviews were conducted. 
Any research strategy built upon qualitative interviews needs to be concerned about 
the accuracy of the qualitative data collected through these means, especially if inter-
views are conducted in comparatively unfamiliar social settings and in a language – 
English – which is neither my nor my interviewees’ mother tongue. Necessarily, some 
interviewees would have tried to guess what a researcher from Switzerland expects 
                                            
166  On the need to build up trust in qualitative research in developing countries see Mansoor and 
Cotton (2006, p. 89). 
167  See the notes on „die Regeln der alltagsweltlichen Kommunikation“ by Schütze et al. (1981, p. 
434); on the need to adapt the organisation of interviews to the business environment see also 
Trinczek (2002, p. 214). 
168  Wengraf (2001), p. 64 
169  The structured questionnaires for companies and training organisations can be found in Annex 4 
and Annex 5 respectively. 
170  Wengraf (2001), p. 5 
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them to tell. This difficulty was partly aggravated in those cases, where interviews 
were conducted with the help of interpreters. Furthermore, even within the same or-
ganisation, interviewees sometimes provided differing information on institutional ar-
rangements, either by default or by purpose. A human resources manager, who is 
rather engaged in structuring the processes, may have different information on train-
ing within a given firm than the head of a particular department, where training is ac-
tually taking place.171 The problem of accuracy was of particular concern in all those 
interviews with entrepreneurs, senior administrators or professionals that were struc-
tured along the lines of oral history tradition in order to inquire into the historical de-
velopment of the garment industry and the way skill formation played into it. The main 
reasons for this have been amply discussed in the methodological oral history litera-
ture: First, many interviewees tend to magnify their careers or their leverage over 
other actors within the system. Second, individuals generally have selective memo-
ries, thus eliminating from their cognitive recollection elements that are considered 
unimportant or not to be fitting into cognitive frames.172 
In order to contain the problems related to potentially lacking accuracy of individual 
qualitative interviews, the information was, whenever possible, cross-checked with 
information gained from similar interviews or with written or statistical accounts of the 
respective developments. In many cases, interviews that focused on past institutional 
arrangements were held, indeed, to get access to more documentary evidence. In 
any event, the overall design of this research also allowed me to ignore potentially 
inaccurate or obviously contradictory evidence which in many cases was highly idio-
syncratic by concentrating on those dimensions of the information which were of real 
comparative value.173 
                                            
171  See Mansoor and Cotton (2006, p. 88), Willis (2006, p. 150); on interviews with the help of inter-
preters see Bujra (2006, p. 173). 
172  On the methods of narrative oral history interviews see Thompson (2000, pp. 222f); on the ten-
dency of public personalities to offer stereotyped recollections see Thompson (2000, p. 242); on 
the methodology of oral history interviews more generally see Thomson (1998, pp. 588f), Tonkin 
(1995, pp. 97ff). For oral history approaches to business history see, for instance, Ryant (1988), 
Tyson (1996). 
173  One such example was the elaboration of the historical development of the Sri Lankan Clothing 
Industry Training Institute (CITI). All individuals involved into its formation gave accounts of a 
plan to privatise this organisation, which went on during several months in 2002/03. The infor-
mation emanating from these interviews was contradictory with regard to the driving forces of 
this plan but was nevertheless very consistent with regard to persons involved into the discus-
sion and in terms of the position of the government and of the employers’ association. The theo-
risation of this information thus concentrated on the consistent information only. 
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Notes on curricula vitae and fieldnotes 
Information on the careers of interviewed managers, administrators and representa-
tives of associations was often collected in the course of the interviews. However, in 
order to collect data on the educational and occupational biographies of employees, 
instructors and trainees, short notes on these careers were taken with a simple form 
that was generally filled in with the help of an interpreter.174 The forms for instructors 
and employees focused on educational backgrounds and occupational biographies, 
whereas the form for trainees also inquired on socio-economic backgrounds, i.e. on 
the occupation of the parents. On the basis of this biographical information, files were 
created, which provided – as can be seen from Annex 3 – rich biographical informa-
tion on individuals of 62 firms and training organisations. On the basis of these notes, 
some of the interviewees were asked to provide information on specific parts of their 
biographies, for instance on the way they were recruited by specific firms. These 
generally very brief, targeted interviews were audio-recorded and subsequently trans-
lated and transcribed by the interpreters. It is for this reason, that the number of inter-
views conducted in firms and training organisations is fairly high. 
In order to comprehensively condense the information gained through interviews 
and the biographical notes, fieldnotes were – as documented in Annex 3 – prepared 
after visits to 34 organisations; many of these documents contained information on 
further observations made in the field.175 Fieldnotes were also recorded in the after-
math of social events to which I was invited (e.g. curriculum development seminars, 
workshops on industrial or training policies etc.) or of interviews which the interview-
ees did not allow to be audio-recorded. 
Documentary evidence 
As this study aims at analysing genesis and change of specific skill formation re-
gimes over time, conducting qualitative interviews would not have been sufficient and 
needed to be complemented by documentary evidence from other sources. Primary 
documents were particularly important in this regard. Such documents provided in-
formation on the more formalised institutions and on past events and processes, 
which may not be accurately recollected by interviewees. Indeed, the primary docu-
                                            
174  For the respective forms which allowed taking notes on the curricula vitae of employees of com-
panies, of instructors and of trainees see Annex 6, Annex 7 and Annex 8 respectively. 
175  On different types of fieldnotes see Neuman (2006, p. 399). 
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ments collected for the purpose of this research were of very diverse nature and 
drafted by even more diverse actors. 
Primary documents collected at the local level included documents by human re-
sources departments, notebooks of instructors and students and curricula developed 
at training organisation level. Of course, whether or not such documents could be 
collected depended on whether they were available and on whether I met persons 
who were both in a position and also willing to share such documents with me. Espe-
cially in Sri Lanka, many firms do have documents in which training processes are 
being defined; but it was, understandably, only in rare cases that such documents 
were handed over to me. 
Primary documents collected at the national level included curricula developed by 
public training agencies, annual reports by ministries and the agencies under their 
purview or policy documents, project appraisals and reports by multilateral and bilat-
eral governmental organisations and many other documents, which provided informa-
tion on the evolution of the skill formation regimes of the garment industry since the 
first respective institutions emerged in the late 1970s. Collection of primary docu-
ments was complicated by the fact that many governmental organisations, including 
ministries, are not systematically archiving documents on specific projects.176 In case 
there were no alternative sources, newspaper articles on specific events were col-
lected. The collection of primary documents generally involved the challenge to also 
select those papers that not only reflected the researcher’s theoretical bias.177 In this 
case, however, the range of documents was restricted by the lack of availability, so 
that, in many cases, I had to take notes or pictures or make photocopies of whatever 
documents I could find on the respective programmes. In order to complement the 
information provided by primary documents, I also collected statistical data, e.g. on 
trade, employment trends and enrolment of particular skill formation programmes.178 
                                            
176  In Bangladesh, for instance, the most important primary documents on the first foreign funded 
project which aimed at developing skills for the garment industry could neither be found at the 
training centre itself nor at the implementing government agency. One document was finally dis-
covered at the local office of a multilateral governmental organisation, on a stockpile of books 
ready to be discarded. A second, very relevant document was handed over to me not in Bangla-
desh but in a Sri Lankan company some months later, when I met with a training manager, who 
had worked for this project 14 years earlier. In Sri Lanka, most of the ministries have the policy 
that they dispose of most documents, for want of space, after a period of five years. 
177  George and Bennett (2005), p. 99 
178  Much of the statistical data may be criticised in terms of the methods through which they were 
collected by the public authorities; in fact, there are virtually no alternative sources of informa-
tion. The effects of potential inaccuracies may be mitigated by the fact that the arguments of my 
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3.3.3 Data analysis 
The data gathered by conducting fieldwork and by tracing primary documents and 
statistical data were the basis of within-case analysis which would then allow me to 
subsequently engage in cross-case analysis and to theorise on the path-dependent 
evolution of the in-firm and out-of-firm skill formation regimes in the two countries 
from a comparative perspective. It was through qualitative within-case analysis that 
the evolution of these regimes could be causally related to other institutional dynam-
ics within Sri Lanka and Bangladesh.179 
Following the rationale of methodical triangulation, the very different types of data 
that were gathered by conducting and transcribing qualitative interviews and by trac-
ing primary documents and statistical data were treated as complementary;180 there-
fore, the methods applied in order to analyse data gathered through qualitative inter-
views did principally not differ from the methods applied to analyse primary docu-
ments. Certainly, reflecting on the accuracy of data was more crucial when it came to 
analysing qualitative interviews, i.e. data which were created for the purpose of this 
study; however, the need to critically analyse the contexts in which data emerged and 
the need to cross-check accuracy of data through triangulation whenever possible 
also extended to the analysis of primary sources and of statistical information.181 
At first, within-case analysis focused on reconstructing the historical trajectories of 
the institutional context of the skill formation regimes, i.e. of the political and adminis-
trative regimes, of the education and training regimes and of the production regimes. 
These trajectories were divided, for analytical purposes, into distinct temporal 
phases, which were characterised by specific critical junctures, for instance by impor-
tant economic or educational reforms or by global trade agreements. This way of 
segmenting the respective historical trajectories was finally also reflected in the or-
ganisation of the chapters. In order to understand the implications of critical junctures 
                                                                                                                                        
study are not primarily founded on statistical data. On a critique of the Bangladesh labour-force 
survey, for instance, see Rahman (2003, p. 210). 
179  Mahoney (2007), p. 134 
180  Virtually all interviews were literally transcribed by the author. Only the targeted, generally very 
brief interviews that were conduced with the help of an interpreter also involved translations, all 
of which were undertaken by the respective interpreters. Interviews and fieldnotes will be cited 
by referring to the respective pages (p.) and lines (l.) in the transcripts. The curricula vitae of in-
terviewees were noted down in tables, the information of which will be cited by referring to the 
respective line (l.) or paragraph (para.) in the table. An alphabetical overview of the data pro-
duced for this study can be found in Annex 9. The tables shown in this annex also help the 
reader to interpret the codes used as references in the footnotes. 
181  On the need to take into account the “cultural and subcultural contexts” in which documents are 
produced see, for instance, Mangen (1999, p. 118). 
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in the education and training regimes and in the production regimes, it was important 
to analyse the timing of these junctures and to scrutinise the actors – and their coali-
tions, material interests and cognitive orientations respectively – that were involved 
into the emergence of these junctures. Subsequently, the effects of critical junctures 
were analysed, namely with regard to the emergence of new actors, e.g. of employ-
ers’ associations or of social demand for educational credentials emanating from col-
lectively acting students that reacted on incentives provided by a new institutional 
framework and were subsequently involved into positive feedback mechanisms that 
also influenced the skill formation regimes of the garment industry.182  
Second, within-case analysis focused on a description of the evolution of the in-firm 
and out-of-firm skill formation arrangements over time. This description was guided 
by the specification of the heuristic model, in which I had defined skill formation insti-
tutions, but was flexible enough to include case-specific features that emerged in the 
process of data analysis. Here, I strongly engaged in historical analysis which traced 
the evolution of the respective institutions since the early expansion of the garment 
industries in the two countries and thus reconstructed largely descriptive chronologi-
cal narratives that can be found in the chapters 8 and 12, both of which conclude the 
country-specific parts C and D.183 The elaboration of the largely descriptive narratives 
of the development of the in-firm and of the out-of-firm skill formation regimes was 
followed by causal reconstruction that aimed at analysing the causal relations be-
tween the evolution of the respective skill formation institutions and the dynamics of 
their institutional context, i.e. of the education and training regimes and the produc-
tion regimes.184 Causal reconstruction was based on the method of process tracing, 
which meant elaborating the causal mechanisms that led to the emergence of spe-
cific skill formation arrangements.185 In the course of causal reconstruction, one 
common problem was to understand whether a particular instance of institutional 
change in the skill formation regime rather resulted from dynamics within the educa-
tion and training regime or from those within the production regime.186 In order to 
                                            
182  In both countries, the emergence of associations of garment employers, for instance, was a 
direct result of economic reforms in the end of the 1970s that provided a new framework of in-
centives. 
183  On chronological narratives see George and Bennett (2005, p. 94). 
184  George and Bennett (2005), p. 91, Mayntz (2004), p. 238 
185  On process tracing and sequence analysis see George and Bennett (2005, p. 207), Thelen 
(2002, p. 97). 
186  The institutional change of in-firm skill formation could generally relatively easily be related to 
changes within the production regime. The problem with regard to the out-of-firm skill formation 
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solve such problems it was important to scrutinise the actors, which were involved 
into institutional change, but also to engage in sequence analysis, i.e. in an investiga-
tion into how the different aspects of institutional change in the industry-specific skill 
formation regime, in the education and training regime and in the garment production 
regime were temporally ordered.187 Similar to hypothesis-testing qualitative research 
in the social sciences, the causal reconstruction focused, at first, on elaborating the 
causal mechanisms that were suggested by the causal model elaborated above. 
However, when it came to the interpretation of specific institutional changes, the hy-
potheses derived from the causal model often proved inadequate, which resulted – 
partly already during the process of data collection – in the elaboration of competing 
explanations, i.e. of empirically grounded, case-specific competing hypotheses that 
were more adequate to explain institutional change than the hypotheses by Ashton et 
al.188 At last, the evidence gathered through within-case analysis was re-assessed 
from a cross-case analytical perspective, which meant taking analytical explanations 
to a more abstract level. In view of the similarities and of the differences of the cases, 
the original hypotheses were reformulated, which finally led to the elaborations of 
contingent generalisations that can be seen in section 14.2.3.189 
                                                                                                                                        
regime was particularly accentuated in the case of organisations, which were – as, for instance, 
the CITI in Sri Lanka – strongly affected by the agency of actors both in the spheres of educa-
tion and training and of production. 
187  Pierson (2000b), p. 87 
188  On the analysis of competing explanations see George and Bennett (2005, p. 91); on many 
occasions, hypotheses were generated “in vivo”, i.e. in the process of interaction with those in-
terviewed; see Glaser and Strauss (1967, pp. 49-52). 
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4 The development of the global textile and garment trade 
4.1 The development of the textile trade until World War II 
Production of textiles and garments has belonged to the most globalised trades for 
many centuries. Not only is the trade in raw materials and finished goods marked by 
exchanges between a high number of economic actors in different parts of the world; 
similarly global is the flow of production technology, capital and skills to manufacture 
yarn, fabric and garments. Techniques of spinning, dyeing and weaving date back to 
Neolithic days, the first known textiles having been excavated in Çatal Höyük in 
southern Anatolia.190 Whereas technology diffused, production generally relied on 
locally available raw materials. In Europe, textile production was based on linen, 
leather or wool until the 19th century; however, since ancient times, there had always 
existed a trade in more luxurious raw materials, for instance in Chinese silk. In the 
beginning of the second millennium, European traders started to import cotton from 
various parts of Asia and, after the beginning of the 16th century, from beyond the 
Atlantic.191 Cotton textiles became more popular with the imports of Indian cottons 
from the 18th century onwards, which soon came to compete with European prod-
ucts.192 In fact, the Indian subcontinent was the largest producer of cotton textiles in 
the world at that time and Bengal was playing a crucial role in this regard.193 
 Through the Industrial Revolution, however, Britain became the uncontested leader 
in the production and trade of textiles.194 With the advent of mechanised power 
looms, yarn and fabric would now be manufactured in large factories in the urban 
areas that produced for mass markets in England and in other parts of the world.195 
Whereas, before the Industrial Revolution, production of textiles was dominated by 
small-scale, often domestic manufacture by skilled spinners and weavers, the new, 
heavily mechanised textile industry was characterised by the division of labour be-
tween skilled technicians, who installed and maintained the machines and controlled 
the overall operations of the factories, and low-skilled workers, who were involved in 
the labour-intensive operation of the machines. The technology soon spread to coun-
tries in Continental Europe but also to other parts of the world, a process, which was 
                                            
190  Wilde (2003), p. 10 
191  Chassagne (1991), p. 25 
192  Lemire (2003), p. 493 
193  Ibid., p. 494, Quddus and Rashid (2000), p. 61 
194  Farnie (1990), p. 151 
195  On technological change in the British textile industry see Musson (1976, p. 417). 
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partly driven by British exporters of textile machinery;196 furthermore, skilled British 
technicians played a considerable role in the expansion of the textile industry in the 
US and – towards the latter part of the 19th century – in India, where Indian investors 
built up a high number of mills catering to the market in the subcontinent.197 More 
eastwards, Japan became a further important centre of textile manufacture, and in 
the aftermath of World War II, the NIEs in East Asia – namely South Korea, Hong 
Kong, Taiwan and Singapore – started to develop their own export-oriented textile 
industries. It was in these years that not only the trade in yarns and fabrics but also in 
garments would become increasingly global. The following paragraphs detail some of 
these developments. 
4.2 The development of the garment trade until 1995 
Compared to the production of yarn and fabric, the production of garments is less 
capital-intensive and thus relies more on the extensive use of labour. For this reason, 
the garment industry is of even more migratory nature than the industrial production 
of yarn and fabric. When the production of garments in North America and Western 
Europe started to be too expensive in the 1950s and early 1960s, it was relocated to 
Japan and later on, mainly in the 1970s and 1980s, to the East Asian NIEs. The next 
wave of relocations, primarily occurring in the 1980s, took the garment industry to 
mainland China and several countries in South and Southeast Asia and, later on, 
also to countries in Latin America.198 The latest relocation differed from the previous 
ones in two important respects: First, it did not mainly result from rising wages in the 
NIEs but rather from import quota imposed on garments from East Asia by govern-
ments in the West. These quantitative limits on imports of specific product categories 
of garments, i.e. of trousers, jackets or underwear, were designed by these countries 
under the so-called Multi Fibre Agreement (MFA) of 1974 in order to reduce competi-
tion from countries with lower wages, which were threatening the remnants of their 
own clothing industry.199 Second, the relocation mainly affected one single element of 
the entire supply chain of the garment business: only the manufacturing part of the 
commodity chain, the so-called CTM production, i.e. cutting, making and trimming, 
was outsourced, whereas the more profitable technology-intensive segments were 
                                            
196  Farnie (1990), p. 150, Jeremy (1998), p. 2 
197  Kiyokawa (1983), p. 97 
198  Gereffi (1999), p. 49 
199  Ibid., p. 51, Joshi (2002), p. 12 
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retained in the East Asian NIEs.200 This process was driven by the trader-turned-
manufacturers from these countries, who were building up integrated commodity 
chains.201 However, even these entrepreneurs were not in a position to manoeuvre 
freely, as they were involved in the so-called Original Equipment Manufacturing 
(OEM) part of the supply chain: They were supplying their goods to buyers, i.e. to 
retailers and branded marketers in the West, who continued to have a relatively tight 
control as lead firms over the design and distribution of the products, and, quite often, 
over marketing and merchandising.202 Depending on experience and on contacts to 
end buyers, many of the entrepreneurs gradually became full-package suppliers, who 
had themselves the control over design, merchandising and marketing.203  
4.3 The development of the garment trade after 1995 
The MFA, which had been formulated under the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) in 1974, was finally abrogated in 1995 when it was succeeded by the 
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC).204 This agreement emanated from the 
Uruguay Round process and prescribed an incremental phase out of the quota sys-
tem, which meant that exporting nations would be allowed to constantly increase their 
exports in the restricted categories up to the end of 2004, when the trade was entirely 
liberalised.205  
In order to partly protect developing countries from the effects of liberalisation and, 
perhaps more importantly, to contain the growth of Chinese exports, both the US and 
the EU started to reduce trade barriers for imports from developing countries: The US 
entered into a number of free trade agreements: Whereas the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) facilitated imports from Mexico, the Trade and Develop-
ment Act (TDA) laid the foundation for countries from the Caribbean, Latin America 
and the Sub-Saharan countries to enjoy zero-duty preferential access to the US but 
also compelled them to partly open up their markets for fabric from the US.206 The EU 
allowed a number of Least Developing Countries (LDC) to profit from unrestricted 
access to the clothing market in the EU under the Generalised System of Prefer-
ences (GSP). This scheme provided incentives for countries to improve backward-
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linkages of the garment industry through its “rules of origin”, which required that a 
higher share of the value-added of products imported to the EU had to result from 
production processes located in the exporting country itself. Whereas the growth of 
the garment industry in many countries had been based on garments being assem-
bled from raw materials imported from more industrialised countries, the GSP regula-
tions thus were aimed at acting as incentives for manufacturers to increasingly use 
locally produced yarn, fabric and accessories.207 
In any event, the ATC basically resulted in more competition between producing 
countries, even though the global trade went on to grow in the decade after 1995. 
The increase in competition among Asian countries under the ATC mainly resulted 
from the rising exports from China. In 2002, when the ATC made garment imports be 
liberalised by 18 percent, China increased its exports to the US by more than 120 
percent.208 Women’s bras were one of the categories coming out of quota in 2002, 
and it was from China, from where many buyers started to source this item.209 Further 
competition arose from manufacturers in India and Pakistan, whose exports had 
been strongly constrained by the MFA and increased, in 2002, by 23 and 15 percent 
respectively.210 
The decade after the formulation of the ATC in 1995, however, did not only result in 
more competition but also brought two further major changes in the global garment 
production regime: In fact, competition in the global garment production regime had, 
for many years, mainly been dominated by the buyers’ concerns with regard to price, 
quality and lead times. However, with the emergence of social movements in West-
ern countries that denounced labour conditions in the garment industry the world 
over, buyers had to increasingly consider ethical and social standards of production 
from the mid-1990s onwards, a tendency, which was not only backed by the ILO and 
many academic institutions and labour administrations of Western countries but also 
owed to changing consumer preferences, some of which were increasingly critical of 
sweatshop labour conditions.211 This movement led to a number of formal codes of 
conduct being formulated by retailers and major buyers, the implementation of which 
was to be monitored by organisations specialised in this field. For manufacturers in 
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the whole world, themselves pressurised by the rising competition emanating from 
the phase out of the MFA, this was an additional challenge to be met.212 
A further development in the years after 1995 was the growing concentration of 
power in the hands of buyers, which tried to maintain their profits even though cus-
tomers were increasingly price-sensitive.213 The major part of buying power – espe-
cially in the US – was concentrated in the hands of relatively few retailers such as 
Wal-Mart and JC Penney, who had increased their market share through mergers 
and acquisitions.214 As many of these retailers, along with branded marketers such as 
Nike and Liz Clairborne, tried to lower costs by reducing the number of intermediar-
ies, there were opportunities for both manufacturers and traders to gain more control 
over the supply chain. Quite early, this process had started with the traders from the 
NIEs, who now not only controlled design, merchandising and manufacturing but in-
creasingly promoted their own brands both in East Asia, the EU and the US, and thus 
became involved into Original Brand Manufacturing (OBM).215 However, these oppor-
tunities were not restricted to entrepreneurs from the NIEs but were available to all 
those with access to the social networks, skills and technologies necessary for this 
type of industrial upgrading. 
The growth of the garment industry in developing countries from the late 1970s on-
wards was, in most cases, facilitated by increasing economic liberalisation. Both Sri 
Lanka and Bangladesh are very important, though distinct examples in this regard. In 
virtually all countries liberalising their economies, this strategy included regulations 
that lowered the barriers for imports and provided incentives for private investments. 
Some countries that aimed at attracting FDI strongly liberalised the tax regimes, so 
the investors could recoup a major part of their profits, whereas other countries, 
which rather aimed at strengthening local entrepreneurs, facilitated access to capital. 
Economic liberalisation necessarily led to private entrepreneurs being given the op-
portunity to make use of the availability of a low-cost labour force that started to be 
engaged in operating the sewing machines, in cutting the fabric or in packaging the 
finished garments. People from rural areas, often young, unmarried women, migrated 
to the urban areas to work in the factories for wages that were – and still are – often 
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close to the opportunity costs of labour.216 In many countries, children were heavily 
involved in production. These characteristics of the industry are nothing recent. The 
development of the textile industry unleashed by the Industrial Revolution in Europe 
was based on a similar social dynamics: without the availability of an – often female – 
“labo[u]r force of almost maximum physical and economic vulnerability”, that moved 
from rural areas to the towns and also included a high number of children, the history 
of textile industry in Europe might have been quite a different one.217 
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5 The development of the political and administrative re-
gime in Sri Lanka 
5.1 The political and administrative regime before economic liberalisa-
tion 
In contrast to most other parts of the Indian subcontinent, the decolonisation proc-
ess in the then Ceylon had hardly been preceded by hostilities towards the colonial 
administration and was less accompanied by violent conflicts between the different 
political, ethnic and religious groups.218 The transition was smoothed by a number of 
continuities that outlasted the British colonial period, after Sri Lanka had gained inde-
pendence from the British empire in 1948 while still formally remaining under the Brit-
ish crown. On the one hand, the political elite basically remained the same: politics 
continued to be the preserve of the anglicised representatives of the Tamil and the 
Singhalese communities, which had increased their influence since the British had 
granted universal adult franchise in the early 1930s.219 Clearly, the subsequent socio-
political movement that pressed for Ceylonese autonomy and for increased social 
equity was initiated by the Singhalese elite and catered to the interests of the poorer 
strata of the Singhalese population, whose political support had become crucial for 
local politicians in the aftermath of the introduction of universal suffrage. But both be-
fore and immediately after independence, the political process was characterised by 
the expatriate, Singhalese and the Tamil elite Tamils cooperating each other.220 
On the other hand, political institutions after 1948 were based on a constitution that 
had been framed by the British and were aimed both at integrating minorities and at 
further expanding the welfare system that had become an important aspect of pre-
independence social policy.221 This rosy picture was corroborated by the positive fi-
nancial situation of the treasury and made many international observers assume that 
Sri Lanka would be the “first potential case of development success among newly 
independent nations”.222 
Already in the beginning of the 1950s, however, economic development stagnated, 
with incomes from exports decreasing and the financial situation of the treasury 
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worsening due to the high consumption of import goods. At the same time, the con-
sensus between the political elite began to fragment and from now the Singhalese-
Buddhist elites began to prevail both over the Anglicised, Christian elite and over the 
Tamil minority. This development was symbolised by the formation of the Sri Lanka 
Freedom Party (SLFP) in 1952 by S.W.R.D Bandaranaike, a descendant from a Sin-
ghalese bourgeois family, who had himself been a member of the governing UNP 
and now embarked on a strategy that used nationalist sentiment and socialist ideol-
ogy as means of gaining popular support.223 The new party and his leader came into 
power in 1956, a year, which was to mark a watershed in different aspects of policy 
making. First, the open economic policy of the UNP government was replaced by 
policies which aimed at developing an industrial infrastructure through the means of 
import-substitution. Second, the welfare orientation of social policy was tremendously 
increased.224 Third, the new government honoured its election promise and made 
Singhalese the only national and official language, a change, which marked the be-
ginning of the marginalisation of representatives of the Tamil communities from the 
North and East both in politics, in the administration and in the armed forces.225 
These policies were accentuated under Sirimavo Bandaranaike, who took over as 
prime minister after her husband had been murdered by an ultra-nationalist Buddhist 
monk in 1959. Apart from an intermezzo with a UNP government from 1965-1970, 
Sirimavo Bandaranaike and her party would stay in power up to 1977. Her post-1970 
coalition, which also included a number of representatives from the communist party, 
was fast to re-adjust some of the changes in economic policy introduced during the 
previous UNP government and to draft a new constitution which ended the formal 
authority of the British crown over a state now to be called “Socialist Republic of Sri 
Lanka”.226 
No longer than a year after the electoral victory of the SLFP, the new government 
was confronted with an insurgency by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), a na-
tionalist-Marxist political movement, which mainly consisted of young students from 
the Singhalese parts of the country.227 Both representatives of the government and 
experts were basically of the view that the main reason for the insurrection was youth 
unemployment, caused by an educational expansion, which wasn’t matched by re-
                                            
223  Jayasuriya (2000), p. 98, Jayawardena (2007), p. 349, Abeyratne (2004), p. 1303 
224  Kelegama (2006), p. 21 
225  Bose (2004), pp. 109-111, Jenne (2003), p. 227 
226  Ministry of Planning (1971) 
227  Abeyratne (2004), p. 1298 
  
 81 
spective economic growth.228 For the first time after 1948, Sri Lanka was on the brink 
of civil war, and even though the government was able to oppress the insurgency, 
the JVP uprising marked an increasing fragmentation of the state’s legitimacy. 
5.2 The political and administrative regime after economic liberalisation 
In the following years, the government tried in vain to address the perceived root 
causes of the insurgency but neither achieved to spur growth nor to substantially re-
duce unemployment. The opposing UNP thus came into power through a land-slide 
electoral victory in 1977; thereby, the party was not only backed by its traditional 
support base, the westernised, urban middle-class, but also by the poorer strata of 
the Sri Lankan society.229 This political support enabled the new government to initi-
ate sweeping reforms. On the one hand, the new cabinet decided to abolish the in-
ward-looking economic policies: it planned to embark on an export-led industrial 
strategy, to drastically reduce the protection of its own industry and to introduce 
structural adjustment programmes, which were to reduce the role of the state in in-
dustrial production and to partially dismantle the welfare-state.230 On the other hand, 
the electoral defeat inflicted on the ruling SLFP enabled the UNP to re-design the 
constitution in a way, which strengthened the position of the president and thus the 
power of its own leader, J.R. Jayawardena.231 
Whereas the overall economic effects of the changes in economic policy are dis-
puted, it is hardly debated that the economic reforms increased social inequalities in 
the following years.232 The small westernised middle-class was given more opportuni-
ties to get involved into global trade and industry but the less privileged strata of so-
ciety, living far away from the employment opportunities created in the urban areas, 
were more often than before living in poverty and suffering from poverty-induced 
malnutrition.233 The increase in social inequalities was paralleled by further political 
fragmentation: in 1988 and 1989, Sri Lanka experienced a renewed insurgency by 
the JVP, which was quelled by the UNP government under president Ranasinghe 
Premadasa; again, the uprising by frustrated Singhalese youths from rural areas cost 
thousands of lives. The main challenge to the state’s legitimacy would, however, start 
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to emanate from radical representatives of the Tamil community: the inability of the 
post-1977 government to address the concerns of the Tamils in the north and the 
east of the country, the rise of unemployment in these areas and the subsequent 
formation of militant groups sparked off a civil-war in 1983, which, since then, has 
cost several tens of thousands of lives, saw times of both intense warfare and cease-
fires and now belongs to the most protracted ones in the world. The most recent mili-
tary campaign started under the presidency of Mahinda Rajapaksa in 2006, which led 
the Sri Lankan army to recapture, by end of 2008, most territories previously lost to 
the LTTE, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.234 The war not only came at tremen-
dous humanitarian costs but also increased the migration of skilled human resources 
to other parts of the world and meant a constant drain of public resources from differ-
ent policy domains into warfare and a threat to sustainable economic development.235 
Most crucially, however, the war further decreased the legitimacy of the central state, 
which lost most of its ordering functions in the war zone and in the areas governed by 
the LTTE.236 In the other parts of the country, the war was increasingly used by the 
respective governments to divert public attention from their inability to address slack-
ening economic growth and corruption.237  
Whereas the UNP government addressed the alienation of the Tamil community 
from the central state through military means, it launched social-policy programmes 
in the southern part of the country that would mitigate the hardships for the poor 
caused by economic liberalisation and the partial dismantling of the welfare-state.238 
President Premadasa from the UNP, in power from 1988 to 1993 and under tremen-
dous pressure from the 1988/89 uprising, thus initiated schemes to take economic 
growth to the rural areas through programmes for electrification, housing and job 
creation.239 Even though these measures were popular among most sections of the 
Singhalese community, state institutions were further weakened under Premadasa by 
increasingly ruthless autocracy, political patronage and crony capitalism, which was 
aimed at strengthening the power of the UNP.240 After Premadasa was killed by the 
LTTE in 1993, not only had the animosities between the two main parties increased 
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but even the UNP itself was fractured, which forced it to enter changing political coali-
tions and finally to rely on a cabinet with 91 ministers in 1994.241 
In the same year, the UNP lost the elections and had to give way to the first SLFP 
government since 1977. Under the new government controlled by Chandrika Banda-
ranaike-Kumaratunga, the daughter of two former prime ministers, the weakening of 
state institutions continued and the war in the north came to a new climax in 1997. 
After a period with a relatively stable coalition, president Bandaranaike-Kumaratunga 
had to accept a co-habitation government in 2001, when the opposition UNP won the 
elections. In order to bring her party fully back into the cabinet, she entered a political 
agreement with the JVP, the movement behind the insurgencies of 1970 and 1988.242 
This strategy prepared the way for a former labour minister, Mahinda Rajapaska, to 
become president of the country with a waver-thin margin in the elections of 2005.243 
As promised in his election manifesto, the government soon engaged in a major mili-
tary campaign against the LTTE, which made most international observers criticise 
the human rights record of Sri Lanka;244 at the same time, nepotism and coalitional 
politics reached new heights: several of the president’s family members were taken 
into the cabinet or into high-ranking administrative positions, and the cabinet was 
enlarged to accommodate more than 100 politicians, which duly reflects the insecure 
political backing of the president even in times of intense warfare that has the support 
of the majority of the Singhalese population.245 
The process of political fragmentation, mainly but not exclusively spurred by the ef-
fects of civil war, was paralleled by a substantial erosion of the capacity of Sri 
Lanka’s administrative system to implement public policies. At the time of independ-
ence, administrative weaknesses partly resulted from the lacking accountability of 
public servants, which were not duly overseen by the parliament and by other watch-
dog bodies.246 In the following decades, the administration’s weakening capacity to 
implement public policies, however, mainly resulted from increasing politicisation, 
which was itself the effect of a number of institutional transitions: first and quite early, 
the implementation of long-term oriented development policies was undermined by 
the formulation of short-term measures, many of which were set by politicians using 
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the welfare state to gain merit “by the giving of alms”.247 Second, the social composi-
tion of the public service started to be increasingly influenced by politicians: at the 
time of independence, Ceylon’s public service was controlled by a cadre of elite civil 
servants, which were clearly at the centre of governance and were appointed, trans-
ferred, dismissed and disciplined by the comparatively independent Public Service 
Commission. The relatively insulated position of these civil servants decreased with 
the growing number of public servants from other categories, many of which lacked 
the elitist social backgrounds of the civil servants and often were recruited on political 
grounds, and virtually ended with the transfer of the powers of the Public Service 
Commission to the Cabinet of Ministers in 1972.248 Third, implementation of policies 
and regulations was more and more depending on potential political linkages of the 
organisations and the individuals concerned. An employer breaking labour-law, for 
instance, did not have to fear administrative sanctions, as long as his contacts to poli-
ticians at the local or at the national level were intact.249 
Political analysts generally agree that the extent of politicisation of the administra-
tion increased during the years of president Premadasa.250 Most visibly, the overall 
employment in the state sector rose by 15 percent during 1989-1993, which made Sri 
Lanka the country with the comparatively biggest public sector in Asia.251 Less obvi-
ous but similarly crucial was the growing partisan control over public servants, who 
were at times personally accountable to the president, having to by-pass their minis-
ters.252 Thus many projects, most prominently the 200 Garment Factories Programme 
and the large-scale poverty programmes of the early 1990s, were basically not for-
mulated because they were in line with a long-term development strategy and were 
regarded to be feasible but rather as they promised to yield visible results within the 
shortest time possible.253 Correspondingly, the implementation of projects and pro-
grammes was constantly at risk of failing and was penetrated by political patronage, 
as analyses of the mentioned programmes showed.254 In 2001, the negative effects of 
partisan influence on public servants led the parliament to pass the 17th Amendment 
to the constitution, which was meant to partly restore the independence of the public 
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service.255 Its implementation, however, remained difficult and was made virtually 
possible by increasing warfare after 2005, which was, in fact, paralleled by a further 
growth of the public sector and rising concerns about wide-spread corruption among 
state officials.256 
The political and administrative regime of Sri Lanka has become tremendously 
characterised not only by over-politicisation and decreasing administrative capacity 
but also by a constant flow of aid from multi- and bilateral donor agencies. After 1948, 
the then Ceylon, integrated into the global economy through its exports of commodi-
ties, mainly received aid from other Commonwealth countries under the Colombo 
Plan but also from the US, which tried to strengthen its ties with the newly independ-
ent countries and thus rendered its support to develop the economic infrastructure.257 
In 1951, a first World Bank mission visited the country, advising the planners not to 
alter the economic structure that relied on exports of primary goods and signed a pro-
ject which was to support the power infrastructure.258 
Soon, decision makers in Sri Lanka had to realise that aid was disbursed on the 
grounds of ideological and geo-political motives: the Bandaranaike government, com-
ing into power in 1956 and more inclined towards strong state involvement in indus-
trial development, found itself faced by the strong critique of the World Bank, which 
reduced its aid and made other countries in the West reduce their financial support, 
the US discontinuing its aid efforts entirely.259 At the same time, aid from the socialist 
block, mainly from Eastern Europe and China increased.260 These socialist ties were 
to sustain into the 1970s, when Sri Lanka was governed by the leftist SLFP and ran 
into even greater difficulties in getting the support from the World Bank and the major 
bilateral donors from the West.261 
The economic reforms of 1977 and the subsequent structural adjustment pro-
grammes were not only highly welcomed by these countries but were also directly 
supported by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund at an unprece-
dented level, allowing the new government to make aid a major element of develop-
ment policy.262 In the aftermath of the end of the Cold War and of the increasing war 
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against the LTTE, the influx of aid to Sri Lanka started to decrease after 1990 but 
donors backed economic reforms and supported social development programmes, 
which would mitigate the hardships of economic liberalisation for the poor.263 It was 
from these years, that donors began to increasingly coordinate their activities and not 
only to influence economic and social policies but also to ask the government to im-
prove the overall governance of the country.264 Furthermore, at the level of planning 
itself, the process to design the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers has led to the 
formulation of development plans, which are not only aimed at getting the support of 
donor agencies for high-profile projects but are also structured along the lines de-
signed by the World Bank and are normally written by consultants working outside 
the public service.265 Following the Tsunami, which hit many parts of the coastal ar-
eas in Sri Lanka, aid agencies again dramatically increased their funding. These 
funds, however, mainly came in the form of humanitarian aid and were generally in-
vested into rehabilitation programmes.266 The funds of one of these programmes 
would also be used to start training centres for the garment industry. Long before we, 
however, enter into an analysis of the respective events, I now turn to the education 
and training regime of Sri Lanka. 
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6 The development of the education and training regime in 
Sri Lanka 
6.1 The education and training regime before economic liberalisation 
At the beginning of the 20th century, Ceylon’s educational system mirrored the seg-
regation of the colonial society into two economic and cultural spheres: Fee levying, 
denominational English medium schools that were designed along the lines of British 
grammar schools exclusively existed for the predominantly Christian and Anglicised 
indigenous elites.267 These schools prepared their students for the universities in Eng-
land or for the few higher education organisations in the island. In fact, as both the 
expatriate and the indigenous elite of the then Ceylon generally sent their breed to 
universities in England, the growth of university education in the colony itself was 
slow. At the end of British rule, there were only the Medical College, the Law College 
and the University College, which prepared students for examinations held by the 
University of London.268 It was through these educational organisations that the colo-
nial subjects could enter the socially prestigious positions in the modern sectors of 
the labour market, which consisted, at that time, of the local administrative service 
and of the companies exporting commodity goods to Western markets.269 
The majority of the Ceylonese population, however, attended inferior elementary 
schools that operated in the indigenous languages.270 These schools were – to a cer-
tain extent – alphabetising the masses but did not allow them to proceed on the edu-
cational ladder and thus prevented them from entering the socially prestigious posi-
tions in the modern sectors of the labour market.271 In the second part of the 19th cen-
tury, a number of training organisations were developed which, in the widest sense, 
continued this alternative ladder of education and can be considered to be the first 
educational organisations formally imparting technical skills in Sri Lanka: after 1859, 
Evangelical missionaries started to establish industrial schools that provided agricul-
tural and craft training. In the years up to 1925, 125 of them were established both in 
urban and rural areas and were, after having run into financial difficulties, subse-
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quently taken over by the Department of Education.272 These industrial schools had 
initially been dedicated to overarching educational and socio-political goals but in-
creasingly focused on preparing their clientele for employment in the industry in the 
years between the two world wars, when a modern, state-funded industrial sector 
was gradually emerging. The schools thus came under the Department of Industries 
and were complemented by skill formation programmes by various government de-
partments. These organisations provided training both in general and specialised 
craft and operative skills for their employees to make them manage and maintain 
public utilities such as government printing offices and railway workshops.273 
In order to train technicians, the colonial administration opened the Government 
Technical College in 1893, which was designed along the lines of the Technical 
Schools in Britain and was administered by the Department of Education.274 This col-
lege provided their trainees with a more elitist technical education that was strongly 
oriented towards its models in the West: the college offered a student exchange pro-
gramme with similar colleges in England and, after 1933, started to prepare students 
for the Associate Membership examinations of the three major professional institu-
tions in Britain, which enabled the successful candidates to eventually qualify as 
chartered engineers.275 Thus, a dualistic system of vocational and technical education 
and training emerged: on the one hand, there existed practically oriented training or-
ganisations that were attended by students coming from inferior elementary schools, 
that were not operated by the educational administration and that prepared students 
for positions at the craft level in the public sector. On the other hand, there existed 
elitist technical education organisations that followed highly academic curricula, that 
were governed by the educational administration and that prepared their students for 
the higher technical positions. This strong dichotomy would from now characterise 
the emerging formal skill formation regime in the country. 
In 1931, some years after universal suffrage had been granted to the Ceylonese, 
the first chairman of the Executive Committee of Education in the State Council, 
C.W.W. Kannangara, initiated a range of reforms, which revolutionised the traditional 
colonial education system: every child in the country was to have the right of free 
education up to university. The ideological core of these reforms was „[to] leave the 
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patrimony of the rich to the inheritance of the poor”, the premise of the then socio-
political movement that pressed for Ceylonese autonomy and for increased social 
equity.276 This movement was initiated by the Singhalese elite but mainly catered to 
the interests of the poorer strata of the Singhalese population, whose political support 
had become crucial for local politicians after the introduction of universal suffrage.277 
In the direct aftermath of these reforms and thus already before the end of British 
rule in 1948, enrolments into primary and secondary schools strongly increased and 
they were boosted by further reforms. In the decade after independence, all govern-
ment schools were made to teach in the vernacular languages and, in 1961, private 
denominational schools were nationalised; again, both reforms reflected the weak-
ened leverage of the Anglicised elites and the increasing political power of the dis-
tinctly Singhalese elites, who wanted the educational system to contribute to the de-
velopment of an autonomous, Singhalese and socially equitable nation.278 Similarly, 
the university education system underwent dramatic changes, which were closely 
linked to the expanding number of secondary-school leavers wanting to enter the 
higher education system. At the time of independence, entry into university was still 
restricted to a limited number, as there were not many English medium schools which 
prepared students for the English medium universities.279 But the post-1956 SLFP 
government decided to introduce programmes in the vernacular languages and to 
establish, practically over night, more universities and to transform two centres of 
Buddhist learning into universities.280 These reforms had, indeed, considerable ef-
fects: the number of university degrees awarded rose from 533 in 1959 to 4614 in 
1968.281 The elitist monopoly of university education thus eroded, so that in 1976 40 
percent of students’ parents had a working class occupation background.282 But as 
there were not many science schools in most parts of the country for many years, the 
expansion of the university system was most articulate in arts and social sciences.283 
All these reforms caused a social demand for education which was soon to exceed 
population growth and to change the educational system more than educational pol-
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icy itself.284 In the first years after independence, high educational achievements 
were, in fact, related to social upward mobility. But although public opinion ascribed 
individual socio-economic advancement to educational careers, this type of mobility 
was not so much a consequence of educational expansion but rather a result of the 
expanding number of jobs in the public sector that were assigned on the basis of 
educational qualifications.285 As, however, the jobs with attractive salaries and corre-
sponding social prestige were soon dramatically outnumbered by secondary school 
leavers and university graduates, employers soon asked for ever higher educational 
qualifications.286 In fact, the number of jobs in the modern sector increased, between 
1951 and 1971, by no more than 1.5 percent per annum on average, which was low 
compared to the increasing number of secondary school leavers in these years.287 
Nevertheless, the reputation of the educational system as an instrument for social 
upward mobility was not curtailed. Thus, especially students from the lower socio-
economic strata continued to be prepared to bear the opportunity costs of education 
and to hope for social advancement, even if it was to be less and less realistic. This 
increasing demand for education successively made the value of educational creden-
tials on the labour market decline from the 1960s.288 
Even though the Kannangara reforms had revolutionised the colonial education 
system and had laid the foundations of the expansion of the education system up to 
the university level in the post-independence period, they did not contribute to a simi-
lar expansion of technical and vocational education and training organisations. In 
fact, the traditional apprenticeship system, which had dominated skill formation in the 
largely informal, rural labour market, was undermined by the spread of general edu-
cation, and the expansion of the formal skill formation system stagnated, as it did not 
offer any comparable opportunities for social mobility to its trainees and as it was, for 
long, no political issue through which politicians attempted to gain popular support.289 
Beyond that, the reforms did not undermine the dichotomy between the practically 
and the academically oriented skill formation organisations, which was, in fact, further 
corroborated by the policies of the governments prior to the economic liberalisations 
in 1977. 
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 The first post-independence government led by the elitist and Anglicised UNP did 
not consider vocational education a priority and only established some academically 
oriented Junior Technical Schools and Junior Polytechnical Institutes under the Min-
istry of Education. Under its rule, the first engineering degrees by a Ceylonese uni-
versity were awarded in 1953, after the Faculty of Engineering had been established 
under the University of Ceylon.290 Initially, only 25 students were enrolled annually.291 
Entry into the higher technical education system thus remained virtually confined to 
the young of the upper socio-economic strata of society, who attended one of the few 
science oriented secondary schools in the country.292 
It was only with the coming into power of the SLFP and the advent of import substi-
tuting industrial policies in 1956 that practically oriented vocational education pro-
grammes were expanded.293 In contrast to the UNP government, the SLFP govern-
ment designated the Labour Department to be the key agency for this expansion. 
This department therefore started to estimate skill needs of the nascent public and 
private industries with manpower-planning techniques and to set up a wide range of 
training programmes, focussing on the accelerated training of skilled workers for the 
industry.294 A next phase of expansion of vocational education took place under the 
left-wing SLFP government between 1970 and 1977, which aimed at reducing edu-
cated unemployment after the riots of 1971 led by young insurgents in the South of 
the country: the new government introduced pre-vocational studies at the junior sec-
ondary level to familiarise students with the world of work and also established the 
National Apprenticeship Board.295 This organisation was to formalise industrial ap-
prenticeship training, which, up to that moment, had primarily existed in some of the 
private, often British owned companies.296 Only gradually, the SLFP government also 
expanded higher technical education: after 1956, the intake into the faculty of engi-
neering, located on the premises of the Peredeniya Campus of the University of Cey-
lon, was increased from 25 to 50, which was still low compared to other disciplines.297 
At the same time, the earlier Government Technical College was gradually developed 
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into a second technical university campus, which was located in Moratuwa, some 30 
kilometres south of Colombo, and made to offer a further engineering degree course 
in 1972.298 
6.2 The education and training regime after economic liberalisation 
6.2.1 The overall development of education and training 
The economic reforms of 1977 were the most far-reaching policy changes in Sri 
Lanka’s post-independence history. Necessarily, the incentives created for the pro-
motion of the private sector, the partial curtailment of the welfare system and the 
subsequent overall increase in social inequality had dramatic consequences for the 
further development of the education and training regime of the country. 
First, the drop of public expenditures for educational development and social pro-
grammes, which reached an all time low in 1985, made overall literacy and numeracy 
rates decline for the first time since approximately 1950; children from socio-
economically more disadvantaged families were most affected by this develop-
ment.299 Second, the public education system started to lose its importance as a 
mechanism which screened individuals on the basis of a given set of requirements 
and allocated them to respective positions in labour market. This was not only due to 
the fact that higher poverty incidence made access to education more difficult but 
also as the role of the state as the main employer of school leavers and university 
graduates declined: whereas in 1977, 40 percent of employees in the formal sector 
were employed by the public sector, the respective figure was at 33 percent in 
1992.300 Nevertheless, school leavers coming from the lower socio-economic strata 
continued to seek state employment: certainly, such positions were considered so-
cially prestigious and secure;301 beyond that, however, employment in the higher 
echelons of the private sector could normally only be required educational credentials 
but also traits of the higher middle-classes, e.g. fluent English skills and broad, west-
ernised general knowledge, which were not imparted to a sufficient extent by the 
general education system.302 More than 90 percent of employment opportunities cre-
ated in the aftermath of the opening of the economy in 1977 were, indeed, created in 
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the private sector but these jobs, often in the manufacturing industries, were labour-
intensive, neither required high level educational qualifications nor the traits of the 
higher middle-classes and didn’t provide secure and comparatively satisfactory 
wages.303 The inflation of educational credentials was thus further fuelled by the eco-
nomic liberalisation, not despite but because of the fact that social mobility through 
the means of educational qualifications had become restricted.304 This development 
further increased the public pressure to make curricula more academic, the extent of 
rote-learning and the importance of private tutoring.305 
A third structural change within the Sri Lankan educational system, which was 
strongly interrelated with increasing competition with regard to the entry of school 
leavers into the labour market, was the re-emergence of private education and train-
ing organisations after 1977. In fact, such organisations had been officially banned in 
Sri Lanka since the early 1960s, when the then government attempted to undermine 
the elitist admission procedures of private denominational schools. After 1977, how-
ever, when social inequalities were rising again, sending children to private schools 
outside the deteriorating public educational system became an important strategy of 
parents from the old and the new upper middle-classes, which were profiting from a 
more open economy.306 In their eyes, the credentials even of the more privileged 
state schools had lost their social standing and no longer guaranteed the entry into 
an overseas university or to a high-paying position in the private sector, both inside 
and outside Sri Lanka. Private education and training organisations were attractive to 
this part of the population, as these schools regulated entry not only by the means of 
academic criteria but also through fees and were thus not affordable to the poorer 
strata of society.307 The ban on private schools was never officially abrogated, and 
the Ministry of Education, thus, never obtained the competency to accredit private 
schools. Instead, these organisations, mainly international schools and foreign de-
gree-awarding organisations, are now being treated as conventional commercial ven-
tures, which have to register along the lines of the Companies Act. Private organisa-
tions have also developed in the field of training and there the respective ministry set 
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up a mechanism, which compels these organisations to get registered and accredited 
if they want to profit from subsidies or to award nationally recognised certificates. The 
absolute number of private training centres cannot be determined exactly; evidence, 
however, suggests that the supply is strongly interrelated with social demand and 
thus with the dynamics in the labour market.308 
A fourth crucial development within the post-1977 education system was the in-
creasing importance of donor agencies in the sector. Indeed, their involvement had 
existed before but the influx of aid grew rapidly after the opening of the economy, and 
it was mainly the World Bank and, in its footsteps, the Asian Development Bank, 
which were spearheading this surge. In most of the 1980s, the focal point of donor 
intervention was the vocational education system, which was considered to be lag-
ging behind other countries in the region.309 At the same time, donors also supported 
the establishment of the Open University and its development of vocationally oriented 
programmes.310 Corresponding with the policy change within the Education Depart-
ment of the World Bank in the 1980s, the World Bank began to substantially reduce 
its support to vocational education and to increase its lending to general education.311 
Towards the end of the 1990s, the Asian Development Bank resumed its lending to 
the vocational education sector; at the same time, the overall university system, 
which hadn’t received any major aid since the beginning of the 1980s, was made a 
beneficiary of two major projects by the two multilateral banks.312 In the following, I 
briefly some key trends in the development of technical and vocational education and 
training. 
6.2.2 The development of technical and vocational education and training 
In 1976, only 0.4 percent of all students of the entire Sri Lankan education and 
training system were enrolled in vocational and technical education and training; this 
share was lower than the respective figures of any other country in the whole of Asia 
at that time.313 Therefore, the new government coming into power in 1977 embarked 
on a strategy to increase enrolment at all levels of this segment of the education and 
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training system through higher total capital investments, a strategy, which coincided 
with the willingness of donors to finance respective projects.314 
One important emphasis of government intervention lay on the expansion of the 
practically oriented skill formation programmes. A number of these programmes 
aimed at training skilled workers for the emerging export-oriented industries. As the 
development of such programmes was considered to be a priority by many policy 
makers and also by donor agencies, new projects were implemented under different 
ministries:315 two subsequent training projects for the construction industry, the First 
and the Second Vocational Training Project, came under the Ministry of Local Gov-
ernment, Housing and Construction and were financed by the World Bank, which 
aimed at training both semi skilled operators and mechanics and supervisors in the 
construction industry.316 Another project that established a training centre for middle-
level technicians in Katunayake, close to the newly opened Free Trade Zone, came 
under the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Employment and was supported by UNDP.317 
The practically oriented skill formation programmes that had traditionally been offered 
by the Ministry of Labour were further expanded under government patronage but 
only enjoyed very little backing from donors. In contrast to the skill formation pro-
grammes that catered to the export industry, these programmes aimed at "providing 
technical/vocational training to unemployed youth and school leavers, to become 
employed and self-employed” and thus had a distinctively socio-political focus.318 This 
focus on training unemployed youth, many of which were living in rural areas, implied 
that these skill formation programmes were, in contrast to those catering to the 
emerging export industry, conducted with very limited contact to the representatives 
of the private sector.319 
Another important emphasis of government intervention lay on the expansion of the 
more academically oriented skill formation programmes. On the one hand, the Tech-
nical Schools under the Ministry of Education were supported by the Technical Edu-
cation Project that was jointly funded by SIDA, UNDP and ADB.320 On the other hand, 
the government established, with aid from a number of donors, the Open University, 
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which was mandated to offer a wide range of fee-levying technical, vocational, and 
science based courses at the certificate, diploma and degree level through distance 
education methods. The reasons for the government to establish the Open University 
were certainly distinct from those underlying its patronage to other skill formation 
programmes. In fact, the Open University was aimed at being instrumental in lower-
ing the social barriers to university entrance, which were still enormous in 1977: only 
5.9 percent of all applicants gained admission and only one percent of the age group 
of 20-24 was enrolled into university education.321 Thus, there was strong pressure 
upon the politicians, who were accused by the opposition to further social inequali-
ties.322 As the World Bank, however, was of the view that the expansion of the univer-
sity education system should not occur through a further increase of enrolments into 
arts and social sciences and as, at the same time, the existing science and engineer-
ing faculties lobbied the government to retain the elitist entry system to their faculties, 
the introduction of technical, vocational, and science based university courses at the 
Open University that were open to anyone but weren’t operating under the University 
Grants Commission was a solution acceptable to all the main stakeholders involved. 
The implementation of these plans, however, met with a number of technical difficul-
ties. The main problem was high student attrition, which resulted from organisational 
and pedagogical weaknesses and from many students finding it hard to combine 
work and education.323 
Despite the limited success of the Open University, the annual intake into formal 
skill formation programmes started to rise, most prominently so between the years 
1981 and 1983.324 The increasing number of training programmes was met by a re-
spective social demand, which followed from changes on the labour market: in fact, 
the opening of the economy resulted in the wages of technically and vocationally 
trained persons becoming partly higher than those of clerical and allied grades.325 
The value of credentials from formal skill formation programmes thus increased, as 
they provided school leavers from the general education system with the opportunity 
to gain further comparative advantage over their competitors in the labour market. 
Paradoxically, this dynamics would lead to most skill formation programmes becom-
ing more academically oriented. 
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As briefly discussed above, the enthusiasm by the decision makers at the helm of 
the World Bank with regard to the potential effects of vocational education and train-
ing gave way to a more sceptical attitude vis-à-vis state-funded vocational training 
towards the end of the 1980s both at the global level and in Sri Lanka itself. Echoing 
the World Bank’s respective key document of these years, the World Bank funded 
Marga Study concluded that overall productivity of employees in Sri Lanka could 
more efficiently be enhanced through a combination of general education and on-the-
job training than through state-funded training programmes, which were too aca-
demic and were not oriented towards the demand from the labour market. 326 
In these years, the World Bank, in conjunction with other donors, therefore initiated 
a number of relatively low-cost technical assistance projects, which aimed at enhanc-
ing the involvement of the private sector into coordination and delivery of training. 
The most straightforward attempt was the plan to establish a Skills Development 
Fund, which would be formed along the lines of “similar successful schemes in Sin-
gapore, Malysia and Korea” and was to fund in-firm training programmes through 
loans and grants.327 This scheme, which was recommended by the staff of the Bank 
in October 1992, was taken up by the Industrialisation Commission and by the Minis-
try of Industry, Science and Technology and was subsequently endorsed by the 
Prime Minister at the end of 1993, who appointed a shadow board of the fund.328 The 
draft regulations which were produced by this body were, however, never ratified.329 
The idea was taken up again by the Kumaratunga government in 1996, which pro-
vided Rs. 100 million in the 1999 budget to establish the fund but its implementation 
failed again due to a lack of interest from the part of the industry.330 
Another donor-backed attempt to involve the private sector into the planning and 
the delivery of skill formation programmes and, at the same time, to strengthen the 
overall coordination of all agencies in this policy domain, was the creation of the Ter-
tiary and Vocational Education Commission (TVEC), which was also to include a 
number of private sector representatives.331 During the first years in the life of this 
organisation, however, the ability of the commission to come up to the expectations 
of the government and of donors was constrained by the fact that it did not have the 
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authority to coordinate long-standing training organisations, all of which were under 
the purview of different ministries. It thus suffered from the same weakness as the 
National Human Resources Development Council (NHRDC), which had been 
founded in 1987 and was re-established in 1997 to give advice on “national human 
resources policy”: this body comprised, among others, the secretaries of all ministries 
involved into education and training, labour and economic development, all of which 
were not interested in coordinating their activities;332 the necessary quorum at the 
NHRDC was, therefore, never reached due to the absence of the council members.333 
Whereas the NHRDC stayed a powerless body even after 1997, TVEC’s position 
was somewhat strengthened, when president Kumaratunga decided to take the ma-
jority of training agencies under one ministry in 1994 and subsequently recom-
mended to extend TVEC’s legal mandate.334 In the wake of this legal change, TVEC 
started to formulate industry-specific Vocational Education and Training Plans in in-
tervals of three to five years, which were based on extensive industry surveys and 
took into account the perspective of entrepreneurs in the private sector.335 Thus, it 
was hoped, TVEC would contribute to the orientation of the state-funded skill forma-
tion programmes towards the needs of the private sector. The relevance of the TVEC 
plans was, however, undermined by the training targets spelled out by numerous 
governments in their national development plans.336 Even though the latter docu-
ments were generally hurriedly formulated by hired consultants in order to secure the 
funds from donor agencies and lacked the analytical depth of the training plans by 
TVEC, it was these documents which started to have a great impact on the opera-
tions of training agencies. TVEC was thus never in a position to enforce its own train-
ing targets both in the agencies under its own ministry let alone in the agencies under 
other ministries, which were all operating according to the guidelines of the national 
development plans. The only instrument available to TVEC to implement the plans 
was to distribute grants to public and private training organisations, through which 
these organisations could upgrade their infrastructure. But as funds were limited and 
insecure, the implementation of the targets as spelled out in the training plans was far 
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from possible.337 In fact, TVEC did not even engage in monitoring the progress of 
their implementation.338 
Both aims of TVEC, to orient skill formation programmes towards the needs of the 
private sector and to coordinate the different agencies providing skill formation pro-
grammes, were challenged by the establishment of the Vocational Training Authority 
(VTA) in 1994. The VTA, the brainchild of the then Minister of Labour and Vocational 
Training and the future president of the country, Mahinda Rajapaksa, was to mainly 
impart training to rural, unemployed youth, and thus revealed that socio-political ra-
tionales were still important for training policy, notably in those years, when the 
Presidential Task Force on Technical Education and Vocational Training Reforms 
eventually stated that "training should no longer be perceived as some kind of wel-
fare support for school dropouts or a temporary alternative to a job that keeps the 
unemployed occupied".339 Within only three years, VTA opened about two hundred 
Rural Vocational Training Centres (RVTC), “pursuing its ambitious and apparently 
politically motivated target of establishing 500 RVTCs”, and thus became Sri Lanka’s 
training agency with the largest enrolment.340 VTA received continued attention from 
the political establishment, which was increased when the former labour minister, 
Mahinda Rajapaksa, became president and announced, in his national development 
programme, that the number of institutes would be increased from 357 in 2009 to 875 
in 2016, and the number of students from 32’000 in 2009 to 75’000 in 2016.341 The 
expansion of VTA, donors and like-minded national experts complained, was mainly 
supply-driven and not efficient; the World Bank reported that only 2.7 percent of VTA 
trainees actually found employment within the first six months after passing out.342 
Instead of providing practical skills for the Sri Lankan local labour market, the system 
was, the critics argued, rather a “formal path to gain more and more advanced quali-
fications with respect to specific vocational fields”.343 
Even though the foundation of VTA had been the result of agency by politicians and 
administrators who attempted to provide equal access to vocationally oriented cre-
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dentials and was certainly not the outcome of lobbying activities by private sector rep-
resentatives or of donor advice, the administrative heads of VTA tried to find ways to 
improve the links of their organisation with the private sector. In addition to involving 
private sector representatives on the board of VTA, the authority decided to form Vo-
cational Training Councils at the local level, which would mainly consist of private 
sector entrepreneurs and were to advise the VTA authorities on how to better cater to 
the needs of the local labour market.344 But as these councils were unable to actually 
influence the programmes of the training centres and as the private sector represen-
tatives in Sri Lanka were not interested in this type of time consuming interaction 
unless their business would have directly profited, the councils demised rapidly.345 In 
order to nevertheless enhance employability of students and to bolster the public 
reputation of the VTA training centres, job placement schemes and career guidance 
programmes were initiated, partly supported by development projects.346 
After the importance of TVEC had been considerably challenged by the establish-
ment of the VTA and its becoming the largest training agency in the country, the posi-
tion of the commission was enormously strengthened in the years after 2000, when 
ADB implemented its Skills Development Project.347 The most prominent component 
of the project was to introduce a National Vocational Qualifications (NVQ) Framework 
which was aimed at contributing to TVEC’s twin goals of both coordinating and stan-
dardising the skill formation programmes in Sri Lanka and of improving their rele-
vance with regard to the needs of the private sector.348 The framework, set up by the 
consultants and the representatives of the ministry in charge of vocational training, 
consisted of a set of seven hierarchically structured levels, leading from level 1 for 
training programmes which prepared students for working processes that were “lim-
ited in range” and “repetitive and familiar” up to level 7 for training programmes which 
prepared students for working processes that “require[d] a command of highly spe-
cialised technical or scholastic and basic research skills across a major discipline”.349 
As it was suggested by the consultants working for the project, it became TVEC’s 
mandate to accredit the national skills standards developed along the lines of the 
NVQ framework, to accredit the respective public and private training agencies that 
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planned to train according to these skill standards and to issue the respective certifi-
cates to students.350 
The formation of the NVQ framework implied that the authority of the VTA and of all 
other agencies under the ministry in charge of vocational training to independently 
design their own courses was undermined, as TVEC had been given the mandate to 
ensure that all skill standards were in line with the needs of the entrepreneurs from 
the private sector. In fact, under the ADB project itself, a high number of such skill 
standards and the respective curricula were jointly developed by the representatives 
of the training administration and of the private sector and were subsequently accred-
ited by TVEC.351 But even though the NVQ framework had come out from a donor 
driven process and was meant to strengthen TVEC as a coordinating agency, the 
development of the NVQ framework had also been furthered by other social forces 
within the education and training regime. Certainly, the NVQ rationale was attractive 
to both administrators and politicians for various reasons: first, the new system repre-
sented an alternative ladder for social mobility through educational structures, as the 
framework offered a ladder of qualifications to all those who did not succeed in the 
conventional, academically oriented education system. Second, this new system was 
outside the purview of the powerful Ministry of Education and the University Grants 
Commission, which controlled the entry into the university system. Third, it was 
hoped that this system would increase the social demand for vocational education 
and training in Sri Lanka. The private sector itself, whose needs were claimed to be 
the cornerstone of this process, was, however, not driving it. Ironically, donors, which 
had generally criticised that the system was driven by the social demand for aca-
demically oriented skill formation programmes and the respective credentials, had 
now helped the government of Sri Lanka to introduce a mechanism, which, in fact, 
would further accentuate this tendency. 
Of course, the dynamics resulting from the social demand for skill formation pro-
grammes which had a reputation of being academically oriented and thus promised 
entry into the socially more reputed positions also influenced the further development 
of agencies that had traditionally been involved in providing more academically ori-
ented skill formation programmes. Depending on their respective political leverage, 
these organisations maintained, increased or partly lost their comparatively more elit-
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ist social standing. One important aspect of the social standing of such organisations 
was their coming under the ministry in charge of higher education after 1995. The 
formation of a single ministry in charge of vocational training in that year would actu-
ally have entailed that the organisations providing training at the technician level 
would come under this ministry as well; however, the largest of these organisations, 
the Sri Lanka Institute of Advanced Technical Education (SLIATE) and the depart-
ments offering the National Diploma in Technology (NDT) programme at the Univer-
sity of Moratuwa, managed to remain outside the purview of the vocational training 
ministry, whose social standing the politically well organised students and teachers 
considered to be lower than that of the ministry in charge of higher education.352 
At the degree level, the technical universities in Peredeniya and Moratuwa re-
mained the most important and most prestigious ones; the reputation of their pro-
grammes was neither challenged by the Open University, whose programmes still 
struggled with limited social demand and high student attrition and were to profit from 
further donor support after 2005, nor the development of a third engineering faculty 
that was opened in 1999 at the university of Ruhuna, in the southern part of the 
country.353 The main reason for their high social prestige was their being allowed to 
retain their aristocratic seclusion in contrast to the other universities of the country, 
whose enrolment rates had been considerably increased. 
 In fact, the number of entrants into public universities increased from 4’688 to 
7’235 between 1988 and 1990, from there to 11’962 in 2000 and to 16’585 in 2005.354 
This growth, which was particularly strong in the years after 2000, was enabled, on 
the one hand, by the establishment of a number of new universities, two of which had 
originally been intended to lead to certificates and diplomas only, a strategy which 
had to be adjusted following student agitation.355 On the other hand, the government 
increased the pressure on the University Grants Commission (UGC) to admit more 
students to the existing universities, mainly to the arts and social science faculties. 
This pressure continued to rise under the Rajapaksa government, which planned to 
raise the number of degree-awarding institutes from 17 in 2007 to 24 in 2016 and the 
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number of passing out undergraduate students from 13’000 to 75’000.356 The impacts 
of this increase in enrolment rates were manifold: the most direct consequence of the 
expansion, taking place in times of a budget constrained by the constant war against 
the Tamil separatists, was the decrease in unit costs at universities, which affected 
the overall quality of instruction.357 At the same time, employability of students, which 
had been traditionally low in Sri Lanka, could not be enhanced, a problem which the 
authorities tried to mitigate through a number of job placement schemes, e.g. the 
Tharuna Aruna programme, and through a World Bank funded project to improve the 
quality and the relevance of undergraduate education.358 The lacking employability of 
students was interrelated with a decrease in the contribution of university education 
to social mobility during the 1990s.359 
Because of the continuously high political leverage of the socio-economically privi-
leged students of the two technical universities, these two degree-awarding organisa-
tions were, for many years, insulated from this process: entry to its engineering and 
physical science degree programmes continued to be characterised by a social se-
lection process that favoured students who came from the prestigious and large, es-
tablished urban schools and generally hailed from the more affluent families; accord-
ingly, graduation in these degree programmes was still strongly interrelated with high 
earnings, and comparatively few of the graduates remained unemployed.360 However, 
there was no certainty with regard to the social standing of these university pro-
grammes: in the late 1990s, for instance, the graduate students of the University of 
Moratuwa criticised the university’s head for compromising the exclusiveness of their 
educational programme, as he also signed the diploma of the NDT students. These 
irritations finally led to violent clashes between the two student groups that forced the 
authorities to close the campus for several months.361 In order to contain future vio-
lence, the authorities then decided to separate the NDT programmes from their re-
spective technical departments and to concentrate them under a separate entity, the 
Institute of Technology of the University of Moratuwa (ITUM) that was given the 
power “to conduct primarily the National Diploma of Technology Course and similar 
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technological courses”.362 This solution reflected the political leverage of the degree 
students at the few technical universities, which continued to constitute Sri Lanka’s 
educational organisations with the highest social standing. These events would also 
affect the institutional development of the out-of-firm skill formation regime of the 
garment industry, whose representatives had, by now, started to strongly interact with 
the textile and clothing department of the University of Moratuwa. These entrepre-
neurs will be an important topic of the next chapter, which elaborates on the historical 
development of the Sri Lankan garment production regime. 
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7 The development of the garment production regime in 
Sri Lanka 
7.1 Industrial development before economic liberalisation 
At the time of independence, Ceylon had a dual economic structure that was char-
acterised by the co-existence of a modern and a traditional economic sector: the 
modern sector consisted of the export-oriented plantation sector producing coconut, 
rubber and tea and of the related service activities, including banking, commerce, 
trade and transport. The traditional economic sector consisted of subsistence agricul-
ture, on which the majority of the population in the rural areas depended.363 It was 
thus a model-type of colonial economy with little formal industry, as manufactured 
products were imported from overseas, mainly from Britain. In the rural areas, some 
cottage industries existed and were a part of the traditional economic structure. One 
of the most important of these industries was the handloom industry, which, in fact, 
had been an important part of the rural economy for many centuries.364 In the modern 
sector as well, the production of fabric was one the early cornerstones of Sri Lanka’s 
industrialisation process: here, textile mills that relied on comparatively sophisticated 
technology imported by the British investors from their homeland started to produce 
fabric and yarn in the late 19th century.365 At the same time, some Indian communities 
that had migrated to Ceylon between 1880 and 1905 got involved in the textile trade 
and were thereby supported by the British, who considered these merchants to be 
important allies in their efforts to strengthen the import-export trade.366 Communities 
such as the Memons thus started to import clothes from India, including sarongs and 
other handloom categories of cloth, by relying on their business networks on the In-
dian mainland.367 
Already before Ceylon became independent, the British rulers decided to set up 
some government-owned manufacturing industries to meet the war-time require-
ments, to produce commodities such as glass, ceramics, paper and drugs.368 After 
independence, some of these factories were sustained and the private sector was 
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invited to invest in small scale ventures.369 As, however, the first UNP government 
was basically committed to an open trade regime, the overall degree of industrial de-
velopment remained low.370 Many representatives of the new political elite, most of 
which were united in the UNP, were themselves involved in the plantation-economy 
and were, therefore, not interested in rapid industrialisation of the country.371 In fact, 
Ceylon’s relatively comfortable financial situation of these years didn’t lead to any 
pressure on the UNP to change its economic policies, all the more as the representa-
tives of the World Bank had advised the government to keep state-involvement into 
industrial development at a low level.372 
When the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) came into power in 1956, it reversed 
the liberal economic regime, which it considered to be continuing the colonial legacy 
of economic dependence from imported goods: it therefore planned to gradually re-
duce the economic importance of traditional agriculture through the means of import-
substitution and to support local manufacturing by providing better protection to local 
industries through high import-tariffs.373 As, however, the then existing socio-
economic elite mainly consisted of plantation owners close to the opposing UNP, the 
new government had difficulties to make indigenous private investors support the 
industrialisation process.374 Only in the beginning of the 1960s, when imports of vari-
ous consumer items were entirely banned, some private entrepreneurs started to es-
tablish their own industrial ventures, a dynamics, which marked the beginning of a 
considerable industrial growth up to 1970, during which 2500 industries were being 
set up.375 
As the overall financial capital invested both by indigenous and overseas private 
entrepreneurs remained low, the majority of the manufacturing ventures opened after 
1956 were owned by the state.376 Most of these state-owned industrial corporations 
were aimed at substituting manufactured goods that had generally been imported 
and had added to the worsening terms of trade. The state industrial corporations not 
only had an effect on the overall industrial structure of the country but also allowed 
the educated Singhalese middle-class to climb the social ladder, whose upper eche-
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lons had, so far, been dominated by the traditional anglicised elite.377 Employment by 
the corporations, however, strongly depended on personal relations with politicians 
and officers and also on the overall economic situation of the country: towards 1970, 
when Ceylon’s terms of trade worsened and unemployment – especially among the 
young – was rising, these corporations were no more in a position to create sufficient 
employment.378 
The industrial ventures established between 1956 and 1965, both in the private and 
the public sector, hardly manufactured for the export trade, which was still dominated 
by tea and rubber. In order to promote non-traditional exports, the post-1965 UNP 
government therefore started to relax and to partly abolish tariffs on certain imports 
and to provide cash-incentives for producers of non-traditional exports. These meas-
ures were complemented by steps to attract more FDI, which were not only expected 
to contribute to a growth of non-traditional exports but also to increase the influx of 
technological know-how and managerial skills.379 
These policies led to a moderately higher growth of the manufacturing sector but 
also worsened terms of trade. The SLFP government coming into power in 1970 thus 
reversed the liberalisations introduced in the years since 1965 and returned to an 
import-substitution oriented industrial policy. Under enormous pressure not only to 
reduce the import bill but also to create employment opportunities, the new govern-
ment formulated a comprehensive economic plan, which placed heavy emphasis on 
the further development of the manufacturing sector, led by the state industrial corpo-
rations, but also aimed at expanding the opportunities for non-traditional exports.380 In 
the years up to 1977, overall production of manufactured goods decreased despite 
the protection provided to this sector but the share of non-traditional exports in GDP 
almost doubled, mainly because of access to the markets in socialist countries.381 
The years between the country’s independence in 1948 and the economic reforms 
of 1977 also saw the gradual development of the textile industry. Whereas under the 
UNP government after 1948, the pre-independence situation in this sector was only 
transformed with regard to more protection given to the handloom-industry, the poli-
cies initiated by the SLFP government in 1956 marked the beginning of a rise of the 
modern textile industry in the then Ceylon: in its Ten Year Plan of 1959 and the sub-
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sequent Master Plan for the Development of the Textile Industry, the government 
declared its intention to substitute the imports of fabric by local manufactures. The 
task to develop the textile industry was entrusted to the National Textile Corporation, 
established in 1958, which was to oversee the publicly owned mills and also to import 
the necessary raw material.382 After 1960, a number of public textile mills were 
opened and started to produce yarn and fabric, generally in the electorates of prime 
ministers and members of the cabinet and often under aid-agreements with socialist 
countries, which also provided for the training of managers and technicians of these 
mills.383 Despite the dominating position of public enterprises in the textile sector, a 
number of private sector mills were established, especially in the years after 1960, 
when imports were virtually banned. Quite a number of these mills were established 
by those Indian entrepreneurs, who had been involved into the clothing trade already 
in pre-independence days. One of the most important ventures established at that 
time were run by two Sindhi families, the Kundanmal’s and the Mirchandani’s fam-
ily.384 These entrepreneurs were profiting both from their entrepreneurial and techni-
cal experience in the textile trade and from their contacts to the Indian mainland, to 
the Far East and to the West, which allowed them to associate with traders and buy-
ers and thus to further increase their entrepreneurial and technical skills.385 Despite 
their international business network, these private sector entrepreneurs were produc-
ing goods of limited range and quality and were mainly catering to the highly pro-
tected local market.386 
After mid-1960s, some private entrepreneurs also started to venture into the manu-
facture of garments. For long, this sector had been dominated by items stitched by 
local tailors and by imports from the Far East but now local manufacturers of ready 
made garments began to profit from the protection under the import-substitution re-
gime.387 The companies Velona, Bernard Boteju and Hirdaramani were among the 
first to do so, the latter one being owned by another Sindhi family, which started to 
manufacture shirts after having been active in the import of textiles and garments 
since the late 19th century.388 Again, most of these entrepreneurs catered to the local 
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market but some gradually ventured into exports. The first exports were, however, 
not launched through the business contacts of entrepreneurs but trough a bilateral 
trade agreement between Ceylon and the USSR, which enabled one company, Hent-
ley, to export a first load of shirts in 1965; other firms were to follow and to produce 
more garments for the Soviet Union.389 These exports marked the beginning of a de-
velopment, which would, in the years up to 1977, see growing exports to the US by a 
few companies, namely Hentley, its associate firm Apparel Exports and GIL gar-
ments, which was, in contrast to the other local firms, fully owned by Japanese inves-
tors and started to produce gents and boy’s trousers and jackets.390 In many re-
spects, this latter venture anticipated some of the most crucial developments in the 
Sri Lankan garment production regime. 
7.2 The garment production regime before the imposition of garment 
quota 
The landslide victory by the UNP in 1977 allowed the new government to introduce 
a number of sweeping changes. The strategies of import-substituting industrialisation 
and central economic planning were entirely phased out and an open trade regime 
was introduced that not only was one of the most liberal introduced by a developing 
country at that time but also spearheaded similar economic reforms at the global 
level.391 The changes were in line with the thinking of the UNP elite, which hailed from 
the westernised, upper-most echelons of society and had been opposing the closed 
economy under the Bandaranaike governments; furthermore, many leading civil ser-
vants were sympathetic to liberalisation.392 But the radical reforms also reflected the 
difficult economic situation of Sri Lanka in 1977 that was marked by high unemploy-
ment and economic stagnation, two structural problems, which had been the main 
reasons for the electorate to sack the previous government. Furthermore, these re-
forms would hardly have found sufficient political support, had not donor agencies, 
namely the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, announced that they 
were prepared to substantially increase foreign aid.393 
The reforms also had their critics: on the one hand side, many leading academics 
were of the view that the liberalisation of the economy would make Sri Lanka more 
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vulnerable vis-à-vis the caprices of foreign investors, would not increase the manu-
facture of local raw material and the use of local technology and would thus further 
Sri Lanka’s economic dependency.394 On the other hand, many private sector entre-
preneurs who had been profiting from the protection under an import-substituting 
trade regime were not supportive of the economic reforms in 1977. Particularly the 
owners of private textile mills were of the view that their operations would be threat-
ened by foreign competition and they therefore successfully lobbied the new gov-
ernment to keep some sort of protection.395 
The 1977 economic reforms in Sri Lanka coincided with the changes in the global 
garment production regime. Both aspects of the translocation process, the quota 
business and the emerging commodity chains with the outsourcing of the entire 
manufacturing process, were part of a global dynamics beyond the reach of Sri 
Lankan policy makers. Basically, the economic reforms of 1977 made it possible for 
Sri Lanka to participate in this relocation process away from some of the NIE at a 
relatively early point, providing Sri Lankan entrepreneurs with the opportunity to get 
involved into cutting, making and trimming (CMT) of garments for exports. Beyond 
that, the institutions established during this period would also influence the very spe-
cific way the garment industry would develop in the years to come. 
Certainly, the low labour costs were a crucial incentive for entrepreneurs to have 
garments manufactured in Sri Lanka.396 Similarly important were, however, policies 
which were explicitly drawn to attract foreign investors. There were, on the one hand, 
regulations to improve the general investment climate, such as the removal of the 
majority of import restrictions, relaxations of controls on capital and different types of 
tax holidays.397 On the other hand, the government improved the infrastructure 
through a couple of capital intensive, donor supported projects, such as the devel-
opment of power plants and the establishment of the Free Trade Zone (FTZ) in Katu-
nayake, which were to foster private sector led economic growth.398 The zones, in-
cluding the export procedures related to its industrial output, were to be administered 
by a newly created, high-powered government agency, the Greater Colombo Eco-
nomic Commission (GCEC) under the Ministry of Industries.399 The development of 
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the industry by local investors producing outside the zones was to be supported by 
special credit lines of national development banks, which were generously backed by 
multilateral agencies.400 Changes of existing labour laws were not as such part of the 
economic reforms of 1977. The Termination of Workmen (Special Provision) Act of 
1971, which aimed at hindering employers to lay off employees and was often criti-
cised both by employers and donors agencies, stayed in place, and, in the 1980s, its 
coverage was extended to also include temporary and casual labour.401 The estab-
lishment of the FTZ, however, meant a restriction of the movement of labour unions, 
which were banned from entering these areas. 
The economic reforms of 1977 were clearly not formulated because of major pres-
sure emanating from individual or corporate actors in the private sector. However, 
these reforms included a set of incentives, which, in the course of only few years, 
created a number of new corporate and collective actors which would themselves 
start to influence policies and regulations for the garment industry. The main respec-
tive corporate actors were two employers’ associations, each of which united entre-
preneurs, who had been collectively profiting from the economic reforms in different 
ways. 
The first employers’ association that mainly united garment entrepreneurs was the 
Free Trade Zone Manufacturers’ Association (FTZMA). It was established as early as 
1978, when the first foreign investors started to open up their manufacturing units in 
the FTZ of Katunayake; from its beginnings, it aimed at lobbying the government to 
protect the interests of the foreign entrepreneurs investing within the zone, which 
were represented either by themselves or by their local partners.402 As, however, the 
industry started to grow outside the zone as well, there emerged another association 
that started to lobby the government to at least partly extend the privileges granted to 
the entrepreneurs manufacturing in the zones to themselves. This was the task of the 
Sri Lanka Apparel Exporters Associations (SLAEA), founded in 1982, which was to 
dominate the lobbying process in the garment industry in the coming two decades. 
Whereas the FTZMA was virtually run by foreign investors, SLAEA was the associa-
tion of the local manufacturers, many of which had started their business as joint-
venture partners of foreign investors or had worked in the senior management of for-
eign-owned companies and then started with their own business. In fact, many joint-
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venture partners of foreign investors belonged to those entrepreneurs who had 
started with either the textile or the garment business before the year 1977, many of 
them having Indian origins.403 
Whereas employers formed powerful organisations, whose representatives had di-
rect access to both policy makers and administrators and were thus in a position to 
influence the formulation and implementation of sector related policies and regula-
tions, there was no similar development of labour unions. The major hindrance for 
such unions to emerge as potent organisations was the control which the main politi-
cal parties had exerted over these organisations since 1948. At that time, the workers 
of the few public enterprises, such as railways, were unionised in ways which gave 
the leaders of political parties the opportunity to make use of these organisations.404 
Partisan control of labour unions, especially the ones in the public sector, grew with 
the ascent of the increasingly nationalist SLFP in the early 1950s, which succeeded 
in gaining the support of the employees in the public sector, both in the administra-
tion and in the expanding public industrial enterprises. Unions thus became useful 
instruments of consolidating the political power of the respective party in power, ei-
ther the SLFP or the UNP, and of destabilising the acting regime when the party was 
in the opposition.405 As the support of the workers was important to win elections, 
there was a considerable pro-labour bias in most of the policies and regulations 
emanating from the SLFP governments in the post-1956 era up to 1977. This led to 
the formulation of the Termination of Workmen (Special Provision) Act No. 45 of 
1971, which aimed at hindering employers to lay off employees and has, as men-
tioned above, remained one of the legislations most criticised both by employers and 
donor agencies alike.406 
Even though the concerns of workers were reflected in the policies and regulations 
of pre-1977 Sri Lanka, the labour movement remained fragmented, with a high num-
ber of weak and small labour unions controlled by individual parties.407 The change in 
government of 1977 did not lead to a major change in labour policies and regulations. 
However, it further weakened the organisational basis of the labour movement. On 
the one hand, the economic reforms reduced the role of public enterprises, the un-
ions’ main field of political action, on the other hand, the new government soon dem-
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onstrated that it would not accept unions agitating against its own interests. In July 
1980, the government stopped a strike of several public and private sector unions 
and dismissed several thousands of public servants who participated in the strike.408 
This incident merely illustrated that Sri Lankan labour unions were not in a position to 
counterweigh the increasing power of well organised and well linked employers’ as-
sociations, which had strong ties to the new political establishment. 
The overall economic effects of the economic reforms of 1977 were mixed. On the 
one hand, economic growth doubled between 1977 and 1982, on the other hand real 
GDP continuously decreased after 1977.409 Similarly contradictory, the share of 
manufacturing in GDP declined but its share of exports increased from 13.2 percent 
in 1975 to 69 percent in 1992.410 The decline of the share of manufacturing was a 
consequence of the fact that the indigenous manufacturing units that catered to the 
local market now faced strong competition from liberalised imports and thus had to 
reduce their operations. One such sector was the local textile industry, namely the 
handloom sector based in the rural areas, which was virtually annihilated by the ef-
fects of the economic reforms.411 Private textile mills only sustained their business 
thanks to high import tariffs but could not increase their operations.412 The economic 
reforms also marked the decline of the role of the state in the manufacturing sector. 
In the textile sub-sector, for instance, no new public mills were opened in the years 
after 1977 and the existing ones came under private management even though they 
continued to be owned by the state.413 
The overall growth of manufactured exports was mainly a consequence of the ex-
pansion of the garment industry, with the share of garments in the total composition 
of exports rising from 3.6 percent in 1978 to 22 percent in 1985.414 A major part of the 
garment units were established with FDI, whose average annual inflow was at US $ 
41 million between 1978-1982, compared to only US $ 0.2 million between 1970-
1977.415 These investments were flowing to a considerable degree into the FTZ in 
Katunayake: 119 projects were opened there between 1978 and 1985, all of which 
were operating under the tax concessions granted by the Greater Colombo Economic 
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Commission. FDI was, however, not merely concentrated inside the FTZ but was 
also flowing into projects operating under the general tax laws: the share of FDI of 
the total investments in the 514 projects opened outside the zone between 1978 and 
1985 thus still amounted to more than 62 percent.416 Most of the foreign investors 
running their own projects came from NIEs, on whose garment exports Western 
countries had imposed quotas. In 1991, most units were thus still operated by Hong 
Kong-based companies, followed by companies from South Korea.417 
The economic reforms had tremendous effects on the development of the labour 
market, even though the respective formal labour regulations were hardly changed. 
The growth of labour-intensive export-oriented manufacturing units in the urban areas 
led to more employment generated in this sector: whereas between 1971 and 1981 
the total number of jobs in the manufacturing sector had increased by 69’000, be-
tween 1980 and 1985 more than 80 000 such jobs were created, 32’000 of them in 
the FTZ alone.418 Even though this growth of employment was remarkable, it was not 
sufficient to absorb the annual additions to the labour force and it hardly created op-
portunities for the better educated among them: in fact, more than 90 percent of the 
employment opportunities created after 1977 were in the unskilled or in the semi-
skilled segments of the labour market.419 
A further important social aspect of economic development in the aftermath of the 
reforms of 1977 was that virtually all new job opportunities were concentrated in the 
industrialised areas of the Western Province.420 Employment creation in the urban 
areas came at the expense of employment in the rural parts of the country, which 
suffered from the decline of the handloom industry that made more than 40’000 em-
ployees lose their jobs.421 If both the decline of this cottage industry and the slow, but 
gradual decline of employment opportunities in the agriculture sector is taken into 
account, it can be assumed that unemployment in rural areas was actually rising dur-
ing 1977 to 1985, which contributed to the overall rise of social inequalities in these 
years. 422 Many people from these areas thus had to look for alternative employment, 
either in the donor-funded infrastructure projects, in the informal economy of Colombo 
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and its outskirts, in the Middle East or in the manufacturing sector.423 Particularly the 
latter option was open to females as well, where employers were eager to employ 
adept and docile women in the unskilled and semi-skilled positions on the shop 
floors.424 The garment industry thus became a female industry. 
The labour conditions for the women working in the manufacturing units were soon 
characterised by low wages, insecure or missing employment contracts and long 
working hours and sometimes also by improper behaviour of superiors.425 This was, 
on the one hand, a consequence of the vulnerable situation of female operators, who 
had to virtually accept any type of employment to secure the livelihoods of their fami-
lies. On the other hand, the implementation of the labour law was weakened, with 
many employers being on good terms with both politicians and administrators, all of 
which were interested not to put a strain on the investors, which were expected to 
solve one of the major political challenges in Sri Lanka, the high rate of unemploy-
ment. 
7.3 The garment production regime during the quota regime 
The fast growth of the garment industry in South Asia had the effect that quotas 
were gradually imposed on exports from South Asian countries, including on those 
from Sri Lanka. In fact, the first quotas on garments from Sri Lanka were launched 
even before the expansion of the industry, Norway and Sweden being the first in 
1976 and 1977 respectively. The effects of quota on the growth of the industry, how-
ever, only then increased, when the US, the major market for garments from Sri 
Lanka, started to gradually impose quota from 1980 onwards. By 1986, the Sri 
Lankan quota system was in full swing with quota imposed on 26 different product 
categories exported to the US.426 For this reason, the year 1986 serves, in this study, 
as a historical mark in the development of the garment industry, which was, for the 
next decade, to be strongly influenced by the quota system at the global level and the 
way quota were allocated at the national level in Sri Lanka. 
By 1986, a further element of the international context of the Sri Lankan garment 
industry had changed: whereas in 1977, Sri Lanka had been one of the few coun-
tries, that offered absence of quotas, low wages and regulations aimed at attracting 
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foreign investors, a couple of other countries in South Asia had also entered the in-
dustry by now: Bangladesh’s garment industry, for instance, had grown by 14.2 per-
cent between 1980 and 1985 from virtually zero and would grow by 21.6 percent in 
the years 1985 to 1990, with a production regime that allowed manufacturers to pay 
wages far below the Sri Lankan average; the garment industries of India and Paki-
stan had similar growth rates, both of which more relied on indigenous yarn and fab-
ric and thus had the advantage of strong industrial backward-linkages.427 
The quota system partly mitigated competition, as, under these regulations, buyers 
could not switch their production sites overnight due to the fixed amount of quota al-
located to individual countries. Thus, the quota system became a barrier against the 
downward spiral of low wages in the sector.428 But the quota system created new 
elements of competition, both at the global and at the national level: on the one hand, 
the governments of the producing countries had to lobby western governments to 
keep quota imposed on their own industry as high as possible. On the other hand, 
the imposition of quota also increased competition between existing manufacturers in 
Sri Lanka, which were generally eager to secure the highest amount of quota possi-
ble for their own companies. 
The imposition of quota over Sri Lanka forced the government to establish institu-
tions to cope with this new situation. As quotas were limited, the Ministry of Textile 
Industry Development was given the authority to allocate quotas to the manufactur-
ers. The allocation process was based on administrative regulations developed for 
this purpose already in 1978, when the first countries in the West imposed their quo-
tas, but it became more prominent only when the quota system was fully established 
in the mid-1980s. The allocation of quota to one specific manufacturer by the admini-
stration was based on his performance under the previous year: if the manufacturer 
had used up the quota, he was allowed to keep them, if not, his share was reduced. 
When the quota allocated for Sri Lanka was increased in specific product categories, 
allocation among the manufacturers in Sri Lanka would similarly depend on their per-
formance during the previous year. In this context, there was a certain role for the 
associations, which lobbied the government for the generous treatment of their own 
clientele. This process was partly accompanied by bribery and corruption but quota 
were generally not granted on the basis of political considerations, all the more as the 
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first generation of garment entrepreneurs in this country did not hail from the political 
and administrative elite of the country.429 
The further development of the garment production regime after the mid-1980s was 
also influenced by the overall political, economic and social development in the coun-
try. The main element in this context was the outbreak of the civil war in 1983, which 
not only claimed a high number of casualties but started to seriously hinder the 
growth of the economy and of the absorption capacity of the labour market.430 Many 
foreign investors became sceptical with regard to the political stability of the country, 
which was further underlined by many major airlines closing their Colombo offices 
after 1983.431 Furthermore, the increase in social inequalities following the economic 
reforms of 1977 and the continuously high unemployment were of major concern to 
the government. This political-economic context of the second part of the 1980s did 
not allow the government to further liberalise the economy.432 In the aftermath of the 
insurgency towards the end of the decade, however, the political and economic situa-
tion in the country had deteriorated to such an extent that president Premadasa was 
under pressure to initiate a second wave of liberalisations in cooperation with the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, through which the government 
hoped to boost economic growth and employment generation.433 It was these reforms 
and the subsequent regulations, which were to considerably transform the garment 
production regime in Sri Lanka once again. 
The assumption underlying these reforms was that the Sri Lankan economy would 
grow faster if the focus on export-oriented industries would become more pro-
nounced. This strategy included, on the one hand, privatisation of public enterprises 
catering to the domestic market, many of which had been incurring considerable 
losses in the years before. On the other hand, the strategy entailed a further liberali-
sation of the trade regime, which was made to offer more incentives to entrepreneurs 
from Sri Lanka and from overseas to invest into manufacturing units in the island. 
Thus, the tax holidays for the manufacturers in the zones were now extended to 
those outside the zones as well. Both the tariffs on imports and the duties on exports 
were significantly reduced and the Greater Colombo Economic Commission was re-
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named as Board of Investment, which offered its services as a “one-stop shop” to all 
entrepreneurs investing in Sri Lanka.434 
The second wave of liberalisations was complemented by the 200 Garment Facto-
ries Programme, Premadasa’s personal high profile project, which aimed both at the 
promotion of export-oriented industrialisation and at the creation of 100’000 employ-
ment opportunities, mainly in the rural areas. In contrast to the economic reforms as 
such, the programme increased direct government intervention in the garment sector 
to an unprecedented extent.435 The design and the implementation of the programme 
were clearly influenced by party politics. Whereas, indeed, unemployment in the rural 
areas was considered to be one of the key elements of social instability in the South 
of the country by many observers, the upliftment of the “economically impoverished” 
rural areas and the correction of “a lopsided development of the country” were also 
intended to have a direct political payoff for the ruling UNP, whose power base in the 
rural areas had been weakened during the major part of the 1980s. 436 
In order to create 100’000 jobs in 200 factories outside the urban areas, each em-
ploying 500 people, the government branded the development of the garment indus-
try to be a national task to be fulfilled by Sri Lankan patriots, poised to place their in-
vestments in “the interest of the national economy”.437 In fact, the government quite 
openly tried to create a new generation of garment entrepreneurs, who were to com-
pete with the dominating foreign investors resented by major parts of the general 
public and many politicians, including those from the UNP.438 In fact, many of the po-
tentially new entrepreneurs were not staunch supporters of a market economy and its 
advocate, the UNP.439 They were rather inclined towards the SLFP but the UNP and 
Premadasa considered their political support vital to win future elections. Many of the 
new entrepreneurs belonged to the so-called “swabasha”-educated middle classes, a 
distinctively Singhalese elite, which had attended the new urban schools established 
after the change in 1956.440 Their profile thus partly contrasted not only with that of 
the foreign investors represented by the FTZMA; it was also distinct from that of the 
first generation of garment entrepreneurs united in the SLAEA, which was dominated 
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by people with long-standing business experience, many of them hailing from an In-
dian background. 
The key leverage of the government which helped it to reengineer the national gar-
ment production regime in the beginning of the 1990s was the quota-system, a sys-
tem that limited the total amount of pieces of garments to be exported by Sri Lankan 
entrepreneurs to specific countries in the West and thus required the intervention of 
the government. Whereas in the early years of the quota regime in Sri Lanka, the 
respective ministry allocated quota to individual companies on the basis of their ac-
tual production in the previous year, the system was changed in order to suit the po-
litical aim of enhancing economic growth in the rural areas: the Textile Quota Board 
(TQB), the new government agency in charge of distributing quota, now had to con-
sider the locations of the manufacturing units, rather than their use of quota in the 
previous year. Factories in the remotest areas of the country, the “most difficult ar-
eas”, were allowed to produce significantly more pieces of garments than those op-
erating in “difficult” or “non-difficult areas”.441 
The most important aim of the TQB, was clearly not achieved during all the years of 
its existence: in contrast to other countries in South Asia, namely India, the entire 
amount of quota allocated to Sri Lanka was normally not used up despite the growth 
of the industry, particularly as garment entrepreneurs were mainly interested in the 
“hot categories”, i.e. in those items that were comparatively easy to manufacture.442 
The implementation of the new mechanism to distribute quota therefore resulted in 
more competition between the old and new manufacturers. Soon it became clear that 
the annual six percentage increase of the quota allocated to Sri Lanka by the US 
would not be sufficient to create the intended number of factories, even though a 
large share of the quota was not distributed to firms. This not only led to substantial 
over-shipments of quota in the hot categories, but also to quota being taken away 
from entrepreneurs who had been operating their business in the urban areas for 
many years. As many of the entrepreneurs in the rural areas had difficulties to use up 
the quota allocated to their firms, they were again selling their quota to entrepreneurs 
in the urban areas.443 
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The growing competition between manufacturers increased the importance of party 
and personal affiliation, and, in contrast to the previous years, the entire process of 
quota allocation thus became tremendously affected by corruption.444 These strains 
on the garment production regime could, however, not be contained by the existing 
associations: the 200 Garment Factories Programme had created a new generation 
entrepreneurs, whose interests were distinct from the ones of the entrepreneurs 
united in the FTZMA and the SLAEA. They thus soon realised the need to form a 
separate association. The National Apparel Exporters Association (NAEA) started to 
function in 1993 and was to voice the concerns of all those profiting from the 200 
Garment Factories Programme.445 This organisation not only included the new entre-
preneurs but also some of the more experienced ones who had decided to move a 
part of their operations to rural areas to increase the production of categories covered 
by quota. 
The government scheme had, however, not only created a group of entrepreneurs 
profiting from the new incentives but also a whole number of old entrepreneurs who 
saw the growth of their business threatened. Many of them owned small or medium 
size firms and had profited from the growth of the garment industry in the 1980s but 
did not have enough capital to expand their operations to the rural areas and were 
thus not allowed to profit from the tax incentives by the Board of Investment. It was 
these entrepreneurs, who now formed another employers’ association, the Sri Lanka 
Chamber of Garment Exporters.446 Within only a couple of months, the garment pro-
duction regime in Sri Lanka thus experienced the emergence of two new corporate 
actors. Even though both of them were not to achieve the political power held by the 
SLAEA and the FTZMA, they nevertheless contributed to the overall increase of po-
litical power in the hands of associations in the garment sector, which was to influ-
ence the future directions of industrial policy. The growing lobbying power of the as-
sociations was, however, not matched by their influence on the business strategies of 
their members. This was demonstrated by the fact that they weren’t in a position to 
ensure that a higher amount of quota allocated to Sri Lanka could be used.447 
The economic development in the years between 1986 and 1995 was influenced 
both by social and political ruptures, the rules and regulations established by the po-
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litical and administrative regime but also by economic trajectories at the global level, 
namely the overall growth of garments manufactured in Asia. Whereas the Sri 
Lankan economy had experienced growth rates around 2.5 percent in the late 1980s, 
the annual average economic growth rate was at over 5 percent again between 1990 
and 1995.448 Similar to the years before 1986, this growth was mainly based on the 
expansion of the garment industry, whose exports earnings were growing more than 
18.7 percent between 1985 and 1990 and another 19.6 between 1990 and 1995;449 
as envisioned by the government, the number of garment factories grew rapidly in 
this period, from 142 in 1990 to 678 in 1995.450 Similar to the period of 1977, this 
growth was fuelled by the influx of FDI, which increased by more than 200 percent 
alone in the years between 1990 and 1995 and also led to some joint venture firms in 
the rural areas.451 The share of garments in the total composition of exports subse-
quently rose from 22 percent in 1985 to 32.8 percent in 1990 and to 48.7 percent in 
1995.452 The growth of the garment industry was paralleled by declining production in 
other sectors of the economy. The share of tea in the export basket, for instance, 
went down from 33.2 percent in 1985 to 12.6 percent in 1995.453 In contrast to expec-
tations by politicians, notably the production of high-tech electronic products did not 
increase in these years.454 And as there was a decline in the production of several 
sub-sectors of the manufacturing sector, the share of this sector in total exports only 
increased from 16.2 percent in 1987 to 19.7 percent in 1994.455  
The growth of the economic weight of the garment industry was reflected by tre-
mendous employment generation in this sector, with the number of jobs in this sector 
rising from 142 000 in 1990 to 250 000 in 1995, many of which were created in the 
rural areas of the country.456 Within this very short period, the contribution of the la-
bour force of the garment industry to that of the entire manufacturing sector, which 
saw the retrenchment of 30'000-50’000 workers in the privatised pubic enterprises, 
rose from 15 to 30 percent, whereas its contribution to the Sri Lankan labour as a 
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whole grew from 2 to 5 percent in the same period.457 Even though the growth of the 
Sri Lankan garment industry was fast, it was not as fast as the respective growth in 
the entire South Asian region.458 In fact, it was rather a consequence of the further 
translocation of the garment industry to South Asian countries than a result of Pre-
madasa’s 200 Garment Factories Programme.459 In any event, the growth of the gar-
ment industry in the period from 1990 to 1995 certainly marked an increasing de-
pendency of the country’s economy from this one economic sector. 
7.4 The garment production regime during and after the phase out of 
quota 
Whereas the first phase of the development of the garment production regime was 
marked by the economic reforms of 1977 and the global relocation process of the 
garment industry and its second phase was strongly influenced by the quota regime 
imposed on Sri Lanka’s garment exports and by the specific way the government ap-
propriated this system under the 200 Garment Factories Programme, the third phase 
was characterised by another change in the global garment production regime: the 
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) of the year 1995, which meant the liber-
alisation of the global garment trade within a period of ten years. Later in this period, 
Sri Lanka signed an agreement with the EU that lifted all quantitative restrictions of 
Sri Lanka’s garment exports to the union from March 2001, in exchange for tariff and 
duty reductions from the side of Sri Lanka.460 
Before it became clear that the global trade in garments would be liberalised from 
early 2005, the UNP government had to leave their seats in the government to the 
opposition party in 1994. Despite the left-leaning orientation of some members of the 
cabinet, the SLFP government under Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga did not 
introduce any major changes to Sri Lanka’s industrial policy-framework. Most impor-
tantly, it re-affirmed that private sector led industrial growth would be the its key eco-
nomic strategy and that it would be committed to privatise public enterprises, a task 
which was to be driven by the Public Enterprise Reforms Commission.461 Government 
interventions were focussed on infrastructure development, i.e. on the establishment 
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of more FTZs outside the Western Province, but also on attracting FDI.462 For obvious 
reasons, this policy framework was warmly welcomed not only by many representa-
tives of the private sector but also by the donor agencies.463 
In order to contribute to the further growth of the garment industry, the government 
introduced, similar to the scheme implemented some years before, a 50 Garment 
Factories Programme, which aimed at creating employment in the rural areas by pro-
viding tax incentives to companies opening a factory in these parts of the country. In 
contrast to the earlier scheme, however, this programme did not include any special 
quota allocation for the respective entrepreneurs and had no effects on the size of 
the industry and on the organisations representing it.464 Much more important was, 
however, the fact that the SLFP government, in its effort to reform trade and tax poli-
cies, decided to entirely abolish the tariffs on imported materials for the garment in-
dustry in 1997.465 The local textile industry, whose competitiveness on the domestic 
market for yarns and fabrics had always been based on some sort of fiscal protec-
tion, was now seriously challenged by imports from other countries. The government 
had to initiate a restructuring programme in 1998 and to introduce the so-called Tex-
tile Debt Recovery Fund, which aimed at modernising the industry through invest-
ments in new technology.466 These measures were, however, not adequate to back 
the textile industry, which resulted in the bankruptcy of a number of private mills, 
many of which had been privatised some years before.467 The massive lowering of 
import duties was, of course, in the interest of the garment manufacturers. This de-
velopment thus marked the increasing lobbying power of the garment entrepreneurs 
at the expense of the owners of textile mills, who had had tremendous influence on 
the duty and tariff structure in the previous post-liberalisation era.468  
Despite, on the one hand, advice from the World Bank to liberalise the labour mar-
ket and, on the other hand, pressure from labour unions to be allowed in the FTZs, 
the new government did not introduce any changes to labour policies, even though 
the SLFP, in its election campaign, had strongly criticised the UNP for having had a 
repressive stand against labour since its coming into power in 1977.469 The govern-
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ment indeed announced a Workers’ Charter in 1995 which planned to allow trade 
unions to enter the FZTs; but the charter was never implemented despite the formu-
lation of the Industrial Dispute Amendment Act 56 of 1999, which, however, only 
gave labour unions limited rights to directly bargain with employers.470 
The second half of the 1990s, which also saw a partial liberalisation of the imports 
to Western countries by 18 percent in the year 1998, experienced an unabated 
growth of the garment industry that strongly contributed to the overall economic 
growth in these years.471 The value of Sri Lankan garment exports to the US in-
creased by more than 76 percent between 1994 and 2001.472 A substantial share of 
the operations was backed by FDI, which grew from US $ 108 million to US $ 158 
million in the years 1995 to 1998 alone.473 The number of garment factories thus went 
up by 56 percent between 1995 and 2002.474 Similar to the two previous decades, the 
growth of the garment industry was not paralleled by similar growth in the other seg-
ments of the manufacturing sector, whose contribution to the country’s GDP had de-
clined from 17.5 to 16.5 between 1990 and 2000 whereas the respective contribution 
of the service sector grew from 49.5 percent in 1990 to 54.6 percent in 2000.475 
The growing economic weight of the garment industry was also reflected by the 
growth of employment in this sector by 32 percent between 1995 and 2002.476 The 
tremendous growth of employment in this industry has, however, to be put into per-
spective: as the entire Sri Lankan labour force grew by close to 21 percent between 
1995 and 2002, the overall contribution by the garment industry to the total labour 
force of the country remained at only 6 percent; its growth was thus lower than the 
growth of employment in the entire manufacturing sector and the service sector, 
which went up from 15 to 17 percent and from 42 to 45 percent respectively between 
1995 and 2002.477 
Similar to many other countries, Sri Lanka experienced economic turbulences in the 
years 2001 and 2002. The attacks on the main international airport in July 2001 
made buyers concerned about the security situation in Sri Lanka and those in the US 
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in September 2001 resulted in a global recession in the following year; the Sri 
Lankan garment industry thus contracted for the first time in its history: Its share in 
total exports went down from 54 percent in 2000 to 51.6 percent in 2002.478 This 
slump was particularly worrying for the manufacturers, as the year 2002 also marked 
a further liberalisation of the garment imports to the US by 18 percent, an opportunity, 
which was used by the manufacturers in India, Pakistan and China to further expand 
their exports.479 The perspective for Sri Lanka to sustain the challenges posed by the 
entire liberalisation of the global garment trade in the beginning of 2005 thus seemed 
bleak to many observers. The economic crisis of 2002 preceded another government 
change and the formulation of a new reform package, the Regaining Sri Lanka Initia-
tive, which aimed at further deregulation, adjustment and liberalisation.480 The gar-
ment industry, this was the thinking of the new UNP government, could not be 
strengthened by more government intervention but only by better access to markets 
in the West. For this reason, the government initiated negotiations for a free trade 
agreement with the US in 2002.481 
In the context of the economic crisis of 2001/02, the looming liberalisation of the 
global garment trade and the advent of a new, decidedly private sector-friendly gov-
ernment, the key representatives of the garment industry began to make to their 
voices heard in a more prominent way. Basically, many of them were of the view that 
further deregulations alone and a possible free trade agreement with the US would 
suffice for the industry to remain competitive after the end of the MFA. For this rea-
son, the heads of the existing employers associations in the garment industry de-
cided to form a committee that would draft a Five Year Strategy for the garment in-
dustry; this strategy was not only to give an overall direction to the future develop-
ment of the industry but was also to lay out proposals to the government in those ar-
eas, where its support was considered vital for the sustainability of the industry. The 
composition of the committee clearly reflected the distribution of power in the national 
garment production regime at that time and the respective changes since the years of 
the 200 Garment Factories Programme. The committee was chaired by Mahesh 
Amalean, a previous chairman of the SLAEA and the head of MAS Holdings, one of 
the two biggest manufacturers of garments; furthermore, it included Ashroff Omar, an 
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earlier chairman of the SLAEA himself, and the head of Brandix, the other of the two 
largest manufacturers in the country.482 Both men originated from Indian families that 
had been involved in the textile business for several decades, had constantly built up 
their companies through FDI-backed joint ventures and were now steering compa-
nies, which were unlikely to be negatively affected by the phasing out of the MFA. In 
contrast to the majority of entrepreneurs in Sri Lanka, their companies had ventured 
into the production of non-quota and higher value-added garments and were about to 
integrate both backward and forward linkages into their business, which marked a 
strategy of industrial upgrading from Original Equipment Manufacturing (OEM) to 
Original Brand Manufacturing (OBM). 
The Five Year Strategy paper produced by this committee clearly reflected the 
thinking of the two former chairmen of the SLAEA. First, it envisioned the entire Sri 
Lankan industry to move from simple manufacturing to the provision of fully inte-
grated services for buyers, which would range from the analysis of market informa-
tion, to the development of product concepts and designs, to high quality manufactur-
ing and after-sale services.483 Second, it planned to “increase market penetration to 
the premium market segments of the global apparel industry” and to “become inter-
nationally famous as a superior manufacture of specific product categories”, such as 
active and sports wear, casual wear, children’s wear and intimates.484 The strategy 
recommended various measures to be taken by the government, the associations 
and the individual entrepreneurs with regard to different aspects of the garment pro-
duction regime. Being aware that the actual power of Sri Lankan associations vis-à-
vis their own members remained limited, the strategy expected the government to 
strongly support the industry in terms of increasing privileged access to Western 
markets, of reforming labour laws and, crucially, in terms of skill development.485 
The Five Year Strategy was a remarkable document not only insofar as it was a 
very comprehensive paper giving an overall direction to the future development of the 
industry but also as it was an initiative driven by a segment of garment entrepre-
neurs, who pressed both the government and their fellow entrepreneurs to overhaul 
Sri Lanka’s garment production regime in a way they considered both feasible and 
conducive for the development of their own companies. The contents of the strategy 
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thus were potentially explosive and could not have emerged from a political-
administrative process in Sri Lanka. It indeed envisioned an industry dominated not 
by a bunch of thriving SMEs but rather by a few large companies controlling all the 
linkages to the buyers and giving out sub-contracts to smaller companies arranged in 
clusters.486 
One of the key recommendations of the Five Year Strategy was the formation of an 
umbrella organisation to unite the voices of the different employers associations and 
to oversee the implementation of the Five Year Strategy.487 Within the period of only a 
few months, the Joint Apparel Association Forum (JAAF) was established; Ashroff 
Omar was selected as the head of the organisation and of the executive committee, 
in which the different employers associations in the garment sector were repre-
sented. In order to implement the recommendations of the Five Year Strategy in 
more detail, a number of thematic committees were formed, which were, for instance, 
to lobby for the revision of labour laws, the development of the SME sector and for 
human resources development. The latter committee was headed by Mahesh 
Amalean, who was of the view that HRD was one of the key topics to be addressed 
by JAAF in order to transform Sri Lanka’s garment industry into a “knowledge based 
industry to stay on top of competition and keep pace with global changes”.488 
Whereas the lobbying process in the 1990s had been characterised by heads of the 
different associations individually contacting both politicians and public servants, the 
formation of JAAF resulted in a more coordinated lobbying process. Even though the 
heads of the member associations of JAAF, mainly those of the SMEs, certainly re-
tained the freedom to informally interact with decision makers in the public sector, 
they now faced greater difficulties to be stakeholders in the formal process of policy-
making itself. One such key body was the National Council of Economic Develop-
ment (NECD), which included representatives of academia, the private sector and the 
public administration and had, in 2005, Ashroff Omar, the head of JAAF, as one of 
the co-chairs of the Apparel Cluster Committee, jointly with the Secretary of the Min-
istry of Industry and Investment Promotion.489 The concerted lobbying efforts of the 
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garment entrepreneurs were quite successful, as – in its budgets for the years 2004, 
2005 and 2006 – the government announced various schemes, through which the 
garment sector was to be supported. A first such scheme concerned a 600 Rs. mil-
lion credit guarantee for the SME and a second one intended to strengthen the skill 
base of the industry by establishing a College of Apparels and Textiles.490 Both of 
these schemes were, however, not implemented, due to the lack of consensus be-
tween JAAF and the implementing government agencies but also among the different 
members of JAAF.491 
From the outset JAAF also started to lobby donor agencies, which were strongly in-
terested in the sustainability of the garment industry from a poverty reduction per-
spective. The lobbying activities resulted in the ILO Factory Improvement Pro-
gramme, which aimed at upgrading the skills of the workforce through consultancies 
provided by overseas experts.492 A next programme, the Productivity Improvement 
Programme, was specifically designed for the needs of the SME sector and to be 
supported by the European Union.493 The aid agency, however, withdrew from the 
project, which made the government announce in its budget speech for the year 
2005 to finance it with its own funds.494 The implementation of the project, namely the 
selection of beneficiaries, was left in the hands of JAAF, which soon had to face se-
vere criticism from the side of the SME representatives and the civil servants in 
charge that the consultancies were actually catering to the needs of the large and 
extra-large firms. A second phase of the project, again funded by the government, 
was thus implemented by the Sri Lanka Chamber of Garment Exporters, the associa-
tion of the SMEs, a development, which not only symbolised the low esteem of JAAF 
among SMEs but also the increasingly critical attitude by the government representa-
tives towards the umbrella organisation.495 
JAAF not only concerted the lobbying efforts within Sri Lanka itself but also in the 
major markets for Sri Lankan garments. One of the major tasks of JAAF was to im-
prove the global image of the Sri Lankan garment industry, which was not only suffer-
ing from the bad human rights record of the government but also from the rising pro-
                                            
490  Daily News (2005) 
491  SL_Int_Firm12_Representative1 (p. 1/l. 13-14), SL_Int_Firm18_Representative1 (p. 1/l. 9-10) 
492  Mannapperuma (2003) 
493  Joint Apparel Association Forum (2003) 
494  Bandaranaike (2004) 
495  Sunday Observer (2007); on the sceptical attitude of leading public servants see 
SL_Int_AdminUnit1_Representative1 (p. 5/l. 1-5). 
  
 129 
duction costs. The main campaign in this regard bore the slogan “Garments without 
Guilt” and aimed at assuring global buyers that garments from Sri Lanka were pro-
duced in a setting where workers’ rights were respected.496 At the same time, the rep-
resentatives of JAAF began to promote that garments from Sri Lanka were not only 
produced in a compliant way but also by a highly trained workforce, which was basi-
cally true for many of the large companies. They thus emphasised that the Sri 
Lankan garment industry was moving towards a “knowledge based industry”, a con-
cept, which was taken up well by the buyers both in Europe and the US and also re-
flected the World Bank’s emphasis of Sri Lanka’s need to strife for integration in the 
global “knowledge economy”.497 A further important task for JAAF was to strengthen 
the ties to the US in order to make its government sign a free trade agreement with 
Sri Lanka. Not only was JAAF financing a company, which lobbied for the agreement, 
but also was it directly involved into trade negotiations between the two governments, 
which led to duty free access of American cotton to Sri Lanka.498 Understanding that 
lobbying in countries like the US included the continuous improvement of networks, 
JAAF started to establish contacts to leading American academic institutions, namely 
to the North Carolina State University, one of the key organisations in textile-related 
research, and to the Fulbright Commission, a US-government sponsored agency in 
the field of academic exchange and knowledge transfer.499 All these events would be 
tremendously important for the development of the out-of-firm skill formation regime. 
Before, we, however, look at this part of the skill formation regime, we need to scruti-
nise, in more detail, the evolution of training processes within firms. 
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8 The development of the skill formation regime of the 
garment industry in Sri Lanka 
8.1 The development of the in-firm skill formation regime 
Even though firms organised along the lines of export-oriented industrial production 
only developed in the 20th century, work shops and small industrial units had existed 
in the rural areas of Sri Lanka for many centuries. As in most traditional industries in 
many other parts of the world, the production arrangements in these industries relied 
on apprenticeship training as the most important institution for skill formation; 
thereby, the skills of a master craftsman were transmitted to an apprentice, who was 
first mainly watching and was then gradually involved in production.500 With the ad-
vent of modern industries in the urban areas of Sri Lanka, the traditional form of 
transmitting skills to new recruits was retained to a certain degree but had to be com-
plemented by more formal training processes, as the technology and the respective 
production processes were not only new to the recruits but also to the country itself. 
This was particularly true for the textile industry: with the introduction of power looms 
in Sri Lanka in the beginning of the 20th century, staff of both private and public mills 
was sent to Japan and India in order to get trained in order to run and to maintain the 
imported technology for weaving, dyeing and finishing. Even after independence, 
many technicians and professionals working for the mills under the National Textile 
Corporation were sent to India, even though many of them were also trained by expa-
triate weaving masters, who often came from India. From this type of skill transfer to 
the state mills, the few locally owned private mills were profiting as well, as they 
managed to poach some of the skilled staff from the public mills.501 
8.1.1 The in-firm skill formation regime before the imposition of garment quota 
At that time, prior to the economic reforms of 1977, the size of the Sri Lankan gar-
ment industry was small compared to that of the textile industry but the few existing 
ventures relied on similar skill formation arrangements. In order to acquire the skills 
to operate the new technology, a part of the technical staff was sent abroad, mainly 
to India; once the staff was back in production, they trained the other employees on-
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the-job.502 This transfer of skills from abroad was certainly facilitated by the fact that 
some of the early Sri Lankan garment manufacturers had, as pointed out in section 
7.2, established wide business networks in the entire Indian subcontinent. 
With the start of the export-oriented garment industry in the 1970s, the production 
arrangements of individual garment factories were integrated into global supply 
chains, which were, at least in this complexity, entirely new to Sri Lanka. The industry 
now not only produced for overseas markets but was, in contrast to the locally ori-
ented textile industry, driven by foreign investors and buyers, who confined the 
emerging industrial units to only get involved into the CTM part of the production 
process. Most of the new factories were, in contrast to the ones producing for the 
local market, neither engaged in product development, nor in merchandising nor in 
the marketing of their products. The growth of an export-oriented garment industry 
thus led to production arrangements, which required the Sri Lankan manufacturing 
units to focus on a comparatively small range of shop floor related skills and thus 
contrasted both with the considerably more technology-intensive production regime 
of the textile industry and with the more integrated production regime of the previous 
import-substituting garment industry. 
The export-orientation of the emerging garment production regime, however, did 
not only entail a focus on shop floor related skills and production processes but also 
required the factories to train the skills of all occupational categories – operating per-
sonnel, technicians, clerical personnel and managers – to meet the new require-
ments of an export-oriented industry in terms of technology, quality and productivity. 
As we will see, the Sri Lankan garment industry therefore increasingly relied on bring-
ing in skills from abroad and thus continued the tradition of the import-substituting 
textile and garment industries. 
When the expansion of the export-oriented garment industry started, a considerable 
amount of production-related skills were imported by foreign investors, who had pre-
viously manufactured garments in a different location and were thus well conversant 
with the different aspects of the production process. GIL Garments, the first FDI-
backed garment factory, operated in this way already from 1974, some years before 
the economic liberalisation. The company, a joint venture between Japanese entre-
preneurs and the local Ganegoda family, employed expatriate technicians and con-
sultants from Western countries, who were involved into production planning, moni-
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tored the quality and efficiency of the production process and trained the local staff.503 
Once the relocation process away from the NIEs to Sri Lanka had gained momentum 
after 1977, many Chinese technicians, who had previously worked in Hong Kong, 
Singapore and Malaysia, became involved into this skill transfer.504 Some of these 
overseas technicians also joined locally-owned factories, whose buyers wanted to 
develop and closely monitor the production processes in the factories of their suppli-
ers.505 This type of skill transfer from buyers to their suppliers, often complemented by 
Sri Lankans being allowed to visit the factories in the Far East, was a result of the 
fact that many of the early local garment exporters had wide-ranging business rela-
tions that helped them to enter such attractive agreements.506 This was particularly 
true for the entrepreneurs of Indian origin who had established their business net-
works through garment imports and textile production.507 
A considerable part of the skill formation process occurred at the level of the sewing 
operators, most of which were females from the rural areas who had undergone 
some years of schooling. In some of the FDI-backed factories, operators acquired 
their skills in training lines outside production, where the trainees learned to operate 
and to control the machines and to stitch the seams. Other factories tried to poach 
skilled operators from these factories or first employed their trainees as helpers, who 
had to assist the more experienced operators and to thereby observe them in order 
to become skilled themselves.508 Operators involved into cutting of fabric were gener-
ally male; their training was, however, basically on-the-job as the process of cutting 
itself necessarily involved helpers to lay the fabric. The operating personnel on the 
sewing and the cutting floor were working under a hierarchy of supervising personnel 
and managers, all of which had to be adequately trained. At the lower supervisory 
level, many employees were promoted from among the operator level and were then 
trained, if available, by expatriate technicians and managers or, otherwise, by experi-
enced Sri Lankan staff. 
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The new recruits to the managerial level of many of the foreign-owned garment fac-
tories generally consisted of the sons of upper middle-class, Anglicised families, 
many of which had resented the closed-door economy of the mid-1970s. Already be-
fore 1977, they had become reluctant to work in the public sector and the economic 
reforms corroborated their attitude. To many of them, a career in the garment indus-
try meant involvement into global trade, a working environment at least partly charac-
terised by foreign technology and access to wealth, which had, in fact, been available 
to the few local garment exporters of the first half of the 1970s.509 The employers of 
the foreign-owned firms expected the recruits to the management level to have final-
ised their A-levels, and in some cases they would even have preferred university de-
grees. In many locally owned factories, especially the ones which entertained close 
contacts to their buyers, the process to recruit mid-level managers was not very dif-
ferent from the ones in the foreign-owned firms and they thus also employed some of 
the sons of the upper-middle classes510 
In most units that were fully or partially owned by foreign investors the training of 
the mid-management personnel was comparatively structured already at an early 
point in time. Depending on the extent of exchange with buyers, this was true for the 
locally owned factories as well. Many factories institutionalised in-firm training periods 
during which the new recruits to the management level were attached, under the su-
pervision of both local and foreign managers and technicians, to the different de-
partments of the firm during a couple of weeks or even month, without being involved 
into production to a high extent. The training period included a considerable amount 
of practical exercises in the different departments. In the sewing department, the 
trainees had to prepare samples and to stitch the garments and to familiarise them-
selves with the machines, the different types of needles and threads before getting 
involved into production planning and management.511 Some of the trainees decided 
to undergo training outside the firm also, for instance at the National Institute of Man-
agement (NIBM), which had become affiliated with an English university and met with 
increasing demand in these years.512 In some cases, these trainees were also sent to 
firms in Europe, the US or in East Asia.513 When the Sri Lankan managers were 
trained and experienced enough to run production themselves, especially the owners 
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of the local factories often sent the technicians from overseas back to their home 
countries.514 
Certainly, the post-1977 garment production arrangements in many of both the lo-
cally and foreign-owned firms were characterised by indecent labour conditions. Es-
pecially the women working as operators not only had to work under harsh circum-
stances on the shop floor but also had to cope with the poor reputation of their occu-
pation, which the general public considered to be linked to prostitution.515 However, it 
was during these years that Sri Lanka saw the establishment of a high number of 
modern and sophisticated garment factories, which were modelled along the lines of 
the production units in the Far East. A structured approach to training became part of 
these production arrangements. Poaching of trained employees may have occurred, 
but certainly not to an extent, which would have deterred employers from investments 
in training. Training was, indeed, a firmly institutionalised practice of many of the 
leading firms. It had been successfully applied in different geographical contexts, had 
thus become deeply entrenched in their production arrangements and could not be 
undermined by the sporadic losses of trained employees. Institutionalised skill forma-
tion processes were not to be confined to the foreign firms. Not only were there a 
number of locally owned factories, which relied on comparatively similar production 
arrangements, but also were the employees of many foreign firms to establish their 
own companies, which would feature the characteristics of their mother firms. 
8.1.2 The in-firm skill formation regime during the quota regime  
When the MFA quotas were gradually imposed on Sri Lankan garments in the be-
ginning of the 1980s, this meant a new framework of incentives, which was, as 
shown in section 7.3, to tremendously influence the production regime of Sri Lankan 
garment industry, but also the business strategies of individual entrepreneurs and, 
thus, the garment production arrangements at the firm level: by the year 1994, 49.6 
percent of all garments exported from Sri Lanka to all parts of the world and 83.6 
percent of those exported to the US only were items covered by quota.516 Even 
though manufacturers had the opportunity to produce non-quota items, there were 
obviously strong incentives to focus on the product categories covered by quota. Cer-
tainly, items like trousers and blouses, the quota for which were used up by 126 and 
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100 percent respectively in the year 1990, were easier to manufacture and were 
technically less demanding.517 Furthermore, manufacturers who decided to produce 
quota-restricted items had their sales volumes guaranteed to a high extent, at least 
as long as they met some of the most basic expectations of buyers with regard to 
quality and time of delivery. There was, under the quota regime, comparatively little 
pressure to raise productivity by lowering production costs or by venturing into 
higher-value added products.518 The emerging incentive structure in quota-oriented 
firms was thus not conducive for the further development of investment-oriented skill 
formation arrangements, especially in entirely locally owned firms, which could not 
profit from the constant transfer of technology and the respective skills from their 
overseas mother companies. 
The drift towards a low-productivity and low-skill garment production regime accel-
erated in the beginning of the 1990s, when there was an increasing global demand 
for garments from South Asia. The drift was particularly marked in the firms under the 
government sponsored 200 Garment Factories Programme.519 According to industry 
surveys in these years, the mean man-machine in the firms under the programme 
was at approximately 2.5:1, bringing the respective ratio for entire Sri Lanka to 1.8:1, 
which was high compared to, for instance, Hong Kong whose ratio was at 1.2:1. Cor-
respondingly, the investment into technology in these firms was low, which led to in-
stances where 10 workers were needed to stitch one pocket, whereas it could have 
been done by one person sitting on a suitable machine.520 
There were several reasons for the development of such a low-productivity regime 
under the 200 Garment Factories Programme. The most obvious reason was, of 
course, that the government had initiated the programme in order to generate more 
employment in rural areas; unproductive production processes involving unsophisti-
cated technologies was certainly not regarded as a major barrier to this aim; further-
more, individual firms were operating in an increasingly unstable and highly politi-
cised business environment. On the one hand, manufacturers started to act accord-
ing to an incentive structure, in which profits were not being reaped through high 
quality production but rather through observation of the political codes of conduct. On 
the other hand, the enormous growth of the garment sector under the programme 
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strained the position of both the previous and the upcoming entrepreneurs. With the 
massive growth of the output of garments, unit prices decreased and quotas became 
scarcer, leading to the annual quota being used up long before the close of the re-
spective period.521 Many of the new firms soon were on the fringe of becoming insol-
vent and were hoping to be bailed out by the government.522 Understandably, this 
was no environment, which would motivate entrepreneurs to invest into both technol-
ogy and skill formation. 
The virtual de-skilling of the garment industry as a whole was strongly interrelated 
with the growth of the industry itself. As garment factories were mushrooming in ar-
eas so far hardly touched by industrial development, there was an emerging shortage 
of employees at all levels of the garment sector, which was lamented by both the en-
trepreneurs, the political decision makers and the media.523 Operators working on the 
shop floor were hardly trained, not only as the experienced personnel to train them 
was lacking but also as labour turnover was high, which posed a tremendous disin-
centive for entrepreneurs to invest in in-firm training.524 Whereas operators could be 
recruited in the rural areas, skilled technicians such as pattern makers and cutters 
were more difficult to find.525 Similarly, only few experienced and talented managers 
were ready to leave the urban dwellings and to move to areas, which they considered 
not only hard to reach but also economically and culturally backward.526 
The drift towards a low-productivity and low-skill garment production under the 
quota regime certainly did not encompass the entire community of garment entrepre-
neurs in Sri Lanka, as, in fact, more than 50 percent of garments exported from Sri 
Lanka were non-quota items. But these garments, which were technically more com-
plex products and thus required higher technical skills of all those involved in the pro-
duction process, were mostly produced by fully or partially FDI-backed firms, many of 
them in the FTZs, and a few of the local firms that had decided to take a different 
path than most of their local competitors. One of the most characteristic effects of this 
period was thus an emerging division of the industry into a very small, but highly pro-
ductive, skill and technology intensive section of firms and a much larger, more la-
bour-intensive, less productive and less skill intensive section of the industry. These 
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differences were to increase in the years after 1995, when the stakeholders in the 
Uruguay Round process decided to phase out the quota regime under the MFA by 
early 2005. 
8.1.3 The in-firm skill formation regime during and after the phase out of quota 
In the decade after the ATC had been agreed on in 1995, the global garment pro-
duction regime was, as described in section 4.3, increasingly characterised by three 
different tendencies: first, by increasing price competition between manufacturers, 
second, by end customers and buyers being increasingly concerned about labour 
conditions in the garment industry and, third, by the growing bargaining power of re-
tailers and buyers. The Sri Lankan government was not in a position to mitigate the 
pressure arising from these tendencies for the majority of manufacturers, and these 
tendencies were thus to have different effects on the two groups of manufactures in 
Sri Lanka. By 2005, when the garment trade was liberalised, the competitiveness of 
the more technology and skill-intensive firms had not only been strengthened but 
they, in fact, had come in a position that allowed them to control the business of 
many of the less skill-intensive ones by turning them into their own subcontractors.527 
The pressure arising from these tendencies became particularly strong for SMEs 
that did not move to the top end of the market: first, their production costs tended to 
be higher than in the larger firms, as competitive garment production in the liberalised 
global garment trade necessarily required both sophisticated technology and a highly 
specialised management.528 Second, many buyers had started to source from a few 
large firms, which reduced their transaction costs.529 Third, the higher ethical and so-
cial standards began to challenge the smaller firms to a higher extent than the bigger 
ones, as the required improvement of infrastructure and the limits to overtime again 
increased production costs.530 The production arrangements of a high number of 
firms therefore started to be characterised by a dearth of technology and skilled per-
sonnel, decreasing orders, low productivity and poor working conditions.531 
These characteristics of the production arrangements in many SMEs undermined 
continuous skill formation: on the one hand, production processes started to be so 
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much under strain that employers were not ready to invest production time or finan-
cial capital into training. On the other hand, the poor working conditions led to high 
labour turnover and prevented more qualified and experienced staff from other units 
seeking employment in such firms. The skill formation arrangements in these firms 
were thus dominated by – often futile – poaching strategies, limited on-the-job train-
ing and the continuous promotion of senior employees to the next higher levels. 
Some aspects of these skill formation arrangements became partly visible at the 
level of operators: low wages, long overtime, the low social status of this occupation 
and the various alternative employment opportunities for socio-economically disad-
vantaged women from rural areas, rendered it difficult for many SMEs to poach ex-
perienced operators in sufficient numbers from other firms or to employ school leav-
ers who had undergone some pre-employment training as operators.532 Personal re-
lations to politicians and to representatives of public training centres or access to fe-
male workers of tea plantations thus became crucial in this regard.533 Having 
searched in vain, many firms therefore had to reluctantly employ new, inexperienced 
recruits as helpers, who assisted the operators, and thus learned how to handle the 
machines.534 Training lines outside production were seldom, as the employers didn’t 
want to keep the new employees out of the production cycle for long.535 
Supervisors were normally promoted from the operator level, which made it more 
attractive for operators to stay with a factory for a long time.536 Among the selection 
criteria, loyalty to the factory was thus more important than the educational level, and 
thus, supervisors in these firms had often dropped out from school after their O-
levels. Once employed, supervisors in these firms tended not to undergo firm-
financed further training outside the firms.537 In contrast to the sewing supervisors, 
technicians such as mechanics and pattern makers often underwent some sort of 
pre-employment training in a private or a public training centre and had been trained 
on-the-job by their immediate superiors, even though in some firms, trainee mechan-
ics were also recruited from among the male operators.538 The management staff of 
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these SMEs was necessarily small. Often, it consisted of a managing director sup-
ported by middle managers overseeing the available departments. Middle managers 
in the production-related departments had often been promoted from the operator 
levels and had, similar to the supervisors, hardly undergone further training outside 
the firms, which would have increased the risk of poaching.539 
Skill formation processes looked very different in the more competitive firms, many 
of which belonged to the biggest in the country. MAS Holdings, Brandix Lanka Lim-
ited and Hirdaramani Group became the three key organisations, all of which had, 
after the removal of the quota system, not only increased their output but had also 
employed many of the retrenched workers from firms closed as a consequence of the 
trade liberalisations.540 The production arrangements of these three ventures shared 
a number of characteristics, which went beyond the fact that they had all emerged 
from companies owned by Indian families, which had profited from the import-
substitution policies after independence. One common characteristic was the attempt 
to constantly increase operations through mergers, acquisitions and joint-ventures 
with foreign-owned companies.541 Their growth allowed these organisations to estab-
lish high-profile head offices, which coordinated relations to customers, operated as 
think-tanks and monitoring units for the entire operations. A second common charac-
teristic was their drive towards industrial upgrading, which had changed their position 
in the garment supply chain.542 Thus, they were themselves involved to a high extent 
into sourcing raw material, partly even producing them themselves, into designing 
and developing the products and into finally distributing them directly to retailers and 
branded marketers.543 In those cases, where buyers wanted to retain more control 
over the production process, joint ventures allowed for collaborations in all these re-
spects. A third common characteristic was their interest in being considered as ethi-
cally responsible manufacturers both in terms of social and ecological standards. Not 
only had the factories of these firms acquired the respective internationally recog-
nised certifications, also had these firms heavily invested into image-building cam-
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paigns, which aimed at making this commitment visible to customers abroad and to 
the populace in Sri Lanka.544 
These three common aspects of the production arrangements of these firms were 
interrelated with similar approaches to human resources development and skill for-
mation. Basically, the development of the skill formation arrangements was the task 
of specialised departments, the human resources departments or separately estab-
lished training departments at the level of the individual plants and the head offices. 
These departments specified the job profiles of the different employment positions by 
delimiting the respective tasks and the skills needed to perform those tasks, moni-
tored the individual performance of employees and eventually proposed them to un-
dergo specific skills training.545 Skill formation in these firms also profited from com-
paratively reputed working conditions both in terms of remuneration and job security, 
which attracted many well-trained and experienced employees to work for these 
firms. The structured approach to skill formation and the fact that employment by 
these firms was comparatively attractive could be observed at all levels of the occu-
pational ladder. 
In fact, at the level of operators, labour shortages were considerably less common 
than in the less technology-intensive SMEs, as both school leavers and experienced 
workers preferred to work for one of these firms.546 All potential employees had to first 
undergo a range of physical and dexterity tests.547 Inexperienced sewing operators 
then normally underwent structured training in a training line outside production for at 
least some days or weeks. The practice to instead let them work as helpers in the 
beginning of their employment period was established in some of the firms, but was 
less common.548 Once the new recruits had been trained, they were rated according 
to their sewing skills, i.e. their speed and the number of operations they performed, 
and may be trained further both on and off-the-job in order to become multi-skilled 
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workers, who could easily be employed in the different parts of the shop floor, when 
new styles were being introduced or other operators were absent.549 
Whereas most factories of the most competitive firms followed relatively compara-
ble strategies of skill formation at the operator level, there were different emphases at 
the level of the supervisors. One first strategy was to recruit school leavers, who had 
at least done their A-levels and had possibly undergone some further training, as 
trainee supervisors and to specifically train them to oversee and manage the produc-
tion lines.550 Such training may have also entailed short attachments to different pro-
duction departments, including cutting, sample making and packaging.551 The second 
strategy was to promote operators to the supervisory level, which reduced the costs 
of training, minimised the risk of poaching from other firms and provided a career 
path to ambitious operators.552 Promoted operators normally hadn’t gone beyond their 
O-levels, if at all, but had excelled in terms of performance.553 In contrast to many of 
the less competitive firms, which similarly relied on promotion of operators as the 
main strategy to recruit supervisors, these trainee supervisors underwent further 
training inside and outside of production, where they learned about the different 
technical and managerial aspects of their new position.554 Often, training outside pro-
duction eventually took place in a company-owned training organisation or in a state-
funded training centre.555 
At the technician level, i.e. at the level of pattern makers, work-study officers and 
designers, these more competitive firms generally recruited staff, which had done 
their A-levels and undergone job-related training in either a public or private training 
centre; in contrast to many of the less competitive firms, these firms tended to recruit 
employees, who had passed their A-levels at the more reputed schools in the urban 
areas of the Western Province. In case the new recruits were lacking any industry 
experience, they were being trained by their superiors, and would, in any event, be 
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sent out for further training programmes, whose costs were generally borne by the 
employers.556 
At the management level, the skill formation arrangements were similar to those at 
the technician level. However, most management trainees had generally undergone 
university training and had passed through broader in-firm training than technicians, 
were involved in the different departments, had to analyse production arrangements 
and to write the respective reports, which were then evaluated by the senior man-
agement.557 Some firms, whose management entertained good relations with univer-
sity departments, offered places for in-plant training to students, some of which were 
directly absorbed as management trainees once they finalised their studies.558 Of 
course, not all senior managers of these firms had university degrees, as many of 
them had started their careers when management trainees were not expected to 
have undergone university training, or as A-level qualified supervisors were some-
times promoted to the management level, especially in the more rural units of these 
firms.559 Certainly, however, at the head offices, managers were university-trained, 
and often had done their A-levels at one of the more privileged schools of the coun-
try, which also reflected their high socio-economic status. Regardless of educational 
background, managers of these firms underwent permanent further training, which 
was partly conducted at the firm-owned training centres.560 
Having now elaborated on the historical trajectory of the in-firm skill formation re-
gime of the Sri Lankan garment industry, we now turn to the development of the out-
of-firm skill formation regime. We will see that the information contained in the last 
sections will be important to understand the following ones. However, the coming 
pages will hardly elaborate on the complementarities between the in-firm and the out-
of-firm skill formation arrangements; these will be looked at in more detail in chapter 
13. 
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8.2 The development of the out-of-firm skill formation regime 
8.2.1 Skill formation programmes before the imposition of garment quota 
The development of a modern textile industry in Sri Lanka in the late 19th century 
was, in contrast to India, not paralleled by the formation of respective formal technical 
education and training organisations. This was a result of the fact that most textile 
mills were run by British managers and technicians, and there was no indigenous 
political movement which would have encouraged the employment of local staff and 
would have pressed the government to establish technical education organisations 
for textile engineers.561 The first skill formation organisation in this field was thus a 
private weaving school in a village close to Colombo – in Rajagiriya –, whose estab-
lishment in 1911 was not related to the development of formal industrial ventures but 
to the promotion of hand weaving and was the result of a private, philanthropic initia-
tive inspired by the desire to revive Buddhist culture in Sri Lanka.562 In subsequent 
years, the school was taken over by the Department of Rural Development, and its 
programmes were complemented by activities of further government departments.563 
In 1917, the Education Department started a weaving school in Talpawila, in the 
southern part of the island, and after 1936, when universal suffrage had been intro-
duced in Ceylon, the Department of Commerce and Industries started to develop its 
own demonstration centres along the lines of Indian model weaving schools. There 
thus existed, by 1942, 16 government weaving schools and 12 assisted, i.e. partly 
government funded weaving schools, none of which trained technicians and manag-
ers for the modern textile industry.564 
Whereas the government of colonial Ceylon began to foster formal training for the 
handloom industry in the rural areas, the modern textile sector in the urban areas 
therefore continued to rely on personnel trained overseas. This policy was retained 
after Ceylon had become independent in 1948. Up to the early 1970s, many techni-
cians, especially weaving masters, came from other countries, mainly from India, and 
most indigenous managers and technicians of spinning and weaving mills in and 
around Colombo, both in the private and the public sector, were sent to India or to 
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Japan where they underwent formal textile education programmes.565 Both the expa-
triate staff and the local managers and technicians then trained their own local staff 
on-the-job.  
After Sirimavo Bandaranaike’s left-wing government had come into power in 1970 
and had declared that the import substitution strategy would be at the core of its eco-
nomic policy, the Ministry of Industries commissioned a report in order to assess the 
manpower requirements of the textile industry. The team of experts, which consisted 
of representatives of the National Textile Corporation, of UNIDO and of a number of 
government agencies, were of the view that Sri Lanka’s dependence on overseas 
technical education organisations had to be halted and they thus proposed the gov-
ernment to establish respective programmes.566 The work of this team was paralleled 
by the formation of the Sri Lankan section of the Textile Institute, an organisation of 
increasingly influential Sri Lankan textile technologists who had acquired their profes-
sional qualifications from the Textile Institute in Manchester and who started, from 
that very moment, to lobby the government to develop textile-related technical educa-
tion in Sri Lanka.567 On the basis of the recommendations and the lobbying efforts, 
the authorities then decided to introduce, with the financial support by UNDP, a Na-
tional Diploma in Technology (NDT) course with a specialisation in textile technology 
at the Katubedde Campus in Moratuwa, along with similar courses on rubber tech-
nology and marine engineering.568 
The three years’ NDT course was meant for students who had done their O-level 
and it prepared them for positions in the industry at the technician level.569 Its curricu-
lum, developed with technical assistance of UNESCO consultants, was originally in-
tended to entirely focus on textile technology but as, after the enrolment of the first 
batch in 1976, the expansion of the garment industry became apparent, it was 
adapted to also include aspects of garment technology, such as garment construc-
tion, quality control and machine maintenance.570 The course was administered by 
the Sub-Department of Textile Technology and thus came under the Department of 
Mechanical Engineering. Most of the teaching staff that joined the sub-department in 
these initial years didn’t have any profound industry experience but had a strong 
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academic background and generally had acquired their degrees in textile technology 
from English universities.571 However, the head of the sub-department, L.D. Fer-
nando, was comparatively well connected to actors outside academia and had formi-
dable links to decision makers in the government, to entrepreneurs and to overseas 
business and academic organisations. Before coming to this position, Fernando had 
gained industry experience at Velona, the largest Sri Lankan hosiery factory at that 
time, and had studied textile technology up to Ph.D. level in England, where he had 
met with individuals that would become leading academics in the field both in Asia, 
Europe and the US.572 Not surprisingly, he was – later on – to be Sri Lanka’s most 
prominent academic in the field of textile and garment technology. 
Despite these efforts, the social demand for the NDT course in textile technology 
remained low in the first years and didn’t reach the target of 40 intakes per year.573 
Problems were also arising in terms of the liaison between the sub-department and 
the industry, notably with regard to the organisation of the in-plant training in firms 
which were not familiar with any such scheme.574 Nevertheless, firms both in the pri-
vate and the public sector readily absorbed the diploma holders. The increasing sup-
port of the industry was also documented by the fact that one of the leading manufac-
tures of textiles in Sri Lanka, Kundanmals Ltd., started to annually award a scholar-
ship to the best performing students.575 But even though the curriculum of the NDT 
course included aspects of garment technology, virtually all students applied for posi-
tions in the textile mills, where it was common to hire technically educated textile 
technologists.576 
The University of Moratuwa was not the only organisation that started to offer tex-
tile-related technical education programmes in the aftermath of the opening of the 
economy in 1977. Hoping to create avenues for educational and social mobility to the 
personnel in the textile industry, the Open University – an initiative by the post-1977 
government that was implemented by the Ministry of Education – started a certificate 
course in textile technology in 1984 that had been developed by an Indian expert in 
textile technology under a project by UNDP and UNESCO.577 Even though the pro-
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gramme started to be developed after 1977, the certificate course – in contrast to the 
diploma course offered by the Moratuwa University – only focused on yarn manufac-
turing, weaving and chemical processing but not on garment technology.578 Similar to 
other programmes at the Open University, the certificate course indeed met with 
some social demand, with 129 students enrolled in 1984; the sustainability of the 
course was, however, challenged by enormous student attrition as many students 
found it hard to combine work and studies. When the first exam at the certificate level 
was held in 1986, only 15 students passed, and all of them subsequently failed at the 
intermediate test at the diploma level.579 Neither backed by powerful students asso-
ciations nor by employers’ associations or production-related ministries and only half 
heartedly supported by the political elite of the country, this course was thus a virtual 
non-starter, which, in these years, hardly had any impact on skill formation for the 
garment industry. 
Whereas there was virtually no absorption of NDT diploma holders and graduates 
from the Open University by the nascent Sri Lankan garment industry, the govern-
ment introduced, in the same years, practically oriented training programmes that 
directly catered to the garment industry and produced trainees who were either al-
ready employed in the industry or were entirely absorbed by the respective firms. At 
the time when the parliament decided to establish an FTZ north of Colombo, the Na-
tional Apprenticeship Board (NAB) was asked in 1979 to open a training centre for 
sewing operators with funds from the GCEC, the authority administrating the FTZ 
under the Ministry of Industries. This centre was considered to be necessary by the 
GCEC to provide foreign investors with a sufficient number of trained operators, a 
quasi-complement to the infrastructure in the zone that became all the more impor-
tant as many of the experienced sewing operators migrated to the Middle East where 
they earned higher salaries. The short courses were conducted by a small number of 
instructors that taught a syllabus from a Korean training centre; when, only a few 
years later, GCEC was of the view that the initial economic demand for trained opera-
tors had been met, the centre was closed down again, and the machines were sold 
to firms in the island.580 
As the economic planners in the administration were of the view that the further ex-
pansion of the garment industry not only required skilled operators but also trained 
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technicians and managers, the Ministry of Textile started to elaborate first plans for a 
Clothing Industry Training Centre (CITI) in 1982, an idea that was also supported by 
some of the leading local garment entrepreneurs at that time.581 The first draft pro-
vided for a relatively small centre costing no more than Rp. 1 million.582 But in the fol-
lowing two years, the authorities managed to convince the representatives of the 
World Bank to allocate Rp. 9 million of an existing credit line to the establishment of 
the training centre, to complementary technical assistance and to overseas training of 
the local staff;583 subsequently, parliament passed the respective act in 1984 and thus 
laid the foundations of a training centre which was to “promote the professional ability 
of workers and executives by providing or implementing training facilities and pro-
grammes relating to the clothing industry”.584 The act prescribed that the operations of 
the CITI were to be overseen by a board of governors, out of which three were to rep-
resent government ministries and six others to represent employers’ associations.585 
Furthermore, it stated that the institute, in contrast to other skill formation organisa-
tions in the public sector, was allowed to charge fees, as the courses were meant for 
trainees who were employed in the industry and thus in a position to afford these ex-
penses. Soon thereafter, the building of the institute was constructed in Ratmalana, 
south of Colombo, on the same premises, where the Ministry of Textile set up, in the 
same years, a Textile Training and Services Centre (TTSC) with aid from UNDP and 
UNIDO.586 At the same time, the Ministry of Textile employed R. Kuruppu as the di-
rector of the institute, an academic who had previously been engaged by L.D. Fer-
nando to serve as a teacher for the NDT course and was himself to become another 
key person in the further development of formal skill formation for the garment indus-
try in Sri Lanka. 587 He subsequently recruited a number of staff, most of which had 
either been awarded the NDT or had gained some experience in the industry at the 
supervisory or at the mid-management level.588 
The first three years of the CITI (1984-1986) were marked by the presence of con-
sultants from Manchester, the costs of which were borne by the World Bank; these 
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experts developed syllabi and trained the local staff but were mainly involved in pro-
viding training both at the vocational and at the technician level for machine opera-
tors, machine mechanics, sewing instructors, supervisors, production managers and 
other occupational grades.589 Even though Kuruppu met with some initial difficulties to 
convince the representatives of the industry and only received lukewarm support by 
FTZMA or SLAEA, the existing associations of garment entrepreneurs at that time, 
the courses met with an increasing demand, as many entrepreneurs of both smaller 
and larger enterprises themselves joined the courses or sent their staff for training.590 
The share of firms profiting from the training at the CITI thus increased rapidly: by 
1987, more than 40 percent of the companies that were registered with the Ministry 
of Textile had utilised the services of the CITI.591 
8.2.2 Skill formation programmes during the quota regime 
Whereas the staff of the Open University were struggling to fill its certificate and di-
ploma courses in textile technology and were far from convincing the authorities of 
their plan to introduce a degree programme in this field, the textile engineers at the 
University of Moratuwa were more successful in this regard. Even though the social 
demand for the NDT course remained lower than the set target, the authorities of the 
university and of the UGC gave in to the pressure mainly emanating from the head of 
the institute, L.D. Fernando, who was not satisfied to run a diploma programme at a 
university whose social standing was based on its engineering degrees.592 In a first 
step, the staff of the sub-department introduced a postgraduate diploma course in 
textile technology of one year duration for graduates of the engineering faculty.593 
With the subsequent backing by the representatives of the textile mills and donor 
agencies from Japan and the UK, the sub-department was also upgraded to an 
autonomous department in its own, well equipped building, where the new depart-
ment would soon run a degree programme in textile technology.594 The need to have 
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a degree programme for future managers and staff working at the higher technologi-
cal level was also legitimised by references to the growth of the garment industry 
which had taken place since the end of the 1970s.595 In order to raise productivity in 
this emerging industry and to improve the quality of its products, the curriculum of the 
programme included aspects of garment technology. Similar to the NDT and to the 
programmes at the CITI, the contents were elaborated by overseas consultants, who 
– this time – came from the University of Manchester and were personally known to 
Fernando and the faculty staff through studies and further development programmes 
of the Sri Lankans in the UK.596 
The first batch of degree students was admitted to the textile department in 1986. 
Due to the closure of universities in the context of the second JVP-uprising in the fol-
lowing years, the first 14 degree students, however, only graduated in 1993.597 But 
apart from these difficulties, the execution of the first degree course was marked by 
success. In contrast to the first years of the NDT course, the organisation of the in-
plant training in the third year, organised through NAITA, was now facilitated by the 
contacts, which the staff had established over the course of the years. This also facili-
tated that the graduates of the textile department were soon employed in the garment 
industry, namely by MAS, one of the leading garment companies in Sri Lanka that 
had entered into a number of FDI-backed joint ventures.598 The staff of the institute 
was satisfied to see their students being recruited by the garment manufacturers and 
started to make plans to introduce new degree courses catering to the industry, 
namely a programme on fashion design. But in these days, the interest of the entre-
preneurs, most of which were still involved into CTM production, remained lukewarm, 
and thus Fernando, the director of the department, had to stall these plans.599 
The tendency to upgrade the educational level of the programmes in skill formation 
organisations did, in these years, not only emerge at the textile department of the 
Moratuwa University but also at the CITI. In the second part of the 1980s, the short 
term training programmes were indeed continued with the help of overseas consult-
ants funded by the World Bank but they were readjusted to cater more to the techni-
cian level.600 In 1987, these courses were complemented by fee-levying pre-
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employment courses for school leavers who were seeking employment in the gar-
ment industry. The first of these programmes was a full-time course of 24 weeks 
leading to the Advanced Certificate in Clothing Manufacture that integrated the con-
tents of a number of aspects of garment technology;601 two years later, the certificate 
course was supplemented by a much more comprehensive diploma course in Cloth-
ing Manufacturing of 72 weeks.602 
Whereas the trainees of the short courses had been selected by their employers, 
the CITI now gained the opportunity of recruiting its own certificate and diploma stu-
dents. Generally, the certificate students and the diploma students were expected to 
have passed their O-levels or their A-levels respectively and to be in funds to cover 
the fees of the course. The fees had a decisive impact: they functioned as a selection 
criterion which guaranteed the employers that employees recruited from the CITI 
came from the urban middle classes. Many of the graduates of the first batches both 
of the certificate and the diploma courses thus came from families who had been in 
industrial production for some time and were interested in their sons acquiring the 
technical skills to run a factory.603 The social status of these pre-service programmes 
was also enhanced by employing the instructors of the TTSC. In contrast to most in-
structors of the CITI, these were generally lacking long-standing industry experience 
but had acquired their degrees in textile technology at overseas universities and, 
later on, at the University of Moratuwa.604 
The introduction of certificate and diploma courses was a result of the institute’s im-
plicit strategy to transform the CITI from a training centre to an educational institute, a 
strategy which was neither supported by the World Bank nor the consultants, who 
were of the view that the CITI should focus on training for employees in the garment 
industry.605 However, the courses met with tremendous social demand from school 
leavers who had not been admitted to university but hoped to make a career in the 
garment industry either in the island or overseas, for instance in Bangladesh or in the 
Middle East. Soon, the demand for these courses was higher than the demand for 
the short-term industry courses, the fees of which were generally borne by the em-
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ployers.606 But even though the development of the certificate and the diploma 
courses had not been driven by representatives of the private sector, the firms were 
ready to employ these students of the CITI, namely those of the diploma course, who 
gained some industry experience during their in-plant training of 24 weeks.607 As it 
had become a common practice in the garment factories to employ school leavers as 
supervisors and management trainees instead of promoting experienced employees 
from lower occupational levels, the diploma course provided employers with the op-
portunity to hire new recruits who already had some theoretical understanding of the 
processes in the garment industry. As the output of the certificate and the diploma 
course was lower than the actual demand from the side of the employers, the CITI 
students began to gravitate towards the more prestigious firms, most of which were 
entirely or partially owned by foreign investors. In order to smooth their relations with 
the CITI and to have better prospects to employ its students, companies now started 
to donate material, mainly fabric, which further increased the linkages between the 
CITI and the industry and thus increased the perceived relevance of its training.608 
The smaller companies, neither in a position to offer handsome salaries nor to donate 
large quantities of fabric, were at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the CITI and thus could 
hardly ever employ and retain its graduates.609 
Similar to the courses that had been conducted by the expatriate consultants in the 
early years of the CITI, the certificate and the diploma courses produced individuals 
who would, later on, play an important role in the industry and would personally en-
gage in the development of the CITI.610 The growing exchange between the industry 
and the CITI was also furthered by an alumni organisation, the CITI Certificate and 
Diploma Holders Association, that was founded by the first graduates of the diploma 
programme and that marked its presence in garment exhibitions and seminars and 
thus served its members to gain better access to the major industrialists.611 
Some years later, after 1992, politicians, public servants and representatives of the 
industry began to voice that the training facilities for the garment industry were highly 
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inadequate.612 These concerns reflected the challenges of Premadasa’s 200 Garment 
Factories Programme that utilised – as discussed in section 7.3 – the global quota 
regime for various political purposes and would result in a high number of garment 
factories being established in the rural areas. Up to that moment, the CITI had been 
the only training institute for the industry, and the 200 Garment Factories Programme 
could have meant a tremendous extension of its operations. But this was not to be 
the case. Since 1988, donors had stopped to directly fund the institute and had re-
duced their support to financing experts from overseas, mainly from British universi-
ties who provided short-term training programmes and gave lectures on different 
technical aspects of garment production.613 In 1991, one year prior to the implementa-
tion of the 200 Garment Factories Programme, CITI indeed managed to receive a 
grant by the National Development Bank so it was able to send a group of ten repre-
sentatives of the garment industry, mainly pattern makers and a number of entrepre-
neurs, to the London School of Fashion in order to have them trained in garment de-
sign.614 After 1992, however, the mainstay of the new training programmes would be 
developed outside the purview of the CITI. 
In order to increase the number of skilled operators for the factories under the 200 
Garment Factories Programme, the government motivated private entrepreneurs to 
establish training centres for sewing machine operators in rural areas. One such 
scheme was planned by Ceylinco, a major group of companies with its own garment 
factories that aimed at setting up 16 training centres island wide so that 15’000 op-
erators could be trained annually, all of which were supposed to pay for the training 
themselves.615 Whereas this plan never materialised, SLAEA, in cooperation with the 
National Youth Services Council (NYSCO), a public training organisation, managed 
to establish training centres for families in rural areas whose members were prepared 
to work in the garment industry616. These initiatives were obvious attempts by the en-
trepreneurs to impress the administration and, namely, the president, whose personal 
support was important to get privileged access to quotas and government funds. 
Whereas these schemes were meant to increase the number of skilled operating 
personnel under the 200 Garment Factories Programme, the Department of Textiles 
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of the University of Moratuwa was made the hub of the training programmes for the 
managing personnel. In fact, the department – with the direct backing of the Ministry 
of Textile Industry – became the organisation that profited most from the govern-
ment’s support for training programmes related to the expansion of the garment in-
dustry to the rural areas. In addition to the NDT course and the B.Sc. degree pro-
gramme, whose first batch was yet to come out, the department started a number of 
short courses in 1991 in various fields of garment production, such as production 
management, quality control, pattern making and work study, all of which specifically 
catered to the needs of the factories established under the programme.617 These 
courses had to be paid by the participants or the firms respectively but were also 
subsidised by the Ministry of Textile Industry, whose political head was personally 
present when some of the respective certificates were awarded.618 
Still, the number of people trained under these short courses remained compara-
tively low: in the first part of 1992, 75 trainees were participating in the short courses 
at the University of Moratuwa, in the second part of the year the enrolment was at 
150.619 Whereas the graduates of the NDT course had, so far, been fully absorbed by 
the textile mills, it was through these short courses that the University of Moratuwa 
started to cater directly to the garment industry. In the course of these early years of 
the 1990s, L.D. Fernando also increased his personal linkages to the garment indus-
try. After having been awarded the Golden Medal of the London-based Clothing and 
Footwear Institute, an organisation of garment technologists, he became the owner of 
a garment factory in the rural areas and thus a member of the National Apparel Ex-
porters Association.620 In the future years, the personal linkages between the De-
partment of Textiles and the garment industry would further increase. 
8.2.3 Skill formation programmes during and after the phase out of quota 
8.2.3.1 Private skill formation organisations 
One of the most important changes in the Sri Lankan out-of-firm skill formation re-
gime of the garment industry in the years after 1995 was the emergence of a market 
for private training programmes, which, as elaborated in section 6.2.1, primarily re-
flected a general tendency in the Sri Lankan education and training regime. As we 
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have seen in the previous section, private training organisations also emerged in the 
context of the 200 Garment Factories Programme. In fact, many of the first private 
training organisations catering to the garment industry were established by garment 
entrepreneurs participating in this programme, as they were of the view that their 
firms would require a high number of newly trained operators but also as they under-
stood that the establishment of such centres was a means to impress not only on the 
respective local population but also the president of the country.621 The practice of 
employers to open up training centres for operators was continued when quota were 
gradually being phased out after 1995.622 The limited amount of statistical evidence 
available in this regard suggests that the total number of operators trained annually 
by private training organisations constantly increased to more than 5000 in 1998 but 
started to decline in the years after: in the year 2000, private training organisations 
only trained 200 operators; by 2005, this activity had ceased altogether.623 As we will 
see later on, this development was mainly a consequence of the fact that public train-
ing organisations expanded their capacities to train operators. 
Whereas private training organisations for operators had already developed in the 
years prior to 1995, there now, after 1995, emerged a market for out-of-firm skill for-
mation programmes which catered to school leavers that aimed to be employed at 
the technician of the garment industry. As with the private training programmes for 
operators, statistical evidence on these programmes is limited; the available docu-
ments suggest, however, that these organisations were generally concentrated in the 
urban areas and that the output of the courses fluctuated tremendously: in the year 
1998, courses for quality controllers and mechanics had the highest output of stu-
dents, which was at 605 and 680 respectively. By 2001, the output of the courses for 
these two occupations would decrease to 350 and 150 respectively, whereas that of 
the courses for pattern makers and for garment production managers would grow – 
between 1998 and 2001 – from 235 and 391 to 632 and 967 respectively.624 Again, 
this development was mainly a consequence of the expansion of the activities by 
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public training organisations, which increased the output of the courses for quality 
controllers and mechanics but opened only few centres for pattern makers and pro-
duction managers. By 2004, the output of courses for the latter two occupations 
would also decrease to 193 and 374 respectively, which was, however, rather a re-
sult of the slackening growth of the garment industry than of the competition from 
public training agencies. 
Whereas the output of private training programmes for school leavers strongly fluc-
tuated, the output of short courses that catered to employees already working in the 
garment industry – and were thus paid either by the companies or by the employees 
themselves – saw a comparatively steady growth. As table 11 demonstrates, the out-
put of courses for quality controllers, merchandisers, work-study officers and pattern 
makers grew between 1998 and 2004, even though it dropped, in the case of work 
study, between the years 2001 and 2004. 
 Quality control Merchandising Work study Pattern making 
1998 40 20 17 16 
2001 122 85 260 190 
2004 199 106 147 212 
Table 11: Output of private training programmes for employees working in the Sri 
Lankan garment industry625 
The most prominent of all private training organisations was the Phoenix College of 
Clothing Technology – later renamed as Brandix College, which was established in 
1996 and would, subsequently, start to enjoy a reputation as one of the leading gar-
ment training organisations in the South Asian region.626 The college was set up as a 
joint venture by the Sri Lankan Phoenix Ventures Ltd. and the US-based Mast Indus-
tries, both of which had engaged in a number of garment production related joint-
ventures for many years; the college was headed by R. Kuruppu, the former head of 
the CITI, who was personally hired by Ashroff Omar, the then CEO of Phoenix.627 The 
first programmes of the institute were a more formal way of organising in-firm skill 
formation, as they catered to employees of Phoenix working at the craft and the 
                                            
625  Own computations based on data in vocational education and training plans; see Tertiary and 
Vocational Education Commission (1999, pp. 64-69), Id. (2002, pp. 69-75), Id. (2007b, pp. 63-
69). 
626  When the World Bank, as we will see, started to back the establishment of the BIFT in Dhaka, 
the representatives of the employers’ association were invited to exchange with the Phoenix 
College; see Daily News (2000a). 




technician level, who, upon finalising the training programmes, would be awarded a 
respective certificate or diploma.628 Only later on, the Phoenix College introduced 
programmes that were open to school leavers who would not necessarily seek em-
ployment at Phoenix, and thus became a eminent stakeholder in the Sri Lankan train-
ing market. The most important of these early programmes for school leavers was 
the course on fashion marketing and retailing, which was started, through Kuruppu’s 
personal contacts, in cooperation with the Manchester Metropolitan University in 
1999 and would tremendously add to the growing reputation of the institute.629 This 
first link to an overseas technical university was complemented by an association 
with the Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology (RMIT), on the basis of which the 
college in Sri Lanka began to offer a diploma in clothing technology and manage-
ment, a degree in textile technology and a degree in fashion and merchandising, the 
latter two being equivalent to RMIT’s Bachelor of Applied Science.630 
The initial motive behind forming and expanding the college was certainly to effi-
ciently train the existing staff of Phoenix and, subsequently, of Brandix. In fact, many 
of the graduates of the college began to be recruited as technicians and mid-level 
managers by the various companies that were merged to become Brandix Group in 
2002.631 However, over the course of the years, the college started to also serve, be-
cause of its association with overseas universities, as an instrument for skills transfer 
from more industrialised countries to Phoenix/Brandix, a strategy, which was also 
backed by the foreign partners of the company at that time.632 The subsequent open-
ing of the programmes to school leavers that were not necessarily employed by 
Phoenix/Brandix but by rival firms was not considered a serious problem by the man-
agement for many years, as it also provided the institute with the opportunity to col-
lect fees, to reduce the unit costs of training and to thus increase its profits. The insti-
tute, however, not only served as a means to train the skills of the company, to trans-
fer new skills to the company from abroad and to make profits through students fees 
but also to obtain better access to end markets for instance in the UK. When Kuruppu 
and Omar visited the Manchester Metropolitan University, they did so with the pub-
                                            
628  Financial Times (2007) 
629  De Silva (1999) 
630  Financial Times (2007) 
631  See, for instance, SL_CV_Firm02 (l. 3-6). 
632  The president of US-based Mast Industries Inc., which was involved in a number of joint-
ventures with Phoenix Ventures Ltd., was present in Sri Lanka, when the link programme with 
the RMIT was presented to the Sri Lankan media; see De Silva (1999). 
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licly stated aim “to establish links with European brand labels for the Sri Lankan cloth-
ing industry” through the personal contacts of the academics in Manchester.633 
Whereas both the CITI and the Department of Textiles of the Moratuwa University 
had needed constant technical assistance to build up their programmes in their initial 
phase, the Phoenix/Brandix college developed its reputation with no donor support. 
It, however, indirectly profited from former aid, as not only Kuruppu but also a con-
siderable number of the academic staff at the college had been employed or trained 
either by the CITI, the TTSC or by the University of Moratuwa. Being backed by one 
the largest garment ventures in the country further allowed the college to recruit staff 
with industry experience, who were also attracted by the comparatively high salaries, 
and to send students for in-firm training as part of their training programmes at the 
college and to thus increase their practical skills.634 Even though the degrees offered 
by the college were not engineering degrees, they soon started to enjoy a high social 
status as they were being awarded by a foreign university and were, similar to most 
of the engineering degrees in Sri Lanka, proof of a privileged socio-economic back-
ground, as the tuition fees were high and thus generally excluded students from the 
lower-middle classes. The college thus became the most prominent of all private 
training organisations catering to the Sri Lankan garment industry and it remained the 
only one offering a degree programme. Whereas many of the other private training 
organisations, notably those focussing on the vocational level, had to be closed down 
because of decreasing social demand for their fee-levying programmes, the output of 
most programmes by the college, notably of its degree programmes, its certificate 
programmes and its short term training programmes, certainly experienced some 
fluctuations but basically increased over the course of the years.635 
Even though the course for fashion marketing and retailing had been important to 
establish the college’s reputation as a training organisation that met international 
standards, this training programme was not expanded. From 2003 onwards, how-
ever, a similar programme, leading to a post-graduate diploma in apparel marketing 
started to be offered by the Sri Lankan branch of the UK-based Chartered Institute of 
Management Accountants (CIMA).636 This was, however, no attempt by this foreign 
                                            
633  De Silva (1999) 
634  SL_Int_TrainOrg01_Representative1 (p. 4/l. 36-39) 
635  Own computations based on data in vocational education and training plans; see Tertiary and 
Vocational Education Commission (1999, pp. 64-69), Id. (2002, pp. 69-75), Id. (2007b, pp. 63-
69). 
636  Sunday Observer (2003) 
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qualifications supplier to challenge the Brandix College. In fact, the introduction of the 
programme resulted from JAAF’s Five Year Strategy that aimed at developing “250 
apparel specific marketers”.637 The programme was thus in line with the strategy of 
some of the largest garment companies in the country, which were about to 
strengthen their backward and forward linkages and thus were in need of marketing 
experts. Accordingly, it had the personal backing of Ashroff Omar and Mahesh 
Amalean, the heads of Brandix and MAS, who were leading the process of formulat-
ing the Five Year Strategy. It was their firms, which would also absorb the majority of 
the graduates from the programme after the first batch graduated from CIMA in May 
2004.638 
These elaborations suggest that the emergence of a great number of private train-
ing providers certainly reflected a general tendency in the Sri Lankan education and 
training regime. At the same time, it is important to note that the actors’ dynamics 
underlying the formation of these training programmes were quite diverse: on the one 
hand, training organisations were formed by garment entrepreneurs themselves, who 
– through these means – aimed at complementing in-firm training processes. This 
was typically the case with the training programmes for operators in the context of the 
200 Garment Factories Programme but also with the early programmes offered by 
the Phoenix College and with the CIMA courses, which – in the name of JAAF – 
clearly catered to the interests of the larger companies that were striving for industrial 
upgrading. In the case of the latter two examples, the establishment of out-of-firm 
training programmes also allowed entrepreneurs to directly channel expertise from 
overseas training organisations into their own firms without having to come up for the 
respective expenses, as these were borne by the trainees. On the other hand, many 
private training organisations were set up by educational entrepreneurs who were 
involved in garment manufacturing but mainly ran training programmes for non-
production-related commercial purposes and thus catered to the tremendous social 
demand for the respective credentials. As it was documented in section 8.1.3, after 
1995, many of the more reputed garment factories in Sri Lanka increasingly expected 
newly recruited technicians, for instance quality controllers, pattern makers and prod-
uct developers, not only to have been awarded a secondary school certificate but 
                                            
637  Joint Apparel Association Forum (2002), p. 33 
638  Observer (2004); the course was stopped when the Sri Lankan branch of CIMA was suspended; 
see Sunday Times (2008); on the absorption of trainees see SL_FNotes_Association1_Repre-
sentative3_PersonalComm (p. 1). 
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also to have acquired some basic job-specific technical skills, and as the number of 
public training organisations at the technician level was limited, a growing number of 
school leavers started to be interested in undergoing training offered by private train-
ing organisations. As we will see in the next section, however, the growth of private 
training organisations did not lead to a halt in the further development of the public 
training organisations. 
8.2.3.2 Public skill formation organisations 
Undoubtedly, there emerged, after 1995, a market for industry-specific out-of-firm 
training programmes that generally channelled socio-economically more privileged 
school leavers to the technologically more advanced, often FDI-backed garment 
companies. This development did, however, not imply that the public training organi-
sations were marginalised or would have started to be only expanded for socio-
political reasons. As the following analysis will show, institutional change was more 
complex than this. There were, in fact, a number of training programmes that were 
introduced or adapted because the government aimed, through them, at increasing 
equitable access to vocationally oriented, industry-specific credentials and that were, 
at least with regard to the changes they underwent, hardly backed by representatives 
of the industry. But there were also a number of public training programmes which 
experienced tremendous institutional change that resulted from the pressure by the 
technologically more advanced, often FDI-backed companies whose in-firm skill for-
mations arrangements were strongly interrelated with these public training organisa-
tions. 
The organisation which continued to organise training mainly because the govern-
ment hoped, through its programmes, to increase equitable access to vocationally-
oriented, industry-specific credentials was the Open University, and it was its pro-
grammes which were particularly challenged by the development of a market for in-
dustry-specific training programmes. As we have seen in section 8.2.1, the staff in 
charge of the textile-related courses at the Open University had struggled, since the 
inception of the programmes in the mid-1980s, to retain the students. This problem 
could hardly be mitigated during the 1990s and in the years after 2000, even though 
the department introduced a number of courses that aimed at catering to the eco-
nomic demand for industry-specific skills. In the beginning of the 1990s, a course 
leading to an elementary certificate in apparel production was introduced and the cer-
tificate and the diploma courses in textile technology were adapted to focus on se-
  
 160 
lected aspects of garment production, such as quality control and work study.639 Be-
ing a distance education organisation, the department developed a large body of 
course material on garment production for the few students who enrolled in these 
courses, without, however, involving representatives of the industry in this process, 
which reflected the department’s limited access to the representatives of the indus-
try.640 As in the previous decade, the main problem of the department remained the 
comparatively limited social demand for the courses and the high drop-out rates at all 
levels.641 
In order to increase social demand for its programmes, the department had for long 
sought to introduce a textile-related degree programme, a plan which was approved 
by the authorities of the university only in 2000, when the department was allowed to 
offer not only one but two degree programmes. None of them, however, was a B.Sc. 
programme, which remained the informal preserve of the regular universities under 
the UGC. One of the degree courses was a Bachelor in Technology with a focus on 
textile engineering, the other one a Bachelor in Industrial Studies with a focus on ap-
parel production and management.642 The new programmes, however, did not in-
crease social demand: in 2008, only nine students were enrolled in the degree pro-
gramme.643 Trying to find further ways to attract students, the department entered into 
discussions with TVEC, as it hoped to use its funds for making more publicity for the 
programmes; but the plan was not supported by the TVEC as it was only prepared to 
fund equipment to implement its national training plan for the garment industry.644 Not 
lacking equipment but students, the department started to make plans to complement 
the bachelor programme by a master’s programme in industrial studies and to also 
introduce, in its Bachelor in Industrial Studies, a specialisation on fashion design and 
product development by using some of the funds available from ADB’s Distance 
Education and Modernization Project.645 
The low social demand certainly reflected, as already in the 1980s, the difficulty to 
offer training programmes to those working in the industry. But the fact that these 
                                            
639  Faculty of Engineering Technology (1994c), p. 13 
640  Id. (1994a), Id. (1994b) 
641  In the year 1999, for instance, 4 students were awarded with an elementary certificate, 2 stu-
dents with a certificate and 35 students with a diploma; in other years, the figures were similarly 
low; see Open University (2000). 
642  Faculty of Engineering Technology (2001) 
643  SL_Int_TrainOrg04_Representative1 (p. 6/l. 43) 
644  SL_FNotes_AdminUnit4_Letter (p. 1), SL_Int_TrainOrg04_Representative1 (p. 4/l. 41) 
645  Department of Textile and Apparel Technology (2006) 
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degree programmes were also attended by A-level graduates without industrial ex-
perience suggests that the low social demand was also a result of the facts that the 
social status of these programmes was considerably lower than that of programmes 
offered by other universities and that their practical orientation was lower than that of 
most other industry-specific training programmes at the technician and at the profes-
sional level, both in the private and in the public sector. Comparatively low status and 
limited practical orientation of the courses, of course, also reduced the scope of the 
department to establish strong relations with the industry but also with the ministry in 
charge of the textile industry, which had always backed the textile-related pro-
grammes offered by the textile department of the University of Moratuwa, even 
though this organisation was under the auspices of the ministry in charge of higher 
education. Accordingly, the main strategy to sustain the textile-related training pro-
grammes at the Open University was to find further ways to increase student demand 
by enlarging the opportunities for educational mobility. 
Issues related to the social demand for credentials were also central for the devel-
opment of the textile-related NDT programme; as elaborated in section 8.2.1, the 
NDT programme at the University of Moratuwa had been the first programme at the 
technician level to cater to the textile and garment industry in Sri Lanka and, in fact, 
was an important means for many to start their career in the industry. When the 
UGC, upon pressure by L.D. Fernando, had allowed the university to introduce the 
programme leading to the B.Sc. in textile engineering in the latter part of the 1990s, 
the NDT graduates lost their exclusive position in the labour market. This caused, on 
the one hand, tremendous irritation among the NDT students, who feared being mar-
ginalised by the graduates of the degree programme. On the other hand, the B.Sc. 
students criticised the university administration to compromise the exclusiveness of 
their educational programme by awarding university credentials to diploma students. 
A number of years after the first B.Sc. graduates in textile engineering had left the 
university, these irritations led to clashes between the violent student groups which 
forced the authorities at the university to close the campus for several months.646 In 
order to contain future violence, the university administration then decided to sepa-
rate all NDT programmes from their respective technical departments and to concen-
trate them under a separate entity, the Institute of Technology of the University of 
                                            
646  Daily News (1999a), Island (1999a) 
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Moratuwa (ITUM) that was given the authority “to conduct primarily the National Di-
ploma of Technology Course and similar technological courses”.647 
In the case of the NDT course on textile technology, moves were taken to split the 
teaching force so that one part only instructed at the diploma level and that the other 
part only taught at the degree level. Furthermore, the authorities planned to physi-
cally separate the ITUM and to establish a new campus, which would reduce access 
of students to the textile laboratory at the Moratuwa University, a plan, which, how-
ever, was not implemented during the next 10 years.648 In any event, this develop-
ment further undermined the reputation of the NDT course in textile technology and 
weakened the interest of the private sector representatives to get involved into the 
further elaboration of the programme. The reserved attitude of the entrepreneurs did, 
however, not reflect an absence of economic demand for the graduates of the insti-
tute. In fact, those having undergone the NDT training continued to be absorbed by 
some of the largest enterprises in the country, namely by the ones under MAS, 
Brandix and Hirdaramani, often as work-study officers, whose prospects for further 
promotion were intact.649 But as there were a number of other training organisations 
in the country, both in the private and the public sector, which offered similar pro-
grammes and thus provided school leavers with basic industry-specific skills, the 
leading entrepreneurs, some of which would strongly contribute to the further devel-
opment of the degree programme, were not eager to get involved into supporting the 
diploma awarding institute. 
The development of the garment-related programmes at the Open University and of 
the NDT was, in the years after 1995, strongly characterised by the authorities trying 
to sustain those programmes that had been established in earlier days, which re-
quired – in the case of the programmes at the Open University – the introduction of 
new degree courses. In contrast, the development of courses at the vocational level 
was more actively promoted by the government, the main reason being the continu-
ously high youth unemployment rates and the rapid development of private providers 
of vocational education and training programmes that were threatening equitable ac-
cess to the respective credentials. When the government, upon initiative by Mahinda 
Rajapaksa, the later president of the country, founded the VTA as the national lead 
agency in vocational education and training in 1995 and put it under the auspices of 
                                            
647  Daily News (1999c), Government of Sri Lanka (2000), p. 18A 
648  Gamage (1999) 
649  SL_CV_Firm02 (l. 15f & 19f), SL_Int_TrainOrg05_Representative1 (p. 1) 
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the Ministry of Labour, this was a clear statement to strengthen the role of the gov-
ernment in the provision of vocational education and training. This was particularly 
true for garment-oriented skill formation programmes. As we’ve seen in the previous 
section, private training centres for sewing machine operators had been established 
since the beginning of the 1990s, and they thus indeed challenged the few training 
centres under NAITA but also the 38 so-called High Speed Sewing Operator Training 
Centres under the Ministry of Labour.650 Once the VTA was founded in 1995, the new 
organisation took over the sewing operator training centres of NAITA and of the Min-
istry of Labour and would subsequently increase the number of the respective train-
ing centres in the island.651 Three years later, in the context of a project by UNDP and 
ILO, the officials at the VTA headquarters decided to commence, in addition, new 
courses for industrial sewing machine mechanics, garment production supervisors, 
quality controllers and pattern makers, i.e. for those occupations where private train-
ing organisations had by now become active in the urban areas, mainly in the dis-
tricts of Colombo and Gampaha, where the concentration of garment factories was 
highest. The new VTA courses generally lasted between three and six months and 
enrolled school leavers that had passed the O-level examinations, and the courses 
did – similar to most other vocational education and training programmes – not open 
up avenues for any further educational mobility. Even though the representatives of 
the garment industry hardly influenced the initiative to introduce these courses, VTA 
indeed started to seek the advice from the representatives of the industry to develop 
the skill standards of these courses.652 
From the very first instance, the development of the VTA was – as discussed in 
section 6.2.2 – a project by a number of prominent politicians that aimed at demon-
strating their willingness to reduce youth unemployment by providing equitable ac-
cess to credentials of vocational education programmes. The establishment of train-
ing centres and the introduction of new courses in various trades thus started to be 
oriented towards national targets of total enrolment figures in vocational education 
and training, a tendency which markedly increased over the course of the years, 
                                            
650  British Council (1995a), p. 21 
651  On the decreasing number of operator trainees in the NAITA training centres see National Ap-
prentice and Industrial Training Authority (2001, pp. 12f). 
652  On the involvement of industry representatives into the development process see Vocational 
Training Authority (1998a, p. 3), Id. (1998b, p. 3), Id. (1998c), p. 3, Id. (1998d, p. 3). 
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namely after Mahinda Rajapaska became the president of the country.653 On the ba-
sis of these figures, VTA then developed the District Training Plans that detailed how 
the targets were to be achieved at the local level by the Rural Vocational Training 
Centres (RVTCs).654 In contrast to what had been planned by the authorities at the 
national level, representatives of the industry were hardly involved into the implemen-
tation process at the local level, all the more as the Vocational Training Councils had 
stopped to exist briefly after they had been established in 1997.655 In order to reach 
the district targets, the representatives of the district offices therefore had to interact 
with other influential individuals at the local level, namely politicians or monks, who 
were interested in having a training centre in their own electorate or on their own 
temple grounds respectively in order to demonstrate their commitment to social wel-
fare in the area.656 
The entrepreneurs’ lack of interests in getting involved with the RVTCs was quite 
prominent when it came to the programmes for quality controllers, sewing machine 
mechanics and pattern makers, whose trainees were, at least from the perspective of 
entrepreneurs, less skilled than those of the CITI or of private training organisations 
in the urban areas but still hoped to be provided with a certificate that would help 
them to find employment as technicians in the garment industry. The entrepreneurs’ 
interest in interaction with the RVTCs was, however, much higher, when it came to 
the training of operators, which could be integrated into production processes much 
faster than unskilled school leavers. Somewhat ironically, it was in the case of these 
courses that many district offices found it difficult to reach their district targets, as 
those school leavers who were prepared to work in the garment industry knew well 
that they would find employment as operators without having acquired any credential 
from an RVTC. Therefore, district offices had to find ways to increase the social de-
mand for the courses, for instance by frequently shifting the locations of the pro-
                                            
653  In fact, in the development framework, which was based on Rajapaska’s election manifesto, the 
Department of National Planning detailed plans for a further expansion of the VTA: it aimed at 
increasing the number of institutes from 357 in 2009 to 875 in 2016, and the number of students 
from 32’000 in 2009 to 75’000 in 2016; see Department of National Planning (2007, p. 151). 
654  Vocational Training Authority (2006c), p. ii 
655  On the virtual non-existence of vocational training councils see Richards (2002, p. 31); fieldwork 
at the district level corroborated the finding that these training councils were defunct; see 
SL_Int_TrainOrg02_Representative1 (p. 5/l. 25). 
656  On the influence by monks and politicians respectively see SL_FNotes_TrainOrg20 (para. 3.3), 
SL_Int_TrainOrg02_Representative1 (p. 2/l. 45-46). 
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gramme for sewing machine operators, as the social demand for the course generally 
decreased rapidly once it was commenced.657 
Nevertheless, most trainees participating in courses catering to the garment indus-
try – close to 80 percent in the years 2005 to 2007 – attended the course for indus-
trial sewing machine operation and a number of training organisations managed to 
quite well match social and economic demand, often upon agreements facilitated by 
local politicians who motivated entrepreneurs to donate fabric and thread to the train-
ing centres and to thus become entitled to employ the trainees after the course.658 
Some of these agreements even authorised entrepreneurs to decide about the intake 
of the training centres, so that the share of those trainees who rather joined the 
course to bridge the waiting period after their O-level and A-level examinations and 
would never have been prepared to join the garment industry as operators, could be 
minimised. Such an agreement was, for instance, entered by the RVTC in front of a 
major FTZ, where a number of firms within the zone recruited trainees, had them 
trained by the centre, employed them as skilled operators and were also given a 
strong say with regard to the skills to be transmitted during the course.659 
As we have seen in section 6.2.2, the government decided to introduce, under an 
ADB-funded project, the NVQ framework in order to increase the avenues for train-
ees of vocational education and training programmes and to thus enhance the status 
of and the social demand for the respective programmes. It was certainly no coinci-
dence that, in 2003, the course for industrial sewing machine operators, which noto-
riously suffered from a relatively low social status, was one of the first courses related 
to the garment industry that was chosen to be overhauled along the lines of the NVQ 
guidelines. Similar to the courses designed under the UNDP/ILO project in 1998, this 
course was developed by involving industry representatives, who now participated in 
the occupation-specific development group or in the National Industrial Training Advi-
sory Committee (NITAC) for the garment industry.660 But even though representatives 
of the private sector had been duly involved into the development process, imple-
                                            
657  See, for instance, the training programmes offered in the Galle District in the years 2003 to 
2008: District Office Galle (2003), Id. (2004), Id. (2005), Id. (2006), Id. (2007), Id. (2008). 
658  Own computations on the basis of data in Vocational Training Authority (2006b), Id. (2007), Id. 
(2008); on agreements see SL_ FNotes_TrainOrg18 (para. 3.9.1.1), SL_ FNotes_TrainOrg19 
(para. 3.8.1.1); on the influence by local politicians on-the-job placement of trainees see 
SL_Int_TrainOrg02_Representative1 (p. 2/l. 7-8). 
659  On the factories recruiting their trainees in rural areas and on the influence of factories on the 
contents of training see SL_ FNotes_TrainOrg19 (para. 5.3.3, 6.2 & 8.1.3). 
660  National Institute of Technical Education (2000) 
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mentation difficulties were pervasive. These difficulties were related to the underlying 
rationale of the NVQ framework to enable school leavers without O-level certificates 
to proceed to the higher levels of the vocational and technical training system. Re-
quired to formulate standards that would lead the trainees to the level 4 of the NVQ 
framework, the development group decided that an operator at the level 4 would 
need to possess the skills to operate 12 different industrial sewing machines that 
were allocated to the levels 1 to 4. Based on the skill standard for the sewing ma-
chine operators, the National Institute of Technical Education of Sri Lanka (NITESL) 
developed the curriculum, which – in order to increase the status of the respective 
courses – ended up with a length of more than 300 pages, notably for courses at 
RVTCs whose length ranged between three and six months.661 Obviously, the NVQ 
guidelines had led to an inflated and overtly academic curriculum. 
At the level of the vocational training centres under the VTA, the implementation of 
the skill standard for sewing machine operators met with such difficulties, so that not 
a single trainee had been awarded a NVQ certificate in this trade by mid-2008.662 The 
main reason for this failure was not only that the curricula and the skills standards for 
this training programme could not be delivered to the respective training centres but 
also that the 12 different kinds of machines necessary to train the students up to level 
4 were not available at the RVTCs.663 In fact, most training centres had not even one 
of the three kinds of machines that were needed to provide students with the training 
required for level 1. According to the NVQ guidelines, trainees would have been free 
to ask their employees to train them in the areas which could not be covered at the 
training centres. This, however, did not happen as employers were not prepared to 
invest in the credentials of their employees and because the employees themselves 
became disinterested in acquiring the certificate once they had entered the garment 
industry.664 Despite these implementation difficulties, the RVTCs, constantly hoping to 
stimulate social demand for the courses, advertised that their ISM operator course 
was based on the new framework that would allow students to move up an alterna-
tive educational ladder outside the conventional education system.665 This was also 
                                            
661  Id. (2003) 
662  SL_FNotes_AdminUnit4_Representative2_Interview (p. 1/l. 22-24) 
663  See, for instance, SL_ FNotes_TrainOrg23 (para. 3.1.4); in fact, not even one of the vocational 
training centres visited for the purpose of this research had been provided with the curriculum, 
whose only copy could be traced at the NITESL. 
664  SL_Int_Firm10_Representative3/4 (p. 1/l. 22-23) 
665  See, for instance, SL_ FNotes_TrainOrg02 (para. 8.1.1). 
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true for the training centre in front of the FTZ that was mentioned above and that did 
not even implement the previous skill standard. 
For the entrepreneurs, the difficulties related to the implementation of the NVQ 
framework were of no major concern, as the RVTCs’ flexible use of national guide-
lines was in line with the entrepreneurs’ interest in short and practically oriented 
courses for school leavers that were ready to join the garment industry. This, how-
ever, does not imply that entrepreneurs were not interested in supporting the NVQ 
framework; in fact, in the context of the USAID-funded Tsunami Reconstruction Pro-
gram, the garment entrepreneurs, led by JAAF, started get more strongly involved 
into the development of a next series of skill standards that were designed along the 
lines of the NVQ guidelines. Aware of the fact that USAID was planning to fund the 
establishment of a number of RVTCs as a component of their project, some mem-
bers of the executive board of JAAF approached the US-representatives in the coun-
try and lobbied them to dedicate some of the new training centres to the garment in-
dustry.666 In order to demonstrate their genuine interest in skill formation, JAAF de-
veloped a comprehensive volume, “Competence and Beyond” that compiled various 
skill profiles of occupations in the garment industry with the help of the CITI and a 
number of managers at MAS Holding.667 
After a whole series of negotiations, USAID decided to establish two of the new 
RVTCs as garment training centres and to fund the development of further skill stan-
dards for the industry. When the respective component started to be translated into 
practice, JAAF was one of the key partners of USAID and CH2MHill, the contractor 
hired by the US government for the implementation of the project. In contrast to 1998 
and 2003, the industry representatives, virtually all of them managers at MAS, were 
therefore strongly involved into monitoring the construction process, into the deci-
sions about the occupations to be trained at the new centres but also into the devel-
opment of the respective skill standards and curricula.668 But even though JAAF had, 
in “Competence and Beyond”, detailed the skill profiles of a high number of occupa-
tions in the industry, the development process started from scratch and had to follow 
the relatively rigid specifications that had been developed under the ADB Skill Devel-
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opment Project.669 However, it was certainly not the main concern of the key industry 
representatives to influence the formulation of skill standards but to promote, through 
unhesitant collaboration, JAAF’s image as a professionally run and cohesive employ-
ers’ association that was placing high emphasis on skill formation – and to get access 
to the trainees that were to be trained in the RVTCs after their opening in late 2008.670 
The development of the other two main organisations that provided garment-related 
skill formation programmes – the CITI and the textile department of the Moratuwa 
University – was similarly influenced by the lobbying of the garment entrepreneurs, 
most notably by JAAF. As the following elaborations will show, the authorities were 
indeed open to accommodate some of the concerns by private entrepreneurs but 
were, at the same time, also forced to conserve what have become the key institu-
tional features of these two organisations. In fact, the entrepreneurs’ leverage was 
stronger in the case of the CITI, which – since the World Bank project in the begin-
ning of the 1980s – was aimed at directly catering to the interests of the industry, 
whose staff it was supposed to train, and was overseen by a board that also com-
prised a number of industry representatives. 
In the years after 1995, the major debate with regard to the development of the CITI 
was whether it should rather focus on short-term training and consultancy pro-
grammes or on its certificate and diploma programmes. As we have noted in section 
8.2.2, this debate had its roots in the latter part of the 1980s, when the institute 
started, despite its initial emphasis on short-term training of those employed in the 
garment industry, to run certificate and diploma programmes, which not only was the 
individual project of its academically inclined director, but also catered to an increas-
ing social demand for the respective educational credentials. Even though these cer-
tificate and diploma programmes attracted an increasing number of students and 
even though its diploma students were automatically awarded the licentiateship of 
the Manchester-based Textile Institute, both donors and entrepreneurs were more 
supportive of the institute’s focus on consultancies or specific short-term training pro-
grammes.671 In the context of a major JICA project starting in 1996, for instance, CITI 
was thus equipped with a Quick Response Cell that was meant to facilitate CITI con-
sulting garment factories on productivity development, an idea, which was later on 
                                            
669  See, for instance, SL_FNotes_AdminUnit5_PartObs1; for the result of the development process 
see National Apprentice and Industrial Training Authority (2007a), Id. (2007b), Id. (2007c), Id. 
(2007d), Id. (2007e), Id. (2007f). 
670  The Morning Leader (2009) 
671  On CITI’s accreditation by the Textile Institute see Western Express (1999). 
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taken up by the Delegation of the European Commission (EC) in its Productivity De-
velopment Programme.672 Most of the subsequent consultancies catered to the few 
large garment companies in the country, which were interested in getting expert ad-
vice for shop-floor supervisors and middle-managers at a fairly attractive price. But 
the share of income from such consultancies remained small and never exceeded 7 
percent.673 
At the same time, the share of income from training at the CITI continuously in-
creased and was at more than 96 percent in 2004, as high as never before. Over the 
course of the years, the importance of the income from part-time training at the CITI 
for employees in the garment industry, however, increased as well, particularly be-
tween 1999 and 2001.674 The part-time courses allowed the CITI to collect considera-
bly higher tuition fees than for the full-time courses, which generally catered to less 
well-off school leavers. The raising importance of training at the CITI was, on the one 
hand, clearly an effect of growing social demand for training, which resulted from the 
fact that both recruitment to positions at the technician level and above and promo-
tions within companies now required pre-employment skill formation or continuous 
private investment into further training respectively. On the other hand, the growth of 
part-time courses was also driven by the demand from some large companies, which 
used the programmes not only to train their employees but also as an incentive to 
retain staff and to build up carrier paths within the occupational hierarchy.675 
Despite high social and economic demand for the training programmes offered by 
the CITI, many private sector representatives criticised its activities for not being suf-
ficiently responsive to the needs of the sector, even though they had been granted 
more rights on the board of the CITI from 1995 onwards;676 the criticism reached a 
climax in 2001, after the coming into power of the new UNP government, which 
planned to tremendously accelerate the process of privatising government-owned 
                                            
672  Clothing Industry Training Institute (2005b), p. 4, Dodankotuwa et al. (2004), pp. 12f 
673  On external training provided to garment factories in 2006 see Clothing Industry Training Insti-
tute (2007, p. 114); on the ongoing pressure by large factories to increase the consultancy ser-
vices see SL_Int_TrainOrg03_Representative5 (p. 2/l. 2-3); on SME’s being comparatively dis-
advantaged with regard to being provided with consultancy services by CITI see Clothing Indus-
try Training Institute (2001), Id. (2002), Id. (2003), Id. (2004), Id. (2005a); see also 
SL_Int_Firm07_Representative1 (p. 1/l. 19-20). 
674  Clothing Industry Training Institute (2001), Id. (2002), Id. (2003), Id. (2004), Id. (2005a) 
675  On nominations by major garment companies see SL_Int_TrainOrg03_Representative2 (p. 2/l. 
22-23). 
676  Kelegama and Epaarachchi (2002), p. 214 
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organisations.677 Understanding that the government was open to their concerns, 
some of the most prominent entrepreneurs planned that the CITI should come under 
private management, ideally under SLAEA, the main employers’ association at that 
time.678 These plans were tremendously opposed by much of the established staff at 
the CITI, who feared that their position would be weakened by a stronger orientation 
on consultancy that would require them to improve their technical skills and to gain 
more industry experience. Furthermore, many representatives of smaller and medium 
enterprises anticipated that the owners of the larger enterprises would gain more 
control over the operations of the CITI and would channel its graduates to their firms 
and to get more exclusive access to its consultancy services. These concerns could 
neither be ignored by the government nor by the most influential owners assembled 
on the board of SLAEA, who tried, in those years, to unite the different employers’ 
associations in the garment sector under a single umbrella organisation, JAAF, and 
thus needed the unambiguous support of all manufacturers. The plans to privatise 
CITI were thus put on hold and finally stalled, when Mahinda Rajapaksa became the 
prime minister of the country in 2004 and the drive to privatise state organisations 
was slowed down.679 
The government’s refusal to entrust the private sector with the management of CITI 
did, however, not entail a general reluctance to take up the employers’ concerns 
when it came to the formulation of new projects at the CITI. In fact, the Productivity 
Improvement Programme, which had been specifically designed for the needs of the 
SME sector, was implemented from within the premises of the CITI and was thus a 
proof of its continuing emphasis on consultancy work.680 As discussed in section 7.4, 
the government and the heads of JAAF, however, soon dissented on the implemen-
tation of the programme. At first, namely the selection of beneficiaries was left in the 
hands of JAAF; but after some months already, the umbrella organisation had to face 
severe criticism from the side of the SME representatives and the civil servants that 
the consultancies were rather catering to the needs of the large firms than to the 
SMEs. A second phase of the project, again funded by the government, was thus 
                                            
677  SL_Int_TrainOrg03_Representative3 (p. 3/l. 40-41); on the general privatisation plans of the 
government see Price Waterhouse Coopers (2004, section 3.1). 
678  On the debates concerning the privatisation of CITI’s management see 
SL_Int_Firm09_Representative1 (p. 7/l. 29-31), SL_Int_TrainOrg03_Representative3 (p. 6/l. 35-
36), SL_Int_TrainOrg03_Representative6 (p. 1/l. 39). 
679  SL_Int_TrainOrg03_Representative6 (p. 2/l. 2-4) 
680  Bandaranaike (2004), Joint Apparel Association Forum (2003) 
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implemented by the Sri Lanka Chamber of Garment Exporters, the association of the 
SMEs, a development, which not only symbolised the low esteem of JAAF among 
SMEs but also the increasingly critical attitude by the government representatives 
towards the umbrella organisation.681 In the context of this new project, the role of the 
CITI was further strengthened, as the main parts of the consultancies were not im-
plemented by overseas experts but by staff of the CITI who were considered to be 
competent enough by the now’s beneficiaries of the project, the owners of SMEs. 
This course of events, however, in no way meant that the government now mainly 
considered the CITI as a consultancy outfit and that it was eager to re-direct the ser-
vices of the institute to the SMEs. In fact, both the government and JAAF were eager 
to strengthen the pre-employment training programmes of the institute, so that also 
the larger companies would profit. 
In fact, in 2005, representatives of JAAF and of the Sri Lankan government paid a 
visit to Washington DC in order to further negotiate on trade concessions and on a 
possible free trade agreement between the two countries. These negotiations, which 
had partly been facilitated by L.D. Fernando of the Moratuwa University, did not result 
in a free trade agreement but paved the way for duty-free import of cotton from the 
US to Sri Lanka; this deal was attractive for some large Sri Lankan manufacturers 
like Brandix and MAS, which were improving their backward linkages and were thus 
interested in lowering the costs of raw materials.682 In the context of these negotia-
tions, JAAF, CITI and TTSC also entered into an agreement with one of the leading 
universities in the field of textile research, the North Carolina State University 
(NCSU), which was to serve as a basis for the collaboration between the three train-
ing organisations.683 Two years after the agreement had been signed, a more speci-
fied proposal for a project worth of close to US $ 0.5 million was outlined by one of 
Fernando’s colleagues at the NCSU. This proposal detailed plans for technical assis-
tance by NCSU’s College of Textiles to the two training centres in Sri Lanka, through 
which curricula would be upgraded in such a way that the respective qualifications 
would meet American standards and could thus be awarded in association with the 
college in the US.684 Thus, from 2007 onwards, Ph.D. students from the US-based 
university visited the CITI and the TTSC to give lectures and to advise on curricula, 
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whereas training officers from the two organisations underwent short-term training 
programmes at the NCSU.  
The link to the NCSU was certainly an important step in the further development of 
the CITI, which was hopeful to award a diploma or even a degree that was accredited 
by an overseas university and to thus be in a position to compete on a level playing 
field with the Brandix College, which offered a degree programme in cooperation with 
the Australian RMIT. Furthermore, this link was interesting for entrepreneurs as a 
means to document to buyers that Sri Lankan companies were investing in human 
resources development by linking up with renowned academic organisations in the 
West. But the fact that skill training programmes at the NCSU rather focused on tex-
tile technology than on garment production and that this was not a major concern for 
those entrepreneurs who had initiated the link with the NCSU suggests that the train-
ing agreement had to also serve non-training related purposes and was even a vehi-
cle to smooth trade negotiations with the US.685 In fact, Sri Lankan entrepreneurs had 
contacted representatives of the NCSU because they were interested in improving 
the economic ties with the US, and it was only shortly thereafter that not only the link 
programme with the NCSU but also the cotton deal, from which the two largest Sri 
Lankan garment companies profited most, was signed.686 
Preceding elaborations have shown that the leverage of the garment entrepreneurs, 
notably of the owners of the largest two garment companies, over the development of 
the out-of-firm skill formation regime was constantly growing; at the same time, they 
have also demonstrated that the authorities were not prepared to entirely give in to 
the pressure by the most powerful representatives of the industry. These findings can 
be documented in more detail by analysing the development of the textile department 
of the University of Moratuwa from the mid-1990s onwards. At this department, which 
was now called the Department of Textile and Clothing Technology of the University 
of Moratuwa, the social demand for the degree programme began to increase from 
the mid-1990s and started to far exceed the number of available seats, after it had 
had tremendous difficulties in attracting a high number of students in the previous 
years.687 Correspondingly, the textile department started to enjoy a high reputation 
among the representatives of the private sector. Many of the largest and most re-
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687  On the difficulties of the early years see Perera (1993); on the continuous growth of enrolments 
see Department of Textile and Clothing Technology (2008b). 
  
 173 
puted garment companies, such as MAS, Brandix, Hirdaramani and many of the 
large FDI-backed companies, absorbed the graduates of the department into their 
cadre and subsequently promoted many of them to some of their most senior posi-
tions.688 
One of the reasons for the department being so successful was certainly the role 
played by L.D. Fernando, who had linked the department with a high number of re-
nowned universities both in Europe and in the US and had been in a position to lobby 
the public authorities and donor organisations alike.689 Many of his contacts were not 
only useful to the department but also to the garment entrepreneurs who were, for 
instance, interested in him supporting them to better access key actors in the US tex-
tile sector.690 Through these contacts, both representatives of the industry and of the 
textile department became strongly interdependent of each other. But Fernando’s 
considerable national and international network was not the only reason for the high 
social standing of the department. In fact, one of the even more important reasons for 
the success of this organisation was that it mainly enrolled students coming from the 
higher-middle classes of the country that were in demand in the upper most echelons 
of the garment industry and who were themselves prepared, partly for the lack of 
other, comparably global and high-paying industries, to work in the garment industry. 
This elitist orientation was, however, not a direct legacy of the traditionally highly se-
lective technical education programmes but the result of concerted lobbying efforts by 
representatives of the department. 
Certainly, the NDT programme, which was the predecessor of the department’s de-
gree programme, had a comparatively high entry barrier compared to other diploma 
courses in Sri Lanka, as all its students needed to have passes in science and 
mathematics at their A-level examination.691 This requirement drastically reduced the 
number of potential students, because, when the NDT course was started, only a 
small minority of schools were offering a science and mathematics stream at the 
higher secondary level. When the B.Sc. programme for textile technologists was in-
troduced in the 1980s, this entry requirement was retained and as social demand for 
entry into a degree programme increased, the intake became even more elitist. Still, 
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however, the staff of the textile department was of the view that the social composi-
tion of incoming students was not ideal. In fact, in the first few years of the B.Sc. 
course in textile technology, the programme belonged to the less prestigious degree 
programmes of the engineering faculty, and was united, together with the B.Sc. pro-
grammes in chemical engineering, materials engineering and mining and minerals 
engineering in the less elitist of two groups of engineering programmes within the 
engineering faculty.692 
This way of grouping engineering programmes served to channel the students with 
the best A-level results to the more prestigious mechanical, electrical and civil engi-
neering programmes, which all belonged to the first group, and those with the lower 
results to the second group; during the first year of the degree programme, the stu-
dents joined their classes together with all other students of the same group, and 
then had to undergo the first year examination, according to the results of which the 
students were either allowed to study an engineering programme of their choice 
within the respective group or had to study in a programme that had open seats 
available. This practice entailed that the textile department could never enrol any of 
the students with the best A-level results and often had to cater to students who were 
not interested in this field of study. Fernando and his team strongly resented this 
practice and therefore lobbied the authorities of the UGC and of the university to al-
low direct entry into textile engineering from the year 2000 onwards.693 This would 
facilitate the department enroling some of the students with the best A-level results 
and thus to increase its overall social status among the different degree-awarding 
departments at Sri Lankan universities. 
The department thus developed in a way which ideally matched with the social or-
ganisation of the most reputed garment companies in the country that has been de-
scribed in section 8.2.3. The absorption of many students from the department by the 
prestigious companies in the country was therefore not only rooted in the fact that the 
students were provided with academic knowledge, basic technical skills and some 
production-related experience or that they had been screened by the demanding 
course of studies at the department which was perceived to be a proof of them being 
prepared to work hard and under constant pressure; beyond that, it was also a result 
of the fact that many degree students hailed from urban upper and upper-middle 
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class families, had attended the most prestigious schools at the higher secondary 
level and thus had a social background that was in line with that of the leading entre-
preneurs and senior managers in the garment industry. The B.Sc. programme in tex-
tile engineering at the Moratuwa University obviously had become, over the course of 
the years, an integral part of the social reproduction mechanism of the elite of the Sri 
Lankan garment industry. 
Even though this elitist bias of the department became strongly entrenched into its 
institutional framework, it also started to partly conflict with the department’s aim to 
technically cater to the skill needs of the textile and garment industry that was under-
lying the public legitimacy of the department’s academic programme. Such conflicts 
emerged after the introduction of the fashion design programme in 2003 and in the 
context of the attempts to establish a new textile faculty. It is worthwhile looking at 
these conflicts in more detail. The introduction of a degree in fashion design had 
been a priority of the department for many years. As mentioned in section 8.2.2, Fer-
nando had been lobbying both the government and donor agencies in this regard 
since the latter part of the 1980s but neither these organisations nor the industry rep-
resentatives were interested in the proposal.694 Towards the end of the 1990s, Fer-
nando, who had already interacted with a number of design schools both in the US 
and the UK in this regard, submitted a proposal for funding to the EC and, when it 
was rejected, re-submitted it to ADB with the backing of a senior minister.695 This 
time, lobbying was successful and ADB agreed in principle to fund a consultant who 
would then develop such a degree programme; but as the development bank re-
quired the department to adhere to their tender rules, the negotiations failed again.696 
Despite these difficulties, the department decided to enrol students for a Bachelor of 
Design programme and to hire a consultant from the London School of Fashion; as, 
in the meantime, the most influential garment entrepreneurs agreed that a fashion 
degree programme would be in their interest and had started to lobby the govern-
ment in this regard, the government finally consented to fund the consultant through 
the textile ministry.697 
                                            
694  SL_Int_TrainOrg06_Representative2 (p. 1/l. 20-24); for newspaper articles on the need to in-
crease the skills in the field of textile and fashion design see Vittachi (1990), Wijesekare (1991). 
695  SL_Int_TrainOrg06_Representative2 (p. 1/l. 39-41), SL_Int_TrainOrg06_Representative4 (p. 4/l. 
33-39); on the support by politicians see SL_Int_TrainOrg06_Representative4 (p. 4/l. 45-48). 
696  SL_Int_TrainOrg06_Representative4 (p. 4/l. 48-51), SL_Int_TrainOrg06_Representative5 (p. 2/l. 
22-25) 




From the outset, representatives of the largest garment ventures were strongly in-
volved into overseeing the implementation of the course. The textile ministry, inter-
ested in funding a programme that catered to the needs of the industry, established a 
steering committee that comprised people from the ministry, the industry – mainly 
represented by a senior manager at MAS – and the university. Furthermore, the aca-
demic head of the new department started to directly report to JAAF’s human re-
sources committee.698 Given the fact that the course programme was written by a 
consultant from the London School of Fashion and was strongly oriented towards the 
degree programmes that were taught at the school in England, the entrepreneurs, 
however, neither got involved into the process of designing the curriculum nor in the 
respective implementation.699 There was little doubt that the programme was a suc-
cess. The programme soon started to be considered as producing students whose 
skills were in high demand in the industry, a reputation which was corroborated by 
the Graduation Fashion Shows that were held on an annual basis at one of the lead-
ing hotels in Colombo; many students of the first batches graduating from the de-
partment from 2006 were employed in the product development departments of some 
of the large garment companies, notably of MAS.700 Despite these achievements, in-
dustry representatives began to criticise some critical aspects of the fashion design 
programme. One point of criticism, brought forward among others by the head of 
MAS, concerned the fact that the course was a general introduction to fashion design 
rather than a preparation for specific tasks in the industry; this point was taken up by 
the academic staff at the department and led to the introduction of projects in highly 
specialised areas as part of the degree programme.701 A further point of criticism con-
cerned the student intake of the programme, and was thus related to the elitist orien-
tation of the department that has been discussed in the paragraphs above. 
In contrast to the textile-related B.Sc. programme, the Bachelor of Design pro-
gramme was no engineering degree. This entailed that students with A-level certifi-
cates in arts, who were not entitled to apply for the B.Sc. degree, were eligible to en-
rol in the fashion design programme. This also opened the doors of the department 
to students from the less prestigious schools in rural areas that offered at least an 
                                            
698  SL_Int_TrainOrg06_Representative1 (p. 2/l. 32-35) 
699  SL_Int_TrainOrg06_Representative5 (p. 3/l. 20-22 & p. 4/l. 32); for the respective curriculum see 
Department of Textile and Clothing Technology (2008a). 
700  SL_CV_Firm14 (l. 10, 13 & 16) 
701  SL_Int_TrainOrg06_Representative1 (p. 2/l. 46-47) 
  
 177 
arts stream at the higher secondary level.702 In order to screen those students that not 
only met the academic requirements but also had a creative talent, the department 
introduced an aptitude test. Despite this selection mechanism, employers soon real-
ised that the graduates of the fashion design course were often lacking the privileged 
social backgrounds of the B.Sc. students. Arguing from a technical point of view, 
these employers were of the view that the low socio-economic status of many of the 
students enrolled in the fashion design programme was related to them being unfa-
miliar with critical aspects of fashion. Students from less privileged families hailing 
from rural areas, one employer argued, were less exposed to an urban environment 
and to occidental culture and thus less qualified to design fashion products that had 
to meet the sophisticated taste of customers in Western markets.703 For these rea-
sons, many garment companies continued to employ product developers who had 
undergone training at a foreign degree-awarding organisation, such as the Indian 
National Institute of Fashion Technology (NIFT), or at a private skill formation organi-
sation in Sri Lanka – and who had the preferred social background.704 
The introduction of the fashion design programme had undoubtedly increased the 
publicity of the department but resulted, among both academics and students, in the 
fear that the social reputation of the programmes offered by the department could 
suffer from further reforms that would lead to a broader student intake. One such po-
tential reform was the plan to establish a separate faculty for textile and garment-
related degree programmes. This plan had been brought forward by some of the 
more influential industry representatives, who thought that such a faculty would offer 
a number of degrees in different textile and garment-related areas that would prepare 
the students more specifically for the various occupational fields in the industry.705 
Even though this proposal was backed by the industry and also had the support by 
the UGC, this plan did not materialise because of the opposition from both students 
and the academic staff of the department.706 The main concern of these parties was 
that the institutional framework of the University of Moratuwa did not allow such a 
new faculty to offer the prestigious engineering degrees, as this was the privilege of 
                                            
702  University Grants Commission (2008), p. 37 
703  SL_Int_Association3_Representative2 (p. 8/l. 32-37) 
704  See, for instance, SL_Int_Association3_Representative2 (p. 8/l. 13-15). 
705  On the support by the industry see SL_Int_TrainOrg06_Representative3 (p. 2/l. 27-28). 
706  On the support of the chairman of the UGC see SL_Int_TrainOrg06_Representative4 (p. 10/l. 
20-22); on the opposition from within the department see SL_Int_TrainOrg06_Representative3 
(p. 2/l. 32 & 48), SL_Int_TrainOrg06_Representative4 (p. 10/l. 48). 
  
 178 
the departments under the engineering faculty, including the one for textile engi-
neers. Furthermore, it was feared that the faculty would enrol an increasing number 
of school leavers who hadn’t gotten any credits in science or mathematics at their A-
level examination, which would have further curtailed the social standing of the de-
partment. 
These elaborations suggest that, in contrast to most other skill formation pro-
grammes catering to the garment industry, the B.Sc. programme in textile technology 
was virtually unchallenged by any private training organisation, not only because it 
provided a very broad technical education but also as it stack to its elitist intake that 
generally favoured socio-economically privileged school leavers from the best secon-
dary schools of the country. Accordingly, only those demands by the entrepreneurs 
were accepted by the authorities and the faculty which did not undermine the de-
partment’s elitist selection criteria and its high social standing. On the one hand, the 
department introduced a less elitist fashion design course, because it was in line with 
the department’s need to align with the needs of the industry and – at the same time 
– did not undermine the elitist orientation of the B.Sc. programme. On the other hand, 
JAAF’s proposal to establish a separate faculty was declined, as the new faculty 
would no more have been allowed to award the highly reputed engineering degree. 
The leverage even of the most influential entrepreneurs was thus contained by the 
well connected actors that supported the institutional framework of the university de-
partment. 
8.2.3.3 The coordination of the out-of-firm skill formation regime 
In the years prior to 1995, out-of-firm skill formation programmes for the garment 
industry were primarily provided by a small number of state agencies, which were, 
however, not formally coordinated and did not refer to any overarching training policy. 
Some programmes, those by the CITI for instance, were initiated because the gov-
ernment wanted to explicitly provide skills to the growing garment industry; others – 
such as those by the Open University – were rather aimed at providing equitable ac-
cess to credentials; furthermore, skill formation organisations themselves had ample 
scope to change their programmes, which generally resulted in these programmes 
becoming more academic and more responsive to the social demand for increasingly 
higher credentials. In fact, the diploma and the degree courses respectively that were 
offered by the CITI and by the University of Moratuwa were initiated by these organi-
sations even though this had never been a priority of the respective ministries. The 
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Sri Lankan out-of-firm skill formation regime of the garment industry was thus mainly 
driven by different state agencies and developed in an uncoordinated and fractional-
ised way. 
In the years after 1995, the fractionalisation of the out-of-firm skill formation regime 
was partly reinforced, one of the most obvious reasons being the further development 
of private training programmes. But also the formation of VTA, which soon proved to 
be the largest provider of vocational education and training programmes in the coun-
try, made it more difficult for any central authority to coordinate the different out-of-
firm skill formation programmes that catered to the Sri Lankan garment industry. Fur-
thermore, agencies offering skill formation programmes at the vocational level all had 
their separate industry advisory committees, most of which concentrated on the for-
mulation of skill standards and generally experienced a tremendous turnover of in-
dustry representatives.707 As a matter of fact, the institutional mechanisms which the 
government established to contribute to a better coordination of skill formation pro-
grammes in the years after 1995, hardly had – as pointed out in section 6.2.2 – any 
effect in this regard. On the one hand, there was the National Human Resources De-
velopment Council (NHRDC), which had been given the mandate to overview the 
entire range of education and training programmes in Sri Lanka but never functioned 
due to the absence of the council members.708 On the other hand, TVEC started to 
publish Vocational Education and Training Plans in intervals of three to five years. 
Training plans for the garment industry were published in 1999, 2002 and 2007, each 
time based on drafts by a team of experts from the TTSC.709 These plans consisted of 
an overview of the development of the industry and of the respective challenges, of a 
survey focussing on training and recruitment practices in the private sector, of an 
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analysis of the supply of training by major public and private training providers and of 
a training plan, where targets for these providers were spelled out. 
But TVEC had only very limited means to implement its recommendations, the main 
problem being that it was in no position to ask other agencies – both under the minis-
try in charge of vocational training and under the ministries in charge of education 
and the textile industry – to adhere to TVEC’s training targets. VTA’s national training 
targets and the respective District Training Plans, for instance, never took into ac-
count the training plans by TVEC. The only instruments available to TVEC to imple-
ment the plans were the grants to public and private training organisations, which 
should help to enable training centres to upgrade their infrastructure.710 But as 
TVEC’s funds were limited and as the disbursement of money was not – as the ex-
ample of the Open University in section 8.2.3.1 has shown – what could solve the 
main problem of some training providers, the implementation of the targets as spelled 
out in the training plans was never achieved.711 
The lack of government coordination and the fact that some of the key representa-
tives of the industry were of the view that some public training organisations did not 
meet their expectations led these actors to elaborate their respective expectations in 
the Five Year Strategy paper that spelled out – under the guidance of Mahesh 
Amalean and Ashroff Omar – how the Sri Lankan garment industry would become 
competitive enough to face the post-MFA challenges.712 As demonstrated in section 
7.4, human resources development was considered to be an important aspect of the 
strategy; it was thus no coincidence that the respective committee was entrusted to 
Mahesh Amalean, who planned to transform Sri Lanka’s garment industry into a 
“knowledge based industry to stay on top of competition and keep pace with global 
changes”.713 This committee now became the focal point of JAAF’s activities in the 
domain of skill formation and it, indeed, managed to coordinate the different lobbying 
efforts in this regard, many of which had already been mentioned in the sections 
8.2.3.1 and 8.2.3.2. In fact, the proposals to motivate CIMA to introduce a post-
graduate diploma in apparel marketing, the lobbying efforts to make USAID sponsor 
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garment training centres, the plans to link the CITI with the NSCU and the entrepre-
neurs’ close interaction with the University of Moratuwa were all coordinated by this 
committee, i.e. mainly by its head and a senior manager at MAS. Furthermore, the 
committee ensured that the issue of skill formation would be brought to the attention 
of the government whenever JAAF’s executive committee lobbied the government to 
increase its support to the apparel industry. These efforts also led the Sri Lankan 
government to allocate – in the budget proposal for the year 2006 – Rs. 250 million 
(roughly Euro 2 million) for the establishment of a College of Textiles and Clothing 
that was to be located in Thulhiriya, far out from Colombo, on the premises of a for-
mer textile mill, which had been closed down under the previous government and had 
been promised in Rajapaksa’s election manifesto to be re-vitalised at any cost. The 
government, thereby, imagined this college to become a regional training provider 
that would attract persons from the entire SAARC region “and would link up with rele-
vant international institutes to offer globally recognized degrees and diplomas”.714 
Even though many garment employers were glad to see their lobbying efforts bear-
ing fruits, the main representatives of JAAF were not delighted about the government 
setting up another training organisation that would be under the exclusive control of 
politicians and public servants and be located far from most production sites. They 
thus made plans to use the allocated government funds for upgrading the existing 
training organisations, mainly CITI, TTSC and the textile department of the Moratuwa 
University, and for the technical assistance by the experts of the NCSU.715 The think-
ing of a number of key representatives of JAAF, however, went far beyond these rec-
ommendations. In fact, JAAF’s HRD committee started to think about using the gov-
ernment funds to better coordinate and monitor the skill formation programmes by the 
existing organisations catering to the garment industry. Eager not to have public 
training organisations entirely controlled by government agencies, the entrepreneurs 
envisioned to establish a “Council of Apparel and Textile” (COAT) in the form of a 
private company that was to be given the authority by the government to spend the 
allocated funds for training purposes.716 In this context, JAAF also invited two Ful-
bright consultants specialised in public administration, which were virtually taken care 
of by MAS and were briefing the entrepreneurs on similar institutional frameworks in 
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other countries;717 furthermore, JAAF’s HRD committee organised several meetings 
to build a coalition of entrepreneurs that would back this proposal and lobby the gov-
ernment in this regard.718 But the government would not give in to this pressure, as it 
felt that it was unwise to have public funds overseen by the most influential represen-
tatives of the garment industry, which would not only have entailed conflicts between 
COAT and the training agencies but also between the entrepreneurs themselves, 
which had very different views on how to further develop the industry.719 Therefore, 
the plans for COAT were finally stalled. 
This, however, didn’t imply that the government would decline to coordinate their ef-
forts in the domain of skill formation with the most influential garment entrepreneurs. 
As elaborated in section 7.4, since the coming into power of the new SLFP govern-
ment in 2005, the Apparel Cluster Committee of the National Council of Economic 
Development (NECD), co-chaired by the head of JAAF and the Secretary of the Min-
istry of Industry and Investment Promotion, had become the most important platform 
where high ranking public servants discussed potential reforms with the key repre-
sentatives of JAAF, and it was here that most of the key concerns by JAAF’s HRD 
committee were being discussed and sorted out.720 In this context, the debate on 
COAT was finally solved in a creative way: MAS, which had bought the textile mills in 
Thulhiriya already two years earlier, was allowed to establish its own private training 
centre, the MAS Institute of Management and Technology (MIMT), on the premises 
of the old mill. This was, of course, a good solution for MAS, which was thus allowed 
to open, in 2008, the second private training organisation owned by one of the largest 
garment entrepreneurs in Sri Lanka and to compete with Brandix College.721 But the 
solution was also attractive for the president himself, who was eager to see more 
employment opportunities being created in a location which he had promised to re-
vive. 
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9 The development of the political and administrative re-
gime in Bangladesh 
9.1 The political and administrative regime before the formation of 
Bangladesh 
The societal life in the eastern part of Bengal has, for many centuries, been charac-
terised by the tensions between the two main communities of today’s Bangladesh, 
the Muslim and the Hindu community. These tensions already existed in pre-colonial 
times, when Bengal was ruled by the Muslim Moguls who had conquered India in the 
16th century and had made Dhaka their administrative and economic centre. When 
the historical region of Bengal became the first possession of the British in India and 
the nucleus of their expansion on the sub-continent from the mid-18th century on-
wards, it was, however, the Muslim community losing its political leverage.722 This fact 
was symbolised by the establishment of Calcutta as the power base of the East In-
dian Company in the beginning of the 18th century and its subsequent becoming the 
seat of the Governor General of India in 1785.723 
The loss of political power of the Muslims was paralleled by their declining welfare 
vis-à-vis the Hindu community, which tremendously profited from the economic, ad-
ministrative and educational policies of the British.724 When the British, supported by 
many representatives of the Muslim community, decided to divide Bengal in a Hindu 
West Bengal and a Muslim East Bengal in 1905, the colonial government virtually 
approved the further division of the two communities.725 Even though this partition 
formally only lasted until 1912 and wasn’t re-established until one year before the 
partition of India, it tremendously contributed to the deepening ethnic fragmentation 
of Bengal. Its political elite became divided and organised itself in political parties that 
were organised along religious lines, the Congress and the Muslim League; this not 
only led to ethnically distinct electorates but also supported the parallel development 
of two separate anti-colonial movements.726 Thus, the last years of British rule in 
Bengal were not only marked by mass protests against British rule but also by riots 
between Hindus and Muslims all over British India, which undermined the British 
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plans for a post-Empire India and finally led to the partition of India along communal 
lines in 1947.727 
The newly emerged Pakistan consisted of two parts, East and West Pakistan, 
which differed in terms of language, culture and ethnicity but not in terms of relig-
ion.728 In fact, Islam was the only common bond between the two wings, a bond which 
the Indian Muslim League had started to promote only from the late 1930s onwards 
and became the main rationale of the Pakistan movement in the 1940s.729 But 
whereas in India the Congress Party and its charismatic leader, Nehru, laid the foun-
dation for the development of democratic and decentralised political institutions, the 
Muslim League was not a well established and disciplined party, which could have 
fulfilled similar tasks.730 Pakistan, therefore, soon experienced frequent changes in 
political leadership and subsequently came under the firm control of the military and 
the civilian bureaucracy, whose top-brass started to run the country in a dictatorship-
like fashion and centralised political power in the western part of Pakistan.731 
In 1952, five years after the country had been formed, the new political elite sought 
to make Urdu the national language, ignoring the aspirations of the majority of the 
inhabitants of Pakistan, which indeed lived in East Pakistan and had Bengali as their 
main language.732 It thus sparked a social movement, which the government finally 
wasn’t able to contain. This social movement was not only spurred by cultural issues 
but also by the economic advantages, which the Western part of Pakistan began to 
enjoy at the expense of their brethren from the east. Even though the major part of 
exports from Pakistan came from East Pakistan, the imports benefited the economic 
development in West Pakistan; in East Pakistan, wealth was concentrated in the 
hands of a few families, many of which were “industrialists cum traders”, having mi-
grated from other parts of India to West Pakistan.733 The densely populated areas in 
East Pakistan were thus neglected by Pakistan’s political elite, which was for long 
virtually disinterested in the worsening living conditions of the poorer strata of the 
Bengali part of Pakistan.734 The cultural and economic discrimination of East Pakistan 
paved the way for a new political opposition that started to rally a nationalist mass 
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movement in the eastern part of the country.735 Driven by the secular, pro-Indian 
Awami league, which had its support from the middle-class bourgeoisie, the petty 
bourgeoisie and socialist-oriented student groups, the movement declared Bangla-
desh’s independence in March 1971 and thus provoked the military intervention by 
the Pakistani army.736 After a couple of months of brutal warfare, which saw millions 
of Bengali civilians being killed and was ended by an Indian military intervention, 
Bangladesh was finally recognised by the international community as an independent 
state in December 1971.737 The leader of the Bengali mass-movement, Sheikh Mu-
jibur Rahman, who had spent the time of the war in exile in India, now became the 
first president of the country. 
9.2 The political and administrative regime after the formation of Bang-
ladesh 
The war of independence not only claimed millions of lives but also destroyed the 
country’s infrastructure and accelerated the exodus of Hindus and of other minority 
communities to other parts of the world, mainly to India.738 Sheikh Mujibur Rahman 
thus had the difficult task of rebuilding a war-ravaged economy and to unite a society 
fractionalised along the lines of ethnicity, socio-economic status and ideological ori-
entation. In order to govern the country in this unstable political situation, the presi-
dent entirely relied on his own political power base, the Awami League, whose mem-
bers had either stayed with him in Indian exile or had supported the Indian army to 
defeat the Pakistani forces; Awami Leaguers now gained access to political power in 
the government and the parliament and to important positions in the administration 
and the emerging public enterprises, and started to exercise political patronage 
themselves.739 Not all influential fractions in the country were, however, satisfied with 
the policies of the Awami League and with the partisan politics of its leader. The po-
litical development of the initial post-war years failed to soften the demands of both 
the left-wing forces in the country but also, and more importantly, those of the mili-
tary. The army’s leadership started to feel alienated from the new government and 
his patron, whose democratic and increasingly socialist ideology and high-handed 
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behaviour they resented.740 Their position was strengthened by a massive drought 
and the subsequent famine in 1974, which again killed millions, weakened the posi-
tion of the government and made it increasingly act in an undemocratic manner by 
banning independent political parties.741 A group of officers, obviously with the knowl-
edge of the army chief himself, therefore decided to topple the government. The mili-
tary coup took place in August 1975 and was followed by a period of enormous politi-
cal instability; during that time, a number of political and military leaders came into 
power and were toppled again, until General Zia Rahman took over the government, 
first, as a military ruler, and later on, after elections held in 1977, as the democrati-
cally legitimised president.742 
Zia’s government introduced a number of changes to the institutional foundations of 
Bangladesh laid by the Awami League by putting into question the country’s secular 
orientation and by promoting a mixed economy, thus putting into perspective the so-
cialist orientation of Bangladesh.743 Whereas the first policy change affected the ex-
ternal relations to secular India, the latter improved relations to western donors, 
which had been pressurising the government to make public policy more private-
sector friendly.744 This, indeed, resulted in the emergence of a distinctively Bangla-
deshi class of private sector entrepreneurs, which were nurtured by the government 
and started to enjoy massive political patronage. In order to sustain these political 
changes and to bolster his own power base by marginalising the Awami League, Zia 
founded a new political party, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), which encom-
passed representatives of the military, the bureaucracy and the emerging business 
community.745 
Zia’s reign saw the further growth of political disunity and of social inequalities, 
which resulted from the considerable population increase and from the soaring 
wealth and aggrandizing power of the urban elite.746 Not even the army, Zia’s original 
power base, stood firmly behind him; different fractions of the military launched more 
than twenty coups against the president, the last of which led to Zia’s death. The 
coup was, once again, followed by several months of enormous political instability 
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and ended with the coming into power of General Ershad, who ruled the country until 
1991.747 Ershad created “an authoritarian, military-bureaucratic state”, with the legis-
lative, executive and the judicative centralised in the hands of the president, of a 
number of generals and of some ministers close to the president.748 Military officials 
were placed in administrative positions both at the national and the local level, in or-
der to undermine the influence of the two main political parties.749 Similar to Zia, Er-
shad did not depend on the political support of the poorest sections of society; there-
fore, the increasing affluence of the emerging middle-class on the one hand and the 
withdrawal of food and agricultural subsidies on the other hand did not cause major 
opposition by the affected population.750 Political opposition was overtly suppressed 
by a government, which, for many years, relied on emergency-rule. 
In the course of the latter part of the 1980s, Ershad’s authoritarian regime met with 
growing opposition by the two traditional parties. By that time, the parties were led by 
family members of the two former state leaders and party founders. The Awami 
League by Mujib’s daughter Sheikh Hasina and the BNP by General Zia’s widow, 
Khaleda Zia. In the year 1990, the opposition movement gained more ground, made 
the regime resort to the imposition of curfews and to stern action against the activists, 
and finally forced General Ershad out of office in 1991. After democratic elections, 
held under the auspices of a neutral interim government, the BNP came back into 
power.751 Their reign lasted until 1996, when Awami League won the parliamentary 
elections and remained in power until 2001. In that year, BNP and its leader, Khaleda 
Zia, were voted in again and stayed in power up to the end of 2006, when they in-
stalled an allegedly interim government. Only a few months later, this government 
was sacked by the army and was replaced by a further interim government, which 
was more acceptable both to the Awami League, the army and the international 
community.752 
The political development under the democratically elected governments since 
1991 was characterised by further politicisation of all aspects of Bangladesh’s society 
and by the hostilities between the two main parties, each of which represents a dif-
ferent vision for Bangladesh’s development and worship one of the two respective 
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party founders. Elections were overshadowed by rigging of votes and political vio-
lence between the main two parties, carried out on the roads and in the dark, and 
there was an increase in extra-judicial political killings, especially under the BNP 
government in power between 2001 and 2006.753 Furthermore, in order to retain or to 
achieve political power both at the national and the district level, alliances had to be 
sought with political parties which had previously only been of marginal importance. It 
was mainly the Islamist forces, which gained from this development, even though 
some of their members started to resort to terrorist tactics and continued to question 
the legitimacy of the Bangladesh as a nation state itself.754 
Despite political violence, the years after 1991 saw a couple of developments which 
would have contributed to the overall stability of the country. One of the key aspects 
of Bangladesh’s development under the post-Ershad governments was economic 
growth. Since the early 1990s, the country’s GDP grew at approximately 3.2 percent, 
which, as economists believe, was translated into sustainable poverty reduction.755 
This process was interrelated with the growth of NGOs that started to be involved in 
the implementation of poverty reduction activities such as micro-credit banking;756 
furthermore, media freedom increased, with more private TV-channels and newspa-
pers both in Bengali and English being published.757 At the same time, the power of 
the military forces was contained to a certain extent by the political leaders of the 
country, who indeed used the different arms of the army to oppress political oppo-
nents but also involved them into lucrative UN-peace keeping missions, making the 
respective military leaders more dependent from the support of the international 
community, which would not back a military-regime in Bangladesh.758 
The process of political fragmentation was paralleled by a substantial erosion of the 
capacity of Bangladesh’s administrative system. According to Transparency Interna-
tional, the extent of corruption in Bangladesh’s administration belongs to the highest 
in the world.759 Many political observers started to lament that administrators held 
wide-ranging powers enabling them to provide their clients with perks and opportuni-
ties for large-scale tax-evasion and that they were working for their individual inter-
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ests, protected by their political masters and not monitored by the parliament and the 
respective standing committees.760 
The main part of Bangladesh’s administrative system has its roots in a colonial ad-
ministration, which the British started to establish after 1765, when they took over the 
control of the revenue administration of Bengal from the Mogul emperors.761 Previous 
administrative structures had evolved under previous Buddhist, Hindu and Muslim 
rulers but were considerably overhauled by the British, who started to build up a civil 
service that was centralised and standardised all over British India.762 After the British 
had left in 1947, the inherited administrative structures were continued on the basis 
of the Government of India Act of 1935, which was adapted by the Pakistan (Provi-
sional Constitution) Order of 1947.763 The core of the alliance of civilian and military 
bureaucrats in Pakistani times was the elitist Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP), which 
was very effective in fending off administrative reforms and thus in conserving the 
structures of the British system.764 When Mujib came into power in 1971, the admini-
stration had been tremendously weakened by the departure of many senior adminis-
trators to West Pakistan; the remaining public servants were mistrusted by the presi-
dent, who therefore tried to establish a public service that would follow his dictates.765 
Many members of the former CSP were dismissed and substituted by party favour-
ites or civil servants who had participated in the liberation war.766 In order to contain 
the power of the former CSP, Mujib also formed the Planning Commission, which in 
fact was a “large multi-sectoral super-ministry”, mainly consisting of academics with 
little experience in administration.767 The Five Year Plans written by this commission 
were meant to plan economic development along the lines of Soviet development 
plans but their implementation was diluted during the consultations between minis-
tries and the planning commission.768 
These early years of the Bangladeshi administration were to be crucial. Not only 
was the public sector made the key actor in economic and social development but 
also was it staffed with individuals selected on the grounds of political loyalty, which 
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contributed to increasing provision of political patronage and rent-seeking and to the 
expanding number of ministries and public servants.769 This trajectory was continued 
under Zia and Ershad. Especially during the rule of the latter, the size of the admini-
stration was more than doubled and corruption and patronage became more wide-
spread;770 the implementation of development plans and annual budget was under-
mined by Statutory Regulatory Orders (SRO), on the basis of which the president 
raised or lowered taxes, import duties and export fees in order to gain the support of 
those he depended on.771 Under the democratic governments in power since 1991, 
corruption in the administration was hardly reduced, and there were no attempts to 
scale down the size of the administration handed over to the democratic regimes by 
Ershad.772 There were numerous failed attempts to decentralise the administrative 
process and to make the staff of ministries and departments, many of which were 
and are lacking job descriptions, more accountable to the general public.773 
From the beginning, the Bangladesh’s political and administrative regime became 
strongly influenced by humanitarian and development aid from more industrialised 
countries. The climax of aid dependence was, however, already reached in the 
1980s, when the aid-GDP ratio was at approximately 10 percent and when the An-
nual Development Programme was nearly entirely financed from foreign aid.774 The 
influx of aid was, however, not a phenomenon that began in 1971. Already during the 
Pakistan period, foreign aid was important, and it was used by the donors to further 
the growth of the private sector.775 This policy was strongly pursued by USAID, the 
major bilateral donor of the country, but also by the World Bank, whose strategy to 
support economic reforms was interrelated with the American efforts to turn Pakistan 
into a strategic partner in South Asia.776 
After the formation of Bangladesh in 1971, the country received considerable aid 
from different donors, at the helm of which was the World Bank. Despite initial reser-
vations with regard to the Bank’s political alignment with the US foreign policy, the 
government under Mujib accepted an Import Programme Credit (IPC), financial sup-
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port to reconstruct the war ravaged infrastructure and food and commodity aid.777 The 
latter was also used for the manufacturing industries in the public sector, which grew 
increasingly aid dependent.778 Aid dependence resulted in Bangladesh being subject 
to political pressure from western donors not to align with the Socialist block, which 
led the government to stop the export of jute goods to Cuba after respective interven-
tions from the US.779 Since then, Bangladesh constantly followed a pro-Western for-
eign policy, a process, which is being symbolised by the constant policy dialogue be-
tween the political and administrative elite and the World Bank.780 
Under Zia, aid became more oriented towards private sector development. The IPC 
was complemented by measures through which industrialists were given favourable 
access to imported material.781 One of the main foci of donor intervention, however, 
became the Development Finance Institutes (DFI), whose loans were disbursed to 
entrepreneurs and were thus intended by the donors to nurture an indigenous private 
sector. At the same time, the private sector was directly supported by construction 
related development projects, under which contracts were awarded to both foreign 
and domestic firms.782 In the early 1980s, Bangladesh experienced a rapid deteriora-
tion of its terms of trade. The donors considerably increased aid but also pressurised 
the government not only to support the development of the private sector but also to 
reduce the country’s financial and external deficit through the means of structural ad-
justment.783 Thus, overall public investments, especially food and agriculture subsi-
dies, were reduced from 1982.784 
The coming into power of a democratic regime in 1991 was paralleled by the advent 
of the Washington Consensus and the World Bank’s renewed global focus on pov-
erty. In Bangladesh, donors accordingly renewed, on the one hand, their efforts to 
support reforms that would reduce regulations in various policy domains, including 
trade, agriculture, food and energy, further private sector led growth and lead to the 
privatisation of state enterprises.785 On the other hand, donors engaged in poverty 
alleviation programmes by contracting non-governmental organisations (NGO), which 
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made this entirely aid-dependent sector become one of the largest in the world.786 
Following the World Bank’s report on governance and development in 1992, the 
World Bank and other donors in Bangladesh also started to put administrative decen-
tralisation, transparency and accountability high on their agendas, hoping that a de-
mocratic regime would be a reliable partner for such reforms.787 In the years after 
2000, reforms to facilitate private sector led growth, to reduce poverty and to improve 
governance were at the core of the two Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP), 
which were being authored by the Planning Commission in strong cooperation with 
donor agencies in order to define priorities in the development strategy and to have a 
commonly agreed rationale for aid programmes.788 
Many of the intended reforms were not only strongly contested in the general public 
but often were not implemented at all, making the World Bank observe that “dysfunc-
tional politics” were the main barrier to development in Bangladesh.789 In fact, aid has 
hardly reached the poor and has itself become part of a corrupt process, driven by 
numerous individual and corporate actors at the different levels of the political and 
administrative regime, none of which have been interested in increasing the account-
ability of the aid process.790 Especially the members of parliament are under constant 
pressure to siphon aid from the centre to the rural areas, so that roads, schools and 
hospitals can be built with their political patronage.791 Over the course of the years, 
the dependence of Bangladesh’s political and administrative regime on foreign aid 
was, however, considerably reduced. Since the 1990s, Bangladesh has rather be-
come dependent, on the one hand, from trade, after the US and the EU had granted 
privileged access to their markets and, on the other hand, from the remittances of its 
migrant workers.792 It is mainly these two developments combined which have al-
lowed Bangladesh to constantly pay back some of the loans and to thus reduce pub-
lic dept.793 
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10 The development of the education and training regime in 
Bangladesh 
10.1 The education and training regime before the formation of Bangla-
desh 
Towards the end of British rule in India, the educational system in the eastern part 
of Bengal was strongly segregated along ethnic lines and thus reflected the commu-
nal fractionalisation of this part of India: Public schools and universities were mainly 
attended by Hindus, whereas an unproportionally high share of Muslims frequented 
the denominational private schools.794 The widespread use of these private schools 
among Muslims was not only the result of colonial education policy but also of devel-
opments in the Mogul period: Up to the 18th century, the Muslim rulers in this part of 
India had successfully motivated the land owners to establish schools which would, 
independently from the central Mogul government, impart Islamic educational con-
tents that, in the urban areas, also included the principal Islamic languages. During 
the first couple of decades of British rule over Bengal, this policy was continued until 
1835, when the British decided that Western knowledge was to be taught to a greater 
extent and thus began to establish a network of English schools and colleges in Ben-
gal. As, in the same years, English became the main language of the courts of the 
entire colonial government service, these new schools met with considerable social 
demand, which also made many private schools introduce English as their main lan-
guage of instruction.795 
This growth of secondary and higher education was further spurred by the estab-
lishment of a university at Calcutta in 1857 but also by the introduction of a scholar-
ship-scheme for deserving students at schools and colleges and an increase in gov-
ernment subsidies to private educational institutions with a secular curriculum.796 The 
educational expansion following these reforms was, as in the decades before, primar-
ily borne by private enterprise, and it led to high educational participation among the 
Hindu middle classes. In fact, more public schools were established in Hindu domi-
nated West Bengal and even the public schools in primarily Muslim East Bengal were 
predominantly frequented by Hindus. The high educational participation rates among 
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the Hindu part of the population resulted in them having better prospects for social 
mobility, as formal education facilitated employment in the colonial civil service and in 
trade, which was equally controlled by the British.797 
After the turn of the century, the colonial government increasingly became aware of 
these inequalities. Especially after 1906, when Assam and the eastern part of Bengal 
were a separate province, the British therefore initiated a number of reforms to pro-
mote public education among the Muslim population and made the first plans for the 
establishment of a university at Dhaka, which would finally materialise in 1921.798 But 
as these reforms were followed by a period of rising tensions between the ethnic 
communities and of staggering economic development in re-united Bengal, the par-
ticipation rates among Muslims did not increase considerably until the British left in 
1947. 
The expansion of technical and vocational education remained limited during the 
British period, which corresponded with the low importance that the colonial admini-
stration attached to industrial development. In the rural areas, a small number of pub-
lic institutes trained artisans, craftsmen, land surveyors and construction supervisors. 
Some of them, the Industrial Schools, were operating under the Directorate of Indus-
tries, which also started a technical training centre in Dhaka to train retired and re-
trenched army personnel after World War I.799 At the higher technical education level, 
the British founded a survey school in Dhaka in 1876, which prepared technicians 
that were to support the administration of rural Bengal.800 In many other parts of India, 
these years marked the beginning of the rise of technical education, which was, par-
ticularly since the 1880s, an important political aim of the Indian National Congress 
and, after 1900, of the Swabeshi movement which aimed at making India more self-
sufficient. In fact, the number of technical education organisations in Bengal rose 
from 23 in 1897 to 202 in 1937 but – similar to general education – this growth would 
be more pronounced in the western part of Bengal, where the British also established 
a more comprehensive technical college.801 
The partition of India tremendously redefined the scenario of educational develop-
ment in the area, as it resulted in the exodus of many Hindu teachers and owners of 
private schools from East Pakistan but also in the loss of Calcutta, the then economic 
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and cultural centre of Bengal.802 The effects of these events were exacerbated by the 
sceptical attitude of the Pakistani government vis-à-vis an expansion of educational 
opportunities, which did, in contrast to Sri Lanka, not allow educational development 
to become part of the process of postcolonial nation-building. In fact, education was, 
very soon, a political domain which dramatically featured the country’s political frag-
mentation along cultural and ethnic lines, the main political controversy at that time – 
the role of the Bengali language in Pakistan – being directly linked to education pol-
icy. In the eyes of the educational planners in Pakistan, a more comprehensive edu-
cational system and a further increase in enrolment rates would have further accen-
tuated these frictions.803 Thus, not only remained both primary and secondary schools 
mainly in private hands but also were there no incentives to establish more non-
public schools.804 Between Pakistan’s independence and the mid 1960s, the number 
of secondary schools in East Pakistan had only been raised by little more than 18 
percent to 4108, which stood in strong contrast not only to the size of the population 
of this part of Pakistan but also to the educational expansion in the western part of 
the country.805 
The government’s restrictive approach to education was also reflected at the uni-
versity level. In the early 1960s, the resources for this segment of the education sec-
tor still came from private sources by more than 50 percent and the share by the pub-
lic sector even declined.806 The six universities established by 1970 and the colleges 
affiliated to them thus only catered to a very limited, affluent section of the East Paki-
stani society.807 Despite restricted university expansion and despite severe laws re-
stricting the public life at these universities, it would be from these locations, mainly 
from Dhaka University, that protests against the regime in the western part of Paki-
stan would emerge and would finally lead to the civil war some years later.808 
In contrast, expansion of technical and vocational training was less contentious, as 
it was, in the eyes of the government, less entangled with the cultural politics of 
Bangladeshi nationalism but rather a crucial element in the transition into the age of 
science and technology.809 Similar to other post-colonial countries at that time, the 
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Pakistani government aimed at boosting economic growth by strengthening both 
workplace-based and school-based technical and vocational training. Workplace- 
based training was to be developed through an apprenticeship training scheme, the 
legal regulations of which were defined in the 1960s and then subsequently imple-
mented under the Labour Department.810 The mainstay of the expansion of the tech-
nical and vocational training system was, however, based on the establishment of 
vocational and technical training centres. Up to the 1960s, it was mainly the Labour 
Department with its five Technical Training Centres and the Directorate of Industries 
with its five industrial schools and the Dhaka Polytechnic Institute which were the 
main providers of school-based vocational and technical training. 
After 1961, however, the Directorate of Technical Education (DTE) started to be the 
key agency in technical and vocational training. Not only did the industrial schools, 
previously under the Directorate of Industries, come under its purview and were up-
graded to Polytechnics but also did the DTE open up 22 Vocational Training Insti-
tutes and a number of further polytechnics by 1970.811 This organisation was, from its 
inception, strongly backed by the World Bank, which supported the education sector 
in Pakistan for the first time.812 As technical and vocational schools, similar to aca-
demic secondary schools, prepared students for examinations, this part of the educa-
tion and training system received its own examination body. The East Pakistan Board 
of Examination for Technical Education was founded in 1954 and re-organised as the 
East Pakistan Technical Education Board in 1967 with the mandate to oversee tech-
nical vocational education offered by the different organisations in the field by devel-
oping curricula, conduct examinations and award credentials.813 
At the higher technical education level, the earlier Dhaka Survey School developed 
to be the most important technical university of East Pakistan. In 1948, the school 
became the Dhaka Engineering College, affiliated to Dhaka University, and subse-
quently developed to a highly prestigious institute.814 The reputation of the college 
was certainly rooted in its highly selective entry system but also in curricula, which 
were, first, based on the model of British programmes and, subsequent to a link with 
the Texas Agriculture and Mechanical College, on American models.815 
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10.2 The education and training regime after the formation of Bangladesh 
10.2.1 The overall development of education and training 
After Bangladesh had become independent in late 1971, the new government de-
clared educational development to be a major element of nation building. Public in-
vestments into general basic education were increased, primary schools nationalised 
and soon, indeed, enrolment rates at the primary level rose considerably.816 Despite 
these changes with regard to the expansion of primary education, secondary educa-
tion policy remained comparatively elitist, as two crucial features of the previous sys-
tem were retained in the course of the post-independence expansion of public educa-
tion. First, the government decided not to nationalise secondary schools and, sec-
ond, it did not away with the selection mechanism at the entry of the junior secondary 
level that was an important reason for socio-economic segregation of the education 
system at the secondary level. Social demand for education remained low as a major 
part of the population, hardly in touch with the formal part of the labour market, did 
not consider schooling to be an important means for social mobility and was not pre-
pared accept its high opportunity costs.817 Accordingly, no political party tried to win 
votes by promoting expansion of secondary education. The development of the gen-
eral education system soon was one of the concerns of donor agencies, which 
started to strongly influence its values and the direction of its overall development; 
their leverage over implementation, however, remained limited for many years as it 
continued to be strongly dominated by local political pressure groups.818 At the time of 
General Ershad, donors therefore started to interact with non-governmental organisa-
tions (NGOs) that operated their own schools and were, instead of the political par-
ties, gradually built up as proponents of basic education.819 
After the demission of General Ershad as president of Bangladesh, the develop-
ment of the education system was dominated to an unprecedented extent by the ex-
pansion of primary education. This was the result of a renewed effort by the newly 
elected BNP government. Echoing the Jomtien declaration of 1991, it declared Edu-
cation for All (EFA) and thus universal primary education to be the main objective of 
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its education policy.820 Subsequently, the government introduced a number of meas-
ures, which aimed at implementing this objective: primary education was made free 
to all children in government schools and girls’ education became free at the junior 
secondary level as well.821 In order to reduce the opportunity costs of schooling, this 
policy change was accompanied by a scholarship programme for girls in rural areas 
and a Food for Education programme in specifically disadvantaged areas of the 
country.822 
The donors, eager not only to see one of their main concerns being implemented 
but also supportive of the incoming democratic government, backed these efforts by 
funding a number of programmes that were aimed at enhancing equitable access to 
primary education and at improving the quality of instruction. The most important of 
these interventions were two subsequent Primary Education Development Pro-
grammes (PEDP).823 In this context, NGO schools were given wide support, namely 
the ones by the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), which subse-
quently became the largest educational NGO in the world.824 These efforts in educa-
tional development effectively increased enrolment rates. The increase in the number 
of schools by 64 percent between 1990 and 1997 was paralleled by an increase in 
the total school population by 50 percent from 12 to 18.3 million.825 By the year 2005, 
the net primary enrolment rate would be at 94 percent and 65 percent of all children 
enrolled into primary education would reach at least grade five.826 Furthermore, the 
enrolment of girls rose further to 50 percent in 2000, after having been at 37 percent 
in 1985.827 
Despite these achievements at the primary level, the growth of enrolment rates at 
the secondary education was relatively slow, especially in the rural areas:828 in 1998, 
secondary education participation of children between 11 and 15 was, on a net basis, 
at 33 percent, subsequently rising to 45 percent in 2005.829 Participation rates were 
particularly low at the senior grades of the secondary level, being at 31 percent in 
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2005.830 The reasons for the comparatively low enrolment rates at the secondary 
level are complex but centre around the fact that a large share, more than 80 per-
cent, of the costs of secondary education continued to be borne by the private 
households.831 In contrast to primary education, attention of secondary schools up to 
grade XII was not made free and secondary schools remained to a large extent in the 
non-government sector. These schools, enrolling more than three quarters of all stu-
dents at the secondary level, were indeed partly aided by the government through 
grant-in-aid for the payment of teacher salaries, which were, however, not sufficient 
to guarantee the quality of instruction in most secondary schools.832 The most promi-
nent combined effect of both increasing primary education participation and the lack 
of funds for the further development of secondary education was the rise of the aver-
age number of students per class from 18 in 1970 to 22 in 1990 and to 56 in 1997.833 
The weaknesses of secondary education are clearly a consequence of political de-
cisions. Whereas development of primary education under state patronage became a 
donor-backed priority in the early 1990s, that of secondary education did not, even 
though the funds allocated for secondary education were rising relative to those 
compared to university education.834 Those traditionally profiting from secondary 
schools, both the urban and the rural middle-classes, were hardly interested in im-
proving the state of secondary education, as increasing enrolment rates at this level 
mainly implied increasing competition for access to higher education. In fact, screen-
ing of able students for further academic education had been the objective of secon-
dary schools since the development of the education system under British rule, and it 
continued to be at the bottom of both curriculum and teaching methods.835 
The academic orientation of secondary schools is also being reinforced by the re-
cruitment practices on the labour market. On the one hand, the credentials awarded 
by the public examination boards are of low importance in most parts of the labour 
market, with only 9 percent of the labour force having undergone at least ten years of 
schooling and thus holding a Secondary School Certificate (SSC) in 2000.836 Espe-
cially in the informal sector of the economy, still the largest segment of the labour 
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market especially in the rural areas, secondary schools certificates are not expected 
by employers, many of which prefer to recruit child labourers and to train them up as 
their apprentices.837 For this reason, there is little pressure from employers to reduce 
the purely academic orientation of formal schooling. 
On the other hand, the secondary education certificates are a requirement for most 
positions in the public sector, whose recruitment rules strongly reward the acquisition 
of academic skills.838 Employment in the public sector only contributes 4.5 percent to 
aggregate employment in Bangladesh. But as these positions often are some of the 
few opportunities for employment in the formal sector in the rural areas and as public 
servants belong to the more organised segment of the labour market and enjoy bet-
ter employment conditions, public sector employment has a “disproportionally large 
impact on the behavioural expectations” of both the existing workforce and the school 
population.839 
The Bangladeshi education system not only experienced tremendous expansion of 
primary and secondary but also of university education, which was an effect various 
reforms and increasing social demand. The first major reform occurred in the 1970s. 
On the one hand, a new university ordinance provided the existing universities with 
more autonomy than under the Pakistani period, giving both teachers and students 
the opportunity to become involved into the governance of their own universities.840 
On the other hand, the universities received permission to enrol more students and to 
open up new departments, such as in the case of Dhaka University.  
The new university ordinance would subsequently lead to the university system be-
coming increasingly politicised, as the staffing of the governing bodies of the univer-
sity started to be inflicted by electoral politics. This politicisation also resulted in the 
inflation of university ranks, e.g. in the rising number of academics being promoted to 
the professorial level, without further lecturers being employed.841 This tendency was 
exacerbated when, after 1980, resources for universities became scarcer. Under 
pressure from donors, which placed high emphasis on the development of general 
education, General Ershad started to considerably reduce the share of university 
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education in the education budget from 10 to approximately 7 percent.842 The combi-
nation of increasing politicisation and a growing lack of funds resulted in a deteriora-
tion of the quality of instruction and research in many disciplines. Similar to Sri Lanka 
and to other parts of the Indian sub-continent, there were a couple of instructive ex-
ceptions. Notably the Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology (BUET) 
– the former Engineering College – continued to be governed by the University Ordi-
nance of 1961 and went on to enjoy considerable government patronage and to re-
ceive funds from donor agencies. Thus, it remained the uncontested preserve of the 
upper most echelons of Bangladeshi society. 
The development of the university education in Bangladesh after 1990 was mainly a 
result of the combined effects of two separate, though interrelated acts, which were 
passed by parliament soon after the new, democratically elected government had 
taken its seats. The National University Act was to lay the legal foundations to affiliate 
degree-awarding colleges, previously affiliated to some of the existing public universi-
ties, to a newly formed National University, which was solely operating as an examin-
ing body.843 The Private University Act was to regulate governance of private universi-
ties, some of which had already evolved some years before.844 Both pieces of legisla-
tion were the consequence of pressure emanating from Bangladesh’s increasing 
middle-class to increase enrolment into university education, which had, so far, been 
tremendously restricted by the University Grants Commission. In fact, between 1970 
and 1993, enrolment into university education had only risen by 1 percent, which 
made the students from the lower middle classes seek employment and those from 
the upper echelons of society migrate to foreign universities.845 
The National University Act soon led to a growth of public degree-awarding col-
leges: by the end of the 1990s, their number had risen to 800, which was a growth by 
60 percent since 1991.846 Thus, in the year 2000, more than 85 percent of all students 
at university level were studying at colleges under the National University.847 Despite 
considerable growth of university enrolments, allocations for the development of 
higher education were strongly reduced in the 1990s.848 Necessarily, the combination 
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of increasing enrolments and declining funds resulted in a financial crisis in all public 
degree-awarding organisations and especially in the degree colleges, with university 
libraries starting to lack books and periodicals and the average class size increasing 
to over 70 at the end of the 1990s.849 Again, public universities in Dhaka – namely 
BUET – were the least affected, with the teacher-student ratio remaining at approxi-
mately 1:15, which was a result from enrolments growing at a slower pace than be-
fore 1990.850 The National University Act thus furthered their aristocratic seclusion. 
At the same time, the Private University Act of 1992 initiated an enormous growth of 
enrolments to private universities. Starting with the North-South University, whose 
owners had been instrumental in lobbying the government to pass the act, the num-
ber of private universities rose to 54 and those of enrolled students to 46080 by 
2003, which was a growth of more than 700 percent only after 1997.851 In contrast to 
public universities, which don’t have the authority to independently recruit teachers, 
the average student-teacher ratio at these universities remained between 1:9 and 
1:20 and was thus significantly lower than even in the most reputed of their public 
counterparts.852 Despite this advantage, many private universities are being criticised 
for not meeting a minimum of performance indicators.853 Following the lines of the 
North-South University and its American models, private universities in Bangladesh 
generally offer four-year bachelor’s degree programmes that are more strongly ori-
ented towards the private sector segments of the labour market in Bangladesh than 
those of public universities, the most popular degree programmes being a Bachelor’s 
in Business Administration, Computer Science and Engineering or in English Lan-
guage and Literature.854 Even though comprehensive statistical data on the absorp-
tion of graduates is lacking, the available evidence suggest that, indeed, they are by 
a majority joining that segment of the private sector, whose salary structure is more 
attractive than that of the public sector, even at its higher echelons.855 
10.2.2 The development of technical and vocational education and training 
The Awami League government led by Sheik Mujib not only promised to expand 
general education but also to increase enrolment in vocational and technical train-
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ing.856 Carrying through this electoral promise, it therefore established – as outlined in 
the First Development Plan and the Two Year Development Plan – seven new Tech-
nical Training Centres (TTC) under the Ministry of Labour and twelve Vocational 
Training Institutes under the Ministry of Education. In contrast to the last decade of 
the Pakistan period, the Ministry of Education now lost its position as the key agency 
for the development of technical and vocational training to the benefit of the training 
organisations under the Ministry of Labour, whose programmes were – particularly by 
donor agencies – considered to be less academic and therefore providing trainees 
with more practical skills than the Vocational Training Institutes.857 
This tendency became more pronounced once Mujib’s government had been top-
pled. Some donors, namely SIDA, indeed continued to support the VTIs with a num-
ber of projects, in order to address exactly these problems.858 The major part of aid, 
however, came from donors, which did not aim at strengthening the VTI but the TTCs 
under the Ministry of Labour: UNDP and ILO, which had already funded the TTCs 
during the Pakistan period, became involved into the rehabilitation of war ravaged 
TTCs after 1972, supported their infrastructure and the development of curricula in a 
four-year project and began to prepare a more comprehensive World Bank funded 
project focusing on these training centres from 1975.859 Under this project, the World 
Bank not only gave infrastructural support to the TTCs but quite openly aimed at re-
ducing the stake of the Ministry of Education in technical and vocational training and 
at making the Ministry of Labour the key agency in this field. First, the World Bank 
advised to transfer all the existing VTIs to the Ministry of Labour, which indeed hap-
pened in 1982.860 Second, the World Bank urged the government to establish a Na-
tional Council for Skill Development and Training (NCSDT), which would coordinate 
the technical and vocational training programmes under the different ministries and 
develop a ladder of skill standards, against the backdrop of which all training pro-
grammes in Bangladesh were to be levelled.861 Despite initial success, both plans of 
the World Bank failed: after only three years, the VTIs were transferred back to the 
Ministry of Education after considerable protest mainly by the trainees of these insti-
tutes. They, in fact, defied to be awarded their certificates by the Ministry of Labour, 
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whose reputation they considered to be lower than that of the Ministry of Educa-
tion.862 Quite similarly, the NCSDT was established and the consultants hired by the 
World Bank also achieved to formulate a set of National Skill Standards (NSS). But 
the NCSDT soon stopped to function, as the Bureau of Manpower, Employment and 
Training (BMET) neither had the manpower nor sufficient legal power to coordinate 
the different agencies.863 Furthermore, the World Bank had to realise that even the 
programmes of the TTCs could not be easily changed in order to match what it con-
sidered to be the expectations of the labour market. Its plan to half the length of the 
TTC courses from two to one year was duly implemented; but soon the reform was 
revoked, as trainers and students opposed the reduction of the academic content of 
these programmes.864 
An earlier focus of donor funding, the promotion of apprenticeship training, was vir-
tually being phased out. Even though the World Bank in its project after 1979 aimed 
at strengthening the organisational capacity of the BMET in order to popularise for-
malised apprenticeship training and even though, in the mid-1990s, a UNDP project 
on in-plant and apprenticeship training had the same intentions, the total number of 
apprentices declined.865 The reasons for this were simple: in the Pakistan period and 
in the early years of Bangladesh many state-owned enterprises trained apprentices 
along the lines of the BMET. In the 1980s, many of these organisations were being 
closed down or privatised but the major part of private sector representatives re-
mained disinterested.866 
Similar to the development of university education, vocational and technical training 
strongly expanded since 1990 and private providers were playing a crucial role in this 
growth, too. In the beginning of the 1990s, this development was not foreseeable at 
all, as some of the major donors in the educational sector had started to change their 
lending priorities at the expense of vocational and technical training. Reflecting the 
change of thinking at its Washington based headquarters, the World Bank proclaimed 
in its policy paper of 1990 that it wouldn’t be wise to further invest into the develop-
ment of VTIs and TTCs, and leading consultants started to criticise both efficiency 
and relevance of the training provided by polytechnics, which had for long been sup-
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ported by donor agencies.867 Funds from the World Bank, which was reiterating its 
critique in policy documents of 2000 and 2006, were thus no longer available.868 
Likewise, the Asian Development Bank cancelled a comprehensive vocational train-
ing project in the first half of the 1990s due to a change of lending priorities.869 In the 
early 1990s, UNDP and ILO were the only major donors involved into a significant 
project in the sector. In line with the global trends, the project, however, didn’t aim at 
further expanding the system with public resources but at reforming its governance.870 
The lack support from donors, in fact, had an impact on spending for the develop-
ment of vocational and technical training, which continuously declined up to 1996.871 
This strategy didn’t spark any protest from the side of the general public or from the 
private sector. Opposition to this negligence of vocational and technical training, 
however, grew within the administration, namely within the DTE and BTEB, whose 
leading officials were of the view that this strategy would hinder sustainable economic 
growth in Bangladesh. Instead of accepting their training organisations being down-
sized, they developed a plan to massively expand them by vocationalising secondary 
education. In 1995, they thus submitted proposals to establish 13 new VTIs and to 
introduce a vocationalised stream at the SSC level – SSC (Voc) – in all existing VTIs 
and in several hundred non-governmental schools.872 
Even though the Planning Commission did not approve this project at that time, 
both DTE and BTEB started with the implementation of the proposal, and with the 
coming into power of the Awami League in 1996 not only were these two proposals 
approved but also became vocationalisation of secondary education an explicit goal 
of the Fifth Five Year Plan of the government of Bangladesh.873 The plan even pro-
posed further projects, such as the introduction of SSC (Voc) courses in government 
aided madrasahs, the introduction of HSC (Voc) and HSC (Business Management) – 
two vocational and a commerce streams at the senior secondary level –, and the 
modernisation of the polytechnics.874 Through these projects, the government hoped 
to increase enrolment rates into vocational and technical training from 3.5 percent to 
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10 percent by 2000.875 For this task, DTE became the lead agency, which meant a 
severe blow to BMET and the Ministry of Labour, both of which had tremendously 
profited from previous donor projects.876 In the following years, the aims of the Five 
Year Plan of 1997 were the basis for further related projects, such as the implemen-
tation of the SSC (Voc) courses in the TTCs and in NGO schools. Furthermore, so-
cial demand for these courses was to be supported by stipends and scholarships for 
the disadvantaged and the highest achieving students.877 
As in other domains of public policy, implementation of these projects was riddled 
with conflicts, all the more as donors were not prepared to step in with their funds. 
Within only few years, new curricula for more than twenty trades were being prepared 
by the staff of the BTEB, which was also responsible for publishing the respective 
textbooks and administrating examinations for all courses. Often, books did not reach 
schools, especially if they were in the non-government sector, and teacher training 
was lacking in many cases.878 The main difficulty of non-government schools was, 
however, the procurement of machines, tools and equipment to teach the vocational 
courses, which was only minimally financed by the government.879 
One of the main features of the expansion of the vocational and technical training 
system after the publication of the Five Year Plan in 1997 was the increasing number 
non-government schools and centres, which had previously enrolled only a small mi-
nority of those trained in the vocational and technical training system. Before 1990, 
there only existed around 200 of such organisations, most of which had developed as 
a result to opportunities opened up for skilled and semi-skilled working migrants to 
the Middle East and to Southeast Asia.880 Other training centres were operated by 
non-profit oriented NGOs providing skills training to the poorest in the rural areas but 
their number remained low.881 Furthermore, there were a small number of non-
government secondary schools with attached technical sections that were eligible for 
grant-in-aid by the DTE and were required to meet certain standards defined by the 
                                            
875  Rafique (1998), p. 42 
876  Planning Commission (1997), pp. 439f; there were no similar plans for the TTCs, the training 
centres under BMET; see Id. (1997, p. 540). 
877  For stipends see Rafique (1998), p. 49; for the merit programme see Planning Commission 
(2000, p. 212). 
878  Rafique (1998), p. 53 
879  Loc. cit. 
880  Titumir (2005), p. 142 
881  Ibid., p. 144 
  
 209 
government.882 All the other schools and training centres were thus largely uncon-
trolled, a fact which often had been lamented by the representatives of the public skill 
formation agencies.883 
When the DTE started to provide grant-in-aid to non-government schools which 
were prepared to offer either SSC (Voc) or HSC (BM) courses, it certainly laid the 
foundations for more private provision. Already in 1998, non-government schools 
were enrolling 25’800 students participating in the SSC (Voc) programmes, and in 
2005, the number had risen to 63’450, which was more than 75 percent of all stu-
dents enrolled for SSC (Voc) in the country.884 Similarly impressive was the develop-
ment at the HSC level, where non-government schools enrolled 50’000 students in 
their HSC (BM) programmes in 2005, which was high compared to the 5’560 stu-
dents enrolled in the HSC (Voc) programme offered by the public Technical Schools 
and Colleges (TSC), the former VTIs.885 
But growth of private provision was not restricted to the SSC (Voc) or HSC (BM) 
programmes but also pertained to programmes at the basis skill and at the diploma 
level, whose supply was not supported by the DTE through grant-in-aid payments. 
Whereas the intake of public training organisations offering basic skill levels courses 
dropped from 23’500 in 1998 to 12’370 in 2005, the intake of private providers rose 
from 1500 in 1998 to 13’300, and at the diploma level, growth was even more promi-
nent.886 Most of the courses offered by private organisations at both of these levels 
were catering to the service oriented segment of the urban labour market, as did the 
HSC (BM) programme, with its focus on accounting, banking and basic computing.887 
Despite growth outside the government-subsidised sector, the main expansion of 
the vocational and technical training system had resulted from grant-in-aid by the 
government, whose main agencies in the field of vocational and technical training, 
the DTE and the BTEB, had achieved that vocationalisation had become an impor-
tant part of the rationale for the development of secondary education. The growth of 
the intake into the SSC (Voc), HSC (Voc) and HSC (BM) programmes resulted from 
a social demand for certificates, whose attraction was not mainly owed to their value 
on the labour market in the respective trades but to it opening up avenues for higher 
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education or to employment in the public sector, for instance as instructors of public 
and private training organisations in the respective trades. Employment in the infor-
mal sectors of the economy or in the labour intensive segments of the formal private 
sector, towards which the vocational trades were actually oriented, was thus not on 
the minds of many students, most of which were searching for a suitable jobs for 
months or remained unemployed.888 In fact, following the gradual opening of the 
economy those industrial sectors were growing most, which require a very small 
amount of technical skills.889 In the jute and cotton textile industries, wages of skilled 
workers were, in 2002, indeed higher by 26 percent than those of the unskilled but 
the relative importance of these industrial sectors had been declining vis-à-vis the 
garment sector, whose employers were not paying more wages to workers that had 
undergone formal vocational training.890 The growth of the training programmes in the 
private sector, which were not subsidised through grant-in-aid, was certainly driven 
by a social demand by students who were to a higher extent prepared to work in the 
formal private sector, though in its service oriented segments in the urban areas. 
There, competition had grown as a result of the growth of secondary education, mak-
ing the trainees assume that an investment into a certificate at the craft or the di-
ploma level would be instrumental for employment in this sector, even though re-
cruitment practices continue to be based on personalised relationships.891 
As could be expected, donor agencies were critical towards the growth of state-
funded vocational education and training; particularly the World Bank criticised that 
courses were too academic and were not catering to the needs of the labour mar-
ket.892 These concerns were reflected in many reports by local experts and even by 
the authors of the first Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, who were calling for a 
more “market driven skill formation”.893 But despite this critique and despite the fact 
that, though the growth of vocational and technical training since 1997 had been 
enormous, it only contributed 3 percent to the total number of students enrolled at the 
secondary level in 2005, the social demand for the vocationalised programmes at the 
secondary level could not be reversed and the fact that social demand was rather 
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oriented towards academic contents than towards practical skills training complicated 
adaptations along the lines of market driven skill formation.894 Nevertheless, the cri-
tique by the donors was translated into the formulation of new projects funded by 
UNESCO, ADB and the European Union, all of which aimed at improving the rele-
vance of the skill training programmes by the public agencies. One of their main con-
cerns was also to involve private sector representatives in the process of developing 
skill standards and curricula.895 At the same time, this involvement indeed increased 
quite independently from donor projects. On the one hand, some of the private train-
ing centres started to approach the BTEB, as they wanted to have their curricula ap-
proved by the board to boost their own reputation on the training market, which, es-
pecially in the urban areas, had become tremendously more competitive. Thus, the 
curriculum developers of the BTEB gained contacts to trainers, many of which had 
worked in the respective trades for a long time. On the other hand, some employers 
in the private sector had themselves become interested in getting involved into the 
development of curricula, for instance – as we will see – the ones from the garment 
industry. 
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11 The development of the garment production regime in 
Bangladesh 
11.1 Industrial development before economic liberalisation 
Prior to the arrival of the British in Bengal in 1756, this part of India had been its 
most industrialised one. Dhaka itself was an important centre of textile manufacture 
that flowered under the patronage of the Mughal rulers and was famous for its varie-
ties of Muslins, finely woven cotton clothes that were exported to many parts of the 
world.896 This industry, which was almost entirely in the hands of Muslims, virtually 
collapsed after the British began to import machine-made cloth from England and to 
establish Calcutta as the main centre of both administration and industry.897 Textile 
related economic production in Bengal remained important but instead of cotton fab-
ric, jute was now increasingly being exported to Western markets.898 As many other 
parts of the colonial world, Bengal now became an exporter of primary goods. In 
most of the 19th century, the British pursued a laissez-faire approach to industrial de-
velopment, which reduced economic opportunities for the Muslims and thus furthered 
the division of the economic life along ethnic lines. Industrial production and trade 
was increasingly controlled by British entrepreneurs, who were growing tea, ran the 
inland waterways and exported jute.899 But also Hindu communities got involved into 
the intermediary trade and started their own industries, partly as joint ventures with 
the British, in the pharmaceutical, petroleum and the textile sectors.900 The growing 
economic power of these groups of entrepreneurs corresponded with their increasing 
political leverage that they exerted through ethnically distinct chambers of commerce, 
which were represented in the legislative bodies of Bengal and were decidedly more 
influential than the chambers of the few Muslim entrepreneurs.901 
Even though jute became the main export commodity, the textile industry remained 
important in Bengal but it now consisted of mechanised spinning and weaving mills 
operated by both British and Indian entrepreneurs. Most factories operated with Eng-
lish machines and, for many decades, strongly depended from European technicians, 
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many of which had come to install the machines and subsequently started to run the 
operations and to train up local staff.902 But the textile industry in India soon suffered 
from slow technological modernisation and the inefficient use of new technologies 
and it thus increasingly lost its competitive advantage for the benefit of the British 
manufacturers.903 This problem was exacerbated when, towards the end of the 19th 
century, many firms began to reduce the share of expatriate staff and employed more 
local technicians in senior positions.904 
Despite the fact that the liberal policies adopted by the British in the 19th century 
were partly replaced by more interventionist strategies after 1900, the colonial rule in 
Bengal ended in the actual de-industrialisation of an entire region, where investment 
in private enterprise was considerably lower than in other parts of the colonial 
world.905 The partition of India further accentuated this problem as it left East Pakistan 
devoid of Calcutta and its hinterland, the economic centre of Bengal. Thus, in 1947, 
only ten cotton mills, five sugar mills and one cotton factory were operating on the 
territory of this part of Pakistan.906 Above all, the ownership of these firms reflected 
the ethnical fragmentation of the country, with no single modern industrial enterprise 
owned by a Bengali Muslim.907 
During the first few years of Pakistani independence, the post-colonial government 
continued the laissez-faire economic policies of the British. Soon, the imports re-
sulted in a shortage of foreign exchange that forced the government to introduce a 
number of rules and regulations which aimed at strengthening the industrial base of 
the country. Similar to many other countries at that time, the country embarked on an 
import-substitution strategy that aimed at redistributing the resources from agriculture 
to industry.908 In contrast to many other developing countries pursuing this route of 
economic development, the Pakistani government, however, emphasised private 
sector led economic development that was facilitated by government intervention.909 
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This Pakistani appropriation of state sponsored capitalism was based on a compre-
hensive system of government patronage, at the centre of which was the East Paki-
stan Industrial Development Corporation (EPICD).910 The EPICD, consigned to de-
velop industries in sectors for which private entrepreneurship and investment were 
not available, provided entrepreneurs with loans on soft terms and set up state-
owned enterprises that were subsequently disinvested to private entrepreneurs.911 
The textile industry particularly profited from the funds of the EPICD, which was in-
terested in strengthening an industry that processed the increasing amount of cotton 
from Pakistan.912 
The region gaining most from government backed industrialisation was Karachi and 
its surroundings.913 In contrast, industrial development in East Pakistan was less ex-
tensive. In 1964, the industrial sector contributed no more than 12 percent to East 
Pakistan’s GDP, whereas the agriculture sector accounted for nearly 60 percent.914 
Despite the low extent of industrialisation in this wing of Pakistan, the industrial sector 
was growing, and similar to the western part of the country industrial growth was 
based on the expansion of the textile sector: The first large industrial enterprise in 
this part of the country was a jute mill, which was opened up in 1949.915 Subse-
quently, a couple of cotton textile mills were established in and around Dhaka by the 
government and by representatives of several trading castes that had migrated to 
East Pakistan from Calcutta, Bombay, Burma and even East Africa.916 The private 
entrepreneurs often had their trader-cum-industrial houses based in West Pakistan, 
where they had easy access to the patronage provided by public servants.917 By the 
end of the 1960s, a few families located in West Pakistan owned more than 47 per-
cent of the industrial assets in East Pakistan, whereas 34 percent were controlled by 
the EPIDC, 18 percent by Bengali Muslims and one percent by foreign multinational 
companies.918 Lacking direct access to the public servants based in West Pakistan, 
the Bengali entrepreneurs were marginalised not only in terms of numbers but also in 
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terms of political influence.919 This unequal industrial development considerably con-
tributed to the alienation of the population of East Pakistan from the ruling elite in the 
western part but also furthered a sceptical attitude towards capitalist development 
among the elites in the eastern part of Pakistan.920 
After the war in 1971, Mujib’s government faced the challenge of having to rehabili-
tate a war ravaged economy without being able to fall back on a sufficiently experi-
enced class of entrepreneurs: Many industrial enterprises had, before the war, been 
owned and managed by non-Bengali entrepreneurs and many of them had subse-
quently left the new country for the remnant part of Pakistan or for India. 921 The few 
Bengali entrepreneurs, mostly concentrated in the jute and the textile industry, were a 
class of first generation entrepreneurs with limited experience that had been inducted 
to the industry through their personal contacts to the public service.922 In its first de-
velopment plan, the new government therefore announced that it would promote in-
dustrialisation through import-substitution and rigid state-centred economic planning 
that would rely on state-owned enterprises.923 As private sector growth was consid-
ered the root of inequitable economic development, the new government passed the 
Abandoned Property Act and thus took possession of factories abandoned after the 
war and re-established them as state-owned enterprises.924 Furthermore, the gov-
ernment did not allow private investments to exceed Taka 2.5 million.925 Many of the 
state-owned enterprises initially performed quite well. Soon, however, these indus-
tries started to suffer from predating managers, many of which had been employed 
because of their personal links to Awami Leaguers in the public service.926 This ten-
dency particularly pertained to the textile sector, which was entirely centralised under 
the Bangladesh Textile Mills Corporation.927 
In these years, Bangladesh also saw the first exports of garments. Up to that point, 
the local garment production had been concentrated in the hands of a few tailoring 
shops producing small quantities for the local market.928 But in the early 1970s, the 
government sponsored Trading Corporation of Bangladesh started to export shirts 
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tailored in Dhaka to East European countries under counter-trade arrangements, and 
thus opened the doors for a new phase of export-oriented industrial development.929 
11.2 The garment production regime before the imposition of garment 
quota 
When General Zia came into power in late 1976, the economic situation of the 
country was tense: The foreign debt was high and the labour-absorption capacity of 
the economy remained low, which made growth of unemployment likely.930 Most do-
nor agencies, critical of Zia’s predecessor’s strategies, were of the view that the in-
ward looking economic policies were an important reason for Bangladesh’s sluggish 
economic development; they thus pointed out that their support would only continue if 
the new regime embarked on a more export-oriented and more private-sector led 
development strategy, which would help to considerably expand the industrial sec-
tor.931 Many academics, researchers, civil servants and the few private entrepreneurs 
were of the same view.932 
Under these circumstances, Zia started to gradually liberalise the economy and to 
build up the institutional foundations of a mixed economy, a strategy, which would be 
the core of the economic policies in the coming decades.933 In contrast to Sri Lanka, 
however, the opening of the economy was not initiated by a comprehensive and co-
hesive package of radical economic reforms but was rather a process of incremental 
policy changes and ad-hoc decisions taken by the top-most civil servants and the 
president himself. In fact, the new government adopted the previous, clearly socialist 
development plan elaborated by Mujib’s government with its emphasis on state-
owned enterprises.934 At the same time, the government started to dismantle the cen-
tral role of the state in economic development by disinvesting a number of state en-
terprises and by expanding the opportunities for the private sector under direct gov-
ernment patronage.935 One of the most central aspects of government patronage was 
the establishment of the donor-backed DFIs, through which potential entrepreneurs, 
                                            
929  Ibid., p. 74 
930  Quddus and Rashid (2000), p. 126 
931  Mahmud et al. (2008), p. 3 
932  Quddus and Rashid (2000), p. 78 
933  Begum and Shamsuddin (1998), p. 97, Quddus and Rashid (2000), p. 78 
934  Syeduzzaman (1995), p. 266 
935  Quddus and Rashid (2000), p. 78, Sobhan (1993), p. 167, Syeduzzaman (1995), p. 266 
  
 217 
many of which were to become staunch supporters of the emerging BNP, were pro-
vided with loans on soft terms.936 
This hybrid development strategy was made more explicit in the Two Year Plan for 
the years 1978-1980. In fact, the textile industry was foremost on the minds of the 
economic planners, who hoped to spur its growth by partly privatising the sector.937 
But in the next few years, the government mainly denationalised some small enter-
prises, whereas most of the large, loss making public companies were retained. In 
1981, the state still possessed all 59 cotton spinning mills, many of which were run in 
inefficiently and rendered BMTC one of the most indebted public agencies.938 At the 
same time, the new regulatory framework and the establishment of DFIs facilitated 
the growth of the garment industry that had not been mentioned in the Two Year Plan 
at all. 
Similar to Sri Lanka, the growth of the garment industry was not only a result of 
changes in the regulatory framework at the national level but also of the transforma-
tion of the global garment production regime. In the second half of the 1970s, the 
translocation process away from the NIEs had just started, thereby attracting buyers 
and manufacturers to source from South Asia, as these countries were still quota 
free.939 Sri Lanka was one of the first South Asian countries to be involved in that 
process but buyers and investors soon showed their interest in Bangladesh as well, 
where labour costs were considerably lower than elsewhere in the region.940 Further-
more, with the outbreak of war in Sri Lanka in the first half of the 1980s, expatriate 
business people involved there started to look for alternative production sites in 
Bangladesh and in some cases also motivated their suppliers to move to this coun-
try.941 Bangladesh’s increasingly open and export-oriented regulatory framework was 
certainly an additional incentive for buyers to source from this country. These institu-
tions at both the national and the global level would subsequently build the institu-
tional foundations of the garment production regime in Bangladesh. 
In contrast to the Trading Corporation of Bangladesh, the first private manufacturers 
of garments did not export to socialist countries in Eastern Europe but to the US and 
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to European countries, which had imposed quota on some of East and Southeast 
Asian economies. Initially, many manufacturers producing for the Bangladeshi local 
market were approached by buyers from the NIEs, especially from Hong Kong, which 
promised them to source their garments and to share a part of the profits. Even 
though the Bangladeshi counterparts had some experience in manufacturing for the 
local market, companies like Reas Garments and Jewel Garment were lacking the 
financial capital, the technology and the skills to enter the export business.942 These 
drawbacks were mitigated by some of the new regulations: On the one hand, access 
to loans for export-oriented production was facilitated by the DFIs.943 Even though 
these development banks approved many unviable projects and thus produced a 
large group of later defaulters, it was exactly the DFIs’ lax lending practices that al-
lowed not only previous manufacturers but also many members of the urban middle-
classes, ranging from former bureaucrats to retired army personnel and profession-
als, to enter the industry as entrepreneurs, although most of them were lacking ex-
perience in trade or industry.944 On the other hand, the more liberal regulations with 
regard for foreign investment opened the doors for joint-ventures, through which local 
manufacturers had more direct access to skills and technology of overseas partners. 
The real breakthrough of the Bangladeshi garment industry would indeed occur 
through this type of collaboration. 
One of the most prominent early large garment factories in Bangladesh was Desh 
Garments, a mainly FDI-backed company, and its example is certainly instructive to 
understand why comparatively little foreign capital would flow into the country: Desh 
Garments was a joint-venture between Korean-based Daewoo and Nurul Quader, 
who was a former top civil servant with no industrial experience and was proposed to 
Daewoo as a potential partner by Zia or some of his associates.945 As Bangladesh 
did, at that time, not allow the establishment of entirely foreign-owned companies, the 
partners agreed on a five-year collaboration in the production and export of gar-
ments. Daewoo also hoped that Quader would be instrumental in extracting the nec-
essary privileges from administrators still unfamiliar with export industries. In 1980, 
the first factory was opened in Chittagong and Daewoo started to transfer both tech-
nology and skills to Bangladesh but after less than two years, Daewoo withdrew from 
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Bangladesh.946 Many of the staff trained by Daewoo subsequently left Desh and were 
poached by other companies or established their own ventures.947 The exact reasons 
for Daewoo’s departure are a matter of debate. Certainly, however, the foreign inves-
tors realised that in case of legal disputes their own interests would be compromised, 
all the more as the operations of Desh had rather been based on tailor-made agree-
ments with the administration than on formal regulations. This signal was also under-
stood by other potential investors, who would now prefer not to get involved into pro-
duction themselves but to only source from Bangladesh, relying on indigenous sup-
pliers with their own capital. 
By the time General Ershad came into power in 1980, the Bangladeshi garment en-
trepreneurs had come into a position, where they not only unilaterally depended from 
the politicians and public servants but could themselves extract policy concessions.948 
At the same time, Bangladesh’s dependence from aid had been rising continuously, 
rendering the government more open towards the advice of donors, which were of 
the view that Zia’s support of export-oriented and private sector driven economic de-
velopment had not been sufficient.949 It was mainly because of the pressure emanat-
ing from these actors that General Ershad considerably adapted the regulatory 
framework of the mixed economy when he proclaimed his New Industrial Policy in 
1982. In this document, the government stated that it aimed at expanding the oppor-
tunities for private sector led and export-oriented industrialisation in several ways. 
First, it announced to accelerate privatisation of public sector enterprises. In fact, 
within a couple of years, banks and insurances were de-nationalised and opened for 
investments from the private sector;950 in the textile sector, 22 state-owned mills were 
privatised, whereas 37 mills remained in the hands of the public sector.951 Second, 
the government announced to improve the infrastructure for export-oriented indus-
tries and thus established the Bangladesh Export Processing Zones Authority 
(BEPZA), under the auspices of which a first Export Processing Zone was started in 
Chittagong in 1983, followed by another one in Dhaka in 1993.952 Third, the govern-
ment presented a number of measures which aimed at a further incremental opening 
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of the economy: Import controls were relaxed and the regulations for trade and indus-
trial investment were considerably deregulated, which was to further increase the 
opportunities for private sector investments.953 Nevertheless, FDI was restricted in 
order to protect the local industries.954 
Even though the New Industrial Policy of 1982 intended to promote non-traditional 
exports, there was, similar to the Two Year Plan, no explicit policy framework that 
planned to foster the growth of the garment industry.955 Still, the respective regula-
tions were developed on an ad-hoc basis, extracted to a great deal by an increasing 
number of entrepreneurs. One of the most crucial lobbyists for the interests of the 
garment entrepreneurs was Nurul Quader, the head of Desh Garments, who had di-
rect access to decision makers.956 Thanks to their lobbying power, entrepreneurs 
were allowed to import duty-free machinery to produce garments for export purposes, 
to open back-to-back letters of credit and to use bounded warehouse facilities, in 
which imported fabric was to be stored. 957 
In 1982, a small number of twelve garment entrepreneurs, some of which had ex-
cellent ties to the political, administrative and military establishment, decided that 
their lobbying activities should be more coordinated and thus founded the Bangla-
desh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA).958 In its early 
years, BGMEA was a weak organisation that only consisted of a few entrepreneurs, 
and many of the lobbying-activities were still undertaken on an individual basis. This 
individualistic behaviour of garment manufacturers was, however, a common strategy 
of private sector entrepreneurs in Bangladesh, as more corporate action meant that 
private access to politicians and bureaucrats had to be shared with potential competi-
tors.959 Over the course of the years, however, corporate action would turn out to be 
more attractive for garment entrepreneurs and BGMEA became the single most im-
portant corporate actor influencing Bangladesh’s garment production regime. 
At the time when employers in the garment industry started to organise themselves 
at a more corporate level, there was no similar development on the labour side and 
the labour movement thus remained politicised and fractionalised. Under the reign of 
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Mujib alone, 638 trade unions had been registered, many of which were under the 
control of the state apparatus and the Awami League. Under Zia, who, together with 
his BNP, started to establish and patronise his own trade unions, the labour move-
ment was increasingly fractionalised along party lines and started to be instrumental-
ised to muster votes in elections.960 This development of organised labour resulted in 
a virtual standstill in the domain of labour policy making: Whereas the regulations 
with regard to private-sector investment were considerably changed after Zia’s com-
ing into power in 1976, there was no adaptation of labour policies. The country’s la-
bour law, which mainly consisted of regulations based on the work of the Royal 
Commission of Labour in 1931 and on the Industrial Relations Ordinance of the Paki-
stan period, was not changed, as there, in fact, was no political pressure to do so.961 
Only in 1985, after considerable growth of the garment industry, the government for 
the first time fixed the minimum wage for garments workers at Tk. 627 per month, 
which was the lowest minimum wage in the formal industrial sector at that time. But 
the government avoided to mention any regulation for apprentices, thus providing the 
entrepreneurs with ample scope to continuously employ workers below the minimum 
wage.962 
In the years when Bangladesh’s garment industry exported to western countries 
without any quota restrictions, the country’s GDP was growing at a higher pace than 
in the previous periods: Between the financial years 1980/81 and 1984/85, the an-
nual average GDP growth rate was at 3.7 percent, which was particularly owed to the 
growth in the industrial sector, which was at 5.7 percent.963 Growth in the agricultural 
sector was at comparatively low 2.7 percent, even though the value added in agricul-
ture could be considerably increased.964 Growth in the industrial sector mainly re-
sulted from the expansion of the garment and leather industry but also from that of 
the fish and seafood processing industry.965 At the same time, the contribution of jute, 
the traditional export crop, to GDP declined from 25 percent in 1973 to 12.5 percent 
in 1984, which was mainly a result of the declining demand on the world market.966 
The growth of the garment industry only started towards the latter part of this period: 
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In 1981/82, there were no more than 25 factories.967 In 1983/84, their number was still 
at only 47 but it increased to 487 in the financial year 1984/85, which was owed to 
the outbreak of the civil war in Sri Lanka.968 Geographically, the garment industry was 
entirely concentrated in the areas of Dhaka and Chittagong.969 Most of the FDI flow-
ing into the country was invested in the EPZ of Chittagong; but even though the 
years between 1975 and 1983 had seen a steady increase of foreign investments, 
mainly originating from South Korea, Japan and Hong Kong, the influx of FDI was not 
significant compared to other countries in the region.970 After 1983, when the garment 
industry started to grow at an unprecedented pace, the share of FDI in the total of 
invested capital in the garment industry declined even more; in that year, there were 
no more than 15, though large FDI-backed joint venture companies, each of which 
was exporting more than one million pieces of garments annually.971 
In the mid-1980s, the industry thus consisted of a number of large firms operating in 
the EPZ and a high number of smaller firms outside the zone.972 Despite the low pro-
ductivity of most of the smaller, locally owned firms employers made ample profits, 
which were estimated to be at around 16 to 22 percent of the total value of the ex-
ported garments.973 This was, of course, only possible because wages were far lower 
than in other parts of the world. In fact, average hourly wages in Bangladesh did not 
exceed US $ 0.25, which was low even compared to Sri Lanka, where employers 
paid US $ 0.35 on average.974 
In 1985, the industry employed approximately 80’000 persons, the majority of them 
being female machine operators, who earned considerably less than their male coun-
terparts, even if controlled for their educational backgrounds.975 Overall, many of the 
female workers came from poor families, were unmarried, had undergone little formal 
education and had migrated to the towns from rural areas.976 The majority of them 
were young, i.e. below 19 years, even though there were some differences in this 
regard between firms within and outside the EPZ, the latter employing a larger share 
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of young workers.977 Employment of women in the formal, monetised sector was, at 
that time, a new phenomenon in Bangladesh: Traditionally, the activity space of most 
women living in rural areas of Bangladesh had been restricted by patriarchal family 
structures, which required the females to spend their lives in the families and the vil-
lage settlements (bari). However, the population growth and the subsequent rise in 
the proportion of landless households to nearly 45 percent in the year 1984 put these 
families under considerable pressure to release young women for wage employ-
ment.978 Initially, employment sought after by women from landless families was in 
the agriculture sector but with the growth of the garment industry, migration to larger 
towns became a viable alternative, even though opportunity costs of working in the 
urban areas were considerably higher than in the rural areas. It was mainly for these 
socio-economic reasons that employers primarily employed women as operators and 
thus made the share of female employment in the garment industry increase to much 
higher levels than in other industries, such as rice milling and jute processing.979 
Labour conditions in most garment factories did not meet the standards that had 
been spelled out in the existing labour regulations.980 The workers were expected to 
work longer hours than prescribed by law and they were not compensated accord-
ingly. In 1990, the average salary of a female sewing helper was at Tk. 438 and was 
thus still below the minimum wage of Tk. 627, which had been fixed as a minimal 
wage for operators in 1985.981 The political will to correct this situation was lacking, as 
employers were eager to exploit the abundant supply of surplus labour in the rural 
areas and as trade unions were controlled by political parties whose leaders did not 
want to lose the political support by the emerging class of private entrepreneurs. The 
power of the labour administration to implement the existing labour laws in the grow-
ing number of production units in the private sector remained weak, as the respective 
administrative unit was not allowed to employ more than ten inspectors in charge of 
all the garment units, a situation, which remained the same until the years after 
2000.982 
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11.3 The garment production regime under the quota regime 
Bangladesh experienced the imposition of garment quotas by the US, Canada and 
many European countries from the mid-1980s. In 1985, the US-government declared 
that it would restrict the imports from Bangladesh to 500’000 pieces annually, which 
sparked protests from both the Bangladeshi government and the concerned entre-
preneurs; the authorities in Washington subsequently agreed on a total annual quota 
of 4.2 million pieces per year.983 The imposition of quotas, even in its softened ver-
sion, caused panic among the manufacturers, who, up to that time, had concentrated 
on four simple items only.984 
Whereas the imposition of quotas by the more industrialised countries came as a 
threat to the garment manufacturers, there was another global level trend, which was 
more appreciated by the garment entrepreneurs in Bangladesh: Many of Bangla-
desh’s donor countries pressed for more liberalisation and deregulation. In this con-
text, the World Bank started to finance a Textile Strategic Management Unit based at 
the Ministry of Textiles from 1989 onwards, which would elaborate plans for the priva-
tisation of textile mills in the public sector and for the further removal of import barri-
ers with the intention to render both the textile and the garment industry of the coun-
try more competitive.985 
Both of these trends strengthened the further organisational development and po-
litical leverage of BGMEA, the association of the garment manufacturers, whose im-
pact on policy-making had been minimal in the years before the imposition of quotas. 
Now, on the one hand, the existing entrepreneurs were pressed by the emerging 
quota regime to act in a more concerted manner, and it gave them an opportunity to 
assist the government in trade negotiations with the respective governments, which 
the Ershad regime considered to be increasingly important for the future economic 
development of the country. Representatives of BGMEA were now more formally in-
volved and contributed to Bangladesh being provided with higher quotas then previ-
ously declared by the US government.986 On the other hand, the increasing pressure 
by the multilateral agencies for more deregulation and privatisation reduced the influ-
ence of the textile mill owners, organised in the Bangladesh Textile Mills Association 
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(BTMA), on whose political support the Ershad government strongly relied.987 During 
the Ershad regime, the political influence of BGMEA was thus rising constantly, and 
since the coming into power of the democratic administrations in 1991, a high num-
ber of former presidents and other senior representatives of this organisation have 
become members of parliament or ministers in the civilian governments.988 One of the 
first former representatives of BGMEA entering the cabinet of ministers was a retired 
major, Abdul Mannan, who, as the Minister of Textiles, had to handle many of the 
delicate issues regarding the further deregulation of the textile sector and thereby 
clearly sided with the interests of BGMEA and the agenda of the World Bank, whose 
Textile Management Unit came under his purview.989 
Many of the policies and regulations devised in the years between 1985 and 1995, 
when the quota regime was in full swing, favoured the interests of the entrepreneurs 
united in BGMEA. One of the first reactions of Ershad’s government to the imposition 
of quotas was to restrict entry into the garment sector in 1984;990 this was a virtual 
protection of the existing entrepreneurs and provided them with ample scope to ex-
pand their business under non-competitive conditions. These regulations were sup-
plemented by a number of incentives spelled out in Ershad’s Revised Industrial Pol-
icy of 1986, which further reduced competition between existing entrepreneurs.991 
After 1991, when the Ministry of Textile was under Major Mannan, further policy 
changes were introduced, which were aimed at improving the investment climate for 
garment manufacturers.992 Most importantly, import restrictions were lowered despite 
considerable disputes between the owners of textile mills and the garment manufac-
turers, even within the cabinet. In the same vein, a number of textile and jute mills in 
the public sector were closed down against violent protest from trade unions, which 
were, however, not in a position to avert the decision.993  
Between 1985 and 1995, BGMEA not only increased its lobbying power with regard 
to the formulation of policies but it also started to be directly involved into the respec-
tive administrative processes implementing industry related policies. One such in-
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stance was quota allocation, a highly politicised administrative process, which had, in 
the first few years after 1984, been left in the hands of the administrators of the Minis-
try of Commerce, who allocated the quota on the basis of past performance but had 
ample scope to favour the entrepreneurs bribing them. After the departure of Ershad, 
the BNP government intended to make this process more transparent and thus 
formed the Quota Allocation and Monitoring Committee, under the rules of which five 
percent were to be allocated to new entrepreneurs.994 This committee was formally 
chaired by a representative of the Export Promotion Bureau (EPB) but the represen-
tatives of BGMEA had a strong say in the allocation process.995 This gave them the 
opportunity to keep quotas allocated to emerging competitors at a low level, which 
not only protected their own orders but also enabled them to make additional profits 
from selling their quotas to other entrepreneurs, including to those, who hadn’t been 
allocated any quota by the committee.996 
Beyond their role in the process of quota allocation, which enabled BGMEA mem-
bers to keep potential domestic competitors at bay, they also started to have a strong 
voice on the Board of Investment (BOI), which allowed them to contain competition 
from potential foreign investors. Formally, this body was supposed to further the in-
flux of FDI and had to approve any respective project; many of the applications were, 
however, turned down, as BGMEA, hostile towards more competition from overseas 
companies, used its political leverage by making respective recommendations to the 
official members.997 Over the course of the years, BGMEA was, furthermore, permit-
ted to formally assume administrative duties: In the early 1990s, BGMEA started to 
issue the utilisation declarations. On the basis of these documents, exporters were 
allowed to import raw materials that were used for the manufacture of garments. This 
administrative function involved processing thousands of applications by individual 
firms and required a high amount of staff to be housed in a central building in Dhaka, 
which was to virtually demonstrate the growing influence of the organisation.998 
The years under the quota regime saw a further growth of the garment industry, 
with the number of garment factories rising from 753 in 1986 to 2353 in 1996.999 By 
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the mid-1990s, the garment industry had thus overtaken the slackening jute industry 
as the main export sector, contributing 65 percent to the total value of exported 
goods in the year 1996.1000 Growth was particularly strong in the knitwear sector, 
whose contribution to the garment exports from Bangladesh rose from 15.1 percent 
to 24.8 percent between the years 1990 and 1997.1001 At the same time, Bangladesh 
now was one of the worlds largest garment exporters, becoming the seventh largest 
exporter to the US and the sixth largest exporter to the EU in 1997.1002 In fact, be-
tween the years 1990 and 1997, the growth of the industry in Bangladesh was 
stronger than in other countries, such as Pakistan and China.1003 As the growth of the 
industry was not based on the influx of FDI, its overall share in total investment in the 
garment industry declined to below 10 percent in the latter part of the 1990s.1004 
11.4 The garment production regime during and after the phase out of 
quota 
When the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) was signed in the course of 
the Uruguay Round, Bangladesh’s garment industry had become the most important 
foreign exchange earning industry in the country and had thus in a large way contrib-
uted to Bangladesh’s growing trade dependence. Under the ATC, Bangladesh was, 
as all other garment exporting countries, allowed to constantly increase its exports to 
the countries still adhering to the rules of the MFA in the restricted categories starting 
from 1995 until the end of 2004, when the trade should be entirely liberalised.1005 The 
coming into effect of the ATC was paralleled by the conclusion of negotiations with 
the European Union, in which it had been agreed upon Bangladesh’s unrestricted 
access to the clothing market in the EU from 1995 under the Generalised System of 
Preferences (GSP). Whereas the phasing out of the MFA under the ATC meant that 
the competition among exporters to the US would constantly increase up to the year 
2005, the GSP status implied that Bangladesh’s garment exporters were given pref-
erential treatment when producing for the EU and that they would thus become more 
competitive than exporters from countries outside the scheme. Despite preferential 
treatment by the EU, it was, however, easily conceivable for both policy-makers and 
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manufacturers that competition among the exporting countries to the EU would re-
main high, as a number of other countries from the South Asian and the Southeast 
Asian Region were eligible for GSP status as well. One main aspect of concern was 
that the productivity in the Bangladeshi garment industry was comparatively low even 
though its wages still belonged to the lowest in the world. Observers were of the view 
that productivity of the industry should be increased by up to 50 percent in order to 
make the industry more competitive and to make sure that the exports to the US, 
which was still importing a major share of garments from Bangladesh, would sustain 
after the liberalisation of the garment trade in 2005.1006 
The major outside pressure on the Bangladeshi garment industry at that time was, 
however, less related to productivity than to the labour conditions in the industry. In 
the eyes of both overseas governments and buyers, the most pressing issue was the 
pervading practice to employ children in garment factories. The child-labour issue 
had been on the minds of many observers in the importing countries since the ex-
pansion of the industry in this country, but only in the beginning of the 1990s the is-
sue was taken up by US trade unions and subsequently brought to the attention of 
US Senator Tom Harkin, who proposed to the American congress to pass the Child 
Labour Deterrence Act in 1992.1007 This act would have required importers of gar-
ments and other items to the US to make sure that these goods had not been pro-
duced by suppliers employing persons below the age of 15. Even though this act was 
never passed in parliament despite a number of further propositions by Senator 
Harkin in the 1990s, it caused considerable despair among both policy-makers and 
manufacturers, who feared that access to the American market would be drastically 
reduced once the bill would be passed. 
In the latter part of the 1990s, other aspects of labour conditions, including low 
wages, safety at the work place and long working hours, became the main concerns 
of buyers. These actors began to ask their suppliers to adhere to internationally rec-
ognised standards, because they had come under the pressure by consumer organi-
sations and by the global movements against bad labour conditions, whose reports 
on the working conditions in the country’s clothing industry had experienced wide 
circulation.1008 Outside pressure thus became considerably more effective than the 
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frequent protests by local trade unions which were themselves pressuring employers 
to improve labour conditions. 
Many of these issues emanating from changes of the global garment production re-
gime were also addressed by donor agencies. The World Bank continued to fund the 
Textile Strategic Management Unit, through which it hoped to further liberalise the 
textile sector in Bangladesh and to thus strengthen the competitiveness of the textile 
and the garment industry. Furthermore, the World Bank and the IMF began to finance 
studies analysing, among other aspects, the potentials and the weaknesses of the 
garment industry; in some instances, these studies also commented on perceived 
weaknesses in the training processes in the industries and thus laid the foundations 
for the formulation of various donor-funded projects and programmes, which would 
financially support skill formation for the garment industry.1009 These two organisa-
tions were, however, not the first ones to address training related issues: Already in 
the late 1980s, the International Labour Organization (ILO) had launched the first do-
nor-funded project related to the garment industry in Bangladesh and thereby fo-
cused on skill formation of its workers. Through this project, ILO became the first do-
nor agency to collaborate with BGMEA, an interaction, which was continued by fur-
ther projects, the most crucial of which would be a project to reduce child labour in 
the garment industry. 
These changes of the global garment production regime had a strong effect on the 
garment production regime in Bangladesh; again, one of the most visible effects of 
these changes was the further organisational consolidation of BGMEA. As we have 
seen above, the senior members of this organisation had acquired considerable po-
litical leverage through their organisation, which enabled them to influence the distri-
bution of quota, to keep off competition from foreign investors and to adopt duties in 
administrative processes. In the mid-1990s, their leverage was further increased by 
the outside pressure concerning child labour and overall working conditions that 
made the senior members of BGMEA more seriously engage in collective action. At 
first, the organisation tried to counter the critics by a public relations campaign, which 
was followed by negotiations with the US-based Child Labour Coalition and diverse 
NGOs in July 1995.1010 Under pressure to revert potential sanctions by the US, 
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BGMEA thereafter signed a memorandum of understanding with UNICEF and ILO in 
1995 that aimed at banning child labour from garment factories and at providing the 
former child labourers opportunities to attend schools.1011 Even though the implemen-
tation of the project did not achieve all of its far-reaching goals, BGMEA began to be 
an important counterpart not only for the public authorities but also for donor agen-
cies. This was a remarkable development insofar as, only a few years before, ILO 
had not continued with its garment related skill development project because BGMEA 
wasn’t regarded as a reliable partner during the implementation process.1012 
In addition to the attempts to rebut the concerns on child labour, BGMEA made 
visible moves to mitigate the critique concerning overall labour conditions in the 
Bangladeshi garment industry. In 1997, the organisation established a separate 
committee, the Labour Cell, that dealt with labour issues and was to solve labour dis-
putes without involving the public authorities.1013 At the same time, the organisation 
formed a Safety Cell, which was a further committee working on labour related is-
sues. This committee mainly organised training programmes on safety measures in 
order to prevent major accidents in the factories and it had the duty to ensure that the 
firms of member companies adhered to the legal regulations.1014 It was in these com-
mittees that entrepreneurs started to also collectively address issues related to skill 
formation. But as the committees were working along the agenda of their respective 
chairmen and were not coordinated from the board of BGMEA, there did not emerge 
any consistent BGMEA policy relating to skill formation but rather a series of hardly 
interrelated lobbying activities on a “daily problem solving basis”, even when BGMEA 
opened a separate Human Resources Development Cell.1015 
Despite its growing political weight, BGMEA remained a highly fractionalised or-
ganisation, which was lacking undisputed leadership. As the senior positions within 
the association, the presidency and the several vice-presidencies, provided opportu-
nities to get involved into administrative duties, to have direct access to policy makers 
and, increasingly, to donors and to appoint close associates to the chairmanships of 
the different committees, these posts started to be highly sought after by the individ-
ual members of BGMEA. For this reason, the elections for the presidency became 
highly contested and politicised, with two semi-formalised camps opposing each 
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other.1016 On some occasions, the country’s prime minister herself got involved into 
the election process within BGMEA and tried to make sure that one of her supporters 
would win.1017 
The climax of this fractionalisation occurred in 1996 and was, again, a direct conse-
quence of the changes in the global garment production regime. As discussed above, 
the EU awarded GSP status to Bangladesh; it thus provided unrestricted entry to the 
European market to those manufacturers whose garments were mainly assembled 
from locally produced yarn, fabric and accessories. Briefly after GSP status had been 
awarded to Bangladesh, one group of garment entrepreneurs, the knitwear manufac-
turers, became aware that the GSP facility would make their interests distinct from 
the ones of the manufacturers of woven garments. For these reasons they separated 
from BGMEA and formed the Bangladesh Knitwear Manufacturers and Exporters 
Association (BKMEA), so they could address their shared agendas collectively.1018 
As, in fact, the knitwear sector was tremendously profiting from the GSP facility, a 
growing number of entrepreneurs ventured into this part of the garment trade and 
became members of BKMEA, which was thus increasingly put into the position to 
seriously compete with BGMEA. Not only did its lobbying power rise but also did it 
get access to donor agencies. Many of these foreign organisations were indeed open 
to cooperate with a new garment association, which they considered to be less politi-
cised and run in a more professional way than BGMEA and thus to fund projects that 
were meant to bolster the competitiveness of the knitwear industry.1019 
In the context of the phasing out of the MFA, there thus emerged a series of hardly 
interrelated donor-funded projects, which were initiated by aid agencies, approved by 
the government and generally warmly welcomed by the two associations. These pro-
jects normally either focussed on social and ecological aspects of the garment indus-
try, on business development or on issues related to the trade-environment and in-
frastructure. Skill development was as an aspect of many of these projects, even 
though they considerably differed in terms of their approaches to this aspect of the 
garment production regime: The IMF, through its South Asia Enterprise Development 
Facility (SEDF), placed its emphasis on skill formation within the firms, whereas the 
Delegation of the European Commission to Bangladesh (EC) and the German gov-
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ernment, through GTZ, more concentrated on formal pre-employment training outside 
the firms.1020 The World Bank, still the most important donor of Bangladesh abstained, 
however, from getting involved in any project directly benefiting the garment industry, 
as it was strongly of the view that the focus on low-value garment production should 
be retained to a considerable extent and that higher-value production would best be 
enhanced through a higher influx of FDI, which would also bring in the necessary 
technology and skills.1021 
Whereas the national garment production regime after 1995 had been strongly in-
fluenced by the organisational development of associations and, increasingly, by the 
intervention of donor agencies, the government of Bangladesh did, up to 2005, not 
introduce any further regulations which would have tremendously altered the overall 
institutional foundations of the garment trade in the country. For some years, the 
government seemed to support the idea to increase the influx of FDI to the garment 
sector, when it permitted the Korean-based Youngone Corporation to set up a pri-
vately run EPZ in Chittagong. This would certainly have meant a considerable policy 
change. But despite having formally granted permission, the administration, obviously 
under the pressure of the major associations in the garment industry, never issued a 
licence that would have allowed the company to establish the EPZ.1022 
In contrast to previous periods, the first years of the new millennium saw the birth of 
a milestone in labour policy: In 2006, the government introduced the Bangladesh La-
bour Law 2006 that reduced the number of labour related acts and ordinances from 
approximately fifty to one. This document was the result of more than 14 years of 
negotiations between politicians, entrepreneurs, labour representatives and UN 
agencies, namely the ILO.1023 Even though the law itself reflected many concerns of 
the critics of the labour conditions in the garment industry and indeed integrated more 
than 85 percent of the requirements of the most common codes of conduct for the 
garment industry, all observers understood that the implementation of the new law 
and thus the enhancement of labour conditions in the industry would take a consid-
erable amount of time.1024 
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In the first years after the ATC had come into effect in 1995, the garment industry 
continued to grow a high pace, with the share of garment exports of the total value of 
exports rising from 65 percent in 1995 to 73 percent in 1998.1025 The growth of the 
garment industry thus strongly contributed to the growth of GDP, which was at an 
annual average of about 3.2 percent in the 1990s.1026 Nevertheless, the formalised 
manufacturing sector continued to be small, contributing no more than 12 percent to 
the GDP even after 2005.1027 The agricultural sector remained important, contributing 
20 percent to the GDP, which was, however, exceeded by the non-agricultural infor-
mal sectors, which contributed more than 40 percent contribution to GDP after 
2005.1028 
The development of the garment industry was slowed down by the Asian Financial 
Crisis after 1997 and was tremendously challenged by the further liberalisations un-
der the ATC in 2002, from which it, however, recovered again in 2003.1029 As in the 
period from 1985 to 1995, the share of garment exports to the US continued to drop 
relative to exports to the EU after 1995, even though the total value of garment ex-
ported to the US was still increasing.1030 
In contrast to the market of the EU, that of the US was still protected by quota until 
2005 and, therefore, Bangladeshi exporters to the US continued to concentrate on 
the production of quota restricted items: In 2004, when the garment industry had al-
ready been considerably liberalised in two steps and was set to be entirely liberalised 
in the following year, more than 67 percent of garment manufacturers exporting to the 
US were still producing quota restricted items and were thus poised to meet with 
strong competition in the year after.1031 
As already in the years before 1995, the total value of the output from the knitting 
sector continued to increase, with its share in the total value of garment exported ris-
ing from 17 percent in 1995 to 40 percent in 2003.1032 This growth mainly resulted 
from the GSP facility the EU had granted to Bangladesh and from a government 
scheme, through which manufacturers were provided with a 25 percent incentive on 
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the value of knit fabric manufactured by using locally produced yarn.1033 Furthermore, 
growth of this industrial sector was also rooted in some of its technical advantages: 
Most importantly, manufacturers of knitted garments can produce with shorter lead 
times, i.e. the total period of time between the initiation of a production process and 
its completion, as they are less dependent on an on-time delivery of raw materials 
than the manufacturers of woven garments. In addition, the machinery to manufac-
ture yarn and fabric used for knitwear is, in any event, cheaper than the respective 
production for the woven sector.1034 
In comparison to other countries in South Asia, the liberalisation of the garment 
trade in 2005 resulted in further growth of the industry in Bangladesh, with the overall 
value of garments growing by 17.5 percent in 2006/07.1035 Growth was particularly 
strong for large enterprises that expanded their business by 23 percent in 2004/05.1036 
The continuing growth of the industry also led to increasing profits by the entrepre-
neurs, which went up by 16.7 percent in the financial years 2004/05 alone. The ones 
profiting most from this trend were the manufacturers of knitwear and, to an even 
higher extent, those producing in the EPZ.1037 The overall output of garments and the 
profits were rising even though prices of garments were slackening by 10 percent 
between 2005 and 2007 alone and even though China dramatically increased its 
overall textiles and clothing exports.1038 Bangladesh thus could sustain growth in the 
industry mainly due to price cutting and rationalisation.1039 
Despite considerable growth of the garment industry since the early 1980s, the total 
employment in this industry still contributed only 2.5 percent to the total employment 
in 2000 and thus not exceeded that of the total employment by the public sector that 
was at 4.5 percent.1040 The garment industry contributed strongly to employment gen-
eration in the manufacturing sector, the total employment of which, however, was 
continuously decreasing between 1990 and 2000 both in relative and absolute 
terms.1041 A major part of the labour market in Bangladesh remained in the informal 
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sector, even though its contribution to total employment decreased from 87 percent in 
1996 to 81 percent in 2000.1042 The agriculture sector still absorbed about 63 percent 
of all employed people in 2000 and even grew in the 1990s.1043 As the overall popula-
tion of the country, however, continued to grow, employment in the urban areas was 
rising as well and this to a considerably stronger extent than in the rural areas.1044 
Studies on the labour conditions of workers in the garment industry documented 
that they remained harsh. One study argued that 62 percent of helpers earned less 
than Tk. 1500 a month, that 75 percent of the workforce worked for 11 to 12 hours or 
longer per day and that more than 50 percent of workers had only one or no holiday 
per month.1045 Others showed that many workers in the industry were missing em-
ployment contracts and appointment letters, which rendered them vulnerable to dis-
missal without previous notice.1046 A number of these issues were addressed by the 
Labour Law 2006 but many observers doubted whether the new regulations would 
result in labour conditions being improved: The means of the public authorities to 
monitor implementation of the new regulations remained weak, with 53 factory in-
spectors assigned to work for all the economic sectors taken together.1047 Observers 
therefore assumed that the garment manufacturers would continue to follow the 
codes of conduct by their own buyers, the approval by which is more vital for the 
short-term survival of an industrial unit than an approval by a government author-
ity.1048 These codes of conduct would, however, also affect the in-firm skill formation 
arrangements of a growing number of firms. How this occurred, will be one of the top-
ics of the next chapter. 
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12 The development of the skill formation regime of the 
garment industry in Bangladesh 
12.1 The development of the in-firm skill formation regime 
Both the traditional handloom industries in the rural areas and the more modern 
textile industry that expanded in the urban areas of Bengal towards the end of the 
19th century basically relied on an apprenticeship-type of skill formation arrangement. 
On the one hand, the young weavers in the villages were trained by experienced 
craftsmen and thus took up the trade by learning through practice.1049 On the other 
hand, many of the mills operating in the urban areas were built up and run with the 
help of staff from Britain, who had themselves hardly undergone any formal technical 
education but had been trained as apprentices in British mills and had come to both 
British and Indian owned factories to install the machinery and to subsequently over-
see and train the local staff.1050 Even though, as we will see in section 12.2.1, the skill 
formation regime of the textile industry in this geographical region was complemented 
by more formalised, school-based training programmes, apprenticeship training 
would remain important. As the garment production regime was operated, from the 
early days of garments exports, under conditions that left little scope to local entre-
preneurs to invest financial capital into the long-term development of their employ-
ees, these traditional apprenticeship type of training institutions were also to be ap-
propriated by the garment factories and thus became the institutional foundation of 
the in-firm skill formation regime of the garment industry in Bangladesh. 
12.1.1 The in-firm skill formation regime before the imposition of garment quota 
The first manufacturers of garments in Bangladesh, such as Reas and Jewel Gar-
ment, produced for the local market, and it was through accidental contacts with in-
termediary traders, most of them hailing from one of the NIEs, that they started to 
export their first consignments of garments.1051 The items ordered by the intermediar-
ies were generally easy-to-make garments with a minimal value added, which had to 
meet relatively low quality standards; along the lines of what has been described as 
CTM arrangements in section 4.2, the traders then provided their Bangladeshi coun-
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terparts the raw material and promised them to sell the finished product to an over-
seas buyer.1052 For these reasons, many potential manufacturers were of the view 
that they needed neither business experience nor market contacts nor technical skills 
to enter the industry, which rendered them vulnerable to financial loss and dependent 
on outside business contacts and technical skills.1053 The business relationship was 
often risky for either of the contracting parties. In some cases, the intermediaries 
booked orders from entrepreneurs whose firms were still lacking the machinery, in 
other cases the intermediaries broke the agreements by not purchasing the ordered 
quantity of garments.1054 In any event, the major part of the profits were retained by 
the intermediaries; but as orders were bulky and labour costs enormously low, the 
local manufacturers were in a position to pocket a sufficient share of the gains.1055 
Devoid of long-term experience in the garment business, the local entrepreneurs 
had to produce under the pressure to meet tight dead-lines, to acquire orders and to 
pay wages on time. Many firms saw their garments rejected, as they failed to meet 
quality standards, which quite early resulted in a credibility gap of the entire industry 
vis-à-vis buyers and intermediaries.1056 The production process in the garment indus-
try thus soon started to be characterised by problem solving on a daily basis rather 
than by long-term business strategies. Many factories mainly consisted of helpers 
and operators and of a management that included the entrepreneur and, in many 
events, some of his family members or friends.1057 Often, the entrepreneurs, who 
were lacking production managers and a sufficient number of supervisors, had to 
oversee the operations themselves.1058 Only in the rare case that entrepreneurs had 
closer relations to their intermediaries, they were given an opportunity to hire expatri-
ate technicians from other parts of Asia, who would guide the operations and train up 
both the management and the workers.1059 Much of the expatriate staff was, however, 
poached by other entrepreneurs who were prepared to pay higher salaries.1060 
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Given the precarious production processes in many of the early garment factories 
by local entrepreneurs, there was only little scope to invest into the further develop-
ment of factories and into development of factory staff. Most operators on the sewing 
floor of these firms, almost exclusively young migrant female workers from the rural 
areas, were often recruited by the entrepreneurs through their family members and 
friends; once employed, these workers, most of which hadn’t undergone formal 
schooling, were then placed as helpers alongside the more experienced operators for 
some months, whom they had to observe and to assist until they themselves were 
employed as operators working directly on the machine and being assisted by new 
helpers.1061 As skilled workers were offered higher salaries by neighbouring factories, 
the turnover of operators was high, which in itself was a strong disincentive for higher 
investment into training.1062 In the other departments of the garment factories, such as 
cutting and finishing, recruitment and training processes developed in a similar way, 
but the workforce was, in contrast to that of the sewing floor, dominated by higher 
paid male workers, as employers were of the view that these jobs were physically 
more demanding.1063 If the firms were large enough to employ supervisors on the 
sewing floor, this staff was normally promoted from among the few male sewing op-
erators.1064 Males were preferred as supervisors because employers were of the view 
that male employees were in a better position to control the labour force and to make 
sure that the targets would be met. Furthermore, this position required basic literacy 
and numeracy skills, which were more common among the few male operators.1065 
Again, skill formation consisted of on-the-job training, which, in the case of the super-
visors, meant being given minor tasks by a senior manager, often by the managing 
director himself.1066 
Already in the early years of the export-oriented garment industry, locally owned, 
low value-added firms which were characterised by skill formation arrangements rely-
ing on limited on-the-job training were the basis for the expansion of the garment in-
dustry in Bangladesh. In-firm skill formation arrangements that included higher capital 
investment in training of the workforce were comparatively rare and were concen-
trated in some of the few FDI-backed joint ventures, whose number did not exceed 
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15 even by 1989.1067 The most important joint venture in the early days of the garment 
industry was the above-mentioned Desh Garments in Chittagong, an operation jointly 
run by Daewoo of South Korea and Nurul Quader, a former senior bureaucrat. In 
contrast to the locally owned firms, Desh Garments tremendously profited from the 
experience and the skills of the South Korean partners but also from the fact that the 
company could employed local staff that had obtained educational certificates from 
among the more reputed schools and universities of the country.1068 
Once the future managers, supervisors and operators had been recruited, more 
than 100 of them were sent for a comprehensive training programme of several 
months in Daewoo’s South Korean plant. Through both theoretical and practical train-
ing, the Bangladeshi trainees were taught the skills needed to cut and sew a garment 
and to control the flow on the shop floor.1069 Back in Bangladesh, they themselves 
started to train up operators and supervisors on-the-job. As the South Korean trained 
employees had, however, become attractive for other entrepreneurs looking for 
skilled personnel, many of them were poached by other firms that were being set up 
both in Chittagong and Dhaka in the early 1980s. Later on, some of those trained in 
Korea would become entrepreneurs themselves and would, in fact, become a part of 
the establishment of the industry.1070 Desh thus had a considerable effect on the 
transfer of skills and technology to the Bangladeshi garment industry but it remained 
an exception. The real growth of the garment industry that was only about to take off 
in these years would be based on the expansion of factories that were lacking the 
relationship to external partners which would have been prepared to share their ex-
perience and their skills with local partners.1071 
12.1.2 The in-firm skill formation regime during the quota regime 
Once the quota regime was introduced to Bangladesh, local entrepreneurs were 
provided with further incentives to produce comparatively low value-added garments. 
In case the entprepreneurs had been allocated quota by the government or had the 
opportunity to purchase quota from one of their competitors, they were neither 
pressed to improve productivity nor to further develop their products, as their sales 
were guaranteed. At the same time, the quota system encouraged manufacturers to 
                                            
1067  Ahmad (1989), p. 96 
1068  BD_Int_Association1_Representative5 (p. 2/l. 5-8) 
1069  BD_Int_Firm02_Representative1 (p. 3/l. 9-12) 
1070  Quddus and Rashid (2000), p. 63 
1071  United Nations Development Programme and International Labour Organization (1986), p. 12  
  
 240 
order garments from subcontractors, whose survival was based on day-to-day prob-
lem solving rather than on long-term investment into technology and skills.1072 Formal 
training remained minimal in most of these firms and thus continued to mainly consist 
of limited on-the-job training for employees at all levels.1073 
Despite the fact that the material interests of Daewoo had not been protected by the 
government of Bangladesh and that the company thus was absorbed by the local 
partner, a small amount of FDI continued to flow into the country under the time of 
the quota regime, too. One of the FDI-backed joint ventures that invested into skill 
formation of their employees in the years under the quota regime was Youngone, 
which established a factory in the Chittagong EPZ in 1980 and another one in the 
Dhaka EPZ a few years later.1074 Similar to Desh, this factory managed to attract 
management trainees with a science-based university background. These recruits 
had to undergo a traineeship of more than one year, during which they worked in a 
number of different departments, partly under expatriate personnel from the mother 
plant in South Korea. This training also included theoretical, class room-based in-
struction.1075 Some of the new recruits were employed in the work-study department, 
where they had the task to increase productivity of the entire production process and 
to plan the operations. Some of these work-study officers, many of which thus ac-
quired a strong background in industrial engineering, were later promoted to the sen-
ior management positions.1076 In contrast to most of the locally owned firms in Bang-
ladesh, employees of Youngones at the technician and at the supervisory level were 
also trained outside production.1077 Many of the quality controllers, for instance, were 
given theoretical instructions for more than one month and then continued to be 
trained on-the-job by expatriate managers, who familiarised them with comprehen-
sive processes of quality control.1078 The skills brought from South Korea to Bangla-
desh, however, remained firmly within the company. Because of the comparatively 
attractive working conditions and the higher salaries at Youngone, hardly any of the 
local entrepreneurs managed to poach its employees, or to visit any of the plants of 
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this company, which all limited the opportunities for the transfer of skills and technol-
ogy.1079 
12.1.3 The in-firm skill formation regime during and after the phase out of quota 
In the years after the formulation of the ATC in 1995, which prescribed the phase 
out of the quota regime by 2005, the manufacturers in Bangladesh faced, as de-
scribed in section 11.4, two major challenges: first, they faced the pressure to in-
crease their productivity, as the liberalisation of the industry led to more price-based 
competition. Second, buyers became increasingly concerned about labour conditions 
in the country’s garment sector. These pressures created incentives to invest in skill 
formation, which, however, did not uniformly affect the enormously diversified gar-
ment production arrangements at the firm level. In fact, the production arrangements 
of most garment companies did not see any major institutional changes. More than 
two thirds of the manufacturers continued to be involved in the most basic production 
processes, i.e. in the CTM mode of operation, and went on to make their profits from 
being able to employ workers at a low salary and from having contacts to buyers who 
were not very quality conscious but ready to place bulk orders.1080 Productivity in 
these firms remained low, and it was even lower by 10 percent in the sub-contracting 
units, which constituted more than 38 percent of firms in 2003.1081 This low focus on 
productivity development resulted in the entire Bangladeshi garment industry raising 
its productivity in the 1990s by only 2 percent, which was low compared to other 
countries.1082 Correspondingly, most entrepreneurs continued to attach low priority to 
the skill formation of their workforce. 
At the operator level of most firms, workers continued to be trained as helpers or to 
be poached from other factories. As, however, many women in the rural areas not 
only began to have undergone more formal schooling and now tended to get em-
ployment in the higher paying and more sophisticated garment factories, many manu-
facturers from the comparatively unproductive firms increasingly suffered from a 
dearth of skilled operators.1083 At the supervisory and mid-management level, these 
firms continued to rely on promoted operators who were not provided any further 
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training.1084 In fact, hardly any of these factories employed technically trained gradu-
ates from Textile Colleges or the engineering universities; the dearth of technically 
trained people in most Bangladeshi garment factories was a consequence of both 
lacking demand and supply. On the one hand, representatives of the large associa-
tions, namely of BGMEA, were of the view that even under the prospects of the liber-
alisation of the garment industry after 2005 employment in garment production did 
not require any formal technical education background. In fact, the practice to pro-
mote senior staff from the operator or the supervisory level remained attractive, as it 
reduced the initial training period. In contrast to new recruits who had a higher educa-
tion background but were lacking industrial experience, the promoted personnel 
didn’t need to familiarise themselves with the production processes, into which they 
had been previously involved at a more junior level. Furthermore, the managers pro-
moted from the shop floor level were sceptical towards any outsiders who could out-
class their own job performance and could thus menace the delicate power equilib-
rium on the highly hierarchical shop floors. On the other hand, supply of such techni-
cally trained personnel remained low; graduates from technical universities were not 
attracted to factories which belonged to a segment of the labour market with a very 
low esteem. To them, the labour market in the urban areas provided a range of other 
job opportunities, which not only offered more social prestige and a higher salary but 
also a less hectic and stressful working environment.1085 
In contrast to most local firms, many FDI-backed firms were pressed by their own-
ers to embark on business strategies that would prepare their ventures for the years 
after the phase out of the MFA in 2005. Even these ventures continued to be mainly 
involved into CTM processes and only gradually ventured into merchandising and 
marketing, whereas hardly any of them opened a product development department 
that would also have required designers. Generally, the foreign owners of these 
companies were of the view that these segments of the supply chain should be kept 
outside Bangladesh. Their priority was thus to make sure that productivity would be 
high enough to keep competitors both in Bangladesh and abroad at bay, which also 
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involved further developing training processes and creating avenues for technically 
trained school leavers and graduates.1086 
At the operator level, FDI companies began to recruit better educated and more ex-
perienced workers and to improve the processes to retain workers longer than their 
competitors outside the zone.1087 Most FDI-backed companies were, therefore, still 
profiting from the fact that many experienced operators were seeking employment 
here so that they had to invest only little into training of operators.1088 As pressure on 
them to raise productivity and, thus, to increase the man-machine ratio was growing, 
some firms also decided to reduce the number of helpers, which required a change of 
training processes: as the helper position had served as a training period for opera-
tors, few companies were now establishing training lines, in which both the future 
operators and the existing workforce were provided training outside production. Fur-
thermore, these training lines could also be used for upgrading the skills of the exist-
ing workforce.1089 One FDI-backed factory also started to invest in literacy pro-
grammes for their operators.1090 
At the supervisory level, the senior management of FDI-backed companies was try-
ing to employ an increasing number of staff which would not be promoted from the 
operator level but were recruited from outside and were expected to have a compara-
tively high education background, i.e. have at least come up to the SSC level. Once 
employed in the factories, these externally recruited supervisors were trained on-the-
job by their superiors and underwent more formal training outside production, which 
focused on skills to handle human resources and grievances on the shop floor.1091 
Despite these attempts, some of these firms failed to attract and to retain a sufficient 
number of such externally recruited supervisors, which made it difficult for the com-
panies to implement the same production processes as in their plants in other coun-
tries.1092 
                                            
1086  BD_Int_Firm06_Representative1 (p. 1/l. 28-30 & p. 6/l. 24-25), BD_Int_Firm06_Representative2 
(p. 1/l. 28-30), BD_Int_Firm09_Representative1 (p. 2/l. 23-26) 
1087  Zohir (2001b), p. 48, BD_FNotes_Firm12 (p. 1/l. 25) 
1088  BD_Int_Firm06_Representative1 (p. 2/l. 32-34), BD_Int_Firm09_Representative1 (p. 3/l. 15-16) 
1089  BD_Int_Firm06_Representative1 (p. 2/l. 17-23) 
1090  BD_FNotes_Firm12 (p. 12/l. 7) 
1091  BD_Int_Firm06_Representative7 (p. 1/l.24), BD_Int_Firm09_Representative1 (p. 3/l. 31-35 & p. 
4/l. 18-19 & 21-25) 
1092  BD_FNotes_Firm16 (p. 10/para. 1.2), BD_Int_Firm09_Representative3 (p. 5/l. 17-20) 
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At the management level, most FDI-backed companies continued, at least partly, to 
rely on managers and technicians from overseas.1093 As, however, the costs of this 
expatriate staff were high, some of these firms also started to recruit local staff and to 
make them undergo a structured training programme: university graduates were re-
cruited as trainees for a specific department but before actually being given any re-
sponsibility there, they were assigned to other departments during several months; 
this helped the trainees to familiarise themselves with the entire operations and 
served the superiors to monitor skills, motivation and performance of the new recruits 
in different working environments.1094 Often, however, even FDI-backed firms found it 
difficult to retain educationally more accomplished staff and therefore had to lower 
the respective requirements.1095 
As we have seen, the production regime of the clear majority of garment factories 
hardly changed in view of the pressure emanating from the ATC; furthermore, we 
could note that the production regime of FDI-backed firms further developed along 
the previously evolved, comparatively more skills-intensive trajectory. We will now 
see that, beyond that, the incentives of the post-1995 era indeed resulted in a num-
ber of locally owned garment factories, whose owners strongly invested into produc-
tivity improvement and better labour conditions, started to produce higher value-
added garments and were striving for industrial upgrading. In contrast to most of their 
local competitors, these firms were not operating as subcontractors to other garment 
manufacturers but were increasingly selling their products directly to end buyers, 
which were interested in sourcing higher value-added garments from Bangladesh 
and, ideally for the manufacturers in Bangladesh, to outsource merchandising or 
marketing to their suppliers. 
In order to be in a position to enter this type of business relationship, the production 
arrangements of many of these firms had to be adapted to integrate new segments of 
the supply chain, such as merchandising, to ensure constant productivity improve-
ment and to document the adherence to labour standards by acquiring the necessary 
compliance certificates. The main strategy of these firms to adapt their production 
                                            
1093  Company 9, for instance, originally employed all technicians from Sri Lanka and also organised 
training for its staff in Vietnam and Korea; see BD_FNotes_Firm09 (p. 2/l. 5), 
BD_Int_Firm09_Representative1 (p. 4/l. 35-37); on training by expatriate managers see 
BD_Int_Firm06_Representative1 (p. 2/l. l. 4-5 & 22-23). 
1094  BD_FNotes_Firm12 (p. 1/l. 38-45), BD_Int_Firm06_Representative4 (p. 1/l. 19 & 25-28), 
BD_Int_Firm09_Representative1, (p. 4/l. 22-29),  
1095  See, for instance, BD_FNotes_Firm16 (p. 15). 
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arrangements was to establish specialised departments for tasks which had previ-
ously been assigned to more integrated departments. Merchandising departments 
had to source the raw materials needed for the products of the company, work-study 
departments were given the task to focus on productivity improvement, and human 
resources departments had to focus on employment conditions, compliance and 
training.1096 
In many instances, the establishment of such departments was a measure to con-
tain the power of the production department, whose management was considered 
not to be in a satisfactory position to increase productivity and to improve compliance 
with the labour standards set by the buyers. In the case of the work-study department 
of one particular factory, the initially very small team of only two people was given the 
task to increase productivity on the shop floor but also to plan production in a way, 
which would allow the factory to meet compliance related requirements.1097 In the 
case of another factory, the owners were of the view that the production managers 
were controlling recruitment, promotion and transfers in a way, which was not condu-
cive for both productivity improvement and compliance. They therefore decided to 
establish a human resources department that had the task to employ, train and moni-
tor the staff.1098 
The change of the firms’ production arrangements necessarily implied a change of 
the respective in-firm skill formation arrangements: on the one hand, the establish-
ment of new departments accelerated the tendency to hire recruits who had been 
trained in specific technical fields, e.g. in merchandising, industrial engineering or 
human resources development. On the other hand, the establishment of new de-
partments, notably those for work study and human resources development, resulted 
in these new employees themselves engaging in further adaptations of the produc-
tion arrangements and, thus, of the skill formation arrangements. One of the tradi-
tional methods in Bangladesh to hire skilled technicians, was to employ skilled expa-
triates, for instance from Sri Lanka, from where many employees had come to work 
in the Bangladeshi garment industry.1099 As, however, these expatriate employees 
                                            
1096  For accounts of this restructuring process and of the pressure by buyers see 
BD_Int_Firm05_Representative1 (p. 3/l. 4-5), BD_Int_Firm07_Representative1 (p. 2/l. 35-39). 
1097  BD_Int_Firm02_Representative1 (p. 9/l. 42-44) 
1098  BD_Int_Firm07_Representative1 (p. 5/l. 38-41, p. 6/l. 34-43 & p. 10/l. 7-13) 
1099  Many factories had recruited merchandisers from Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan and China; see 




were working for considerably higher wages, the firms – similar to the FDI-backed 
ones – started to increasingly employ university-trained local recruits, who had ideally 
undergone some industry related technical training.1100 One of the firms, for instance, 
had started its work-study department with two graduates from a private training insti-
tute, who had previously not been involved in the garment industry.1101 Once the de-
partment was established, this practice continued and it was complemented with a 
traineeship, during which the recruits from outside were provided the opportunity to 
learn the skills on-the-job.1102 
Many of these more specifically trained recruits of the new departments helped the 
firms to further adapt their production and skill formation arrangements by defining 
skill levels and elaborating training manuals, which would refine the training contents, 
assessment methods and the ways to monitor performance after the training pe-
riod.1103 In such companies, sewing operators started to be trained in separate train-
ing lines outside production and the practice to recruit supervisors and middle-level 
managers from outside was not only applied to the new departments but also to the 
existing ones.1104 These externally recruited employees were then trained on-the-job, 
and in case the senior management was of the view that the capacities for further 
skill development within the factories were not sufficient, these employees were also 
sent to out-of-firm training organisations.1105 
Even though the owners of these firms had the clear intention to hire more techni-
cally trained people from outside, establishing such new recruitment and skill forma-
tion arrangements was related to some difficulties: first, the senior management had 
to accept the fact that graduates with only limited industrial experience were not fully 
productive even after their training period and that it thus took time until investments 
were returned. Second, for many years, it was difficult for these firms to find univer-
sity graduates prepared to work in the garment industry, and even if they could be 
                                            
1100  On recruitment and educational backgrounds of staff of these new departments see 
BD_FNotes_Firm05 (p. 2/l. 12-18), BD_FNotes_Firm07 (p. 2/l. 4-9), BD_Int_Firm02_Repre-
sentative2, (p. 1/l. 23-24), BD_Int_Firm02_Representative3 (p. 1/l. 22-25), BD_Int_Firm02_Re-
presentative4 (p. 1/l. 18-21), BD_Int_Firm02_Representative5 (p. 1/l. 24-25). 
1101  BD_Int_Firm02_Representative1 (p. 7/l. 3-10 & p. 9/l. 42-44) 
1102  BD_Int_Firm02_Representative1 (p. 10/l. 33-36) 
1103  Ahmed (2007), Industrial Engineering Department DBL Group (2007), BD_FNotes_Firm15 (p. 
1/l. 31-32 & p. 2/l. 1-5), BD_Int_Firm03_Representative1 (p. 2/l. 24-28) 
1104  BD_FNotes_Firm01 (p. 6/para. 4.1 & p. 7./para.4.2), BD_FNotes_Firm20 (p. 1/. 23f), BD_Int_ 
Association1_Representative7 (p. 2 / 23-26), BD_Int_Firm02_Representative1 (p. 6/l. 35-36 & p. 
8/l. 9-12), BD_Int_Firm03_Representative1 (p. 3/l. 29-31), BD_Int_Firm07_Representative1 (p. 
4/l. 1-2) 
1105  BD_FNotes_Firm20 (p. 1/l. 37-41), BD_Int_Firm01_Representative1 (p. 1/l. 30-32) 
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recruited, it was often difficult to retain them, which made employers reluctant to in-
vest in their skills.1106 Third, the employment of university graduate led to social con-
flicts, especially in the production departments. Those previously employed in senior 
positions without having undergone any university training often felt threatened by 
the presence of the accomplished newcomers, who were poised to use academic 
concepts in order to question existing production arrangements.1107 These difficulties 
in conjunction with outside job opportunities often made the young, educationally ac-
complished trainees quit employment even at the more sophisticated and technology-
intensive locally owned garment factories.1108 
Factories which were striving to adapt their skill formation arrangements certainly 
had to accept the lower productivity of trainees during the induction period for the 
sake of higher returns at a later moment and had to partly live with high attrition 
rates.1109 At the same time, many of these factories began to establish mechanisms to 
retain their trained personnel at all levels of the occupational hierarchy. In order to 
retain operators, for instance, one factory started to organise yearly pick-nicks with 
the entire staff and theatre presentations by the family members of their employ-
ees.1110 At a more senior level, companies tried to find ways to retain their mid-level 
managers either by rapidly promoting them to senior levels or by paying better sala-
ries and providing other benefits.1111 Some companies realised that training could 
lead to later returns even if the trained technicians or managers could not be retained 
and were poached by other companies, as their former employees, loyal to the fac-
tory from where they gained their skills, further enlarged the company’s access to 
other organisations and individuals in the trade, especially if they started to work for 
potential buyers.1112 Changes like these, of course, also would affect the development 
of the out-of-firm skill formation regime, which will now be scrutinised in more detail. 
                                            
1106  BD_Int_Firm03_Representative1 (p. 4/l. 28-30) 
1107  BD_Int_Firm07_Representative1 (p. 5/l. 24-31) 
1108  BD_Int_Firm05_Representative1 (p. 7/l. 9-21) 
1109  BD_Int_Firm08_Representative1 (p. 4/l. 21-29) 
1110  BD_Int_Association1_Representative7 (p. 2/l. 16-20); in one company, the mechanisms to re-
tain workers were aimed at constantly keeping a 5 percent surplus of operators; see 
BD_FNotes_Firm20 (p. 1/l. 32). 
1111  BD_Int_Association1_Representative7 (p. 2/l. 38-40) 
1112  BD_Int_Firm02_Representative1 (p. 8/l. 23-24) 
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12.2 The development of the out-of-firm skill formation regime 
12.2.1 Skill formation programmes before the imposition of garment quota 
The basis of textile-related technical education in India was laid in the late 19th cen-
tury, when the European staff of textile mills started to be gradually replaced by In-
dian technicians. Whereas the traditional production regime in the industry had relied 
on skilled technicians migrating to Indian factories from Great Britain and on Indian 
staff trained on-the-job, this transition resulted in the general perception that the in-
dustry was suffering from a skills shortage. Textile technologists thus started to la-
ment the low state of textile-related technical education in India, a claim which was in 
line with the demands by the representatives of the Indian National Congress and the 
Swabeshi movement, who were pressurising the governments of the Indian prov-
inces for more technical education after 1880 and after 1900 respectively.1113 India’s 
first technical school that was entirely dedicated to the textile industry was the Bengal 
Textile Institute in Serampore, in the western part of Bengal;1114 by the 1940s, eleven 
more such organisations, all offering technical education programmes up to diploma 
and licentiate level, were established all over India.1115 As the representatives of the 
British government were of the view that an excess supply of technically educated 
personnel would be harmful for the social and economic development of the colony, 
no such textile-related institute was established in the eastern part of Bengal.1116 The 
Dhaka survey school, which virtually exclusively prepared its students for employ-
ment in the Public Works Department, thus remained, as described in section 10.1, 
the only higher technical education organisation in this part of Bengal. 
There emerged, however, a different type of textile-related skill formation organisa-
tions. After the First World War, the Indian government formulated plans to revive 
and to modernise the rural handloom industry; hence, it established, under the De-
partments of Industry in the different provinces, peripatetic weaving schools that op-
erated from the major towns of the country to diffuse new weaving technologies in the 
rural areas.1117 The peripatetic schools, 30 of which were established in the eastern 
part of Bengal, then moved to the villages, where they stayed for a few days or 
weeks in order to familiarise the local weavers with new machines and techniques. 
                                            
1113  Kiyokawa (1983), pp. 120f 
1114  Roy (2002b), p. 516 
1115  Kiyokawa (1983), p. 123 
1116  Ibid., p. 121 
1117  Department of Textiles (2001), p. 6, Roy (2002b), p. 516 
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The staff of these schools consisted of a superintendent, who had undergone formal 
education, and a number of assistants, who were lacking this type of education but 
were skilled craftsmen.1118 Partly owing to the facts that the weavers had learnt their 
skills as apprentices from skilled craftsmen and that the superintendents were not 
skilled weavers themselves, many local weavers were reluctant to learn from these 
schools, which thus only had a limited impact on the diffusion of the new technolo-
gies.1119 
In the years under the Indian colonial government, a number of organisations were 
developed that obviously became part of the skill formation regime of the Indian tex-
tile industry. In both cases, state patronage was essential for their evolution. But 
whereas the organisations providing higher technical education had resulted from the 
demand from the growing community of textile technologists, from the mill owners in 
the private sector and from the pressure by political parties, vocational education for 
the textile industry was entirely supply-driven and catered to weavers in the rural ar-
eas, who had traditionally relied on the apprenticeship system and were therefore 
reluctant to take up the skills from an outside agency. 
After the formation of Pakistan in 1947, the eastern part of Bengal finally received 
its Textile Institute: in 1954, the East Pakistan Textile Institute in Dhaka enrolled its 
first students for a diploma course in textile technology, with a first delivery in 
1958.1120 The institute offered diploma courses of three years in textile technology and 
in jute technology and a diploma in textile chemistry of two years, and it thus pre-
pared students as junior and mid-level textile technologists that would take up posi-
tions in the emerging mills both in the private and the public sector.1121 Even though 
the development of the textile industry was a priority of Pakistan’s economic plan-
ners, there was no degree level technical education programme for textile engineers 
in East Pakistan. Graduates of the diploma programmes who wanted to pursue fur-
ther studies therefore had to move to the western part of Pakistan, to India or to Eng-
land to obtain a higher degree in textile technology. Once Bangladesh was formed, 
some of them also headed for the Soviet Union, which thus trained a considerable 
number of textile technologists.1122 
                                            
1118  Ibid., p. 517 
1119  Loc. cit.; on the reluctance of local weavers to take up the technology see Ghosh (1910, p. 176). 
1120  Khan (2007), p. 6 
1121  Department of Textiles (2005b), p. 15 
1122  On studies in India see BD_Int_AdminUnit4_Representative2 (p. 2/l. 11-16); on studies in the 
Soviet Union see BD_Int_TrainOrg06_Representative1 (p. 5/l. 8-12). 
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This situation changed in 1978, when the Textile Institute was upgraded to the Col-
lege of Textile Technology that was affiliated to the highly reputed Dhaka University; 
this strategy was in line with the economic plans of the incoming government under 
General Zia, which considered the development of the jute and textile industry with 
both private and public investments to be one of the most important aims of its eco-
nomic policy.1123 From that year, the college started to award a B.Sc. degree in textile 
technology and subsequently phased out its diploma programme, under which tech-
nicians had been trained since 1954.1124 The development of the college, notably of 
its infrastructure, its curricula and its staff, began to be tremendously supported 
through donors funded projects, namely through those of UNDP that were imple-
mented in the early 1980s. With these funds, the college developed to be one of the 
best equipped technical education organisations at the university level.1125 The repu-
tation of the college was, however, not only based on its being funded by outside 
agencies but also on the high social status of its teaching force: all of its professors 
were made to belong to the Class I gazetted officers, the highest rank in the Bangla-
desh Civil Service, the members of which are generally recruited from the uppermost 
echelons of society and often had received their degrees from renowned foreign uni-
versities.1126 Similarly elitist, student entry into the Textile College was restricted by a 
very competitive exam, and the course programme itself was based on a highly aca-
demic curriculum that was developed in cooperation with overseas universities. 
The textile engineers trained at the Textile College in Dhaka were employed in the 
senior positions of the textile mills in the country. Being the only such organisation in 
Bangladesh, the college strongly contributed to the corporate professional identity of 
the former graduates, which not only facilitated the exchange of skills and knowledge 
in the textile industry but also increased the opportunities for collective action.1127 In 
fact, after the first batch of degree students had graduated from the college, an 
alumni organisation, the Institution of Textile Engineers and Technologists was 
formed, which was to give the textile technologists a voice independent from the en-
                                            
1123  Planning Commission (1978), p. 153 
1124  Department of Textiles (2005b), p. 15 
1125  On development projects by the UNDP see Governing Council of the United Nations Develop-
ment Programme (1990, p. 18), Planning Commission (1993, pp. 260f); on the development of 
equipment and staff of the Textile College see BD_Int_TrainOrg10_Representative1 (p. 1/l. 29-
35). 
1126  On the high reputation of teachers of the Textile College see 
BD_Int_TrainOrg10_Representative1 (p. 1/l. 36-40); on the social background of Class I officers 
see Quddus (2007, p. 78). 
1127  Rossbach (2006), p. 10 
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trepreneurs associated in BTMA, which was lobbying the government with regard to 
textile-related policies.1128 Under these circumstances, the college was soon strongly 
interrelated with the textile industry; its ties with the garment industry, whose first 
phase of expansion occurred in the years when the first textile graduates left the col-
lege, did, however, not develop in a similar way. In fact, this industry was not consid-
ered an option for employment by the graduates of the college, even though a test on 
garment technology was introduced in the first half of the 1980s.1129 Certainly, the 
production processes of the garment industry were quite different from the ones of 
the textile mills that were producing yarn and fabric. But the lacking absorption of tex-
tile technologists by the garment industry was rather rooted in the fact that the tech-
nically educated graduates, many of which hailed from upper-middle class families, 
did not regard the garment industry as a sufficiently prestigious employer. As dis-
cussed in section 12.1.1, employment of university graduates in the garment industry 
was rare and was concentrated in the few technologically more sophisticated and 
thus socially more prestigious FDI-backed garment firms; but even there, university-
trained employees generally had not undergone any industry-specific technical edu-
cation programmes but had obtained their degrees in more general fields, such as 
arts, science and economics. Accordingly, these firms did not establish any linkages 
with the Textile College either. 
Whereas technical education catering to the textile industry was developed through 
the establishment of the Textile Institute under Pakistani rule, there was no similar 
effort at the vocational level. The weaving schools that catered to the rural handloom 
industry were retained but hardly improved. Only after the publication of the Two 
Year Plan formulated by Zia’s government, six of the existing weaving schools were 
upgraded to Textile Institutes, at which the former certificate courses were abolished 
and substituted by three-year diploma programmes catering to future technicians in 
the fields of weaving, spinning, dyeing and finishing.1130 These institutes were, as 
were the weaving schools, operated by the Department of Textiles, which had been 
founded under the Industries Division of the Ministry of Industries and Commerce in 
1978 and was, at that time, also overseeing the textile mills in the public sector, some 
                                            
1128  Institution of Textile Engineers and Technologists (2008) 
1129  On the introduction of the first paper on garment technology see 
BD_Int_AdminUnit4_Representative2 (p. 3/l. 35-37). 
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of which started to be privatised in these years.1131 The department argued that the 
textile mills would be in need for more mid-level supervisors and technicians. Man-
power requirements were, however, certainly not the only reason to establish the 
Textile Institutes. Indeed, the institutes started to absorb textile technologists who 
had been retrenched from the first denationalised mills and they were poised to ab-
sorb more of them once the privatisation strategy was to be accelerated.1132 Further-
more, the locations of the institutes rather reflected the electorates of leading politi-
cians in the BNP and thus did not correspond with the main centres of textile produc-
tion.1133 This may explain why Dhaka and its vicinity were left without a skill formation 
organisation providing training for the textile industry at the diploma level. 
The strategy by Zia’s government to expand textile-related vocational and technical 
education also included the establishment of an institute for further training of techni-
cians in the textile industry. The Textile Industry Development Centre (TIDC) pro-
vided training, testing and consulting services to the public mills under the BMTC, 
whose public textile mills had become loss-making ventures in the second half of the 
1970s and were poised to be privatised after the publication of the Two Year Plan in 
1978.1134 Similar to the Textile College, the infrastructure, the development of curric-
ula and staff training at the TIDC was supported by UNDP, which implemented its 
programme through the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation 
(UNIDO).1135  
As these elaborations show, there developed, at the time when the Bangladeshi 
garment industry started to grow in the beginning of the 1980s, no formal skill forma-
tion programmes that would have catered to the garment industry. In fact, there were 
no actors, neither in the public nor in the private sector, which would have considered 
the establishment of such organisations a vital ingredient to the development of the 
industry, all the more as the growth of the garment industry was no result of tradi-
tional economic planning but rather of concessions extracted by individual entrepre-
neurs. At the same time, there was, however, a strong, government-led impetus for 
skill formation programmes for the textile industry that were indeed an outcome of 
                                            
1131  Government of Bangladesh (1982), p. 1 
1132  On the retrenchment of employees of the Department of Textiles under the privatisation strategy 
see Chandra (1994, p. 93). 
1133  The Textile Institutes were located in Tangail, Dinajpur, Pabna, Barisal, Noakhali and Chit-
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economic planning by the Planning Commission. It was under this umbrella that both 
the Ministry of Education, with its Textile College, and the Ministry of Industries, with 
its Textile Institutes and the TIDC, started to be strongly involved into preparing 
school leavers for positions in the textile industry. These two organisations would 
continue to be crucial for the development of the out-of-firm skill formation of the 
garment industry in the next decades. 
12.2.2 Skill formation programmes during the quota regime 
The years between 1986 and 1995 saw, for the first time, the rise of formal skill 
formation programmes that were explicitly catering to the garment industry. The main 
characteristic feature of this development was, as before, the strong involvement of 
donor agencies, which now, unlike in the previous years, started to also interact with 
the employers’ associations. The first skill formation programme that catered to the 
garment sector was developed under a project financed by UNDP and implemented 
by the Geneva-based International Trade Centre (ITC) in cooperation with the Bang-
ladesh Export Promotion Bureau (EPB) that operated under the Ministry of Com-
merce.1136 Starting from mid-1986, this project facilitated training sessions primarily 
for the managers of different industrial sectors but also included a garment industry 
component that provided managers with skills related to production development, 
quality control and export development. Furthermore, the project financed expatriate 
experts, who were consulting firms on productivity improvement.1137 Just at the time 
when the implementation of this project had commenced, UNDP and ILO launched 
another project which aimed at initiating training programmes specifically catering to 
the garment industry. These two organisations chose as their implementing partner 
the BMET, one of the major training agencies in the country that was under the con-
trol of the Ministry of Labour. In fact, the Youth Development Bureau of Bangladesh 
had, already before, offered some training courses on dress making and tailoring but 
these courses were aimed at developing skills for domestic use.1138 On the contrary, 
the new project proposed by the donor agencies intended to develop training pro-
grammes that were directly catering to the industry; the donors therefore also de-
cided to involve BGMEA, the main employers’ association in the Bangladeshi gar-
                                            
1136  The International Trade Centre (ITC) was a joint technical cooperation agency of UNCTAD and 
GATT (later on WTO); see Glover (1984). 
1137  United Nations Development Programme and International Labour Organization (1986), p. 16 
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ment industry, into the implementation of the project. The first draft of the project 
suggested to train trainers of garment factories and instructors of various TTCs, to 
finance studies on labour laws and working conditions, to develop job descriptions for 
positions in the garment industry and to initiate letters of agreements between indi-
vidual garment manufacturers in the NICs, in the EU and the US and those in Bang-
ladesh to facilitate “transfer of technology through correspondence”.1139 A modified 
draft that did not provide for this transfer of technology and that limited the training of 
instructors of TTCs to one single training centre was finally agreed upon in April 
1990. The project thus started in early 1991 and was subsequently extended four 
times; it finally ended in early 1995.1140 
It was no coincidence that the key agency for the implementation of the project was 
the BMET under the Ministry of Labour; as illustrated in section 10.2.2, this organisa-
tion had become, during the 1980s, the main beneficiary of donor aid to the voca-
tional and technical education sector and was regarded by the aid agencies to be 
more attuned towards the needs of the labour market than the DTE under the Minis-
try of Education. Both the technical expertise by a number of international consultants 
and the support for infrastructure and machinery were thereby channelled to the larg-
est TTC of the country, the Bangladesh-German Technical Training Centre (BGTTC) 
in Dhaka; there, the consultants started their work, which – to a large extent – con-
sisted of the delivery of training. The courses, at a length of two to six weeks, primar-
ily catered to technicians in different fields of garment production, including quality 
control, pattern making, cutting and marking, sewing machine maintenance and pro-
duction supervision.1141 Some courses were specifically organised for supervisors that 
were supposed to transmit their skills to the operating workforce inside the firms.1142 
As the industry hardly promoted female operators to the supervisory level, the 
courses only catered to few women; thus special courses for female operators and 
supervisors had to be organised.1143 For all courses, the consultants developed ex-
tensive course material, which they later on used as the basis for curricula that were 
to be implemented in the aftermath of the project. These courses for employees were 
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complemented by guest lectures, where staff of FDI-backed firms addressed factory 
owners.1144 Furthermore, the consultants visited factories and provided training to op-
erators and technicians on the shop floors, which was considered a highly effective 
way of training not only by the entrepreneurs but also by the expatriate consultants, 
who increasingly started to put into question the effectiveness of the off-the-job train-
ing provided at the BGTTC.1145 
The main concern of the expatriate consultants was the quality of the 14 local in-
structors that assisted them with the training. Being the first training project catering 
to the garment industry, they thus documented a feature of industry-related training 
programmes in Bangladesh that would be discussed by many later consultants. The 
main complaint was that the instructors were lacking sufficient industrial experi-
ence.1146 In fact, virtually all of the recruited instructors had acquired degrees and had 
worked at training centres under different government departments but only one per-
son had previously been employed in the garment industry, where he worked as a 
pattern master in a non-exporting factory up to 1984.1147 Criticising BMET for not hav-
ing recruited suitable instructors, the consultants were finally of the view that not even 
a third of the trained personnel of the BGTTC would be in a position to professionally 
train future supervisors for the industry.1148 
The sustainability of the training programme was, however, not impaired by the al-
leged lack of sufficiently skilled instructors but by the disinterest of the garment 
manufacturers to come forward to partly finance the training programme. Most train-
ing programmes, both at the training centre in Dhaka and in the firms had indeed 
been organised in cooperation with BGMEA.1149 But towards the end of the project, 
ILO and UNDP declared that a continuation of the project would only be considered 
by the two agencies in the case of stronger financial commitment by BGMEA. For this 
purpose, the donors had drafted a Memorandum of Understanding between BGMEA 
and the Government of Bangladesh, which was meant to pave the way for future col-
laboration between the association, the BMET and the donor agency. This document 
proposed that BGMEA would overtake the management of the garment training insti-
                                            
1144  See e.g. Athukorala (1995, p. 13), BD_Int_TrainOrg01_Representative5 (p. 2/l. 46-47). 
1145  International Labour Organization and United Nations Development Programme (1995), p. 9 
1146  Ibid., p. 5 
1147  For the curricula vitae of the respective instructors see BD_Int_TrainOrg01_Representative2 (p. 
1), BD_Int_TrainOrg01_Representative3 (p. 1), BD_Int_TrainOrg01_Representative4 (p. 1) 
1148  Athukorala (1995), p. 9, International Labour Organization and United Nations Development 
Programme (1995), p. 15 
1149  Athukorala (1995), p. 13, BD_Int_AdminUnit2_Representative1 (p. 2/l. 36-38) 
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tute at the BGTTC and that fees would be levied from the employers and the trainees 
that profited from the services of the centre.1150 As BGMEA finally did not come for-
ward to financially contribute to the training programmes under BMET, the donors 
withdrew, sceptical about the impact of a project that had aimed at sensitising em-
ployers, who – as the consultants put it – “knew nothing about their trade”, for the 
necessity of investments into training.1151 
The first involvement of BGMEA into the development of skill formation pro-
grammes for the garment industry occurred at a time, when the political influence of 
the organisation was increasing. This influence was, obviously, not sufficient to con-
vince UNDP to continue its funding for the project at the BGTTC but it was, from now, 
being used to lobby the government to introduce garment-related skill formation pro-
grammes. The first such instance was its move to press the BNP government, which 
also included a senior member of BGMEA, to ask the Textile College in Dhaka to es-
tablish a garment related department that would complement the ones for weaving, 
spinning and dyeing and finishing.1152 The government soon agreed to this proposal, 
and thus the Textile College not only established a Department of Apparel Manufac-
turing but also introduced a garment-related stream within the B.Sc. programme on 
textile engineering, in the development of which a number of UNDP-sponsored con-
sultants were involved.1153 The course structure of the garment specialisation included 
subjects related to textile technology in the first two years and a number of subjects 
related to general aspects of garment production, including maintenance of the ma-
chinery, quality control and fashion design.1154 
As we have noted in the section 12.2.1, the Textile College had, up to these years, 
been mainly linked to ventures in the textile industry but was lacking similar contacts 
to the garment industry. One would assume that the establishment of the Department 
of Apparel Manufacturing at the college would have somewhat changed this scenario 
by contributing to a higher absorption of graduates by the garment industry. For sev-
eral reasons, this was, however, not to be the case. On the one hand, there contin-
                                            
1150  International Labour Organization and United Nations Development Programme (1995), p. 18; 
for information on the development of the negotiations between donors, BMET and BGMEA see 
ILO Area Office (1994), p. 3, BD_Int_AdminUnit3_Representative1 (p. 2/l. 38-41). 
1151  International Labour Organization and United Nations Development Programme (1995), p. 1 
1152  BD_Int_TrainOrg10_Representative1 (p. 4/l. 16-19) 
1153  BD_Int_AdminUnit4_Representative2 (p. 3/l. 23-25) 
1154  The only documents available in this regard were prospectuses of later years; see, for instance, 
College of Textile Technology (2006), Id. (2007); interviews, however, confirmed that the struc-
ture of the course with the specialisation in apparel manufacturing was retained since its intro-
duction in the early 1990s. 
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ued to be a lack of potential links between the programmes of the college and the in-
firm skill formation arrangements of most garment factories in the country. Still, most 
locally owned garment factories relied, as illustrated in section 12.1.2, on on-the-job 
training of employees that had undergone comparatively little formal schooling; em-
ployment in these garment factories thus continued to be non-prestigious and not to 
be adequate for the standing of graduates from a college that was attached to the 
reputed Dhaka University. 
At the same time, the more attractive FDI-backed firms, which were, indeed, em-
ploying university graduates, were generally not looking for industry-specifically 
trained staff but for recruits with a sound background in mathematics or business, 
who would, upon employment, be trained by experienced personnel, both local and 
expatriate. On the other hand, the problems of the college to relate with the garment 
industry were rooted in the fact that the representatives of BGMEA, who had pressur-
ised the government and the college to establish the garment department, were dis-
appointed by the enrolment practices of the college. In fact, many of the BGMEA en-
trepreneurs had hoped that the establishment of the Department of Apparel Manufac-
turing would provide them with the opportunity to nominate their own family members 
as students of the college, who would, upon graduation, be employed in the upper 
echelons of their relatives’ ventures. However, access to the college was to be de-
nied to most of them as entry to the Textile College continued to be based on the re-
sults achieved in entry exams. The rigidity of the selection process would soon moti-
vate the entrepreneurs to think about alternative ways of developing skill formation 
programmes at the higher education level.1155 
As we see, the Bangladeshi out-of-firm skill formation regime of the garment indus-
try started to take shape during the quota regime of the Multi Fibre Agreement, i.e. in 
the years between 1986 and 1995. In the previous phase, the regime had basically 
not existed at all, as none of the textile-related vocational and technical education 
programmes that were offered by agencies under the Ministry of Education and un-
der the Ministry of Industries explicitly referred to the emerging garment industry. 
Whereas the development of the textile-related technical education programmes had 
been guided by the rationales of the Planning Commission and its economic plans, 
the first garment-related out-of-firm skill formation programmes were not mainly a 
result of economic planning by state agencies but of the agency of donor organisa-
                                            
1155  BD_Int_TrainOrg10_Representative1 (p. 6/l. 9-14) 
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tions and employers’ organisations. On the basis of their efforts, there developed two 
organisations which now offered garment-related skill formation programmes, the 
Textile College and the BGTTC. Namely the development of the training programmes 
under the BMET, controlled by the Ministry of Labour, documented that the out-of-
firm skill formation regime of the garment industry would not only become more com-
prehensive but also more complex and less susceptible for coordination by a few 
government agencies.  
12.2.3 Skill formation programmes during and after the phase out of quota 
12.2.3.1 Private skill formation organisations 
As we have noted in the section 10.2.1 of this study, the emergence of private de-
gree-awarding organisations and of private vocational and technical training organi-
sations was an important feature of the development of the Bangladeshi education 
and training regime in the 1990s. This tendency affected the further trajectory of the 
out-of-firm skill formation regime of the garment industry as well, and the growth of 
the respective organisations was particularly prominent in the years after 1995. Of 
course, private skill formation programmes had already been offered in earlier years, 
even though such activities were not welcomed by government agencies. Lecturers 
of the Textile College, for instance, offered, already before this organisation opened 
its Department of Apparel Manufacturing in the early 1990s, courses outside the 
campus on a private basis that catered to senior employees of both FDI-backed and 
locally owned firms.1156 
The most prominent private skill formation organisation that started to cater to the 
Bangladeshi garment industry in the years after 1995 was the training institute of 
BGMEA, the BGMEA Institute of Fashion and Technology (BIFT), which has been 
lauded by the World Bank and other donors to be a formidable example of private 
initiative in the field of technical education and training.1157 The establishment of the 
institute, which admitted its first students in 2000, was the result of processes that 
were strongly interrelated with developments within both the education and training 
regime and the garment production regime in Bangladesh. There are voices claiming 
that the establishment of BIFT was a result of BGMEA members not being allowed to 
nominate their family members as students of the newly created garment department 
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at the Textile College in Dhaka.1158 Even if there are not enough data to corroborate 
this claim, the foundation of BIFT needs to be seen in the context of the growth of 
private universities in Bangladesh in the 1990s, which was, as elaborated in the sec-
tion 10.2.1, rooted in the fact that the growing urban upper-middle classes were 
searching for alternative ways into the higher education system, the access to which 
had, up to that time, been highly restricted by the University Grants Commission. 
The establishment of BIFT goes back to an initiative by the then BGMEA president, 
who founded a separate company, Education Services Ltd., in 1996 in order to set up 
a private university, Dhaka Imperial University; one of the main programmes sup-
posed to be offered by the university was an extended B.A. degree course in fashion 
design. In order to develop a curriculum that would be accredited by the National 
University, the BGMEA president contacted a senior professor at Nottingham Trent 
University, one of the leading British universities in this field, who indeed developed a 
first version of such a document.1159 After a series of discussions between the two, 
the project was, however, shelved for some years and was taken up again by a sen-
ior member of the BGMEA board a few years later, who not only visited Nottingham 
but also Phoenix College in Sri Lanka and had the backing of his colleagues on the 
board.1160 
In 1999, BGMEA finally founded the institute with its own funds, which allowed to 
rent a house in the northern part of Dhaka and to procure some equipment.1161 The 
plan to establish a private training institute for the garment industry had, from the be-
ginning, the backing of the donor community as well.1162 The World Bank decided, 
after considerable lobbying by BGMEA, to fund the staff for the first two years under 
its Export Diversification Project that had been running since 1999.1163 With the 
Bank’s support, BGMEA hired a team of highly qualified lecturers, many of which 
came from India, and a principal from an English university, who was to develop the 
curricula and to lobby the World Bank and other organisations for further financial 
support.1164 
                                            
1158  BD_Int_TrainOrg10_Representative1 (p. 6/l. 9-14) 
1159  See correspondence by Cowell (1997), Newton (1998); for the draft minutes of the first meeting 
of the board of directors see Education Services Co. Ltd. (1997). 
1160  BD_Int_Association1_Representative7 (p. 3/l. 33-35) 
1161  BD_Int_TrainOrg02_Representative1 (p. 5/l. 1) 
1162  For respective comments by a consultant of the World Bank see Dowlah (1999, p. 951). 
1163  World Bank (2005b), p. 34 
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The programmes developed at that time were two B.Sc. programmes of four years, 
one focussing on apparel manufacturing and technology and another one on fashion 
design technology, both of which were accredited by the National University. In con-
trast to the Textile College’s degree programme with its specialisation in garment 
technology, the BIFT thus offered two degrees that less emphasised textile technol-
ogy but the different aspects of garment production. In addition to the degree 
courses, BIFT started to offer diploma and certificate courses that were providing 
skills and knowledge for specific fields of the garment industry, such as apparel mer-
chandising, woven garment manufacturing and merchandising of knitwear and of 
sweaters.1165 
Similar to other private universities in Bangladesh, the academic head of the insti-
tute came under the direct purview of the board of management, whose members 
were appointed by the directors of BGMEA.1166 Once the first principal was in her 
seat, the early promoters of the BIFT were not in a position to convince their col-
leagues on the board of BGMEA to come forward to fund more equipment and to in-
vest in the future development of the institute.1167 The board thus made it clear to the 
principal that they expected her to run the institute in a way that the funds advanced 
by BGMEA would be paid back as soon as possible.1168 After the first two years, the 
World Bank funding was phased out and, more importantly, the board of BIFT was 
filled with new directors, as the opposing faction of entrepreneurs won the BGMEA 
elections; these changes marked the beginning of a first period of uncertainty at the 
BIFT. The main challenge at that time was the fact that the new directors had to 
oversee an organisation that had been founded and staffed by their opponents. Many 
of them were of the view that the BIFT wasn’t important altogether as their firms 
rather required skilled operators than technically educated fashion designers and 
production technicians.1169 Both the increasing factionalism and the withdrawal of the 
World Bank made the principal resign and most of the other expatriate staff leave 
BIFT.1170 A new principal was hired but the financial situation of the institute wors-
ened, and the problems could only be overcome when, after renewed BGMEA elec-
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tions, a new board was installed and a new principal was appointed.1171 It was in this 
new composition that the BIFT again managed to fill its classes and thus to generate 
profits for BGMEA, a part of which now started to be used for other purposes than 
only for the further development of the BIFT.1172 At the same time, donors, eager to 
demonstrate their commitment to save the garment industry from the effects of the 
phase out of the MFA, initiated a number of projects; most projects aimed at either 
directly benefiting the institute in terms of technology and know-how or at using its 
expertise in the garment industry for different development projects.1173 
Despite the turbulences in the process of organisational development, BIFT not 
only began to enjoy a good reputation among donors, some of which had been in-
volved into its establishment, but was also viewed by many employers in the garment 
industry to offer programmes that were catering to their needs, which, in turn, in-
creased the reputation of the institute among potential students and thus the social 
demand for the courses.1174 The programmes by BIFT, namely the two degree 
courses, thus the view of many employers, were providing the students with the basic 
theoretical knowledge and reduced the time needed to train new recruits in the 
firms.1175 This image of providing updated skills and knowledge about industry proc-
esses was also furthered by customised courses for managers or technicians of spe-
cific firms, which were conducted either at the institute or in the firms.1176 This good 
reputation relativised the fact that the instruction process, particularly at the degree 
level, mainly focused on the transmission of academic knowledge and was hardly 
more practical than in other training organisations in the country. It also did not matter 
for employers that curricula were not developed by private sector entrepreneurs but 
by the staff of the institute without their participation. In fact, the degree programmes 
were entirely designed by expatriate staff, namely by the first principal, whereas the 
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garment entrepreneurs continued to be reluctant to comment on the curricula even 
when the documents were sent to them for comments. 1177 
The perception that the programmes at the BIFT were demand-oriented was also 
based on the fact that the institute started to employ a number of instructors with pri-
vate sector experience, which was often lacking among the instructors at the state-
funded training organisations.1178 Nevertheless, most of the instructors at the institute 
continued to have little practical experience in the industry, as they were professors 
from the low-paying public universities or former graduates of the BIFT, and if experi-
enced employees from the private sector were recruited, personal relations to the 
members of the BIFT board often were more important than professional or educa-
tional backgrounds.1179 In fact, employment of experienced employees in the garment 
industry was, from the beginning, made difficult by their lack of educational qualifica-
tions, which were required from all those who wanted to become instructors at a de-
gree-awarding organisation affiliated by the National University.1180 
The perception that the programmes of the BIFT were providing basic skills for the 
garment industry and that there were instructors with industry experience certainly 
started to be important reasons for the good reputation of the BIFT among employ-
ers; the attractiveness of the institute for the private sector was, however, tremen-
dously increased by a number of important characteristics of the student intake. First, 
virtually all students at the institute hailed from Bangladesh’s upper-middle class, 
which enabled them to afford the comparatively high fees of the institute.1181 Second, 
many students had contacts to potential employers long before employment, either 
because they were nominated for enrolment by BGMEA members – a practice that 
had already started with the first batch – or because they established contacts with 
garment entrepreneurs during their studies, for instance through managers from the 
industry who were teaching at the BIFT.1182 This began to be a tremendous advan-
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tage of the institute compared to the Textile College or to public training institutes 
catering to the garment industry, most of which generally entertained very limited 
contacts to employers. This characteristic of the BIFT’s student intake was related to 
the fact that the institute needs to be understood as a BGMEA-owned institute in 
every aspect. The employers’ association, or a faction within this organisation re-
spectively, not only initiated the establishment of the institute and overviewed the 
employment of its staff and the development of its courses but it started to virtually 
control both the intake of students and their absorption by the labour market. 
BGMEA’s control over the BIFT necessarily implied that its link to the – comparatively 
few – FDI-backed garment companies were limited, most of which did, due to expa-
triate human resources, not need to rely on industry-specifically trained local employ-
ees. A further, third important characteristic of the student intake was the fact that 
those who enrolled at the BIFT were generally interested in working in the garment 
industry – which was another major difference to the Textile College or to public train-
ing institutes that catered to the garment industry. 
This third characteristic of the intake, the willingness of the students to work in the 
garment industry, needs further clarification. Even though both employers and the 
academic staff of the institute began to be of the view that skills were especially lack-
ing in the production departments of the Bangladeshi garment factories, the gradu-
ates from BIFT were hardly prepared to take up employment in these departments 
but were particularly interested in working in merchandising. Not only were wages in 
these departments somewhat higher but also was this type of employment related to 
higher social status. For the same reasons, employment in merchandising was at-
tractive for the graduates of the fashion design programme as well. As fashion de-
partments continued to be rare in the Bangladeshi garment industry and as pattern 
making departments, the work tasks of which are partially akin to that of fashion de-
sign, were considered to be of low status, graduates started to gravitate to merchan-
dising.1183 The characteristics of the social demand also had a direct impact on the 
overall development of the course programme. On the one hand, programmes that 
imparted skills for production-related areas, such as productivity development and 
quality control either had to be cancelled or were run with insufficient student num-
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bers.1184 On the other hand, the social demand for merchandising and marketing re-
lated courses was high, so that, in 2008, the institute could start an MBA programme 
for Apparel Merchandising.1185 Since its establishment in the year 2000, the develop-
ment of the BIFT was thus not only influenced by the agency of BGMEA representa-
tives but, likewise, by the characteristics of the social demand from students, whose 
occupational aspirations were being matched by the entrepreneurs who employed 
them in specific departments of their firms. 
Apart from the BIFT, other private educational organisations, namely a number of 
private universities, started to offer degree programmes that catered to the garment 
industry and were driven by the social demand for degree programmes that facilitated 
entry into the more reputed segments of the garment industry. The first respective 
programmes offered by private universities were designed as B.Sc. courses in textile 
engineering with optional specialisations in garment technology.1186 The academic 
programme thus rather likened that of the Textile College in Dhaka than that of the 
BIFT, which was certainly a consequence of the fact that a high number of former 
professors and students of the Textile College started to teach at the private universi-
ties. A few years after the establishment of the BIFT, some private universities also 
started to employ former staff of the BIFT and thus managed to offer courses that 
virtually copied some programmes of the BIFT, for instance those in fashion design 
or apparel merchandising.1187 
From the mid-1990s onwards, private organisations providing formal skill formation 
programmes catering to the garment industry did, however, not only develop at the 
degree level. At the technician level, a high number of organisations providing skills 
formation programmes emerged with hardly any initial backing by employers’ asso-
ciations and donor organisations. Resulting from the increasing demand by some of 
the technologically more sophisticated firms, both local and foreign, for technically 
trained personnel (see section 12.1.3) and from the rising competition between 
school leavers and graduates to find employment in some of the higher paying jobs 
in the industry (see section 10.2.1), the number of such private training organisations 
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started to grow fast.1188 Not regulated by any public authority, these commercial or-
ganisations began to strongly differ in terms of quality, which indeed motivated some 
of the respective owners to ask BTEB to develop standards, against which their pro-
grammes would be benchmarked in order to contain pressure from competitors that 
tried to attract students rather through low prices than through sound training.1189 At 
the vocational level there emerged a high number of non-government secondary 
schools that offered the vocational courses on dress making and tailoring and gener-
ally were, as their counterparts in the public sector, criticised for being too academic, 
for not catering to the needs of the labour market and for being driven by the demand 
of students eager to proceed towards higher education.1190 There indeed, however, 
emerged a number of private organisations that were exempted from this critique and 
that started to serve as show-pieces for donor organisations, which were either inter-
ested in demonstrating the higher relevance of training offered by private providers or 
in providing the planners in the public sector with a model how relevant training pro-
grammes were to be developed. 
One of the most prominent examples started to be the Underprivileged Children 
Education Programme (UCEP), an NGO whose programmes were entirely funded by 
DFID, SDC and by a number of other bilateral donors.1191 In fact, the organisation 
started to feature some characteristics, which, compared to state-funded vocational 
training agencies, rendered the trainees comparatively employable. Some reasons 
for this being the case were certainly the facts that that the private sector representa-
tives were involved in the process of planning the courses, that curricula were devel-
oped jointly by local staff familiar with the garment industry and expatriate consult-
ants, that the machinery was comparatively less outdated, that the instructors had 
industry experience and that the transition into the world of work was facilitated by a 
job-placement team at the schools and by respective agreements with the authorities 
of the export processing zones.1192 More importantly, however, the children entering 
the UCEP-schools all hailed from the poorest sections of the urban areas in Bangla-
desh and were thus prepared to work in the garment industry as operators or me-
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chanics, as it obviously meant social mobility to them.1193 This in contrast to many 
public skill formation organisations, as the following section will show. 
12.2.3.2 Public skill formation organisations 
Despite the growth of private skill formation organisations that increasingly catered 
to the technologically more advanced local and FDI-backed garment companies in 
the years after 1995, there also emerged a whole number of new skill formation pro-
grammes offered by public training organisations, and the ones previously estab-
lished underwent considerable changes. As we will see, the development of this part 
of the Bangladeshi out-of-firm skill formation regime of the garment industry was, 
over the major part of the post-1995 period, mainly driven by state agencies, but 
there was an increasing tendency of private sector entrepreneurs to influence the 
respective social dynamics as well. 
As we have seen in section 12.2.2, the programmes by the BMET and by the Tex-
tile College were virtually the only ones offered by public skill formation organisations 
that specifically catered to the garment industry in the years prior to 1995. These two 
organisations would remain important in the years after but both of them also suf-
fered from the fact that the representatives of the private sector were reluctant to col-
laborate more strongly with the representatives of these skill formation organisations. 
This problem was particularly evident in the case of the training programmes by the 
BMET; as pointed out in section 12.2.2, these courses didn’t qualify for any more do-
nor support after 1995, as BGMEA hadn’t shown any interest in financially contribut-
ing to the further development of the courses by BMET. Not only having employed a 
number of instructors but also having installed machinery for training, the BMET de-
cided to continue to offer training programmes nevertheless, thus without the finan-
cial support by donors and garment entrepreneurs. This also led to considerable 
changes in the nature of the training programmes. 
Whereas in the previous years the consultants had provided short-term training 
courses for staff employed in garment factories at different occupational levels, the 
length of training programmes was now extended and training was primarily provided 
for school leavers without work experience in the garment industry. This rationale 
was already underlying the courses for sewing machine operators, who were trained 
in three batches from 1995 until mid-1996. All the trainees were selected by the staff 
                                            
1193  BD_CV_TrainOrg22_Trainees (row f), BD_CV_TrainOrg23_Trainees (row f) 
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of the training centre, were undergoing courses with a length between three and six 
months and didn’t need to have worked in the industry but to have attended school 
up to grade 8.1194 After one year, the courses were abolished and substituted by two 
courses, a course of 3 months on sewing machine operation and maintenance and a 
course of 4 months on pattern making, marker making and cutting.1195 Some years 
later, in 2002, the courses were extended to 6 months and renamed as courses on 
industrial garments manufacturing and machine maintenance and on marker design 
and pattern making.1196 Furthermore, the BNP government decided in 1995 to ap-
prove a project that aimed at introducing a number of new courses in the different 
TTCs of the country and went about to rapidly implement the project before the next 
government came into power in 1996.1197 One of the courses to be introduced in the 
TTCs was the 3 months industrial sewing machine operation and maintenance 
course that had been started at the BGTTC in Dhaka and was extended to 6 months 
after 2002. All these courses had the same enrolment criteria as the course for sew-
ing machine operators introduced at the BGTTC in 1995. 
The development of the courses in itself marked a further step away from the earlier 
course system developed by the expatriate consultants prior to 1995. The admission 
requirements became more elitist and the contents of the courses were broadened, 
encompassing more than just one occupational area, as it was hoped that the em-
ployability of students passing out from the institute would be enhanced. Further-
more, the extension of the length of courses led to increasingly academic curricula, 
which the instructors had compiled on the basis of the comprehensive course mate-
rial prepared by the consultants. The academic bias of curricula may indeed be ex-
plained on the grounds that they reflected the professional backgrounds of the in-
structors who had developed the course material. As mentioned in section 12.2.2, the 
instructors in the BGTTC in Dhaka had undergone higher education in non-technical 
fields and were normally lacking industrial experience. Most of the instructors in the 
other TTC’s that were visited for the purpose of this study had similar backgrounds, 
even though there again were a few exceptions. Many of them had, furthermore, un-
dergone a training programme at the TTC and were subsequently employed by the 
                                            
1194  BD_Int_TrainOrg01_Representative1&5 (p. 2/l. 15) 
1195  Ibid. (p. 2/l. 19-21) 
1196  Ibid. (p. 3/l. 1-7); for curricular material of these courses see Bureau of Manpower, Employment 
and Training (2002a), Id. (2002b) 
1197  Planning Commission (1996), p. 225 
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BMET as instructors.1198 Those instructors with the lowest educational qualifications 
and most industry experience were work-shop assistants. They normally had only 
done their SSC or HSC and subsequently joined the industry before working for a 
TTC.1199 Certainly, the force of instructors was likely to press for longer, broader and 
less practically oriented courses. In fact, the decision to extend the length of the pre-
vious courses was taken because of the demands from the instructors, who were 
interested in teaching their students, as one instructor put it, “the syllabus in a more 
detailed way”.1200 The strong impact by instructors on the contents of these training 
programmes corresponded with the weak respective leverage of employers. 
At the same time, the academic bias of the garment-related courses at the TTCs 
also reflected the characteristics of the social demand. One instructor stated: 
“(…) the certificate which the students acquire after taking part in the three months 
course isn’t of any use. They can’t even show it to any place to get a job. Maybe that 
is why we have applied again, again and again that it would be better if the course 
duration was six months. And you know, when it became a six months course, they 
could use the certificates as well as they could utilize the time.”1201 
This quotation is instructive in several ways. First, it suggests that the trainees 
didn’t seem to mind investing their time in training and accepting the opportunity 
costs of training, which reflected the social backgrounds of the targeted clientele. In 
fact, a rough analysis of the biographies of students in the visited TTC suggests that 
most of them belonged to the lower half of the middle-class, as a high number of 
them had government servants as their fathers.1202 Their middle-class origin is also 
brought out by their educational backgrounds: the majority of the interviewed trainees 
at the BGTTC in Dhaka stated that they had done at least an HSC, many of them 
also having passed university education.1203 In the TTCs that were situated in other 
parts of the country, educational qualifications of the interviewed students were con-
                                            
1198  BD_CV_TrainOrg19_Instructors (rows g, h, j & l), BD_CV_TrainOrg20_Instructors (rows g, h, j & 
l), BD_FNotes_TrainOrg03 (p. 6/para. 2.1, 2.2 & 3), BD_FNotes_TrainOrg21 (p. 6/para. 2.1, 2.2 
& 3, p. 7/para. 2.1, 2.2 & 3, p. 8/para. 2.1, 2.2 & 3) 
1199  See, for instance, BD_FNotes_TrainOrg03 (p. 7/para. 2.1, 2.2 & 3). 
1200  BD_Int_TrainOrg21_Representative1 (p. 2/l. 32-33) 
1201  BD_Int_TrainOrg03_Representative1 (p. 5/l. 14-16) 
1202  See, for instance, BD_CV_TrainOrg19_Trainees (row f), BD_FNotes_TrainOrg21 (p. 10/para. 9, 
p. 11/para. 2 & p. 12/para. 2). 
1203  BD_Int_AdminUnit02_Representative1 (p. 4/l. 10-13), BD_Int_TrainOrg01_Representative6 
(para. 3.1), BD_Int_TrainOrg01_Representative7 (para. 3.1), 
BD_Int_TrainOrg01_Representative8 (para. 3.1), BD_Int_TrainOrg01_Representative9 (para. 




siderably lower, the majority of them only having passed SSC.1204 Still, these were 
comparatively accomplished educational backgrounds in rural Bangladesh. 
Second, the quotation suggests that the positions aspired for by at least some of 
the trainees were in those segments of the labour market, where employers recruited 
employees rather on the basis of educational credentials than on the basis of them 
having acquired specific skills. The evidence on the absorption by the labour market 
which was gathered for the purpose of this study suggests that some of the trainees 
with at least an HSC got employment as supervisors or quality controllers in garment 
factories.1205 These employment opportunities were still comparatively rare. As docu-
mented in section 12.1.3 only a minority of firms started to fill these positions with 
individuals who neither had worked there as operators nor enjoyed privileged access 
to the recruiting personnel through personal relations. In these firms, human re-
sources departments began to search potential new, of course, male recruits with 
comparatively high educational qualifications. As the number of applicants who 
passed an HSC or did a Bachelor’s degree was rising, a certificate from a well-known 
public training agency, the BMET, was certainly a comparative advantage in the la-
bour market. The perceived value of the certificate was, in the eyes of the trainees, 
therefore less dependent from the work-related skills being taught at the training cen-
tre than from the length of the course itself. 
There were further segments of the labour market aspired for by many trainees of 
the TTCs, where recruitment processes, in the eyes of the trainees, emphasised the 
value of the certificate itself. One such segment was employment in the public sector, 
namely as instructors at TTCs or at training centres under the Ministry of Education. 
As a university degree was a basic requirement to enter such a position and as the 
recruitment process in the public sector favoured academic achievements, this clien-
tele was similarly more interested in the academic side of the course programme.1206 
Further segments of the labour market aspired for by trainees from the TTCs were 
those abroad, for instance employment in the garment industry in the Middle East. 
Again, recruitment in general but especially by the more reputed recruitment agen-
                                            
1204  BD_CV_TrainOrg17_Trainees (rows i), BD_CV_TrainOrg19_Trainees (rows i), 
BD_CV_TrainOrg20_Trainees (rows i), BD_FNotes_TrainOrg21 (p. 9/para. 6, p. 10/para. 10, p. 
11/para. 3, p. 12/para.3) 
1205  On employment of passed out trainees as supervisors see BD_Int_AdminUnit03_Repre-
sentative1 (p. 4/l. 4-6), BD_Int_TrainOrg05_Representative1&2 (p. 5/l. 30-31). 




cies was strongly based on an appraisal of educational qualifications.1207 At the same 
time, there were, especially in the TTCs in the rural areas, a high number of female 
students, who were not prepared to work in the garment industry and were also not 
looking for a position as a trainer at a TTC but were interested in acquiring the skills 
for domestic use.1208 
This evidence suggests that the development of the BMET course programmes 
was mainly driven by the social demand for credentials and by an administration that 
aimed at providing low-cost access to industry-specific credentials which increasingly 
were, especially in the urban areas, also provided by private training organisations. 
Even though many firms employed the trainees of the TTCs, particularly those of the 
Dhaka-based BGTTC, the coalition of actors backing these programmes did thus not 
include the entrepreneurs themselves; as we will see, this narrow set of actors would 
make the institutions governing these programmes more susceptible to radical 
change. 
The situation at the Textile College, which had, already in the years prior to 1995, 
opened a separate department that aimed at preparing its students for employment 
in the garment industry, was quite different to the one at the BMET. As we have dis-
cussed in section 10.2.1, increasing privatisation in the Bangladesh education and 
training sector especially affected the public degree-awarding organisations. This 
was also true for the Textile College in Dhaka. Even though enrolment in the college 
continued to be associated with high social status and even though particularly the 
students specialising in garment technology started to be increasingly recruited by 
the non-production-related segments of the garment industry, namely by the mer-
chandising departments and by the buying houses, the college began to face a num-
ber of difficulties that partly followed from the development of private degree-
awarding organisations.1209 
One main challenge for the Textile College was its declining teacher-student ratio, 
which went down from approximately 0.75 in the mid-1990s to 0.12 in 2008.1210 This 
decline was, on the on hand, the result of a national strategy to increase the enrol-
ment into higher education and of the lack of funds to attract a sufficient number of 
                                            
1207  BD_FNotes_TrainOrg19 (p. 2/para. 2.1); on recruitment practices for overseas labour markets 
see Khan (2003, pp. 305f). 
1208  BD_FNotes_TrainOrg21 (p. 4/para. 4), BD_Int_TrainOrg03_Representative1 (p. 3/l. 14-16) 
1209  On employment of graduates in the garment industry see BD_Int_TrainOrg10_Representative1 
(p. 6/l. 41-44), BD_Int_TrainOrg10_Representative2 (p. 5/l. 25-28). 
1210  Computed on the basis of information from BD_Int_TrainOrg10_Representative1 (p. 7/l. 31-34). 
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teachers; on the other hand, it was also a consequence of the growing number of 
private degree-awarding organisations that started to employ the lecturers of the Tex-
tile College as their own teachers. A second challenge resulting from the privatisation 
process was that the Ministry of Education did not allow the college to start further 
specialisations that would directly cater to the needs of the industry, for instance a 
programme on fashion design that had been under discussion for many years.1211 The 
ministry’s stand was related to the growth of private skill formation organisations, no-
tably of the development of the BIFT. Whereas, in the beginning of the 1990s, 
BGMEA had lobbied the authorities to have a specialisation in garment technology 
introduced at the Textile College, the development of a specialisation in fashion de-
sign would have meant serious competition for the respective degree programme at 
the BIFT. BGMEA, an organisation with tremendous political leverage, not only de-
clined to cooperate in terms of curriculum development but would also have influ-
enced policy makers to prevent the college from introducing the specialisation at the 
Textile College in Dhaka.1212 
Whereas the college in Dhaka was partly hindered to offer garment-related pro-
grammes that were catering to potential social demand, the Ministry of Textiles de-
cided to upgrade some of its Textile Institutes to degree-awarding Textile Colleges, 
which were to offer programmes similar to the ones at the existing college in Dhaka, 
including the specialisation on garment technology.1213 As these colleges had tre-
mendously profited from the political support of a former textile minister and senior 
BGMEA member and as they were located far from Dhaka and thus meant no seri-
ous competition for the BIFT, BGMEA did not oppose the proposal.1214 
The development of garment-related programmes both at the BMET and at the 
Textile College in Dhaka document that the collaboration with the representatives of 
the industry was a difficult venture, and this even then, when the industrialists were 
involved into the establishment of programmes at an early point and when there had 
been tremendous support by donor agencies. The case of the Textile College also 
suggests that the further expansion of programmes was hindered by opposition from 
the side of the entrepreneurs. Lacking support from the side of industrialists was, 
however, no serious barrier to the development of further public skill formation or-
                                            
1211  BD_Int_TrainOrg10_Representative1 (p. 5/l. 29-30) 
1212  Ibid. (p. 5/l. 41-42) 
1213  Department of Textiles (2005a), p. 6 
1214  On the development of the institutes in the beginning of the 1990s see Department of Textiles 
(2005b, p. 14). 
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ganisations. Important examples in this regard are the development of the vocational 
and technical training programmes, which were introduced under the aegis of the 
Ministry of Education in the years after 1995. 
In the second half of the 1990s, the development of the vocational and technical 
education system in Bangladesh was marked by the rapid expansion of the number 
of schools offering courses at the SSC (Voc) level at the state-funded Vocational 
Training Institutes (VTIs) – or the Technical Schools and Colleges (TSCs) as the 
VTIs were called after 2000 – and the non-government secondary schools. As we 
have noted in section 10.2.2, this reform was part of a strategy to vocationalise sec-
ondary education, i.e. to enrich academic secondary education with vocationally ori-
ented and more practical contents – against the explicit advice by donor agencies, 
which would soon criticise this reform to be excessively supply-driven. Most of the 
courses implemented in the first years of the SSC (Voc) reform were catering to 
trades that were commonly taken up by men, e.g. carpentry, welding and civil con-
struction. As the decision makers both at the DTE and at the BTEB were, however, of 
the view that girls should attend SSC (Voc) and HSC (Voc) programmes as well, 
these organisations started to develop courses catering to this part of the school 
population. 
The first two of these courses were introduced in the second part of the 1990s at 
the SSC level only and focused on dress making and food processing.1215 The course 
on dress making, mainly oriented towards domestic production of clothing, was intro-
duced in TSCs and non-government schools but also at the Textile Vocational Insti-
tutes to which a number of weaving schools had been upgraded in the first part of the 
1990s.1216 Some years later, BTEB developed a follow-up course at the HSC level on 
clothing and garments finishing, which was explicitly oriented towards the work in the 
garment industry and was to be attended by those students who had successfully 
passed the SSC (Voc) examinations and would open them the doors of a number of 
diploma and degree-awarding organisations in the country.1217 
                                            
1215  Rafique (1998), p. 50 
1216  On the reorganisation of weaving schools see Planning Commission (1993, pp. 70f); on the 
introduction of SSC (Voc) at the Textile Vocational Institutes see Department of Textiles (2001, 
p. 24), Planning Commission (2000, p. 101); over the course of the years, two more courses at 
the SSC (Voc) level were introduced in the Textile Vocational Institutes. As these courses for 
“Weaving” and “Dyeing and Printing” were entirely oriented towards employment in the textile 
mills, these courses will not be discussed in more detail; for the respective course material see 
Department of Textiles (2000). 
1217  Bangladesh Technical Education Board (2003) 
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Similar to the courses under the BMET, the implementation of the SSC (Voc) and 
the HSC (Voc) courses resulted in teaching practices which were academically ori-
ented and thus only to a very limited extent related to the practical aspects of gar-
ment production. The major part of the time dedicated to the practical subjects was 
thereby spent on theoretical instructions, during which students were noting down the 
elaborations of their instructors. One may attribute the academic orientation of the 
SSC (Voc) and HSC (Voc) courses to the fact that curricula and syllabi were hardly 
developed in cooperation with representatives of the garment sector but were mainly 
the products of administrators at the BTEB and the professionals of the Textile Col-
lege in Dhaka, who all represented an academic approach to vocational and techni-
cal education.1218 However, one of the key reasons for the academic bias of training 
was the fact that the examinations of both SSC and HSC (Voc) programmes rather 
rewarded rote learning than practical skills. 
This bias was reinforced by a number of factors, some of which were already dis-
cussed in the elaborations on BMET above. One such factor was that instructors in 
the trade-related subjects had undergone higher education or had a diploma from a 
Textile Institute but were lacking working experience in the garment industry.1219 At 
one school offering the HSC (Voc) programme, the only garment-related practical 
experience gained by instructors was the training undergone at a TTC in another 
town.1220 There were, of course, exceptions, especially among the instructors trained 
at Textile Institutes, whose work experience had, however, rather been acquired in 
textile mills than in garment factories.1221 The academic bias of the SSC (Voc) and the 
HSC (Voc) programmes was, furthermore, reinforced by the fact that the required 
equipment was partly lacking. Whereas this problem was less pronounced at the 
SSC level, where the students in the practical classes were mainly taught to produce 
traditional Bangladeshi clothes, for the production of which domestic sewing ma-
chines were sufficient, the situation at the HSC level was different.1222 There, the con-
tents of the practical subjects were decidedly oriented towards the garment industry 
                                            
1218  For the World Bank’s critique of curriculum development at the BTEB see World Bank (2000c, p. 
x & 43); for information on the curriculum development process see BD_Int_AdminUnit04_Re-
presentative1 (p. 1/l. 21-22). 
1219  BD_CV_TrainOrg16_Instructors (rows g & n), BD_CV_TrainOrg17_Instructors (rows g & n), 
BD_CV_TrainOrg18_Instructors (rows g & n) 
1220  BD_FNotes_TrainOrg16 (p. 5/l. 38f) 
1221  BD_CV_TrainOrg11_Instructors (rows n & o), BD_CV_TrainOrg12_Instructors (rows n & o), 
BD_CV_TrainOrg13_Instructors (rows n & o) 
1222  On the production of traditional Bangladeshi clothes in the SSC (Voc) programme see, for in-
stance, BD_FNotes_TrainOrg18 (p. 2/l. 7). 
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and referred to operating electrified and more expensive machines; but most training 
centres were not in a position to impart the practical skills to operate industrial sewing 
machines, as machines were either lacking or not functioning because of insufficient 
power supply; furthermore, a considerable part of the practical subjects of the HSC 
(Voc) programme was dedicated to preparing students to operate machinery that was 
not available at any training centre, for instance industrial washing machines.1223 Be-
cause of this dearth of machinery, some schools started to neglect the practical as-
pects of the examinations or to handle them in a way which aimed at demonstrating 
the authorities of the BTEB that practical aspects were indeed being examined.1224 
The curricula of both the SSC and the HSC (Voc) programmes provided that the 
possible lack of practical training within the schools was to be compensated by indus-
trial attachments; the execution of industrial attachments for the two programmes 
was, however, riddled with a number of further difficulties. At both the SSC and the 
HSC level, students were generally sent to tailoring shops in the proximity of the 
school.1225 As the tailors in the workshops were used to having their apprentices for a 
number of years during which the trainees were gradually being familiarised with the 
trade, most tailors were reluctant to actually involve the students into practical work. 
The industrial attachments thus mainly consisted of a period of a few weeks during 
which groups of maximum 20 students visited a workshop and observed the tailors 
doing their work.1226 The representatives of several schools, however, stated that, in 
many cases, industrial attachments could not be organised at all or had to be con-
ducted by the regular instructors on the premises of the schools, as tailors were not 
prepared to welcome students in their workshops or as some parents didn’t allow 
their daughters to undergo training in a workshop that they considered to be a male 
domain.1227 Even though the practical contents of the HSC curriculum would have 
required a more industry-based industrial attachment, placements in the garment in-
dustry were hardly organised, as not only were the geographical distances to the next 
                                            
1223  BD_Int_TrainOrg18_Representative1 (p. 2/l. 13-15) 
1224  BTEB did not have the manpower to ensure that practical aspects of the examinations were 
conducted by a representative of the board and that marks were given on the grounds of an as-
sessment of the instructors. In those schools, where practical equipment was lacking, instructors 
had ample scope to give marks for practicals that had, in fact, not taken place. 
1225  BD_Int_TrainOrg16_Representative1 (p. 2/l. 23-24) 
1226  See, for instance, BD_FNotes_TrainOrg16 (p. 2/l. 34-35), BD_FNotes_TrainOrg18 (p. 2/l. 9) 
1227  On the reluctance of parents to send their daughters for industrial attachments see, for instance, 
BD_Int_TrainOrg14_Representative1 (p. 1/l. 21-22); on the organisation of industrial attach-
ments on the school premises see BD_FNotes_TrainOrg13 (p. 2/l. 7-8). 
  
 275 
garment factories too long but also were the instructors lacking the necessary con-
tacts to send their HSC students to a garment factory. 
Similar to the TTCs under the BMET, the academic bias of the instruction process 
of SSC and HSC (Voc) programmes matched the characteristics of social demand. In 
fact, students of these programmes were even more inclined towards acquiring rather 
the credentials than the skills, as both programmes were part of the ladder leading to 
higher education, for instance to the Textile Institutes offering a programme at the 
diploma level.1228 Again, most students came from the lower-middle classes, with a 
high number of them having fathers working in the public sector. This group of stu-
dents was particularly large at the HSC level of the TSCs, where the families of the 
students needed to be in a position to bear the high opportunity costs of schooling for 
two more years.1229 Most of the trainees in the schools offering garment-related SSC 
and HSC (Voc) programmes thus, on the one hand, hailed from families, which 
hoped to send their child for higher education and were not prepared to send their 
children to work as apprentices or employees in tailor shops or as operators in the 
garment industry.1230 Indeed, some students stated that they would be eager to work 
in the industry as supervisors in case they would be barred from entering the higher 
education system;1231 but as most firms in their recruitment processes at the supervi-
sory level continued to give preferential to internally promoted candidates, this occu-
pational aspiration was only matched by limited economic demand. Certainly, some 
schools stated that a few students had gone to work in Dhaka but they remained ex-
ceptions.1232 
Despite the problems to link the programmes to the world of work, these courses 
had become an integral part of the out-of-firm skill formation regime of the garment 
industry. Of course, the World Bank and likeminded critics of vocationalised secon-
dary education criticised the SSC (Voc) courses for being too academic and for not 
catering to the needs of the labour market; this critique, indeed, led the administration 
to take up some of these concerns, and it therefore engaged in partly remedying this 
situation, for instance by introducing, under a UNESCO-funded technical assistance 
                                            
1228  Rafique (1998), p. 54 
1229  BD_CV_TrainOrg17_Trainees (row f), BD_CV_TrainOrg18_Trainees (row f), 
BD_CV_TrainOrg19_Trainees (row f), BD_FNotes_TrainOrg13 (p. 6-9) 
1230  This is especially true for female students from lower-middle class families who are not allowed 
to migrate to towns for employment purposes; see, for instance, BD_FNotes_TrainOrg18 (p. 
2/para. 5.3). 
1231  See, for instance, BD_Int_TrainOrg16_Representative2 (p. 1/l. 32-33). 
1232  BD_FNotes_TrainOrg16 (p. 3/l. 1-2), BD_FNotes_TrainOrg18 (p. 2/para. 5) 
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project, the so-called activity sheets that were aimed at increasing the practical as-
pects of instruction at TSCs.1233 Such reforms of very limited scale did, however, not 
result in higher collaboration by the representatives of the private sector. In fact, it 
was sufficient for the administration to only engage in cosmetic changes of the pro-
grammes, as the political backing of the SSC (Voc) programmes was unabated in the 
view of the large social demand they had created. 
The strategy to strongly vocationalise secondary education in Bangladesh that was 
underlying the development of the SSC (Voc) stream after 1995 and that had been 
officially stated in the Fifth Five Year Plan in 1997 also included the expansion of the 
number of polytechnics, from a mere 20 to 75. Five of the additional polytechnics, 
thus planned the government, were to be Mohila Polytechnic Institutes, i.e. polytech-
nics for women.1234 Two years after the publication of the Fifth Five Year Plan, the 
DTE, therefore, submitted a proposal to establish three of these institutes with the 
help of the Islamic Development Bank (IDB), which was prepared to finance the con-
struction of the buildings, the procurement of equipment and the development of 
training material.1235 
During the subsequent negotiations between the DTE and the IDB, it was decided 
that one of the polytechnics for women would offer a diploma programme on gar-
ments design and pattern making technology that would be the first one at a poly-
technic to explicitly cater to the garment industry. The programme was to be con-
ducted by the newly established institute in Chittagong, the second most important 
centre of garment production in the country, and aimed at catering to the technician 
level of the occupational hierarchy within the firms. Similar to the implementation of 
the SSC and HSC (Voc) programmes, the realisation of the diploma programme at 
the school level had a clear academic orientation that indeed reflected the overall 
aims of the educational planners in the DTE and the BTEB but would make most en-
trepreneurs sceptical vis-à-vis the relevance of the training for their firms. 
The process to develop the curriculum was, as in the case of the SSC and HSC 
(Voc) programmes, coordinated by the BTEB that commissioned the teachers of the 
Textile College in Tejgaon to draft the curriculum in cooperation with principals and 
teachers from the Textile Institutes and a few representatives of the textile and the 
                                            
1233  For a critique of the SSC (Voc) programme, see, for instance, World Bank (2000c, p. 26); for an 
example of an activity sheet see Directorate of Technical Education (2006). 
1234  Directorate of Technical Education (2002), p. 2 
1235  Ibid., pp. 2f; for the official approval see Planning Commission (1999, p. 198). 
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garment industry.1236 Even though the planners thought to develop a curriculum that 
would also focus on garment design, no expert in this field could be hired from aca-
demia or from the private sector; in fact, the BIFT was, at that time, already running 
its own course on fashion design and therefore not prepared to cooperate in this re-
gard.1237 The curriculum developed by this team certainly reflected its composition. 
Similar to the curriculum taught at the Textile Institutes, the first three semesters en-
tirely focused on textile technology; the garment-related subjects that started in the 
fourth semester included a wide range of aspects of garment production but did not 
specifically prioritise pattern making and design. Whereas pattern making was being 
covered in two semesters, no subject was planned to explicitly focus on garment de-
sign.1238 
The first batch of the diploma course on garments design and pattern making tech-
nology started in 2006 in an entirely new building outside the heart of Chittagong, 
whose garment laboratory included a wide range of machines, including sophisti-
cated industrial sewing machines, cutters and other equipment that had clearly not 
been procured on the basis of a detailed analysis of the curriculum but rather re-
flected the agendas of the individuals involved into the procurement process.1239 Simi-
lar to the SSC and HSC (Voc) programmes, there was a lack of instructing personnel 
with sufficient industrial experience that would not only have been in a position to 
teach both the theoretical and practical aspects of the diploma programme but would 
have disposed of personal links to the garment industry. Due to a variety of adminis-
trative problems at the polytechnic institute the garment department thus employed – 
instead of seven – no more than two instructors. The more senior of the two instruc-
tors had a diploma from a Textile Institute and had previously worked as an instructor 
for dress making and tailoring in a non-government secondary school but had never 
been employed in the garment industry. This lack of qualified instructors finally even 
forced the institute to stop enrolling students in the garment-related course in 
2007.1240 
                                            
1236  BD_Int_TrainOrg10_Representative2 (p. 4/l. 35-36) 
1237  BD_Int_TrainOrg10_Representative1 (p. 5/l. 1-4) 
1238  Bangladesh Technical Education Board (2007a); see also Id. (2007b), Id. (2007c), Id. (2007d), 
Id. (2007e). 
1239  Some of the most expensive machines included an embroidery machine and a collar press ma-
chine; the operation of the latter is, in a factory, generally the responsibility of a semi-skilled op-
erator. 
1240  On the curriculum vitae of the respective instructor and on the need to employ more instructors 
see BD_FNotes_TrainOrg26 (p. 2 /l. 12-13 & p. 4/l. 1-8). 
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Similar to the scenario observed at the schools offering SSC and HSC (Voc) pro-
grammes, the academic bias of the programme was reinforced not only by an aca-
demically outlined curriculum and the primarily academic background of the force of 
instructors but also by the characteristics of social demand and the persistent lack of 
economic demand from the side of the private sector. On the one hand, social de-
mand, as observed during the visit, emanated from young women with a middle class 
background, the majority of which, again, had fathers working in the public sector and 
were eager to go for higher education once they finalised the diploma programme.1241 
On the other hand, the instructors anticipated that the economic demand for the fe-
male students, the most senior of which were, at the time of the visit, only in their fifth 
semester, would be low in the beginning but might develop over the years.1242 Their 
main concerns were, in line with the arguments outlined in section 10.1.3, that most 
employees in the garment industry, even at a more senior level, had been promoted 
from the ranks and were thus sceptical to employ persons with a more academic 
background that might challenge their own positions. The main challenge for the fu-
ture graduates may, in fact, be to overcome the gender bias in the garment industry, 
where women were generally employed as operators only, whereas the senior posi-
tions were held by males.1243 
This programme of the polytechnic institute in Chittagong, limited as its scope may 
be, documents some of the key challenges of the public skill formation programmes. 
One of it was the fact that the goals underlying this and many other programmes by 
public skill formation organisations were not shared by the industrialists. The institute 
in Chittagong aimed at increasing the share of females at the technician level of the 
garment industry. Other public skill formation organisations, the TSCs for instance, 
aimed at other socio-political goals, e.g. at increasing access to secondary education 
in order to contribute to overall social mobility, and the programmes of the TTCs un-
der the BMET were, at least the way they were structured before 2007, legitimised on 
the grounds that their wide coverage of skills contributed to the overall economic 
growth of the garment industry. Undoubtedly, these goals, even the latter one, didn’t 
belong to the priorities of most employers in the Bangladeshi garment industry. Ac-
cordingly, programmes by public skill formation organisations did not need to be 
backed by employers but of a political-administrative coalition that supported the re-
                                            
1241  BD_CV_TrainOrg26_Trainees (row f), BD_FNotes_TrainOrg26 (p. 4/l. 32-39) 
1242  BD_Int_TrainOrg26_Representative1&2 (p. 4/l. 1-2) 
1243  Ibid. (p. 3/l. 36-37) 
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spective goals and also felt obliged to consider the social demand for the respective 
programmes. The coordination of the out-of-firm skill formation regime had thus be-
come more complex over the years. The remainder of this chapter will now delve 
more specifically into this issue. 
12.2.3.3 The coordination of the out-of-firm skill formation regime 
In the years prior to 1995, out-of-firm skill formation programmes for the garment 
industry in Bangladesh were primarily conducted by the BMET and the Textile Col-
lege, whose efforts in this field had been, indeed, formally approved by the Planning 
Commission, but were not actually coordinated by any overarching authority. As 
elaborated in section 10.2.2, the only organisation which would have had the man-
date to come up to this task, the NCSDT, had been defunct since its establishment in 
the 1980s. In the years after 1995, the complexity of the out-of-firm skill formation 
regime of the garment industry increased tremendously. The main reason for this 
increase in complexity was the emergence of more public skill formation organisation 
and of a large group of private training organisations. As pointed out in the previous 
section, a large number of public training organisations was set up under the Ministry 
of Education, under the aegis of which only the Textile College in Dhaka had previ-
ously offered its programmes. In this context, the role of the BTEB was considerably 
strengthened, as both the development of the curricula and the administration of the 
respective examinations was overseen by this organisation. In addition, the BTEB 
had now also started to operate as the only organisation that was entitled to accredit 
programmes offered by private training organisations that were prepared to meet 
BTEB’s quality standards.1244 Nevertheless, the courses by BMET, which had been 
the first ones to cater to the garment industry in the beginning of the 1990s, were still 
beyond the control of BTEB, and the BTEB certainly never played a role as a coordi-
nating agency that would have assumed the responsibilities originally entrusted to 
the NCSDT. 
In the context of the phase out of the MFA, notably in the years after 2005, this 
fragmented mode of coordination of the out-of-firm skill formation regime of the gar-
ment industry was taken to new heights. There were two main reasons for this devel-
opment. On the one hand, a number of donor agencies started to increase their in-
terventions in the field of skill formation for the garment industry and, at least partly, 
                                            




aimed at also assuming a coordinating role in this regard. On the other hand, repre-
sentatives of the private sector started to lobby key representatives of the govern-
ment to make them adjust existing training programmes along the lines of their sug-
gestions.  
The verve of donor organisations to strengthen skill formation programmes for the 
garment industry was mainly focussed on supporting the efforts of employers’ asso-
ciations, i.e. BGMEA and BKMEA, in the field of training and on strengthening private 
training organisations that catered, as pointed out in section 12.2.3.1, to the increas-
ing social demand for formal skill training. The donor organisation that had tradition-
ally provided direct financial assistance to private sector organisations was one of the 
first donor organisations to become active in this field: the World Bank Group’s Inter-
national Finance Corporation (IFC) launched a Small Enterprise Development Facility 
(SEDF) that financially supported a number of small skill formation organisations. 
Most of these organisations were commercial training centres, which both offered 
their consultancy services to the garment industry and conducted out-of-firm training 
programmes for those planning to join the industry or to improve their prospects for 
promotion;1245 in addition, however, SEDF also supported the Department for Indus-
trial and Production Engineering of Bangladesh’s prime technical university, BUET, 
which had started to offer its consultancy services to a few higher value-adding firms 
interested in comprehensively overhauling their production processes.1246 
Over the course of the years, the two largest donors that financially supported pro-
grammes of private training organisations catering to the garment industry, however, 
became the Delegation of the European Commission (EC) and the German govern-
ment that operated through GTZ. In the context of its Small Projects Facility Pro-
gramme, the EC funded a Sweater Manufacturing Training Centre (BSMTC) at the 
BGMEA-backed BIFT from 2003 onwards that aimed at retraining potentially re-
trenched garment worker and a productivity improvement programme that was im-
plemented in direct cooperation with BKMEA.1247 Furthermore, the EC’s Bangladesh 
Quality Support Programme (BQSP) featured a component that aimed at further de-
veloping the training programmes of the BIFT through cooperation with overseas 
training organisations and planned to place the former TIDC – the National Institute 
                                            
1245  Kabir and Denecke (2007), p. 6; on the activities of a training organisation supported by SEDF 
see BD_Int_TrainOrg08_Representative1 (p. 3/l. 25). 
1246  Kabir and Denecke (2007), p. 6, BD_Int_TrainOrg04_Representative1 (p. 3/l. 8-9) 
1247  Kabir and Denecke (2007), p. 3; on the implementation by BKMEA see 
BD_Int_TrainOrg07_Representative1 (p. 2/l. 6-7). 
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of Textile Training, Research and Design (NITTRAD) – under the private manage-
ment of BTMA, the association of the textile manufacturers.1248 
Similarly, GTZ’s project for the Promotion of Social, Environmental and Production 
Standards (PROGRESS), starting in 2007, directly sponsored a wide range of short-
term training programmes that generally catered to the management level and were 
jointly organised with both BGMEA and BKMEA and also involved representatives of 
the German retail trade.1249 GTZ furthermore engaged in coordinating the different 
efforts to prepare Bangladesh’s garment industry for the years after the phase out of 
the MFA through the means of a Multistakeholder Forum that involved donors, em-
ployers, labour unions and buyers; GTZs’ efforts in this regard finally resulted in the 
formulation of a strategy paper, the so-called “development proposal”, and to four 
papers that outlined the priorities for future funding by donors, government agencies 
and employers’ associations alike. One of the main concerns of these documents 
was to further increase the productivity of the industry through considerable invest-
ments into in-firm and out-of-firm training. It was therefore suggested that the industry 
would need, by 2009, to profit from the services of three institutes, one for technical 
and quality skills, one for workers and supervisors and one for management skills 
respectively, and that, by the end of 2010, 100 percent of owners and managers and 
40 percent of all the workers in the garment industry should have undergone produc-
tivity training.1250 For the main authors of these documents it was clear that the asso-
ciations, rather than government agencies, would need to play a key role in the im-
plementation of these plans. The service providers, thus the suggestion of the au-
thors, would need to be accredited by BGMEA and BKMEA so that the services could 
be implemented “as demanded by the factory owners”.1251 
Even though both of these employers’ associations were certainly not reluctant to 
profit from the financial support by donor agencies, these two organisations had 
somewhat different priorities when interacting with donors; BKMEA, on the one hand, 
traditionally catering to the owners of the more technology-intensive knitwear facto-
ries, used the donors’ support to promote its image as an association that supported 
its members’ efforts for higher value addition and therefore lobbied for more technical 
                                            
1248  United Nations Industrial Development Organization (2004); on the implementation of private 
management structures at NITTRAD see Khan (2007, p. 7), United Nations Industrial Develop-
ment Organization (2007, p. 14); see also BD_Int_DonorOrg01_Representative2 (p. 2/l. 4-7). 
1249  Kabir and Denecke (2007), p. 4 
1250  Multistakeholder Forum Bangladesh for Garments (2007a), p. 30 
1251  Id. (2007b), p. 3 
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training for technicians and managers;1252 BGMEA, on the other hand, was rather 
seeking donor assistance to expand out-of-firm operator training, which it indeed 
achieved when the training centre for knitting operators was opened at the BIFT with 
funds from the EC.1253 Undoubtedly, the donors’ direct financial support of the two 
main employers’ associations of the garment industry contributed to the leverage of 
these associations vis-à-vis the government in terms of the further development of 
out-of-firm skill formation programmes. The remainder of this chapter seeks to illus-
trate this development in more detail by elaborating on the events subsequent to the 
inauguration of the EC-funded training centre for knitting operators at the BIFT. 
In fact, the opening of the centre in 2007 itself helped BGMEA to give more publicity 
to their need for operator training and to convince the Chief of Army Staff, the then 
unofficial head of the state who was present at the respective inauguration cere-
mony, that their concerns were legitimate.1254 This lobbying effort not only led to gov-
ernment agencies being instructed to start short-term operator training programmes 
but also to further donor agencies being asked to contribute in this regard.1255 Obvi-
ously, the government now felt that such a larger training scheme would not only 
mitigate the lack of trained operators but also open up opportunities for social mobility 
to the poorest segments of the Bangladeshi society.1256 Thus, a scheme for operator 
training was developed that used existing training centres of the BMET and of the 
Department of Youth Development, whose training programmes the employers did 
not consider to have been responsive to their needs so far. Subsequently, the gov-
ernment decided that donor-funded NGO’s and representatives of the army would 
select the trainees and cover their cost of living during the training period, that the 
training organisations would conduct short-term training programmes and that 
BGMEA would take the trained operators to the urban areas and employ them in their 
firms.1257 
A few months after the negotiations had started, the scheme was implemented at 
the TTC in the north of the country, which had previously conducted the much 
broader and considerably longer course on industrial garments manufacturing and 
                                            
1252  BD_Int_TrainOrg07_Representative1 (p. 2/l. 27-41) 
1253  On a senior BGMEA representative’s stand on operator training see BD_Int_Association01_Re-
presentative4 (p. 4/l. 23-26). 
1254  BD_Int_TrainOrg02_Representative1 (p. 7/l. 28-31) 
1255  Ibid. (p. 8 /l. 21-23 & p. 10/l. 10-13) 
1256  BD_Int_Association01_Representative4 (p. 3/l. 29-31) 
1257  Unknown author (2007a) 
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machine maintenance. as decided by the different stakeholders, the trainees of the 
course were selected by a donor-funded NGO, which was, in the case of the BMET 
training centre, an organisation implementing DFID’s Char Livelihoods Programme 
(CLP), a programme that aimed at the socio-economic development of people living 
in flood-affected areas in the north-west of Bangladesh.1258 In contrast to the earlier 
course, the trainees of this scheme thus had comparatively less privileged socio-
economic backgrounds and had lower educational qualifications, which made them – 
similar to the trainees of UCEP (see section 12.2.3.1) – consider employment in the 
garment industry a means for social mobility.1259 The course had a length of one 
month instead of six and was based on a very detailed, entirely practically oriented 
curriculum that had been developed by the instructors at the BIFT.1260 As the involved 
BGMEA representatives were of the view that not only the previous curriculum had 
been too broad and irrelevant but also that most instructors were lacking industry ex-
perience, several of them were trained at the BIFT and were subsequently sent for 
on-the-job training at the factory of the main initiator of the programme.1261 Once the 
trainees passed out from the course at the TTC, they were brought to firms in the 
greater Dhaka area, most of which belonged to influential BGMEA members.1262 
As mentioned above, the scheme was also implemented at the training centres of 
the Department of Youth Development that were instructed to train operators for the 
knitwear industry. The first of these training centres was implemented in another town 
in the north of Bangladesh; in contrast to the scheme at the TTC, the trainees were 
not selected by a donor-funded NGO but by representatives of the army, the district 
administration, BGMEA and the training agency.1263 As no public training organisation 
had experience in training for the knitting sector, BGMEA not only developed the cur-
riculum but provided both knitting and the linking machines and the trainers, all of 
which had previously worked as operators in factories of BGMEA members.1264 Simi-
lar to the TTC, BGMEA members directly drove the first trainees to their firms to em-
                                            
1258  BD_Int_TrainOrg03_Representative2 (p. 1/l. 6-10) 
1259  BD_FNotes_TrainOrg03 (p. 8/para. 6, p. 9/para. 11, p. 10/para. 14, p. 11/para. 17, p. 12/para. 
20); on the comparatively lower educational qualifications see BD_Int_TrainOrg03_Represen-
tative1 (p. 4/l. 1-6). 
1260  BGMEA Institute of Fashion and Technology (2007c), Technical Training Centre Bogra (2007); 
on the implementation of the curriculum see BD_Int_TrainOrg03_Representative1 (p. 2/l. 43-
45). 
1261  BD_Int_Association01_Representative2 (p. 1/l. 23-28), BD_Int_TrainOrg03_Representative1 (p. 
2/l. 32-35) 
1262  BD_FNotes_TrainOrg03 (p. 3) 
1263  BD_FNotes_TrainOrg25 (p. 2/l. 1-12) 
1264  Bangladesh Forces et al. (2007a), Id. (2007b), BD_FNotes_TrainOrg25 (p. 5-7). 
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ploy them as operators. After the second batch, however, this practice stopped, as 
the demand for trained operators was slackening. The passed-out trainees therefore 
had to go to Dhaka themselves to seek employment in the industry and often came 
back to their hometown, which resulted in less demand for the training offered at the 
centre of the Department of Youth.1265 
Realising that both government agencies and donors organisations were open to 
support the entrepreneurs’ quest for trained operators, the BGMEA representatives 
continued with their lobbying efforts:1266 in 2007, they made plans to use the training 
facilities of ANSAR, a paramilitary organisation of volunteers under the army of Bang-
ladesh, and also approached representatives of the World Bank to inquire whether 
resources allocated to a social development project could, similar to DFID’s CLP, be 
used to upscale the scheme for operator training.1267  
The government agencies whose training centres were used for the scheme partly 
remained sceptical of it. Notably the BMET was of the view that the previous courses 
had been more comprehensive.1268 Their critique, however, was not sufficient to hin-
der policy makers from arranging further agreements with the entrepreneurs. Follow-
ing a meeting of the concerned minister with representatives of BGMEA and the 
BIFT, the latter visited the BGTTC in Dhaka and began to elaborate plans to adapt 
the programmes offered by the centre.1269 At first, the garment entrepreneurs simply 
planned to integrate the BGTTC in its scheme for operator training;1270 after protests 
from the side of the BMET and subsequent further negotiations, however, the BMET 
agreed to introduce short and occupation-specific courses for supervisors, pattern 
makers and sewing machine mechanics, all of which were developed by instructors 
of the BIFT.1271 Despite this compromise, these developments document that the em-
ployers associations’ of the garment industry had become, by the end of 2007, influ-
ential organisations, whose agency had started to tremendously influence the devel-
opment of the Bangladeshi out-of-firm skill formation regime of the garment industry. 
                                            
1265  Ibid. (p. 2/l. 20-24) 
1266  BD_Int_Association01_Representative4 (p. 4/l. 5-8), BD_Int_TrainOrg02_Representative1 (p. 
11/l. 2-5) 
1267  Unknown author (2007c), p. 1, BD_Int_DonorOrg02_Representative1 (p. 1/l. 35-37) 
1268  BD_Int_AdminUnit2_Representative1 (p. 4/l. 41-43), BD_Int_TrainOrg01_Representative1 (p. 
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1269  Unknown author (2007c), p. 1 
1270  Id. (2007b), BD_Int_AdminUnit2_Representative1 (p. 7/l. 7-8) 
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13 The empirical evidence from a historical-institutionalist 
perspective 
Parts C and D have shown that the trajectories of the skill formation regimes of the 
garment industries in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh have developed in a markedly path-
dependent way. The following chapter will now condense the empirical evidence from 
a historical-institutionalist perspective that looks at both country-specific and common 
aspects of the trajectories of the two skill formation regimes. A first section concen-
trates on the institutional contexts of the skill formation regimes – on the education 
and training regimes and on the garment production regimes respectively. A second 
section ponders on the path-dependent development of the in-firm and of the out-of-
firm skill formation regimes and thereby follows, similar to some of the empirical 
chapters, the temporal structure defined by the crucial junctures in the development 
of the global garment industry. It will be here that, for the first time in this study, the 
theoretical concepts of historical institutionalism will be thoroughly applied; thus, I will 
concentrate on critical junctures in the trajectories of the regimes and on the respec-
tive sequencing and timing of events; I will also point to positive feedback mecha-
nisms and increasing returns of specific institutional arrangements and will document 
the complementarities between in-firm and out-of-firm skill formation arrangements. 
Furthermore, I will scrutinise – as is commonly done in the historical-institutional and 
in the political-economic literature more generally – the breadth of coalitions underly-
ing specific skill formation arrangements and discuss the respective effects on differ-
ent types of institutional change. On the basis of these considerations, I will then, in 
the following chapter, assess the basic argument that has been underlying this study. 
13.1 Institutional contexts of the skill formation regimes 
13.1.1 The education and training regimes 
When Sri Lanka’s and Bangladesh’s economies became integrated into the global 
garment production trade towards the end of the 1970s, the education and training 
regimes of the two countries were quite distinct from each other: At that time, Sri 
Lanka had high literacy rates and its primary and secondary schools not only catered 
to the upper echelons of society but also to the lower-middle and to the lower classes 
in the country. As social demand for educational credentials was high and as the 
number of jobs in the formal segment of the labour market was growing slower than 
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that of school leavers and of graduates, the country experienced an inflation of the 
value of educational credentials from the 1960s onwards. In contrast, Bangladesh’s 
literacy rates were considerably lower and the primary and secondary schools, both 
public and private, catered to the very small middle and upper classes of the country 
but neither to the lower nor to the lower-middle classes. The restricted and highly elit-
ist access to education consequently didn’t result in any inflation of the value of edu-
cational credentials in the country. 
These strong differences between the education and training regimes resulted from 
very different historical trajectories: In Sri Lanka, the characteristics of the education 
and training regime were a result of the efforts in nation building by the political elite 
of the newly independent country in 1947: At that time, the welfare state in the island 
had expanded to a much higher extent than in other parts of the Indian subcontinent, 
and it became the goal of the indigenous political elite to continue this policy which 
catered to the most important part of their electorate, the lower-middle classes of the 
Singhalese community in the south of the country. Notably after 1956, when the 
SLFP came into power for the first time, the education and training regime was in-
creasingly governed by egalitarian institutions, through which the development of pri-
vate and English medium schools was repelled and state funds could be channelled 
into the expansion of the general education system. The early post-independence 
years of educational development in the then Ceylon thus clearly marked a critical 
juncture that initiated positive feedback mechanisms, from which both the political 
and administrative elite of the country gained in influence and on the basis of which 
lower-middle classes of the country were given the possibility of social mobility de-
spite increasing competition in the labour market and the subsequent decrease in the 
value of educational credentials. 
In contrast, Bangladesh’s postcolonial nation-building process was enormously pro-
tracted, which hindered the widespread expansion of public primary and secondary 
schools. Whereas in Sri Lanka, the political elites used educational expansion for 
their political purposes, the political elites of the Pakistan period continued to rely on 
private schools, the costs for which could not be afforded by the majority of the popu-
lation in East Pakistan. At the time of Bangladesh’s independence in 1971, the 
Awami League government indeed tried to increase enrolment rates by nationalising 
the primary schools but even then – and under subsequent governments – the major 
part of the socio-economically disadvantaged segments of society would find it hard 
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to bear the high opportunity costs of primary education, which tremendously stifled 
social demand for education. 
Even though the education and training regimes of the two countries differed with 
regard to access to primary and secondary education, they shared a number of im-
portant similarities: First, both primary and secondary schools taught on the basis of 
highly academic curricula that, similar to the years under the British, aimed at prepar-
ing students for clerical jobs both in the private and the public sector and for the uni-
versities. Second, both countries – similar to what is being reported from India – tre-
mendously restricted entry into universities, especially into the technical faculties, 
which thus secured their aristocratic seclusion;1272 by this means, they would con-
tinue, for many decades, to mainly cater to the interests of the upper-middle and up-
per classes of the country, who were interested in securing their social status and 
their exclusive access to the most prestigious segments of the labour market. Third, 
governments in both countries had, by the late 1970s, hardly invested into the devel-
opment of technical and vocational education and training programmes and thus con-
tinued a further legacy of British rule. The existing practically-oriented skill formation 
programmes were mainly school-based and had originally been geared towards the 
skill needs of public works departments and of industries in the public sector; most 
programmes either had a comparatively academic orientation and thus were more 
prestigious or had a more practical bias that prepared trainees for the less prestigious 
occupations at the craft level. Especially in Sri Lanka, many of these programmes 
also started to have a strong socio-political focus, as they aimed at imparting voca-
tional skills to educated but unemployed youth. 
When Sri Lanka’s and Bangladesh’s garment industries started to expand from the 
mid-1980s onwards, both the common and the more country-specific characteristics 
of the two education and training regimes were re-produced to a great extent. The 
main difference between the two regimes – the enormous disparities in terms of liter-
acy rates and in terms of enrolment at the primary and at the secondary education 
level – was reduced to some extent but was certainly not compensated by the donor-
backed efforts of the Bangladeshi government to increase enrolments into primary 
and secondary schools. In Bangladesh, an enormous share of educational expansion 
was borne by private schools which received state subsidies to pay the teacher sala-
ries. In 1991, the country’s legacy to expand education through private initiative was 
                                            
1272  On the “aristocratic seclusion” of some Indian technical universities see Chitnis (1993, p. 25). 
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carried forward to the tertiary level, when the incoming democratic government – 
upon pressure from the increasingly powerful middle classes – passed a law that al-
lowed private degree-awarding organisations to be established. The subsequent 
surge of private universities and training organisations was interrelated with a grow-
ing number of private sector firms in the urban areas that started to ask for higher 
educational credentials and industry-specific skills, which was in itself a result of the 
previous expansion of secondary and university education that made educational 
credentials more widespread among job seekers. In Sri Lanka, there was, from about 
the mid-1990s, a similar growth of private schools, degree-awarding organisations 
and training centres. This growth was, however, not actively promoted by the Sri 
Lankan government and was the result of the social demand by the growing middle-
classes for credentials which were more prestigious than those offered by public uni-
versities and training centres and thus allowed them to conserve their comparative 
advantages in the labour market. 
Even though donor agencies began to abstain from launching projects in the voca-
tional education and training sector, both countries started to tremendously expand 
the intake into vocationally and technically oriented skill formation programmes after 
1995. In both cases, these programmes were school-based and strongly emphasised 
the academic aspects of skill formation. Being mainly driven by the social demand for 
credentials, these courses earned little interest from the side of the private sector en-
trepreneurs in the two countries but were to considerably influence the development 
of the out-of-firm skill formation regimes. 
13.1.2 The garment production regimes 
The export-oriented garment production regime in the two countries emerged to-
wards the end of the late 1970s. This evolution resulted, on the one hand, from the 
availability of export opportunities originating from the changes in the global garment 
production regime and, on the other hand, from economic liberalisations that were 
enacted by the two governments at that time. The new garment factories generally 
supplied garments to overseas buyers, which again sold these items to their custom-
ers in the West, mainly in the US and in Europe. Yarn and fabric – imported from 
abroad – were supplied by the buyers, which also provided for the design of the 
products and for the marketing. The firms therefore concentrated their business on 
labour-intensive cutting, making and trimming (CMT) of garments. In both countries, 
economic liberalisation and the subsequent emergence of such companies led to a 
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new group of individuals, the garment entrepreneurs, whose interests not only were 
distinct from their employees but also from those of the few other groups of entrepre-
neurs. Thus, employers’ associations emerged whose political leverage would con-
tinuously grow over the next few decades – notably at the cost of the labour move-
ments, which had become tremendously politicised and fragmented.  
Despite these basic similarities, the garment production regimes of the two coun-
tries differed in a number of important aspects, namely in terms of influx of FDI into 
the country and in terms of the characteristics of the local entrepreneurs that entered 
the garment industry. In Sri Lanka, the economic liberalisation after 1977 was radical 
compared to that of other developing countries at that time. The reforms aimed at 
fostering private sector led economic growth by attracting FDI and thus included re-
laxations for this type of investment, extensive tax holidays and the development of 
investor-friendly infrastructure, notably in the FTZ. These policies, of course, reflected 
the liberal ideology of the then ruling party, the UNP, but also were a desperate move 
of the government to gain access to foreign currencies, to regain the support of the 
donor community and, most importantly, to reduce unemployment in the country. Be-
yond that, the garment production regime would also be influenced by the fact that 
the local entrepreneurs, who now either entered into joint ventures with foreign inves-
tors or started to directly supply garments to overseas buyers, had gathered experi-
ence in textile-related trading and manufacturing during the previous decades when 
Ceylon’s local manufacturers were protected by import-substituting economic poli-
cies. 
In contrast to Sri Lanka, the influx of FDI into the Bangladeshi garment industry was 
very limited: Here, entrepreneurs from the NIE’s and other parts of the world princi-
pally decided not to directly invest into production but to source garments from local 
manufacturers. This was the result of economic policies, which aimed at fostering 
export-oriented and private sector led economic growth but were less conducive for 
FDI. Thus, there grew a strong group of local entrepreneurs that enjoyed consider-
able political patronage and would, in the beginning of the 1980s, form BGMEA, 
Bangladesh’s first employers’ association in the garment industry; this association 
itself became inimical to potential competition emanating from foreign investors and 
would lobby the government to continue its policies in this regard. 
The comparatively small extent of FDI influx into the garment industry was, how-
ever, not the only reason why Bangladesh’s garment production regime developed 
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so differently than Sri Lanka’s. In fact, the protracted nation-building process not only 
restrained educational development but also the development of an industrial base in 
that part of the Indian subcontinent which had belonged to its most industrialised 
ones prior to the East Indian Company’s rule over Bengal. In the postcolonial, hardly 
industrialised East Pakistan, Bengali entrepreneurs in fact had little access to the 
privileges extended to business people from the western part of Pakistan, who tre-
mendously profited from the government’s import-substituting policies and thus be-
gan to own virtually all of the few industrial ventures in this part of the country. By the 
end of the war of 1971, many of these entrepreneurs had either died or left the coun-
try, which resulted in a dramatic void of industrial experience and talent. Most of the 
state-owned enterprises developed in the 1970s were thus run very inefficiently and 
only provided limited opportunities for local entrepreneurs to gain experience in busi-
ness and industrial production and to develop the respective social networks. The 
very rapid growth of the garment industry from the late 1970s onwards was thus 
borne by entrepreneurs, who were lacking experience in industrial production and 
were, beyond that, profiting from the funds and the patronage, which the govern-
ments at that time extended to potential political supporters. 
After the mid-1980s, when most Western countries had imposed quota on garments 
from both Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, the garment production regime in both coun-
tries started to be tremendously influenced by the incentives provided by the quota 
system. Thus, some of the important institutions that were underlying production of 
garments were invigorated in both countries: Most companies continued to engage in 
CTM production processes and to manufacture garments for overseas traders and 
buyers, which provided their suppliers with fabric, accessories and design and mar-
keted the products in the West. The quota system contained little incentives to ven-
ture into the production of higher value-added, non-quota garments, to become in-
volved into other segments of the garment supply chain by moving beyond CTM pro-
duction or to substantially invest in productivity improvement. The quota system, 
however, not only resulted in the reproduction of considerable elements of the gar-
ment production regimes but led to some crucial transformations, notably with regard 
to the constellation of actors. 
Thus, not only the similarities but also the differences between the two garment 
production regimes were invigorated, notably the differences in terms of how gov-
ernments interacted with the garment entrepreneurs. In Sri Lanka, political instability 
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in the country was at stake again: not only had the war in the north intensified in the 
second part of the 1980s, which resulted in many foreign investors leaving the coun-
try for other destinations, but also experienced the island another insurgency in the 
south. It was in this context that the government decided to use the quota system for 
its own political purposes by introducing the 200 Garment Factories Programme that 
basically provided manufacturers with a number of incentives to establish garment 
factories in the rural parts of the country. The programme had tremendous effects: In 
contrast to the expansion in the immediate post-1977 period, the growth of the indus-
try in the early 1990s was strongly carried forward by local, mainly Singhalese manu-
facturers who enjoyed the personal support of the Sri Lankan president. As the in-
centives provided by the government under the programme created a new group of 
entrepreneurs, two more employers’ associations emerged, which fragmented the 
collective bargaining power of the entrepreneurs but increased the voice of the local, 
Singhalese manufacturers. 
In contrast to Sri Lanka, Bangladeshi entrepreneurs now started to increase their 
political leverage by using the quota regime for their own purposes: representatives 
of BGMEA were in a unique position to assist the public servants in their negotiations 
with the respective governments in the West; at the same time, they invigorated their 
pressure on the government to restrict entry into the garment industry to new entre-
preneurs, which considerably reduced the competition in the industry. The position of 
the garment manufacturers, namely vis-à-vis the owners of textile mills, was further 
strengthened by the World Bank, which was pressing the government to further liber-
alise economic policy. In the early 1990s, when the leverage by the Sri Lankan gov-
ernment over the garment industry was as strong as never before, the situation in 
Bangladesh was quite different: A senior BGMEA member now entered the BNP-
government as a minister and started to press for further concessions to the local 
garment entrepreneurs. In both countries, however, the transformation in this period 
led to local entrepreneurs and their associations becoming increasingly powerful ac-
tors. 
When the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) was signed by the stake-
holders of the Uruguay Round process in 1995, it was decided that the quota regime, 
which had governed the global garment trade for the last two decades, would be 
gradually phased out by 2005, with incremental liberalisations in 1998 and 2002. Dur-
ing the ten years after 1995, the global competition in the garment trade therefore 
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increased, even though garment manufacturers from some less industrialised coun-
tries, notably those from Bangladesh, were given privileged access to the European 
market under certain conditions. More competition in the garment trade primarily 
meant pressure to increase productivity by lowering production costs, which was 
strongly felt by the entrepreneurs both in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. This pressure 
was further corroborated by the concentration of power in the hands of fewer buyers, 
particularly in those of European and US-American retailers. 
This outside pressure on the garment production regimes in both countries resulted 
in them being transformed with regard to a few but highly crucial aspects. First, even 
though the majority of garment factories continued to be involved in relatively simple 
CTM processes, a number of companies transformed their production processes in a 
way, which would render them more competitive in the period after 2005. This proc-
ess was more pronounced in Sri Lanka, where labour costs were considerably 
higher. There, a few companies not only improved their productivity and engaged in 
higher value-added production but entered into direct contact with their end buyers 
and were provided with better opportunities to engage in industrial upgrading: They 
thus gradually moved their ventures away from the exclusive focus on CTM produc-
tion and entered new segments of the garment supply chain. At the same time, these 
companies gained leverage over their competitors by involving many of them into 
sub-contracting arrangements and by becoming the uncontested leaders of JAAF, a 
newly formed umbrella organisation of all garment associations that started to coor-
dinate and to reinforce the lobbying efforts. 
In Bangladesh, the garment production regime underwent a similar but much less 
pronounced transition: Even though only few companies started to strive for industrial 
upgrading, a small but growing number of entrepreneurs transformed their ventures 
by improving labour conditions and productivity. Furthermore, a new group of indus-
trialists came up, which concentrated – in the wake of the new incentives provided 
under the scheme by the EU – on the more technology and skills-intensive produc-
tion of knitwear. As a consequence, BGMEA’s hegemony was challenged by the 
emergence of another association, BKMEA. Thus, both organisations individually 
started to lobby the government and donor agencies for assistance in various do-
mains by referring to the looming phase out of the MFA. In any event, the lobbying 
power of the garment entrepreneurs continued to grow in both countries in the period 
after 1995. And both in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, the respective employers’ asso-
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ciations would play a crucial role with regard to the institutional transformations of the 
skill formation regimes. 
13.2 The path-dependent development of the skill formation regimes of 
the garment industries in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh 
13.2.1 The development of the skill formation regimes before the quota regime 
Having reviewed the trajectories of the education and training regimes and the 
garment production regimes of Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, this chapter turns to the 
condensed analysis of the trajectories of the skill formation regimes. It mainly aims at 
assessing – from a historical-institutionalist perspective – in which way the country-
specific sequences of the educational expansion and of the expansion of the garment 
industry have influenced the institutional development of the respective skill formation 
regimes or, to put it more straightforward, whether the country-specific sequences 
themselves have resulted in the differences between the two regimes.  
In-firm skill formation regimes 
The early expansion of the garment industry both in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh was 
characterised by a rapidly growing number of firms that were engaged in labour-
intensive cutting, making and trimming (CMT) of garments for exports and that mainly 
depended on the labour of socio-economically disadvantaged female operators, most 
of which came from the rural areas. Despite these basic similarities, the in-firm skill 
formation regimes began to develop in a very country-specific and path-dependent 
way. 
Sri Lanka. In Sri Lanka, most factories emerging at that time were backed by for-
eign investors or had established strong links with their overseas buyers; for this rea-
son, many foreign technicians were involved into establishing and overseeing the 
production processes and into training local operators, technicians and managers. 
Accordingly, the in-firm skill formation regime was mainly rooted in the institutions of 
apprenticeship training, which was facilitated by the fact that virtually the entire work-
force was literate. In contrast to Bangladesh, the in-firm skill formation arrangements 
of many firms partly relied on recruiting comparatively accomplished school leavers: 
Many firms, both foreign and local, thus employed A-level graduates hailing from the 
socio-economically more privileged families of the country, who were then trained on-
the-job in the different departments of the firms and employed as supervisors or as 
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mid-level managers. The institutions that regulated recruitment and skill formation 
can be considered as investment-oriented in-firm skill formation arrangements, on the 
basis of which employers were enabled to make their profits and thus to enjoy in-
creasing returns of investment into training. The development of these arrangements 
was facilitated by effects of changes in the education and training regime and in the 
production regime: On the one hand, the expansion of the education system had re-
sulted in the supply of educationally accomplished school leavers and, on the other 
hand, the economic reforms of 1977 led to more reputed jobs being created at the 
management level of the export-oriented industries. The arrangements had strong 
distributional effects that privileged the comparatively highly educated recruits from 
the upper-middle classes over the less educated employees, who were thus less 
likely to be promoted to higher positions within the occupational hierarchy. These in-
firm skill formation arrangements, resulting from contingent social processes, would 
be at the core of the skill formation regime of the Sri Lankan garment industry; they 
would be reproduced because the early recruits of FDI-backed firms, later on, as sen-
ior managers or entrepreneurs would consider this type of in-firm skill formation ar-
rangement as in line with their own preferences and with the production processes 
they were overseeing, and they would tremendously facilitate the development of 
complementary out-of-firm skill formation institutions. 
Bangladesh. In contrast to Sri Lanka, most of the early firms in Bangladesh were 
not backed by foreign investors and only loosely interacted with their overseas buy-
ers; production processes were thus soon characterised by problem solving on a 
daily basis and by entrepreneurs trying to sustain production in a still unknown and 
highly unstable business environment. In contrast to traditional crafts and to the pre-
viously developed state-owned industries, garment entrepreneurs tried to keep the 
investment both of time and financial capital into training at a low level. Thus, a 
strongly production-oriented in-firm skill formation regime developed that was exclu-
sively rooted in the institutions of apprenticeship training and mainly relied on junior 
staff being provided with limited on-the-job training and being promoted by the supe-
riors, a practice which became common at practically all levels of the occupational 
hierarchy. The management staff either consisted of those close to the entrepre-
neurs, who had picked up the skills from rare interaction with the overseas buyers, or 
of staff promoted from the supervisory or even from the operator level. Employment 
at the upper echelons of garment production, therefore, didn’t become an attractive 
  
 297 
option for accomplished school leavers, most of which had other employment oppor-
tunities, notably in the textile industry. 
Despite very limited capital investments into in-firm skill formation, entrepreneurs 
made tremendous profits, which, in this very competitive business environment, 
would have been lowered by investments into the skills of new recruits that were 
highly likely to be poached by other firms. In contrast to Sri Lanka, these arrange-
ments had strong distributional effects that privileged loyal, experienced employees 
who were lacking formal technical training; many later senior managers or entrepre-
neurs, who were trained under such circumstances, would consider this type of in-
firm skill formation arrangement as in line with their own preferences and with the 
production processes they were overseeing and they would thus be strongly en-
gaged in reproducing this type of production-oriented in-firm skill formation regime. 
This would not only complicate the later efforts for more investment-oriented in-firm 
skill formation but also impede the development of complementary out-of-firm skill 
formation arrangements. 
Out-of-firm skill formation regimes 
Sri Lanka. In Sri Lanka, the early development of the out-of-firm skill formation re-
gime of the garment industry was characterised by the emergence of programmes 
offered by different state agencies after 1977. The first important programme in this 
regard, a result of the efforts by the previous government to strengthen the textile 
industry, was a diploma programme for textile engineers at the Moratuwa University. 
At that time, social demand for the programme was low and it would produce gradu-
ates who did not seek employment in the nascent garment industry but preferred to 
join the textile mills. In contrast to similar programmes in Bangladesh, this pro-
gramme, however, laid the foundation for a subsequent collaboration between the 
respective university department and key representatives of the garment industry. At 
that time, in the years up to 1985, two training organisations, initiated by industry-
related government agencies, were more prominent than the university’s diploma 
programme, because they both aimed at facilitating the growth of an FDI-backed 
garment industry: On the one hand, the government decided to have a training centre 
established in the neighbourhood of the upcoming FTZ by one of its most prominent 
training agencies in order to provide the foreign investors with a skilled operating 
workforce. On the other hand, the government, with the support by the World Bank, 
established the CITI, a training institute for the clothing industry that provided practi-
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cally oriented short-term skill formation programmes to already employed technicians 
and managers, many of which would become industry leaders in later years. Even 
though the entrepreneurs and the two main employers’ associations, the FTZMA and 
the SLAEA, would not have been prepared to initiate any out-of-firm training pro-
grammes, notably the development of the CITI was well received by the entrepre-
neurs, as its programmes complemented the in-firm skill formation institutions that 
had emerged in many firms and thus contributed to the entrepreneurs’ increasing 
returns. At the same time, the programmes at the CITI corroborated the development 
of entrepreneurs’ preference for industry-specific formal training, which would 
strongly facilitate the development of further out-of-firm skill formation programmes. 
In the same years, out-of-firm skill formation programmes developed which didn’t 
emanate from the initiatives of production-oriented ministries and thus weren’t mainly 
rooted in the government’s rationale to rapidly expand the export-oriented industries. 
The textile-oriented programme at the Open University, for instance was a conse-
quence of the post-1977 government to rapidly expand university education. Accord-
ingly, it was entirely under the control of the ministry in charge of higher education 
that was lacking the contacts to the textile industry. Similar to the programme at the 
University of Moratuwa, this programme met with little social demand, and it did thus 
not start to complement the skill formation institutions in the textile and the garment 
industry, a difficulty, which would – in contrast to the programme by the University of 
Moratuwa – never be overcome. Nevertheless, the programme survived as its phase 
out would have sparked protests from the respective instructors and the larger com-
munity of educationists, who would have criticised the government for moving away 
from educational egalitarianism. 
Bangladesh. In Bangladesh, the early years of the expansion of the garment indus-
try were paralleled by the expansion of textile-related technical education pro-
grammes that were offered by organisations under the ministries in charge of educa-
tion and in charge of textile industry development. This strategy was in line with the 
publicly declared aim that textile production, i.e. the production and processing of 
yarn and fabric, was to be supported by the BNP government. In contrast to Sri 
Lanka, no formal skill formation programmes for the garment industry emerged in 
these years. This lack of formal training reflected the fact that the early development 
of the garment industry in Bangladesh was not mainly a result of an explicit policy 
change but rather of concessions extracted by the garment entrepreneurs. As these 
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entrepreneurs had started to make their profits on the basis of production processes 
that required virtually no formal training, there didn’t emerge any political pressure 
emanating from individual entrepreneurs or from their association, the BGMEA, to 
establish an institute along the lines of the CITI.  
13.2.2 The development of the skill formation regimes under the quota regime 
In-firm skill formation regimes 
As the quota system provided little incentives to venture into the production of 
higher value-added, non-quota garments, to get involved into other segments of the 
garment supply chain and to substantially invest in productivity improvement, the 
quota system invigorated, in both countries, the attractiveness of low value-added 
CTM production. 
Sri Lanka. In Sri Lanka, the in-firm skill formation regime was partly transformed 
during the quota regime. Similar to the early years of Bangladesh’s expansion of the 
garment industry, the growth of the Sri Lankan garment industry was now driven by 
entrepreneurs with comparatively little industrial experience, who were – as quota 
allocation was highly politicised – operating in a highly volatile business environment 
and generally produced lower value-added items. The group of new firms thus con-
tributed to an emerging gap between production units, which either started to gravi-
tate towards the higher or towards the lower end of the value-added spectrum. This 
drift also had its implications for the in-firm skill formation regime of the Sri Lankan 
garment industry, which partially lost its previously very prominent investment orien-
tation: The fast growth of the industry was paralleled by an enormous number of posi-
tions being filled with recruits who could not be adequately trained prior to employ-
ment and only received very limited on-the-job training. The lack of skilled personnel 
was exacerbated by the fact that many firms were established in rural areas, where 
educationally accomplished and experienced personnel at the technician and at the 
managerial level were not as available as in the more urban and industrialised parts 
of the country. For a number of different reasons, productivity in many of these firms 
dropped considerably, which rendered them unsustainable after a few years of op-
eration and thus undermined the emergence of increasing returns from a more pro-
duction-oriented in-firm skill formation regime. 
Bangladesh. In Bangladesh, the quota system mainly reproduced the existing in-
firm skill formation regime that had developed during the initial expansion of the gar-
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ment industry and relied on the institutions of apprenticeship training and on junior 
staff being trained on-the-job. Only a small number of foreign investors set up firms 
whose production processes were comparatively more oriented towards productivity 
improvement and towards the upper end of the value-added spectrum. These manu-
facturers, however, began to establish recruitment and training practices that resem-
bled those developed in many of the FDI-backed firms in Sri Lanka and thus placed 
higher emphasis on recruitment of comparatively accomplished school leavers for 
management positions and on them being continuously trained by both local and 
overseas personnel. 
Out-of-firm skill formation regimes 
Whereas the in-firm skill formation regimes of the two countries began to partially 
converge due to the quota system, the development of the two out-of-firm skill forma-
tions regimes would be more contradictory in these years. 
Sri Lanka. In Sri Lanka, the development of state-provided out-of-firm skill forma-
tion programmes continued to be more pronounced than in Bangladesh, notably un-
der the government-sponsored 200 Garment Factories Programme that had resulted 
in the general perception of a tremendous skills shortage in the garment industry. In 
the early 1990s, private but strongly government-backed training centres launched 
skill formation programmes for operators, whereas the University of Moratuwa – un-
der a scheme financed by the ministry in charge of the textile industry – began to 
conduct practically oriented short-term courses for the technicians and managers 
already employed in the industry. These programmes did not reduce the concerns 
regarding the lack of skills in the industry but they rendered a new class of entrepre-
neurs and their association, the NAEA, stakeholders of out-of-firm skill formation pro-
grammes. Perhaps more importantly, the short programmes offered by the University 
of Moratuwa established strong linkages between this organisation and the represen-
tatives of the garment industry and thus laid the foundation for an increasingly exten-
sive collaboration. Whereas these programmes newly emerged under the aegis of 
production-related ministries, some of the previous programmes – notably those of-
fered by the University of Moratuwa and the CITI – were transformed or underwent 
what we have previously called institutional conversions. Even though neither donor 
organisations nor the ministries in charge, let alone the employers and their associa-
tions, had exerted respective pressure, both the key representatives of these organi-
sations decided to make their programmes more academic and thus reflected one of 
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the key dynamics of the Sri Lankan education and training regime: the social demand 
for increasingly higher educational credentials. The CITI thus not only began to offer 
short-term training programmes but also to conduct certificate and diploma courses 
for school leavers, which aimed at gaining comparative advantage in the labour mar-
ket by acquiring further educational credentials. 
At the same time, the textile department at the University of Moratuwa, run by dis-
tinctively academically inclined teachers, upgraded its diploma programme to a B.Sc. 
programme, whose curriculum included several aspects of garment technology. Even 
though employers had never asked for programmes to become more academic, they 
didn’t mind employing students with higher qualifications, as the credentials facilitated 
selection of potential new recruits. Notably the development of the B.Sc. programme 
unleashed, in contrast to the programme offered by the Open Univerity, a number of 
important positive feedback mechanisms and respective distributional effects: As, 
when the first students graduated in the beginning of the 1990s, the industry was 
growing enormously, many of them were absorbed by some of the technologically 
more developed production units; finding these new recruits helpful to efficiently 
manage production processes, the economic demand for graduates grew, which con-
tributed to the department being linked up with the best garment factories in the 
country; this, in turn, further increased the status of the degree programme and made 
it more attractive to A-level graduates from the most renowned public schools of the 
country. Over the course of the years, many of the former students of the programme 
would move up the occupational ladder within firms and start to recruit employees 
with a similar educational background and, through this, to strongly back the status 
awarding academic inclination of the B.Sc. programme. Thus, even though the trans-
formation of the programmes at the CITI and at the University of Moratuwa was nei-
ther driven by the government agencies nor by entrepreneurs, there developed 
strong institutional complementarities between these programmes and the in-firm skill 
formation arrangements of the technologically more developed production units. 
Bangladesh. Whereas in Sri Lanka the first government-sponsored skill formation 
programmes that explicitly catered to the garment industry had already emerged in 
the late 1970s and were expanded when the CITI was established in 1984, the first 
such programmes emerged in Bangladesh only in the early 1990s. The most promi-
nent programme, offered by an agency under the Ministry of Labour, imparted skills 
in various fields of garment production to both operators, technicians and managers 
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and emerged from a development project by UNDP and ILO. Even though the project 
lasted for four years, the impact of the programme was limited, as there was a lack of 
complementarities with the in-firm skill formation regime of the garment industry. In 
fact, the industry had grown tremendously by entirely relying on very limited on-the-
job training, which resulted in positive feedbacks from production-oriented skill forma-
tion. By the time the implementation of the project was proceeding in the beginning of 
the 1990s, the donors’ view on the role of state-funded training changed at a global 
level, which resulted in them pressing the private sector, notably the representatives 
of the increasingly powerful BGMEA, to financially contribute to the further develop-
ment of the programmes. As most employers relied on production-oriented in-firm 
skill formation arrangements, the employers’ association was not prepared to come 
forward in this regard; subsequently, donors withdrew and the skill formation pro-
grammes had to be continued without any financial support by donors or by the pri-
vate sector. This further decreased the prospects for enhancing the institutional com-
plementarities between the programme and the in-firm skill formation regime of the 
Bangladeshi garment industry. 
In the same period, BGMEA convinced the government to establish a department of 
garment technology at the textile college and to adjust the existing degree pro-
gramme for textile engineers. In contrast to the B.Sc. programme in Sri Lanka, the 
graduates of this programme, however, did not join the garment factories but buying 
offices or textile mills. The reason for this was not only that there was a sufficient 
number of attractive employment opportunities outside the garment industry but also 
that the social standing of employment even at the upper echelons of the garment 
industry was not in line with the aspirations of the academically trained graduates, 
most of which hailed from the upper-middle and upper classes of the Bangladeshi 
society. Those trained at the department could thus not contribute to enhancing the 
linkages between the college and the garment industry. Furthermore, the college did 
not allow entrepreneurs to nominate their own candidates as students of the depart-
ment, which resulted in them becoming increasingly disinterested in this skill forma-
tion organisation. Again, there was a tremendous lack of institutional complementari-
ties with the in-firm skill formation regime of the garment industry and a marked ab-
sence of positive feedbacks, which would have reinforced the efforts of the industrial-
ists and their association to strengthen the programme. 
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13.2.3 The development of the skill formation regimes during and after the 
phase out of quota 
In-firm skill formation regimes 
Both in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, the majority of companies only marginally, if at 
all, adapted the in-firm skill formation institutions in view of the challenges posed by 
the phase out of the MFA. These firms continued to strongly rely on a strategy that 
aimed at poaching experienced workers at the various levels of the occupational hi-
erarchy from other firms and on providing them with limited on-the-job training. Par-
ticularly in Sri Lanka, this strategy was, however, undermined by high labour turnover 
and fewer and fewer experienced and educationally accomplished employees joining 
these firms because of the low respective occupational status and of the lack of at-
tractive labour conditions. Despite this very limited transformation of the skill forma-
tion processes in most factories of both countries, a considerably smaller number of 
firms adapted both production and skill formation institutions within their firms in order 
to better cope with the changes of the global garment production regime. They thus 
enhanced the investment orientation of their in-firm skill formation regimes; accord-
ingly, the returns of these businesses became increasingly dependent on such in-
vestments and on the need to document these investments to buyers. 
Sri Lanka. In Sri Lanka, the strategy of a few more investment-oriented firms to 
move towards industrial upgrading required them to open new departments, e.g. in 
fashion design and marketing, all of which had to be staffed with skilled personnel in 
the respective technical fields. The need to improve productivity and to improve la-
bour conditions in the firms furthered the tendency for human resources development 
being addressed by separate departments that re-structured recruitment and skill 
formation processes within firms. Here, new operators were trained outside produc-
tion in separate training lines, then graded into different skill levels and subsequently 
absorbed into production. At the upper management level, most recruits were re-
quired to have obtained domain-specific diplomas or degrees and had to regularly 
undergo out-of-firm training. The distributional effects of this investment-oriented skill 
formation regime strongly privileged those with formal technical education and train-
ing, all the more as investing into skill formation became an essential aspect of these 
firms’ business strategy that aimed at convincing existing and potential buyers of their 
genuine commitment to socially and ethically responsible garment production. 
  
 304 
Bangladesh. In Bangladesh, the technologically more advanced companies didn’t 
generally engage in industrial upgrading but in improving their labour conditions and 
in substantially increasing productivity, which required the respective in-firm skill for-
mation arrangements to become more investment-oriented. In these ventures, more 
departments emerged in the fields of industrial engineering and human resources 
development, to which an increasing number of educationally more accomplished 
staff was recruited, some of them having degrees in technical fields, which would fa-
cilitate the evolution of complementary out-of-firm skill formation. As a matter of fact, 
this transition challenged the previous distribution of power and, therefore, caused 
conflicts in firms between the senior staff that had generally been promoted from the 
ranks and the fresh recruits, who were lacking the industrial experience but started to 
analyse and overhaul production processes from a more academic perspective. 
Out-of-firm skill formation regimes 
Whereas in the previous period, the out-of-firm skill formation regimes of the two 
countries still considerably differed in terms of the range of programmes catering to 
the garment industry, the regimes would, in the period after 1995, be affected by 
three common trends: First, there emerged, both in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, more 
private organisations that conducted formal pre-employment skill formation pro-
grammes for the garment industry so that there evolved a market for private training. 
Second, a number of skill formation programmes were either introduced or adapted 
by public training organisations that aimed at increasing equitable access to creden-
tials certifying vocational skills. Third, there emerged more institutional arrangements 
that were based on comparatively broader coalitions and thus had the support by 
actors both from the private and the public sector. Even though these tendencies de-
veloped in both countries, there were, however, strong differences with regard to the 
way the tendencies affected the overall transformation of the out-of-firm skill forma-
tion regimes. 
Sri Lanka. In the years prior to 1995, out-of-firm skill formation programmes for the 
garment industry were primarily provided by a number of state agencies. Some of 
these programmes were explicitly initiated because the government wanted to back 
the growing garment industry; others – such as those by the Open University – were 
rather aimed at providing equitable access to credentials, and the programmes of-
fered by the University of Moratuwa and by the CITI were – over the course of the 
years – made to respond to the social demand for increasingly higher credentials and 
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became more academic, even though this had never been a priority of the respective 
ministry, let alone of the employers. Obviously, the Sri Lankan out-of-firm skill forma-
tion regime of the garment industry was mainly state-driven but developed in an un-
coordinated and fractionalised way. 
In the years after 1995, this trend was partly reinforced. One of the most obvious 
challenges to a strongly state-coordinated skill formation regime was the further de-
velopment of private training programmes. In Sri Lanka, private training centres for 
operators had already emerged in the previous phase, partly – especially under the 
200 Garment Factories Programme – with the strong backing by the government; in 
the period after 1995, new training centres came up and started to impart skills at the 
craft and at the technician level both for school leavers and for the workforce in the 
industry, a development, which was, however, not unique to the garment sector but 
reflected the emergence of a growing Sri Lankan market for private education and 
training and the incremental erosion of the political coalition supporting the policy of 
free education. 
The programmes of these training centres catered to an increasing social demand 
for credentials that were considered to facilitate school leavers finding employment in 
those firms, whose recruitment processes strongly favoured those with formal qualifi-
cations certifying the acquisition of industry-specific skills. There thus emerged con-
siderable returns from private investments into skill formation, a process, which 
started to reinforce the institutions of the training market. At the degree level, private 
training programmes were conducted by only one training organisation that was es-
tablished by one of the two largest garment companies in Sri Lanka and was com-
plementary with the strong investment orientation of the in-firm skill formation ar-
rangements of the respective firm. Through the training programme, the company not 
only recruited a considerable number of its own staff but also started to establish new 
contacts to crucial individual and corporate actors in its European markets, which 
were interested in sourcing from a supplier that was genuinely committed to socially 
and ethically responsible garment production. There were thus multiple returns that 
reinforced the institutions of a market for private skill formation programmes catering 
to the garment industry. 
In the same period, a range of skill formation programmes were either newly intro-
duced or adapted, a development, which resulted from the efforts of the government 
and of the public skill formation organisations to increase equitable access to creden-
  
 306 
tials. The Open University, which had aimed, since the beginning of the 1980s, at 
opening up avenues for educational mobility to students who didn’t have the privilege 
to study at a conventional university, launched certificate, diploma and degree pro-
grammes oriented to the garment industry. A further diploma programme, the NDT 
offered by the University of Moratuwa, was restructured following violent student 
clashes between diploma and graduate students, which had erupted after a contro-
versy over the social status of the diploma certificate. Both organisations thus contin-
ued to cater to some social demand and to produce graduates that were generally 
absorbed by the industry but the coalitions supporting the growth of these pro-
grammes neither included representatives of the more production-oriented ministries 
nor the associations of the entrepreneurs.  
Whereas the new programme at the Open University was basically a reproduction 
of its traditional textile-oriented programmes and was backed by the respective in-
structors and some donor agencies, the NDT programme underwent a major institu-
tional conversion: Having been the flagship of textile-related technical education for 
many years, the NDT saw its status threatened by the degree programme that in-
creasingly gained the backing of employers, their associations and of the ministry in 
charge of higher education. The main forces behind the further reproduction of the 
programme mainly remained the instructors, the respective students and those parts 
of the educational community, which appreciated the comparatively strong practical 
bias of the NDT programme. The political returns from running this programme may 
were limited for administrators and politicians but any further institutional rupture 
would certainly have entailed negative political costs. 
In addition, new vocational training programmes started to be offered by VTA, a 
rapidly growing public training organisation that enjoyed the patronage from leading 
politicians of the SLFP. These vocational courses were strongly oriented towards the 
increasing social demand for credentials that certified the acquisition of industry-
specific skills and were thus perceived to be a comparative advantage in a highly 
competitive labour market whose recruitment processes were tremendously charac-
terised by credentialism. Despite the fact that the respective actor coalition did not 
include employers and donor agencies, which criticised the programmes for not 
meeting the needs of the private sector, and despite partially restricted institutional 
complementarities with in-firm skill formation arrangements, the respective pro-
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grammes created returns for politicians and administrators, who were considered to 
indeed provide more equitable access to credentials. 
These two tendencies – the increasing number of private skill formation organisa-
tions and the further development and reinforcement of skill formation programmes 
that were mainly driven by the government’s aim at meeting the social demand for 
credentials – could be seen as emblematic of an increasingly fractionalised mode of 
coordination of the Sri Lankan out-of-firm skill formation regime of the garment indus-
try. When we now analyse the emergence of institutional arrangements that were 
based on comparatively broader coalitions, which included actors from the private 
and the public sector, we will see that this fractionalisation of state coordination was 
contained, even though the central government and the skill formation organisations 
now faced a new, enormously powerful association – JAAF – that was controlled by 
the heads of the country’s two largest garment companies. In fact, on several occa-
sions radical institutional changes were proposed by the entrepreneurs but blocked 
by the government or the respective organisations and thus became the basis for 
more incremental institutional change that was backed by enlarged coalitions of ac-
tors. 
The most prominent blockage to potentially radical institutional change was the 
government’s halt of the negotiations on the Council of Apparel and Textiles (COAT), 
which would, in the eyes of the key representatives of JAAF, have to become a pri-
vate sector controlled body to improve the coordination and the relevance of the dif-
ferent out-of-firm skill formation programmes in order to move the garment industry 
towards what these actors perceived to be the requirements of the knowledge econ-
omy. Radical institutional changes were also averted, when the government withdrew 
from negotiations on privatising CITI, and when the plans to upgrade the Department 
of Textile and Clothing Technology of the University of Moratuwa to a separate fac-
ulty were shelved. The prevention of such potential institutional ruptures resulted 
from the fact that the different institutional arrangements governing the operations of 
these skill formation organisations were supported by broad coalitions of actors, all of 
which enjoyed distinct types of returns emanating from the respective arrangements.  
Instead of radical institutional changes, there occurred more incremental institu-
tional transformations that did not weaken but rather broadened the existing actor 
coalitions and strengthened the respective positive feedback-mechanisms. In the 
case of the institutional transformation of the garment-oriented VTA programmes, we 
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may talk of officially sanctioned institutional decoupling. Here, many local entrepre-
neurs entered into agreements with training centres that provided them with trained 
operators and thereby started to practically ignore the increasingly academically ori-
ented curricula by the central authority that were considered irrelevant by the entre-
preneurs. 
In the case of the programmes by the textile department of the University of 
Moratuwa, we may talk of institutional layering. At this organisation, only those de-
mands by the entrepreneurs were accepted by the authorities and the faculty, which 
did not undermine the department’s elitist selection criteria and its high social stand-
ing. Accordingly, JAAF’s proposal to establish a separate faculty was declined, as the 
new faculty would no more have been allowed to award the highly reputed B.Sc. de-
gree in engineering that was reserved for the university’s engineering faculty. At the 
same time, the department introduced a fashion-design course that was less elitist 
than the B.Sc. programme and prepared the students for employment in the techno-
logically more advanced firms of the country. This further increased the coalition sup-
porting the department as a whole and meant no challenge to the elitist reputation of 
the B.Sc. programmes and to the exceptional returns enjoyed by the graduates of 
this programme in the labour market. Institutional layering was also at play, when the 
plans for COAT were stalled and a number of reforms were introduced at the CITI: 
Not only were the entrepreneurs allowed to a greater say with regard to the nomina-
tion of the head of the organisation, but also was it planned to introduce a degree 
course that would lead to a credential offered by a US-based university. This would 
not only increase the social status of the CITI but similarly contribute to some Sri 
Lankan firms’ reputation of tremendously investing into training, which has become 
an important basis for the returns of Sri Lankan manufacturers.  
In Sri Lanka, the increasing lobbying power of employers’ associations did not rein-
force the fractionalisation of state coordination of the out-of-firm skill formation re-
gime, as many of the public skill formation programmes enjoyed positive feedbacks 
emanating from broad coalitions that included both key representatives of the indus-
try and other segments of Sri Lankan society, whose political support was important 
for the government. Rather, the role of the state in coordinating the out-of-firm skill 
formation regime and moderating incremental institutional change was reinforced. 
Bangladesh. Before 1995, there were only few out-of-firm skill formation pro-
grammes for the Bangladeshi garment industry, whose provision was virtually not 
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coordinated at all. In the years after 1995, this fractionalisation of the regime would 
be considerably reinforced. As in Sri Lanka, the most obvious challenge to state co-
ordinated skill formation was the strong and partly donor-backed expansion of private 
skill formation organisations, which mainly catered to social demand for the respec-
tive credentials and thus enabled school leavers from the middle classes to be em-
ployed as supervisors, technicians or executives in some of the more technology-
intensive garment companies of the country. In contrast to the 1980s and early 
1990s, both secondary school certificates and degrees had become more wide-
spread, which increased the pressure on job seekers to gain comparative advantage 
through further credentials. The in-firm and out-of-firm skill formation regimes of the 
garment industry thus developed in a complementary way and the recruitment and 
subsequent promotion of graduates from private skill formation organisations would 
serve as a tremendous positive feedback that would reinforce the further expansion 
of this type of training and would change the distribution of power within the more 
technology-intensive firms for the favour of those with more formally certified, indus-
try-specific skills. 
The most prominent private skill formation organisation was the BIFT, a BGMEA-
owned degree-awarding institute that was established with direct backing from the 
World Bank. Directly catering to the interests of individual BGMEA members, the in-
stitute became the entrepreneurs’ focal organisation with regard to professional skill 
formation programmes for the industry. Whereas the BIFT was backed by a coalition 
including both donors and entrepreneurs, the latter withdrew from the coalition sup-
porting the further development of the garment-related degree programme at the 
Textile College, which, in 1991, had been introduced upon lobbying by BGMEA but 
never started to complement the in-firm skill formation arrangements of garment fac-
tories. The trend for privatisation in the Bangladeshi out-of-firm skill formation regime 
of the garment industry thus clearly contributed to the further fractionalisation of state 
coordination. 
Similar to Sri Lanka, the fractionalisation of state coordination was not only rein-
forced by the expansion of private skill formation organisations but also by the devel-
opment of further skill formation programmes by public training agencies that – partly 
in response to the growth of private training organisation – aimed at providing more 
equal access to credentials that certified industry-specific skills. Overall, these 
courses, offered by the training organisations under the BTEB and by the BMET, 
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were characterised by a focus on generally applicable vocational and technical skills 
and thus did not cater to the primary interests of entrepreneurs, who were rather 
looking for more specifically trained recruits. Despite the obvious lack of institutional 
complementarities with in-firm skill formation arrangements of most firms in the coun-
try, these skill formation programmes started to enjoy strong positive feedbacks as 
students could use the credentials as a means to seek employment in different sec-
tors. Whereas the private skill formation organisations thus mainly contributed to the 
out-of-firm skill formation regime becoming less coordinated by the state, these or-
ganisations contributed to an increasing disjuncture within the skill formation regime 
between those programmes which were strongly complementing the in-firm skill for-
mation regime and those which were rather not. Understandably, the latter, based on 
actor coalitions that excluded private sector entrepreneurs, would be more likely to be 
radically transformed and thus to suffer from institutional ruptures. 
In contrast to Sri Lanka, the fractionalisation of state coordination of the out-of-firm 
skill formation regime further increased, as those skill formation programmes, which 
were complementary to the skill formation arrangements of an increasing number of 
garment companies, were virtually all provided by the private training organisations. 
Here, the emergence of such institutional arrangements was characterised by institu-
tional ruptures and renewed, hardly coordinated institutional geneses and by unsta-
ble actor coalitions that included employers with exclusive access to policy makers 
and donor organisations. The skill formation programmes by the BMET and by the 
Youth Department, which were virtually devoid of any institutional complementarities 
with the in-firm skill formation regime of the garment industry and were therefore lack-
ing the support by the representatives of the garment industry, were completely re-
structured in the aftermath of the phase out of the MFA in order to provide employers, 
i.e. the key representatives of the main association, with skilled employees in specific 
occupational areas. In this context, industrialists supported government agencies to 
upgrade the machinery, to rapidly adapt curricula and to increase the practical skills 
of instructors, some of which were now recruited by the employers; but they were 
also given the right to select the trainees and to directly absorb them as employees of 
their own firms. These programmes were thus characterised by considerable rents 
extracted by a small number of employers. Clearly, these institutional ruptures were 
signs that actor coalitions backing institutional out-of-firm organisations were broad-
ened and started to include representatives of the garment industry. But still, the coa-
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litions were narrow and the main challenge – to build lasting institutions which were 
both partly complementary with the in-firm skill formation regimes and were, at the 
same time, providing the industry with a greater amount of higher skills – remained. 
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14 Assessment of the hypotheses 
In the previous chapter, we have revisited the empirical elaborations of this study in 
detail and from a path-dependent perspective without actually delving into theoretical 
issues, namely into an assessment of the hypotheses underlying this study. There-
fore, the following chapter is aimed at assessing the arguments presented by Ashton 
et al. that were discussed in section 2.3 and served as a basis for building hypothe-
ses in section 3.2.4. There, it has been assumed that, even though Sri Lanka and 
Bangladesh strongly differed in terms of educational expansion at the beginning of 
the expansion of the garment industry, the skill formation regime of the garment in-
dustry would, in both countries, converge along the lines of what Ashton et al. have 
described as the neo-market model of skill formation, the main reason being the 
comparatively dependent position of such developing countries in the global political-
economic context. In a first section, this chapter will now argue that the trajectories of 
the skill formation regimes differ in many important aspects, which can’t be explained 
on the basis of the model by Ashton et al., and that the main reason for this being the 
case are the different country-specific sequences of educational expansion and the 
expansion of the garment industry. It will be here that I will – in nuce – elaborate on 
the institutional foundations of the comparatively high-skill formation regime in Sri 
Lanka and of the comparatively low-skill formation regime in Bangladesh. In a second 
section, the chapter more specifically addresses the model presented by Ashton et 
al. and will finally suggest to revise it in a number of regards. 
14.1 Country-specific trajectories of the skill formation regimes  
The country-specific sequences of educational expansion and the expansion of the 
garment industry had tremendous implications for the development of the skill forma-
tion regime of the garment industries in the two countries. In Sri Lanka, where the 
central government had been successfully engaged in increasing literacy rates to a 
high level for several decades and where the development of the educational system 
was already characterised by tremendous inflation of the value of educational cre-
dentials when the garment industry started to expand, FDI-backed companies found 
it easy to develop strongly investment-oriented in-firm skill formation arrangements 
that were based on the availability of literate and easily trainable workers and of edu-
cationally accomplished, westernised school leavers, who were prepared to work in 
the garment industry. Even though the investment orientation of the in-firm skill for-
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mation regime was partly challenged by the massive and considerably less FDI-
backed expansion of the garment industry in the early 1990s, it was reinforced by the 
increasing returns of training – partly facilitated by exogenous pressure on the gar-
ment industry – but also by emerging complementarities with a number of practically 
oriented early out-of-firm skill formation arrangements; even though these were initi-
ated by state agencies, they started to contribute to the entrepreneurs’ increasing 
returns and thus to be borne by actor coalitions that also encompassed the represen-
tatives of the private sector. 
As a result of the social demand for credentials, some of the early skill formation 
programmes became more academic and thus underwent institutional transforma-
tions that were neither initiated by the ministries in charge nor by the entrepreneurs 
but started to be borne by actor coalitions that would, later on, also encompass key 
representatives of the industry who were interested in industrial upgrading. In addi-
tion to the state-funded skill formation organisations, there also emerged private 
ones, which similarly catered to the increasing social demand for credentials and 
were – at least in some cases – strongly interrelated with the investment-oriented in-
firm skill formation arrangements of those firms which were backing the private train-
ing centres. But despite the emerging market for private skill formation programmes 
the public skill formation organisations didn’t get marginalised; furthermore, because 
of the relatively broad coalitions that were underlying these organisations, respective 
institutional change was generally rather incremental than abrupt and, therefore, 
characterised by a complex process of institutional layering, conversion and decoup-
ling; during this process, the different state agencies involved into providing skill for-
mation programmes enhanced – partly under pressure of the increasingly powerful 
representatives of the garment industry – collaboration and thus increased the scope 
of state coordination, which would facilitate catering to the interests of both the larger 
and the smaller enterprises but also to those of the instructors and trainees of the 
existing skill formation organisations. This broad coalition of actors was thus engaged 
in reproducing a comparatively high-skill formation regime. 
In Bangladesh, where the central government had been less successful in increas-
ing literacy rates and where the expansion of the secondary and the higher education 
sector was still limited when the garment industry started to expand, the rapid growth 
of the garment industry, mainly borne by technically inexperienced local entrepre-
neurs, saw the development of an in-firm skill formation regime that was strongly 
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production-oriented and would, for a long time, complicate and delay the develop-
ment of out-of-firm skill formation programmes. In fact, the first state-funded formal 
skill formation programmes were not complementing the in-firm skill formation ar-
rangements in most firms and thus hardly met with the interests of entrepreneurs; 
accordingly, they were based on comparatively narrow actor coalitions and were not 
supported by the representatives of the garment industry. 
In the years after 1995, by when not only the number of secondary school leavers 
and university graduates had grown but also a small number of firms had started to 
increase their capital investments into skill formation, there, in fact, developed indus-
try-specific training programmes for technicians and middle-level managers, whose 
trainees were absorbed by the industry and were thus complementary to the in-firm 
skill formation arrangements of a growing number of technologically more advanced 
firms. These programmes were, however, generally conducted by private training 
organisations and catered to the most immediate skill needs of companies. The im-
portant role of the private training market – and of the subsequent disjuncture be-
tween private and public skill formation organisations – thus started to be a crucial 
characteristic of the out-of-firm skill formation regime of the Bangladeshi garment in-
dustry. 
At the same time, public agencies increased the number of out-of-firm skill forma-
tion programmes without, however, being in a position to include key representatives 
of the industry into the respective coalitions backing these programmes. In the years 
of tremendous pressure on the garment industry to become more competitive, the 
government, upon pressure from the industry, intervened in order to radically change 
some of these programmes so they would cater to what it perceived to be the imme-
diate needs of entrepreneurs. Again, the respective coalitions were narrow, as these 
programmes mainly benefited a small number of entrepreneurs with exclusive con-
tacts to policy makers and representatives of donor organisations, and the evolution 
of the out-of-firm skill formation regime thus continued to be characterised by unco-
ordinated institutional geneses and institutional ruptures, all of which reinforced the 
disjunctures within the out-of-firm skill formation regime and continued to limit the 
scope of coordination by state agencies. The lack of an institutionalised coordination 
of the different actors was thus interrelated with a continuous reproduction of a com-
paratively low-skill formation regime. 
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As this analysis has shown, the trajectories of the two shop flooration regimes have 
evolved in a strongly path-dependent way and were clearly influenced by the se-
quence of educational expansion and the expansion of the garment industry. How-
ever, the analysis also demonstrates that the effects of the respective sequence were 
reinforced by further historical contingencies, namely by the industrial development 
prior to the expansion of the garment industry and by the relation between the influx 
of overseas technology and skills at the time of expansion and the pace of this ex-
pansion itself. If, for instance, Desh Garments, one of the first FDI-backed exporters 
from Bangladesh, had convinced the then government to open the doors to further 
investments from overseas, or if there hadn’t been any war in Sri Lanka since 1983, 
which not only cost tens of thousands of lives and hindered economic growth in the 
island but contributed to the translocation of the industry to Bangladesh, this study 
might have been a very different one. 
Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, this section could not conceal that the 
trajectories of the two skill formation regimes featured, despite considerable differ-
ences, a number of similarities that are, at least partly, in line with the hypotheses 
that have been formulated against the backdrop of writings by Ashton et al. in section 
3.2.4 of this study. In fact, the elaborations on the path-dependent trajectories have, 
so far, not enabled us to substantially assess and to eventually revise the model by 
these authors. This shall, therefore, be the task of the second section of this chapter. 
14.2 Common aspects of the trajectories of the skill formation regimes 
Whereas we have, in the previous paragraphs, focused on the country-specific, 
path-dependent trajectories of the skill formation regimes of the garment industry, this 
section aims at demonstrating common aspects of the trajectories of the skill forma-
tion regimes and thus at assessing and at refining the model presented by Ashton et 
al. As this study is based on the analysis of two cases only, the refinement will lead to 
a set of generalisations that has two distinct features: First, it clearly specifies – 
unlike functionalist or game-theoretic models on skill formation – the context, in which 
the generalisations have evolved, and places much emphasis on the evolution of the 
skill formation regimes over time. Second, this set of generalisations emphasises, 
unlike much of the literature on skill formation written from a political-economic per-
spective, the importance of the dynamics of educational systems, notably of the 
strong role of social demand for credentials. 
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The generalisations will demonstrate that, at a highly aggregate level, there are 
striking convergences between the trajectories of the two skill formation regimes that 
are indeed partly in line with the arguments by Ashton et al.; they, however, also 
show that any analysis of industry-specific skills formation regimes necessarily needs 
to combine approaches both from political economy and comparative education.  
14.2.1 The development of the in-firm skill formation regimes 
In both countries, the garment industry started to expand as a highly labour-
intensive industrial sector that offered many disincentives for investments into in-firm 
skill formation. The market structure of the global garment trade allowed – as pointed 
out by Ashton et al. – firms to make profits without tremendously investing into the 
skills of their workforce. These disincentives for training were particularly pervasive in 
Bangladesh, where those who were provided with extensive on-the-job training were 
likely to be poached by other firms or – in the case of employees at the management 
level – to set up own enterprises. The in-firm skill formation regime was, in contrast to 
Sri Lanka, strongly production-oriented. There, high literacy rates, the tremendous 
influx of FDI and the comparatively high degree of entrepreneurial experience and 
skills prior to the development of the garment industry contributed to a more invest-
ment-oriented in-firm skill formation regime. 
Even though this basic divergence between the two regimes would be reproduced 
to a considerable extent, the in-firm skill formation regimes of the two countries would 
partially converge over the next decades. The main reasons for these increasing 
similarities were that investment-oriented skill formation arrangements would, as a 
consequence of growing liberalisation and increasing competition in the global gar-
ment trade, become more widespread in Bangladesh and that the share of those Sri 
Lankan companies would grow, which were struggling with the adverse conditions in 
the trade and thus had to engage in more production-oriented skill formation. The 
“new global division of labour” thus implied – as furthermore suggested by Ashton et 
al. – a major disjuncture in the structure of the industry in both countries and in the in-
firm skill formation regimes. Those firms, which had the necessary access to skills 
and capital, began to engage in productivity improvement, compliance and industrial 
upgrading and to emphasise the investment orientation of their in-firm skill formation 
regimes. These often larger firms formed segmentalist labour markets by providing, 
particularly at the executive level, attractive career prospects to comparatively educa-
tionally accomplished recruits, which were then more comprehensively trained on-
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the-job than employees in the companies with more production-oriented skill forma-
tion regimes. 
As we see, the development of the in-firm skill formation regimes developed quite 
similar to the suggestions by Ashton et al.’s model. This mainly results from the fact 
that the respective skill formation arrangements developed in strong interrelation with 
the production arrangements in the garment industries, which were, to a considerable 
extent, dependent from the economic structure of the global garment industry. Un-
doubtedly, exogenous processes – the emergence of a new global division of labour, 
the availability of global capital, the influx of which was also a result of the pressure 
by international organisations to open up the economy, and the increase of liberalisa-
tion and of competition in the trade – lay at the bottom of the convergence of the in-
firm skill formation regimes. 
14.2.2 The development of the out-of-firm skill formation regimes 
Phase I:  Early programmes provided by state agencies 
Prior to the emergence of skill formation programmes catering to the garment in-
dustries there existed, in both countries, university-level technical education organi-
sations that had catered, for some time, to textile mills established in the context of 
import-substituting strategies. Similarly, the first more comprehensive skill formation 
programmes for the garment industry in both countries were provided by state agen-
cies but they were also backed by donors, which regarded the development of the 
garment industry as a crucial step in the countries’ industrialisation process. These 
early programmes were relatively tailor-made and occupation-specific industrial train-
ing courses for experienced employees at the craft and at the technician level of the 
garment industry. The contents and the further characteristics of these programmes – 
e.g. the criteria for enrolment – were designed with very limited participation from rep-
resentatives of the private sector but bore the imprints of technical advice by over-
seas consultants, which enabled the programmes to attract the interests of the entre-
preneurs even then, when the skill formation programmes were not complementing 
the in-firm skill formation programmes. 
The emergence of both textile-related technical education programmes and of the 
first skill formation programmes for the garment industry are, in fact, similarly in line 
with Ashton et al.’s arguments, as they were either directly related to import substitu-
tion programmes or were, despite economic liberalisation, inspired by the respective 
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thinking of public servants. For this reason, these early programmes were hardly in-
fluenced by the representatives of the industry, as the more investment-oriented en-
trepreneurs relied, in terms of skill formation, on segmentalist labour markets and as 
their more production-oriented colleagues made, for many years, handsome profits 
without having to invest in human resources development. 
Phase II:  Later programmes provided by state agencies 
In a second phase, many of the early state-funded programmes were extended and 
their curricula tended to become more academic. This development was certainly not 
in line with most of the common political-economic approaches to skill formation, no-
tably by that of Ashton et al., who suggested that state-funded skill formation pro-
grammes would either run parallel to import-substitution strategies or would result 
from attempts by governments to correct market-failures. In fact, in neither of the two 
countries these changes of the state-funded programmes were a result of explicit 
government strategies or of lobbying by employers – as it might be expected from a 
structural-functionalist perspective –, let alone of international organisations. Rather, 
these developments were a consequence of the fact that the public skill formation 
organisations were operating in social contexts that were influenced by previous edu-
cational expansion and subsequent credentialism in the labour market. 
In fact, with the technologically more advanced firms starting to increasingly look for 
recruits with specific credentials, there grew, in both countries, a stronger social de-
mand for qualifications certifying the acquisition of industry-specific skills. The social 
demand for credentials and the development of recruiting practices which started to 
favour educationally accomplished and industry-specifically trained recruits over less 
qualified competitors on the labour market were, of course, highly interdependent. In 
any event, both tendencies were thus affected by the aggregate effects of educa-
tional expansion, which rendered secondary school certificates and university de-
grees more widespread on the labour market. Whereas the early state provision of 
garment industry-oriented skill formation programmes at the craft and at the techni-
cian level was clearly meant to provide employers with skills that donors and public 
servants considered vital for the development of the industry and to sensitise em-
ployers for the need of training, the next generation of state-provided programmes 
thus rather catered to the social demand for credentials. Accordingly, programmes 
started to become broader and more academic and to lead to more formal creden-
tials, some of which opened up further opportunities for educational upwards mobility. 
  
 319 
As the governments aimed at ensuring equitable access to such credentials, the 
costs of these programmes were – in contrast to the early programmes by state 
agencies – mainly borne by the state and, accordingly, the representatives of the in-
dustry were not compelled to financially contribute to this sort of training either. The 
interest of the entrepreneurs was, however, also undermined because – in contrast to 
the early state-provided skill formation programmes – the new generation of such 
programmes lacked the support of overseas consultants and, therefore, what the 
employers perceived to be Western technology and skills. Furthermore, many of the 
programmes now started to be provided beyond the geographical centres of the gar-
ment industry and to be associated with non-garment-related segments of the labour 
market, e.g. with the public administration or with overseas labour markets. All these 
aspects made it more difficult for the representatives of these training organisations 
and the representatives of the industry to establish and to improve interdependent 
and potentially mutually beneficial liaisons.  
Phase III:  Programmes by private training providers 
In both countries, there emerged, from the mid-1990s onwards, private training pro-
grammes catering to potential recruits or to existing workers of the garment industry. 
This fact is fully in line with the model by Ashton et al. However, we understand that 
the underlying social forces are not the ones suggested by these authors. In fact, the 
trend has to be seen in the larger context of increasing privatisation in the education 
and training system, which, in both countries, was neither a functional requirement of 
changes in the labour market nor a result of the pressure by international organisa-
tions but rather of the pressure by the middle classes that lobbied the governments to 
open up new avenues to credentials. More specifically, many programmes catering to 
the technician level of the industry were driven by the social demand of school leav-
ers who aimed at being recruited by some of the technologically more advanced 
companies; these school leavers were looking for alternatives to the respective pro-
grammes by the state agencies, as, for instance in the case of universities, access to 
these organisations was complicated by comparatively elitist selection criteria or as 
some organisations hardly improved access to the aspired positions. Thus, there 
emerged, for the first time, a market for private skill formation programmes that ca-
tered to the garment industry, which entailed both serious competition for some of the 
state-sponsored programmes and a challenge to the public administration’s previous 
– though limited and fragmented – role in coordinating and monitoring the existing 
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skill formation programmes. In contrast to the programmes provided by state agen-
cies, the private courses, notably those at the vocational and at the technician level, 
were more narrow and occupation-specific and thus shorter. The fact alone that the 
courses were fee-levying reduced the number of potential trainees, which rendered 
many of these training organisations more elitist than their equivalents in the public 
sector and thus improved the social status of the credentials, even though they gen-
erally didn’t entitle the graduates to climb the ladder of educational mobility.  
Phase IV:  Public-private partnerships in out-of-firm skill formation 
In contrast to the model elaborated by Ashton et al. and in contrast to any other of 
the previously discussed theoretical approaches to skill formation both in more indus-
trialised and developing countries, the most recent phase in the evolution of the skill 
formation regimes of the garment industries in the two countries was characterised 
by the development of institutional arrangements that were based on comparatively 
broader coalitions and thus included actors both from the private and from the public 
sector. In other words, there was an emergence of different varieties of what in the 
literature on public management has been called “public-private partnerships”. In 
both countries of our analysis, this new type of institutional arrangement occurred at 
times of considerable exogenous pressure on representatives of the industry, admin-
istrators and politicians to avert negative growth in the garment industry following a 
major liberalisation of the trade. Obviously, the traditional out-of-firm skill formation 
regimes did not produce satisfactory results to some of the key actors, notably to the 
entrepreneurs, which, in both countries, were the initiators of this phase of institu-
tional change but were, thereby, strongly supported by donor agencies. 
In fact, entrepreneurs felt that, on the one hand, many of the skill formation pro-
grammes sponsored by state agencies were only of limited relevance as their con-
tents were too broad and were hardly related to the practical aspects of garment pro-
duction and partly enrolled people who were not prepared to join the garment indus-
try upon training. On the other hand, entrepreneurs also saw that the output of non-
government sponsored, private skill formation programmes was not sufficient to meet 
their increasing need of skilled recruits. Their claim for stronger cooperation with 
state agencies in the field of training had, of course, considerable weight as their as-
sociations – representing the interests of the largest export-oriented industry – had 
gained tremendous political weight over the decades since the incremental opening 
of the two economies. Administrators and politicians, who were worried about the 
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potentially drastic effect of liberalisation on employment and were eager to improve 
the reputation of the state training agencies in this regard, thus started to consider 
enhanced cooperation with the representatives of the private sector in the field of 
training as politically important, all the more as the concept of public-private partner-
ship had been advocated as a panacea for skill formation by donor organisations for 
many years. Thus, out-of-firm skill formation programmes developed which were for-
mally administered by state agencies but were designed and implemented under 
considerable influence from the side of private sector entrepreneurs. 
Many of these programmes shared a number of common features: First, the con-
tents of these programmes were comparatively narrow and less theoretical, i.e. more 
occupation-specific, than those offered by the state agencies; second, there was a 
tendency for employers to influence the student intake of the programmes and to 
manipulate the absorption of trainees by specific firms, a practice, which had become 
common in private training organisations and generally increased employability of 
students – a major concern of administrators and politicians. Third, employers partly 
financed some of the machinery and consumables but were relieved from contribut-
ing to the salaries of instructors. In sum, many of these new out-of-firm skill formation 
arrangements were highly advantageous from the perspective of the companies 
which finally absorbed the trainees, and thus were clearly marked by the characteris-
tics of straightforward rent-seeking by individual entrepreneurs, who were lobbying 
the governments in the name of the entire industry. In fact, only in a few cases, there 
emerged skill formation programmes, from which a broad set of entrepreneurs could 
profit and which thus contributed, at least partly, to the associations’ image of indeed 
lobbying the government in the interest of a broader set of industrialists. 
These elaborations suggest that exogenous social processes, i.e. the pressure to 
increase the productivity of the industry in the context of the phase out of the MFA, 
have been tremendously important for the development of public-private partnerships 
in skill formation for the garment industries. At the same time, we understand that 
these new institutional arrangements were, by no means, a functional refinement of 
what might be considered to be earlier imbalances in the skill formation equilibrium. 
In fact, they were – similar to the increasingly academic orientation of public skill for-
mation programmes (phase II) – the result of the fact that, over the course of time, a 
new set of actors had started to lobby the government in their own interest. Whereas 
the previous phases in the development of the skill formation regime had mainly re-
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sulted from the agency of state agencies, collectively acting students and their par-
ents and the training organisations themselves, it was now the turn of rent-seeking 
entrepreneurs. 
14.2.3 Theorising on the dynamics of skill formation regimes 
The different phases in the development of the skill formation regimes of the gar-
ment industries in the two countries were influenced by a high number of different 
factors and it seems that the trajectories of the regimes, similarly to what Archer has 
suggested for educational systems more generally, displayed regularities but did not 
embody logic.1273 The complexity of the two trajectories can, therefore, neither be 
comprehensively explained by referring to most of the macro-sociological theories of 
educational change discussed in section 2.2 nor by arguing along the lines of the 
model developed by Ashton et al. that has been used as the theoretical backdrop of 
the elaborations outlined in this study. On the one hand, both dependency theories 
and neo-Marxist, structural-functionalist and postcolonial explanations – the most 
common theoretical approaches to educational change in developing countries – 
would be in a position to only explain isolated aspects of the development of the two 
skill formation regimes, particularly when it comes to in-firm skill formation arrange-
ments. On the other hand, most of the common political-economic approaches to skill 
formation, including the one by Ashton et al., fall short of sufficiently theorising on the 
changes in the out-of-firm skill formation regimes. Certainly, the elaborations by 
Ashton et al. have pointed to a number of important aspects in the development of 
the skill formation regimes; still, however, the empirical findings of this historical-
comparative study suggest that their model needs to be refined by taking into ac-
count a number of considerations. 
Undoubtedly, the trajectories of the two skill formation regimes were strongly influ-
enced by the global economic and geo-political context. Exogenous factors thus 
were, as Ashton et al. suggest, important but they were, contrary to their model, far 
from being the only determining factors. In fact, the institutional foundations of the 
two countries were strongly influenced by their postcolonial situation; this is particu-
larly true for the trajectories of the political and administrative regimes but also, and 
even more importantly, for the education and training regimes, whose colonial roots 
were reflected by the organisational structures of the education systems, by the cur-
                                            
1273  Archer (1982), p. 58 
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ricular contents of the respective programmes and by the perception by the general 
public that high academic achievements in formal education were an avenue for em-
ployment in the public sector. Similarly, the evolution of the garment production re-
gimes was not only marked by the dynamics of the global garment trade but also by 
the institutional legacies of the respective dual economies, which had restricted in-
dustrial growth in colonial days and led to import-substituting strategies in the first 
postcolonial decades, whose failure – in combination with tremendous international 
pressure from the West – finally resulted in the opening of the two economies in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s respectively. In this context, there emerged – in the gar-
ment industries of both countries – strong disjunctures in the in-firm skill formation 
regimes, which resulted, as Ashton et al. have suggested, on the one hand, from the 
influx of FDI into more technology-intensive firms and, on the other hand, from ample 
opportunities in the global garment business for less experienced, local manufactur-
ers, who owned more labour-intensive firms. Similar to what Ashton et al. have dis-
cussed, the first out-of-firm skill formation programmes for the garment industries, 
formed by government agencies that were still rooted in the tradition of catering to 
import-substituting strategies, would find it difficult to equally satisfy the skill needs of 
both types of entrepreneurs. 
However, when it comes to explaining, in more detail, the further trajectories of the 
out-of-firm skill formation regimes it is not sufficient to refer to exogenous forces and 
to the postcolonial situation of the two countries respectively. If we want to under-
stand why early state-funded programmes became broader and more academic, why 
there emerged private skill formation programmes and – finally – why programmes 
were formed along the lines of public-private partnerships we need to comprehen-
sively take into account endogenous factors that were not discussed by Ashton et al. 
Arguing from a more structural-functionalist perspective one might think that these 
trajectories reflected the functional requirements of changes in the economic struc-
tures of the two countries. But if we look at, in more detail, how institutional change in 
the out-of-firm skill formation regimes actually occurred, for instance when it comes to 
the latest respective developments in Sri Lanka as described in section 8.2.3.3, we 
understand that the growth of skill formation programmes was often hardly related to 
technological change in the industry as such but to dynamics in other social fields, in 
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this particular case to trade policies and international relations.1274 In fact, it would be 
far more plausible to argue – echoing the respective neo-Marxist theories of educa-
tional change – that these trajectories, for instance with regard to the “aristocratic 
seclusion” of higher technical education, were a result of the dominant classes striv-
ing for reproducing their social status, as the motivational orientations of most actors 
involved into the dynamics of the two out-of-firm skill formation regimes were oriented 
towards either achieving or retaining comparatively high socio-cultural and socio-
economic status.  
But when it comes to explaining the dynamics of the trajectories from a more over-
arching perspective, it seems that institutional reproduction and change did not occur 
along the lines of the rationales of such grand theories; rather, we are confronted 
with a complex process that was not only characterised by the social interaction be-
tween purposeful corporate actors but also by aggregate, often unintended effects of 
previous institutional geneses, some of which led to the formation of new actors, both 
collective and corporate, who started to become important for the subsequent devel-
opment of the education and training regimes on the one hand and of the garment 
production regimes on the other hand. We thus explain the increasingly academic 
orientation of state programmes and the emergence of private skill formation pro-
grammes by referring, along the lines of Archer’s work, to the structurally elaborated 
trajectories of educational systems, i.e. to the fact that the skill formation regimes 
started to be shaped by the uncoordinated agency of actors, e.g. of training organisa-
tions and of collectively acting students and parents, all of which had successively 
emerged in the process of educational expansion and were themselves interdepend-
ent with its aggregate effects, notably with the increasing inflation of the value of 
educational credentials.1275 
Similarly, we need to understand the development of public-private partnerships, 
the emergence of which was not foreseen in the model by Ashton et al., as a result of 
the agency by employers’ associations, whose political leverage had been gradually 
growing in the decades after the economic liberalisation, the main institutional 
change in the political economies of both countries that had not only transformed the 
                                            
1274  Many important facets of scepticism with regard to applications of the structural-functionalist 
theories was formulated in an early article by Ball (1981). In fact, one of the main challenges 
with applying structural-functionalist and systems theory to developing countries is the fact that 
one tends – as, for instance, Luhmann (1994, pp. 57 & 77) did – to focus on missing aspects of 
Western development. 
1275  Archer (1979) 
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economic structure but had also affected the actor dynamics in this sphere of society. 
These corporate actors, in fact, started to interact with the state-funded organisa-
tions, whose programmes had – against the entrepreneurs’ own interests – been 
tremendously affected by the aggregate effects of educational expansion and the 
social demand for the respective credentials. Depending on the breadth of the coali-
tions supporting these programmes, the associations had now more or less scope to 
influence institutional change and to have the training programmes readjusted along 
the lines of the key entrepreneurs’ interests; this is why public-private partnerships in 
Sri Lanka look quite different than the ones in Bangladesh.1276 In any event, labour 
unions, which were generally aligned to the major political parties of both countries 
and were entirely overshadowed by the comparatively freely manoeuvring employers’ 
associations, never played a major role in these dynamics. 
These elaborations have, of course, not the all-encompassing explanatory power of 
grand theories. The fact alone that time, as the previous paragraph have demon-
strated, is being considered as a factor in its own right restricts their scope to univer-
sally explain the dynamics of skill formation regimes. However, they are certainly an 
important refinement of Ashton et al.’s model and a contribution to a more encom-
passing middle-range theory of industry-specific skill formation regimes in developing 
countries that not only considers the agency of governments, employers’ associa-
tions and labour unions – the key actors in most political-economic studies on skill 
formation regimes – but also the influence of collectively acting students and parents, 
whose aggregate effects have been widely discussed in the comparative education 
literature. 
                                            
1276  For political-economic literature that particularly refers to the importance of employers’ associa-





15.1 The findings in brief 
This study aimed at better understanding the dynamics of skill formation regimes of 
labour-intensive, export-oriented industries in developing countries by conducting two 
in-depth case studies on the skill formation regimes of the garment industries in Sri 
Lanka and Bangladesh. In brief, its findings are the following: 
First, the study scrutinises the key characteristics of the respective skill formation 
regimes. On the one hand, it shows that in Sri Lanka, a comparatively investment-
oriented in-firm skill formation regime emerged that started to be complemented by 
out-of-firm skill formation arrangements, which were mainly provided and coordinated 
by state agencies. On the other hand, it documents that the in-firm skill formation re-
gime in Bangladesh were comparatively production-oriented and that state agencies 
were less involved into providing and coordinating out-of-firm skill formation ar-
rangements. In short, it contrasts the institutional features of the comparatively high-
skill formation regime in Sri Lanka with those of the comparatively low-skill formation 
regime in Bangladesh. 
Second, the study relates these key characteristics to critical junctures in the his-
torical development of the two countries which have initiated positive feedback 
mechanisms and thus contributed to the skill formation regimes evolving in very dis-
tinct and path-dependent ways. It thereby points – from a historical-institutionalist 
perspective – to the considerable role played by the sequence of educational devel-
opment and industrial expansion and shows that other factors have reinforced the 
differences between the two trajectories as well, notably the critical junctures in the 
development of the production regimes. In this context, the study also showed that 
there is a strong interrelation between the coalitional breadth underlying a given insti-
tutional arrangement and the way these arrangements are being changed by either 
undergoing institutional ruptures or institutional transformations. 
Third, the analysis presents a set of contingent generalisations, which explain social 
processes that characterised the common paths of both countries and thus refines 
the arguments by Ashton et al., who have suggested that the growth of export-
oriented, FDI-backed industries in developing countries the world over would – irre-
spective of other institutional features of these states – have led to a market for pri-
vate training organisations, which were catering to the upper echelons of the foreign-
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owned companies and thus started to marginalise public training organisations. The 
generalisations demonstrate that the trajectories of the skill formation regimes in both 
countries indeed converged to a certain extent and that, indeed, private training or-
ganisations became increasingly important in both countries – despite the different 
sequences of educational development and industrial expansion. However, the dis-
cussion of four phases in the evolution of the out-of-firm skill formation regimes dem-
onstrated that, in contrast to what could be expected from Ashton et al.’s elabora-
tions, the trajectories of these regimes were, in both countries, not only more com-
plex and finally led to different forms of public-private partnerships but that they were 
also rooted in other societal forces than the ones suggested by Ashton et al. In fact, 
endogenous social factors that emanated from aggregate effects of the education 
and training regimes, i.e. the growing social demand for training, and of the produc-
tion regimes, i.e. the increasing political leverage by employers’ associations, were 
critical for the development of the skill formation regimes. 
15.2 Contributions to the literature and an agenda for further research 
These findings contribute to the literature on skill formation and comparative educa-
tion, as it was discussed in chapter 2, in several ways. First, the study analyses skill 
formation regimes in developing countries by integrating a historical-institutionalist 
perspective into a larger comparative education framework. The comparative educa-
tion literature has a strong tradition of putting social and cultural contexts of educa-
tion and training at the centre of analysis but has tended to narrowly focus on school-
based vocational education and training, whereas the analysis of skill formation proc-
esses in the industry – and of its economic context – was generally left to neo-
classical economists. This study is certainly different in this regard: By focusing on 
the skill formation regimes of one specific industry, it necessarily needed to scrutinise 
in more detail not only formal training organisations but also in-firm skill formation 
arrangements, which were, in fact, an important key to understanding why the two 
out-of-firm skill formation regimes have evolved in such different ways. The applica-
tion of a historical-institutionalist perspective, whose representatives have tremen-
dously contributed to the understanding of the political economy of in-firm skill forma-
tion regimes in the recent years, was certainly crucial. It was against the backdrop of 
much of this reasoning that this study also – in order to understand skill formation 
processes – comprehensively reconstructed the historical trajectories of the garment 
industries in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh and their political-economic contexts and 
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thereby contributed to an important aspect of South Asian economic historiography. 
There is thus little doubt that an encompassing analysis of the transmission of skills 
for specific economic sectors, which is undoubtedly an integral aspect of educational 
processes as such, necessarily needs to bring in perspectives from both political 
economy and comparative education. 
Second, the findings of this study not only contribute to the comparative education 
literature on skill formation in developing countries but more generally to a key de-
bate in comparative education that discusses whether globalisation leads to increas-
ing convergence of education and training systems.1277 The analysis of the two case 
studies shows that – in contrast to what could be expected, for instance, from a neo-
institutionalist perspective – even in the case of skill formation regimes of export-
oriented, labour-intensive industries, trajectories may be highly country-specific. In 
contrast to many critics of neo-institutionalist reasoning, the study, however, also 
shows that endogenous forces have tremendously shaped the skill formation ar-
rangements in ways that share many similarities, possibly across societies world-
wide. Even though the trajectories under study may be path-dependent, they are far 
from being entirely idiosyncratic; rather, they are characterised by similar regularities 
that don’t result from the impact of global level forces but from aggregate effects of 
education and training regimes on the one hand and of production regimes on the 
other hand. 
Third, this study focuses on geographical contexts, where research on the political 
economy of skill formation is very rare – and the application of models elaborated in 
different political, economic and social contexts quite frequent. In fact, the historical-
institutionalist literature has tremendously influenced the political science literature on 
skill formation in more industrialised countries and, to some extent, in the NIEs, but 
its authors have been reluctant to scrutinise similar processes in developing coun-
tries.1278 In contrast to most historical-institutionalist approaches to skill formation, the 
study was, however, based on an analytical framework that takes serious the dynam-
ics unleashed by the growth of educational systems; it thus pointed to a major weak-
ness of much of the literature on the political economy of skill formation in more in-
dustrialised countries. In fact, a comprehensive analysis of reforms in vocational edu-
                                            
1277  On the debate on convergence and divergence of education and training systems see Gonon 
(2004), Green et al. (1999a), Marginson (1999), Oelkers (2006, p. 29), Schriewer (2004). 
1278  As discussed in section 2.3, one of the few political-economic studies that uses methods in-
spired by historical institutionalism in order to analyse skill formation regimes in developing 
countries in Southeast Asia is the one by Ritchie (2001). 
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cation and training, be it in Switzerland, France or the US, needs to turn to a very 
crucial type of collective actors – students and their parents –, who may be, as indi-
viduals, far less powerful than associations, labour unions, political parties and state 
agencies, but have a tremendous aggregate effect on the dynamics of the dynamics 
of skill formation regimes, as their agency is the basis of social demand for specific 
education and training programmes. 
Undoubtedly, more research needs to be conducted in order better explain how skill 
formation regimes of labour-intensive, export-oriented industries evolve in developing 
countries. The temporal model outlined above certainly contributes to a better under-
standing of the respective processes but it also serves as a stepping stone for further 
research on the political economy of skill formation in developing countries. Of 
course, further research would gain from focussing on different countries and regions 
but also from scrutinising different types of critical economic sectors, be it in South 
Asia or elsewhere. Research would certainly profit from analyses of respective proc-
esses in similarly globalised but considerably more skill-intensive industries, such as 
the manufacture of electronic devices, or of developments in much more domestically 
oriented economic sectors, such as agriculture or the construction industry. Both in 
Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, one may further look at the skill formation regime of the 
nascent ship building industry, which may be a further important step in the industri-
alisation process of the two countries.1279 
Further research on the political economy of skill formation in developing countries 
certainly needs, as it was done in this study, to scrutinise the role of employers’ as-
sociations. In fact, these organisations have turned out to be highly crucial actors, 
and it can be assumed that in any other developing country which adopted a private 
sector led strategy of economic development such organisations would be of similar 
importance for the development of skill formation regimes, notably in the wake of 
their being strengthened by donor organisations. This may involve, as in this study, a 
major effort to trace and interview the respective individuals, as the evolution of such 
organisations – not only in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh but in developing countries 
more generally – has, until recently, been neglected, whereas the history of labour 
unions, which lost much of their previous leverage, is rather well documented.1280 
                                            
1279  Senewiratne (2009), Star Business (2009) 
1280  For more recent research on business associations in developing countries see Doner and 
Schneider (2000), Goldsmith (2002), Lucas (1997), Schneider and Maxfield (1997). 
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15.3 Revisiting the debate on “high skills” in developing countries 
This study was also conducted in order to contribute to a global debate centring 
around the problem how “high skills” in developing countries could be fostered in the 
wake of a “new international division of labour”. The overall design of the study was, 
thereby, rooted in the assumption that this debate needs to be more informed about 
the historical development of skill formation regimes in specific countries and indus-
tries. Selecting the garment industry has proved to be highly fruitful, as the industry 
is, in fact, an important example of a traditionally low-skill and highly labour-intensive 
trade that started to require higher skills from the respective workforce in the context 
of increasing global economic liberalisation and competition. This could be shown by 
taking Sri Lanka and Bangladesh as examples, two countries, whose economies 
started to critically depend on the garment industry, even compared to other coun-
tries in South Asia, one of the most important garment exporting regions in the world. 
The in-depth case studies show that it will be highly unlikely that the dilemma how 
to best foster “high skills” in developing countries may be solved by referring to global 
models as panaceas to address what are perceived to be very pressing challenges. 
They also show that the development of skill formation regimes, notably the devel-
opment of out-of-firm skill formation programmes and organisations, has been, in 
both countries, riddled by innumerable difficulties. The main difficulty with establish-
ing out-of-firm skill formation arrangements is certainly to make them sustainable 
over a long period and to make sure that they indeed enhance skills in potentially 
critical domains and that they indeed contribute to the development of an entire in-
dustry – and not only to the improvement of a couple of firms, whose owners are on 
good terms with politicians, administrators and representatives of donor agencies. 
Furthermore, the study demonstrates that very effective institutional arrangements, 
which may be attractive to serve as best practices for donors and other organisa-
tions, not only are very seldom but need to be scrutinised with regard to context-
specific conditions that facilitated what key actors perceived to be successful. 
The CITI in Sri Lanka, for instance, has become a highly reputed organisation be-
cause it had the backing of donor agencies for more than two decades, which helped 
this organisation to at least keep in line with the technological development in some 
of the technologically more advanced firms of the country. The BIFT in Bangladesh, 
to mention another example, partly owes its success to donors as well, many of 
which, however, tend to overlook that this organisation is virtually owned by a small 
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group of entrepreneurs who represent one faction of the leading association in the 
garment trade. The analysis also suggests that the schemes formed along the lines 
of public-private partnership entail a number of characteristics, which may undermine 
their sustainability in the long run. Certainly, many of these programmes are being 
borne by comparatively broader coalitions and cater more specifically to the needs of 
entrepreneurs than many of those traditionally offered by public training organisa-
tions. But the analysis points out that a number of such schemes lead to funds both 
by government and donor organisations being used as an extension of privileges to a 
small group of rent-seeking entrepreneurs and that they are often the result of ad-hoc 
agreements between state agencies, donor organisations and associations, or their 
representatives respectively, and, above all, only rarely contribute to a better coordi-
nation of skill formation regimes. 
The main reason for many of the difficulties with the relevance and with the sus-
tainability of out-of-firm skill formation programmes is certainly their often lacking 
complementarities with in-firm skill formation regimes, and it is in this regard that or-
ganisations like CITI and BIFT have become more successful than others. However, 
the emergence of comparatively ideal complementarities is often highly contingent 
and is difficult to be replicated in other contexts. Quite simply, the growth of a com-
paratively higher number of skill formation programmes, which are considered rele-
vant by representatives of the industry, is more likely in countries, where, as in Sri 
Lanka, a relatively high number of firms had a more investment-oriented in-firm skill 
formation regime at an early point. There, the development of such a regime was fa-
cilitated by a radical liberalisation of the economy that aimed at opening the doors to 
FDI and by the high availability of easily trainable secondary school leavers and 
graduates, who were eager to join an emerging industry. 
This conclusion may be seen as corroborating the World Bank’s emphasis on FDI 
and on investments into general education as a basis for technological change and 
industrialisation and thus as de-legitimising industrial policy and investments into 
technical and vocational education and training.1281 This is, however, not the case: 
first, the Sri Lankan trajectory suggests that the importance of FDI needs to be put in 
perspective: in fact, there were, already at the time of the expansion of the garment 
industry, a group of very experienced, local entrepreneurs who had emerged in the 
context of the import-substituting policies of the 1960s and who would help to expand 
                                            
1281  See, for instance, De Ferranti and Perry (2003, p. 2).  
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the industry – notably after the outbreak of the war, when FDI started to be partly 
withdrawn from Sri Lanka. 
Second, the Sri Lankan garment industry tremendously profited from subsequent 
governments and donor organisations supporting state-funded skill formation pro-
grammes. The CITI and the textile and clothing department of the University of 
Moratuwa are very important examples in this regard. If governments had concen-
trated on investments in general education and had left skill formation in the hands of 
the private sector, the Sri Lankan garment industry might be far less sophisticated 
than it is today. The current situation on the global market for garments suggests that 
such investments by state agencies will continue to be important, as only few firms 
tend to engage in investment-oriented skill formation. Certainly, increasing collabora-
tion between these actors, the state agencies and representatives of the industry, is 
vital to move towards “high skills”. But planners need to be careful enough to discern 
between the entrepreneurs’ more short-term, production-oriented interests in skill 
formation and more long-term perspectives on training. 
Third, the fact that the rapid expansion of the Sri Lankan general education system 
was not paralleled by equal rapid economic development considerably contributed to 
political tensions in a country, which, at the time of its early postcolonial years, was 
deemed to be one of the most likely candidates for rapid economic growth. In this 
regard, one may also be sceptical of the long term impact of global programmes like 
EFA. The examples of East Asian countries suggest that both economic and social 
development in countries will be more sustainable if governments are in a position to 
coordinate industrial and educational expansion.1282 
In any event, both of these recipes for economic development, to attract FDI and to 
heavily invest into the development of a general education system, are not merely 
technical matters but highly political issues, with a great number of unforeseeable 
consequences, particularly in states with weak and fractionalised political and admin-
istrative regimes. Certainly, the development of a strongly production-oriented skill 
formation regime in Bangladesh, where both the influx of FDI and literacy rates were 
low, has contributed to some of the difficulties of its garment industry. But if one con-
siders the different routes that leading industrial nations, e.g. France and Great Brit-
ain, have taken with regard to education and skill formation in previous centuries, 
                                            
1282  For important contributions to the fairly large body of literature that theorises on the role of edu-
cation in the NIEs see Ashton et al. (1999), Green (2007), Morris (1996). 
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there is some scope to assume that there are, even now, different ways to achieve 
sustainable economic and social development.1283 There is thus ample evidence that 
the garment industry in Bangladesh fast improves its backward linkages, a fact, 
which is, at least partly, a consequence of the government’s investments into textile-
related technical education in the last three decades. And if there indeed evolves a – 
comparatively higher value-adding – ship-building industry in Bangladesh, past ef-
forts to develop the skills of technicians and engineers in this industrial field will cer-
tainly play a crucial role. 
It is for reasons like this that this study, unlike other work on skill formation in more 
industrialised and developing countries, didn’t elaborate any ideal model of skill for-
mation arrangements that could be applied in a number of different geographical and 
cultural contexts. But it certainly contributes to more realistic assessments of the po-
tential effect of reforms in the field of skill formation; some of its theoretical tools, no-
tably the tables elaborating on the dimensions and aspects of in-firm and out-of-firm 
skill formation institutions, may be of very practical use for those who aim at analys-
ing existing and prospective skill formation programmes and organisations, for in-
stance in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, where donor organisations and state agencies 
will be engaged in far-reaching reforms of the technical and vocational education and 
training system. 
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 Bangladesh Sri Lanka Total 
Administrative units 4 4 8 
Associations 1 4 5 
Companies 20 29 49 
Donor organisations 2 0 2 
Training organisations 26 23 49 




Annex 2: Categorisation of firms and training organisations 
 
Annex 2.1: Firms 
Sri Lanka 
Firm 1 FTZ 
Firm 2 FTZ 
Firm 3 FTZ 
Firm 4 FTZ 
Firm 5 Non-FTZ 
Firm 6 Non-FTZ 
Firm 7 Non-FTZ 
Firm 8 Non-FTZ 
Firm 9 Non-FTZ 
Firm 10 Non-FTZ 
Firm 11 Non-FTZ 
Firm 12 Non-FTZ 
Firm 13 Non-FTZ 
Firm 14 Non-FTZ 
Firm 15 FTZ 
Firm 16 FTZ 
Firm 17 FTZ 
Firm 18 Non-FTZ 
Firm 19 Non-FTZ 
Firm 20 Non-FTZ 
Firm 21 Non-FTZ 
Firm 22 Non-FTZ 
Firm 23 Non-FTZ 
Firm 24 FTZ 
Firm 25 Non-FTZ 
Firm 26 FTZ 
Firm 27 FTZ 
Firm 28 Non-FTZ 
Firm 29 Non-FTZ 
Bangladesh 
Firm 1 Non-FTZ 
Firm 2 Non-FTZ 
Firm 3 Non-FTZ 
Firm 4 Non-FTZ 
Firm 5 Non-FTZ 
Firm 6 FTZ 
Firm 7 Non-FTZ 
Firm 8 Non-FTZ 
Firm 9 FTZ 
Firm 10 FTZ 
Firm 11 Non-FTZ 
Firm 12 FTZ 
Firm 13 Non-FTZ 
Firm 14 Non-FTZ 
Firm 15 Non-FTZ 
Firm 16 FTZ 
Firm 17 Non-FTZ 
Firm 18 Non-FTZ 
Firm 19 Non-FTZ 








Legend:  FTZ  Firm situated in a Free Trade Zone 
Non-FTZ Firm situated outside Free Trade Zones 
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Annex 2.2: Training organisations 
Sri Lanka 
Training organisation 1 professional 
Training organisation 2 craft 
Training organisation 3 technician 
Training organisation 4 professional 
Training organisation 5 technician 
Training organisation 6 professional 
Training organisation 7 craft 
Training organisation 8 craft 
Training organisation 9 craft 
Training organisation 10 craft 
Training organisation 11 craft 
Training organisation 12 craft 
Training organisation 13 craft 
Training organisation 14 craft 
Training organisation 15 craft 
Training organisation 16 craft 
Training organisation 17 craft 
Training organisation 18 craft 
Training organisation 19 craft 
Training organisation 20 craft 
Training organisation 21 craft 
Training organisation 22 craft 
Training organisation 23 craft 
 
Bangladesh 
Training organisation 1 craft 
Training organisation 2 professional 
Training organisation 3 craft 
Training organisation 4 professional 
Training organisation 5 craft 
Training organisation 6 professional 
Training organisation 7 technician 
Training organisation 8 technician 
Training organisation 9 professional 
Training organisation 10 professional 
Training organisation 11 craft 
Training organisation 12 craft 
Training organisation 13 craft 
Training organisation 14 craft 
Training organisation 15 technician 
Training organisation 16 craft 
Training organisation 17 craft 
Training organisation 18 craft 
Training organisation 19 craft 
Training organisation 20 craft 
Training organisation 21 craft 
Training organisation 22 craft 
Training organisation 23 craft 
Training organisation 24 craft 
Training organisation 25 craft 




Legend:  craft  Organisation providing training programmes at the craft  
level, normally awarding a certificate. 
technician Organisation providing training programmes at the  
technician level, normally awarding a diploma 
professional Organisation providing training programmes at the 
professional level, normally awarding a degree 
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 Curricula vitae Fieldnotes Interviews 
Administrative units 0 0 7 
Associations 0 0 7 
Companies 0 13 56 
Donor organisations 0 0 3 
Training organisations 22 11 39 
Total 22 24 112 
 
Sri Lanka 
 Curricula vitae Fieldnotes Interviews 
Administrative units 0 2 6 
Associations 0 2 7 
Companies 16 0 24 
Donor organisations 0 0 0 
Training organisations 24 6 16 




Annex 4: Structured questionnaire on in-firm skill forma-
tion processes (excerpt)1284 
 
 
                                            
1284  This version of the questionnaire was designed to gather information on the Vocational Training 
Centres in Sri Lanka. Questionnaires for other types of training organisations were structured in 

















Annex 5: Structured questionnaire on out-of-firm skill for-
mation processes (excerpt) 1285 
 
                                            
1285  This version of the questionnaire was designed to gather information on the Vocational Training 
Centres in Sri Lanka. Questionnaires for other types of training organisations were structured in 








Annex 6: Questionnaire on curricula vitae of employees in 















Annex 9: Overview of empirical data gathered for the study 
Part 1: Sri Lanka 
Name of the electronic file, as cited in the chapters 
 
Type of data 
 




Type or no. of representatives 
/ other notes 
SL_CV_Firm01 Curriculum vitae Firm 1  
SL_CV_Firm02 Curriculum vitae Firm 2  
SL_CV_Firm05 Curriculum vitae Firm 5  
SL_CV_Firm06 Curriculum vitae Firm 6  
SL_CV_Firm10 Curriculum vitae Firm 10  
SL_CV_Firm11 Curriculum vitae Firm 11  
SL_CV_Firm13 Curriculum vitae Firm 13  
SL_CV_Firm14 Curriculum vitae Firm 14  
SL_CV_Firm19 Curriculum vitae Firm 19  
SL_CV_Firm20 Curriculum vitae Firm 20  
SL_CV_Firm22 Curriculum vitae Firm 22  
SL_CV_Firm23 Curriculum vitae Firm 23  
SL_CV_Firm24 Curriculum vitae Firm 24  
SL_CV_Firm25 Curriculum vitae Firm 25  
SL_CV_Firm26 Curriculum vitae Firm 26  
SL_CV_Firm29 Curriculum vitae Firm 29  
SL_CV_TrainOrg02_Instructors Curriculum vitae Training organisation 2 Instructors 
SL_CV_TrainOrg02_Trainees Curriculum vitae Training organisation 2 Trainees 
SL_CV_TrainOrg03_Instructors Curriculum vitae Training organisation 3 Instructors 
SL_CV_TrainOrg03_Trainees Curriculum vitae Training organisation 3 Trainees 
SL_CV_TrainOrg05_Instructors Curriculum vitae Training organisation 5 Instructors 
SL_CV_TrainOrg06_Instructors Curriculum vitae Training organisation 6 Instructors 
SL_CV_TrainOrg07_Trainees Curriculum vitae Training organisation 7 Trainees 
SL_CV_TrainOrg08_Instructors Curriculum vitae Training organisation 8 Instructors 
SL_CV_TrainOrg08_Trainees Curriculum vitae Training organisation 8 Trainees 
SL_CV_TrainOrg09_Instructors Curriculum vitae Training organisation 9 Instructors 
SL_CV_TrainOrg09_Trainees Curriculum vitae Training organisation 9 Trainees 
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Name of the electronic file, as cited in the chapters 
 
Type of data 
 




Type or no. of representatives 
/ other notes 
SL_CV_TrainOrg10_Instructors Curriculum vitae Training organisation 10 Instructors 
SL_CV_TrainOrg11_Instructors Curriculum vitae Training organisation 11 Instructors 
SL_CV_TrainOrg12_Instructors Curriculum vitae Training organisation 12 Instructors 
SL_CV_TrainOrg12_Trainees Curriculum vitae Training organisation 12 Trainees 
SL_CV_TrainOrg13_Instructors Curriculum vitae Training organisation 13 Instructors 
SL_CV_TrainOrg13_Trainees Curriculum vitae Training organisation 13 Trainees 
SL_CV_TrainOrg14_Instructors Curriculum vitae Training organisation 14 Instructors 
SL_CV_TrainOrg14_Trainees Curriculum vitae Training organisation 14 Trainees 
SL_CV_TrainOrg15_Instructors Curriculum vitae Training organisation 15 Instructors 
SL_CV_TrainOrg15_Trainees Curriculum vitae Training organisation 15 Trainees 
SL_CV_TrainOrg16_Trainees Curriculum vitae Training organisation 16 Trainees 
SL_CV_TrainOrg17_Instructors Curriculum vitae Training organisation 17 Instructors 
SL_CV_TrainOrg17_Trainees Curriculum vitae Training organisation 17 Trainees 
SL_CV_TrainOrg19_Instructors Curriculum vitae Training organisation 19 Instructors 
SL_CV_TrainOrg19_Trainees Curriculum vitae Training organisation 19 Trainees 
SL_CV_TrainOrg20_Instructors Curriculum vitae Training organisation 20 Instructors 
SL_CV_TrainOrg20_Trainees Curriculum vitae Training organisation 20 Trainees 
SL_CV_TrainOrg21_Instructors Curriculum vitae Training organisation 21 Instructors 
SL_CV_TrainOrg21_Trainees Curriculum vitae Training organisation 21 Trainees 
SL_CV_TrainOrg23_Instructors Curriculum vitae Training organisation 23 Instructors 
SL_CV_TrainOrg23_Trainees Curriculum vitae Training organisation 23 Trainees 
SL_CV_TrainOrg24_Instructors Curriculum vitae Training organisation 24 Instructors 
SL_CV_TrainOrg24_Trainees Curriculum vitae Training organisation 24 Trainees 
SL_FNotes_AdminUnit4_Letter  Fieldnotes Administrative unit 4 Notes on a letter 
SL_FNotes_AdminUnit5_PartObs1 Fieldnotes Administrative unit 5 Participant observation 
SL_FNotes_Association1_PartObs1 Fieldnotes Association 1 Participant observation 
SL_FNotes_Association1_Representative3_PersonalComm  Fieldnotes Association 1 Personal communication 
SL_FNotes_TrainOrg02 Fieldnotes Training organisation 2  
SL_FNotes_TrainOrg09 Fieldnotes Training organisation 9  
SL_FNotes_TrainOrg18 Fieldnotes Training organisation 18  
SL_FNotes_TrainOrg19 Fieldnotes Training organisation 19  





Name of the electronic file, as cited in the chapters 
 
Type of data 
 




Type or no. of representatives 
/ other notes 
SL_FNotes_TrainOrg23 Fieldnotes Training organisation 23  
SL_Int_AdminUnit1_Representative1 Interview Administrative unit 1 1 
SL_Int_AdminUnit2_Representative1 Interview Administrative unit 2 1 
SL_Int_AdminUnit3_Representative1 Interview Administrative unit 3 1 
SL_Int_AdminUnit3_Representative2 Interview Administrative unit 3 2 
SL_Int_AdminUnit4_Representative1 Interview Administrative unit 4 1 
SL_Int_AdminUnit4_Representative2 Interview Administrative unit 4 2 
SL_Int_Association1_Representative1 Interview Association 1 1 
SL_Int_Association1_Representative2 Interview Association 1 2 
SL_Int_Association2_Representative1 Interview Association 2 1 
SL_Int_Association3_Representative1 Interview Association 3 1 
SL_Int_Association3_Representative2 Interview Association 3 2 
SL_Int_Association4_Representative1 Interview Association 4 1 
SL_Int_Association4_Representative2 Interview Association 4 2 
SL_Int_Firm02_Representative1 Interview Firm 2 1 
SL_Int_Firm02_Representative2 Interview Firm 2 2 
SL_Int_Firm02_Representative3 Interview Firm 2 3 
SL_Int_Firm02_Representative4 Interview Firm 2 4 
SL_Int_Firm03_Representative1 Interview Firm 3 1 
SL_Int_Firm04_Representative1 Interview Firm 4 1 
SL_Int_Firm04_Representative2 Interview Firm 4 2 
SL_Int_Firm04_Representative3 Interview Firm 4 3 
SL_Int_Firm07_Representative1 Interview Firm 7 1 
SL_Int_Firm08_Representative1 Interview Firm 8 1 
SL_Int_Firm09_Representative1 Interview Firm 9 1 
SL_Int_Firm10_Representative1 Interview Firm 10 1 
SL_Int_Firm10_Representative2 Interview Firm 10 2 
SL_Int_Firm10_Representative3&4 Interview Firm 10 3 and 4 
SL_Int_Firm12_Representative1 Interview Firm 12 1 
SL_Int_Firm15_Representative1 Interview Firm 15 1 und 2 
SL_Int_Firm16_Representative1 Interview Firm 16 1 
SL_Int_Firm17_Representative1 Interview Firm 17 1 
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Name of the electronic file, as cited in the chapters 
 
Type of data 
 




Type or no. of representatives 
/ other notes 
SL_Int_Firm18_Representative1 Interview Firm 18 1 
SL_Int_Firm21_Representative1 Interview Firm 21 1 
SL_Int_Firm22_Representative1 Interview Firm 22 1 
SL_Int_Firm26_Representative1 Interview Firm 26 1 
SL_Int_Firm27_Representative1 Interview Firm 27 1 
SL_Int_Firm28_Representative1 Interview Firm 28 1 
SL_Int_Firm29_Representative1 Interview Firm 29 1 
SL_Int_TrainOrg01_Representative1 Interview Training organisation 1 1 
SL_Int_TrainOrg03_Representative1 Interview Training organisation 3 1 
SL_Int_TrainOrg03_Representative2 Interview Training organisation 3 2 
SL_Int_TrainOrg03_Representative3 Interview Training organisation 3 3 
SL_Int_TrainOrg03_Representative4 Interview Training organisation 3 4 
SL_Int_TrainOrg03_Representative5 Interview Training organisation 3 5 
SL_Int_TrainOrg03_Representative6 Interview Training organisation 3 6 
SL_Int_TrainOrg03_Representative7 Interview Training organisation 3 7 
SL_Int_TrainOrg04_Representative1 Interview Training organisation 4 1 
SL_Int_TrainOrg05_Representative1 Interview Training organisation 5 1 
SL_Int_TrainOrg06_Representative1 Interview Training organisation 6 1 
SL_Int_TrainOrg06_Representative2 Interview Training organisation 6 2 
SL_Int_TrainOrg06_Representative3 Interview Training organisation 6 3 
SL_Int_TrainOrg06_Representative4 Interview Training organisation 6 4 
SL_Int_TrainOrg06_Representative5 Interview Training organisation 6 5 









Part 2: Bangladesh 
Name of the electronic file, as cited in the chapters 
 
Type of data 
 




Type or no. of representatives 
/ other notes 
BD_CV_TrainOrg11_Instructors  Curriculum vitae Training organisation 11 Instructors 
BD_CV_TrainOrg11_Trainees Curriculum vitae Training organisation 11 Trainees 
BD_CV_TrainOrg12_Instructors  Curriculum vitae Training organisation 12 Instructors 
BD_CV_TrainOrg12_Trainees Curriculum vitae Training organisation 12 Trainees 
BD_CV_TrainOrg13_Instructors  Curriculum vitae Training organisation 13 Instructors 
BD_CV_TrainOrg13_Trainees Curriculum vitae Training organisation 13 Trainees 
BD_CV_TrainOrg16_Instructors Curriculum vitae Training organisation 16 Instructors 
BD_CV_TrainOrg16_Trainees Curriculum vitae Training organisation 16 Trainees 
BD_CV_TrainOrg17_Instructors Curriculum vitae Training organisation 17 Instructors 
BD_CV_TrainOrg17_Trainees Curriculum vitae Training organisation 17 Trainees 
BD_CV_TrainOrg18_Instructors Curriculum vitae Training organisation 18 Instructors 
BD_CV_TrainOrg18_Trainees Curriculum vitae Training organisation 18 Trainees 
BD_CV_TrainOrg19_Instructors  Curriculum vitae Training organisation 19 Instructors 
BD_CV_TrainOrg19_Trainees Curriculum vitae Training organisation 19 Trainees 
BD_CV_TrainOrg20_Instructors  Curriculum vitae Training organisation 20 Instructors 
BD_CV_TrainOrg20_Trainees Curriculum vitae Training organisation 20 Trainees 
BD_CV_TrainOrg22_Trainees  Curriculum vitae Training organisation 22 Trainees 
BD_CV_TrainOrg23_Trainees  Curriculum vitae Training organisation 23 Trainees 
BD_CV_TrainOrg24_Instructors Curriculum vitae Training organisation 24 Instructors 
BD_CV_TrainOrg24_Trainees  Curriculum vitae Training organisation 24 Trainees 
BD_CV_TrainOrg26_Instructors Curriculum vitae Training organisation 26 Instructors 
BD_CV_TrainOrg26_Trainees Curriculum vitae Training organisation 26 Trainees 
BD_FNotes_Firm01 Fieldnotes Firm 1  
BD_FNotes_Firm05 Fieldnotes Firm 5  
BD_FNotes_Firm06 Fieldnotes Firm 6  
BD_FNotes_Firm07 Fieldnotes Firm 7  
BD_FNotes_Firm09 Fieldnotes Firm 9  
BD_FNotes_Firm12 Fieldnotes Firm 12  






Name of the electronic file, as cited in the chapters 
 
Type of data 
 




Type or no. of representatives 
/ other notes 
BD_FNotes_Firm15 Fieldnotes Firm 15  
BD_FNotes_Firm16 Fieldnotes Firm 16  
BD_FNotes_Firm17 Fieldnotes Firm 17  
BD_FNotes_Firm18 Fieldnotes Firm 18  
BD_FNotes_Firm19 Fieldnotes Firm 19  
BD_FNotes_Firm20 Fieldnotes Firm 20  
BD_FNotes_TrainOrg03  Fieldnotes Training organisation 3  
BD_FNotes_TrainOrg13 Fieldnotes Training organisation 13  
BD_FNotes_TrainOrg16  Fieldnotes Training organisation 16  
BD_FNotes_TrainOrg17 Fieldnotes Training organisation 17  
BD_FNotes_TrainOrg18 Fieldnotes Training organisation 18  
BD_FNotes_TrainOrg19 Fieldnotes Training organisation 19  
BD_FNotes_TrainOrg21 Fieldnotes Training organisation 21  
BD_FNotes_TrainOrg22 Fieldnotes Training organisation 22  
BD_FNotes_TrainOrg24 Fieldnotes Training organisation 24  
BD_FNotes_TrainOrg25 Fieldnotes Training organisation 25  
BD_FNotes_TrainOrg26 Fieldnotes Training organisation 26  
BD_Int_AdminUnit1_Representative1&2 Interview Administrative unit 1 1&2 
BD_Int_AdminUnit2_Representative1 Interview Administrative unit 2 1 
BD_Int_AdminUnit2_Representative2 Interview Administrative unit 2 2 
BD_Int_AdminUnit3_Representative1 Interview Administrative unit 3 1 
BD_Int_AdminUnit4_Representative1 Interview Administrative unit 4 1 
BD_Int_AdminUnit4_Representative2 Interview Administrative unit 4 2 
BD_Int_AdminUnit4_Representative3 Interview Administrative unit 4 3 
BD_Int_Association1_Representative1 Interview Association 1 1 
BD_Int_Association1_Representative2 Interview Association 1 2 
BD_Int_Association1_Representative3 Interview Association 1 3 
BD_Int_Association1_Representative4 Interview Association 1 4 
BD_Int_Association1_Representative5 Interview Association 1 5 
BD_Int_Association1_Representative6 Interview Association 1 6 
BD_Int_Association1_Representative7 Interview Association 1 7 






Name of the electronic file, as cited in the chapters 
 
Type of data 
 




Type or no. of representatives 
/ other notes 
BD_Int_Firm02_Representative1 Interview Firm 2 1 
BD_Int_Firm03_Representative1 Interview Firm 3 1 
BD_Int_Firm04_Representative1 Interview Firm 4 1 
BD_Int_Firm05_Representative1 Interview Firm 5 1 
BD_Int_Firm05_Representative2 Interview Firm 5 2 
BD_Int_Firm05_Representative3 Interview Firm 5 3 
BD_Int_Firm05_Representative4 Interview Firm 5 4 
BD_Int_Firm05_Representative5 Interview Firm 5 5 
BD_Int_Firm06_Representative1 Interview Firm 6 1 
BD_Int_Firm06_Representative2 Interview Firm 6 2 
BD_Int_Firm06_Representative3 Interview Firm 6 3 
BD_Int_Firm06_Representative4 Interview Firm 6 4 
BD_Int_Firm06_Representative5&6 Interview Firm 6 5 and 6 
BD_Int_Firm06_Representative7 Interview Firm 6 7 
BD_Int_Firm06_Representative8 Interview Firm 6 8 
BD_Int_Firm06_Representative9 Interview Firm 6 9 
BD_Int_Firm06_Representative10 Interview Firm 6 10 
BD_Int_Firm06_Representative11 Interview Firm 6 11 
BD_Int_Firm07_Representative1 Interview Firm 7 1 
BD_Int_Firm07_Representative2 Interview Firm 7 2 
BD_Int_Firm07_Representative3 Interview Firm 7 3 
BD_Int_Firm07_Representative4 Interview Firm 7 4 
BD_Int_Firm07_Representative5 Interview Firm 7 5 
BD_Int_Firm07_Representative6 Interview Firm 7 6 
BD_Int_Firm07_Representative7 Interview Firm 7 7 
BD_Int_Firm07_Representative8 Interview Firm 7 8 
BD_Int_Firm07_Representative9 Interview Firm 7 9 
BD_Int_Firm07_Representative10 Interview Firm 7 10 
BD_Int_Firm07_Representative11 Interview Firm 7 11 
BD_Int_Firm08_Representative1 Interview Firm 8 1 
BD_Int_Firm09_Representative1 Interview Firm 9 1 






Name of the electronic file, as cited in the chapters 
 
Type of data 
 




Type or no. of representatives 
/ other notes 
BD_Int_Firm09_Representative3 Interview Firm 9 3 
BD_Int_Firm10_Representative1 Interview Firm 10 1 
BD_Int_Firm11_Representative1 Interview Firm 11 1 
BD_Int_Firm11_Representative2 Interview Firm 11 2 
BD_Int_Firm11_Representative3 Interview Firm 11 3 
BD_Int_Firm11_Representative4 Interview Firm 11 4 
BD_Int_Firm11_Representative5 Interview Firm 11 5 
BD_Int_Firm11_Representative6 Interview Firm 11 6 
BD_Int_Firm11_Representative7 Interview Firm 11 7 
BD_Int_Firm11_Representative8 Interview Firm 11 8 
BD_Int_Firm11_Representative9 Interview Firm 11 9 
BD_Int_Firm11_Representative10 Interview Firm 11 10 
BD_Int_Firm13_Representative1 Interview Firm 13 1 
BD_Int_Firm13_Representative2 Interview Firm 13 2 
BD_Int_Firm13_Representative3 Interview Firm 13 3 
BD_Int_Firm13_Representative4 Interview Firm 13 4 
BD_Int_Firm13_Representative5 Interview Firm 13 5 
BD_Int_Firm13_Representative6 Interview Firm 13 6 
BD_Int_Firm13_Representative7 Interview Firm 13 7 
BD_Int_Firm13_Representative8 Interview Firm 13 8 
BD_Int_Firm13_Representative9 Interview Firm 13 9 
BD_Int_Firm14_Representative1 Interview Firm 14 1 
BD_Int_Firm14_Representative2 Interview Firm 14 2 
BD_Int_DonorOrg1_Representative1  Interview Donor organisation 1 1 
BD_Int_DonorOrg1_Representative2 Interview Donor organisation 1 2 
BD_Int_DonorOrg2_Representative1  Interview Donor organisation 2 1 
BD_Int_TrainOrg01_Representative1 Interview Training organisation 1 1 
BD_Int_TrainOrg01_Representative1&5 Interview Training organisation 1 1 and 5 
BD_Int_TrainOrg01_Representative2 Interview Training organisation 1 2 
BD_Int_TrainOrg01_Representative3 Interview Training organisation 1 3 
BD_Int_TrainOrg01_Representative4 Interview Training organisation 1 4 
BD_Int_TrainOrg01_Representative5 Interview Training organisation 1 5 
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Name of the electronic file, as cited in the chapters 
 
Type of data 
 




Type or no. of representatives 
/ other notes 
BD_Int_TrainOrg01_Representative6 Interview Training organisation 1 6 
BD_Int_TrainOrg01_Representative7 Interview Training organisation 1 7 
BD_Int_TrainOrg01_Representative8 Interview Training organisation 1 8 
BD_Int_TrainOrg01_Representative9 Interview Training organisation 1 9 
BD_Int_TrainOrg01_Representative10 Interview Training organisation 1 10 
BD_Int_TrainOrg01_Representative11 Interview Training organisation 1 11 
BD_Int_TrainOrg01_Representative12 Interview Training organisation 1 12 
BD_Int_TrainOrg01_Representative13 Interview Training organisation 1 13 
BD_Int_TrainOrg01_Representative14 Interview Training organisation 1 14 
BD_Int_TrainOrg01_Representative15 Interview Training organisation 1 15 
BD_Int_TrainOrg02_Representative1 Interview Training organisation 2 1 
BD_Int_TrainOrg02_Representative2 Interview Training organisation 2 2 
BD_Int_TrainOrg02_Representative3 Interview Training organisation 2 3 
BD_Int_TrainOrg02_Representative4&5 Interview Training organisation 2 4&5 
BD_Int_TrainOrg03_Representative1 Interview Training organisation 3 1 
BD_Int_TrainOrg03_Representative2 Interview Training organisation 3 2 
BD_Int_TrainOrg03_Representative3 Interview Training organisation 3 3 
BD_Int_TrainOrg04_Representative1 Interview Training organisation 4 1 
BD_Int_TrainOrg05_Representative1&2 Interview Training organisation 5 1 and 2 
BD_Int_TrainOrg06_Representative1 Interview Training organisation 6 1 
BD_Int_TrainOrg07_Representative1 Interview Training organisation 7 1 
BD_Int_TrainOrg08_Representative1 Interview Training organisation 8 1 
BD_Int_TrainOrg09_Representative1 Interview Training organisation 9 1 
BD_Int_TrainOrg10_Representative1 Interview Training organisation 10 1 
BD_Int_TrainOrg10_Representative2 Interview Training organisation 10 2 
BD_Int_TrainOrg14_Representative1 Interview Training organisation 14 1 
BD_Int_TrainOrg15_Representative1 Interview Training organisation 15 1 
BD_Int_TrainOrg16_Representative1 Interview Training organisation 16 1 
BD_Int_TrainOrg16_Representative2 Interview Training organisation 16 2 
BD_Int_TrainOrg18_Representative1 Interview Training organisation 18 1 
BD_Int_TrainOrg21_Representative1 Interview Training organisation 21 1 






Name of the electronic file, as cited in the chapters 
 
Type of data 
 




Type or no. of representatives 
/ other notes 





















The following pages list in alphabetical order the literature on the basis of which a 
large part of this study is based. The list contains both primary sources by govern-
mental and non-governmental organisations, newspaper articles, contributions from 
the social science literature and other documentary evidence. There are two main 
reasons for not having allocated the documents to the conventional categories of 
primary and secondary sources: First, it would have been misleading, as many 
documents have been used both as primary sources and as secondary literature. 
Second, this way of organising the literature was considered to be more convenient 
for readers who are interested in quickly tracing bibliographical information on spe-
cific references in the text. 
 
For all those who are interested in looking for literature in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, 
possibly for some of the documents mentioned below, the following information may 
be helpful: The best way to trace documents both in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka is to 
directly address the authors or the editors respectively, particularly when it comes to 
publications by government agencies and training organisations. The national ar-
chives in both countries have not been found to be very fruitful in this regard. How-
ever, researchers in Sri Lanka may visit the library of the University of Colombo and 
the library of the Ministry of Finance and Planning, which have a rich collection of 
official documents. Furthermore, newspaper articles can be traced in the library of 
the Lake House, where the government’s official newspaper has its head office. In 
Bangladesh, researchers will find the library of the Bangladesh Institute of Develop-
ment Studies (BIDS) and the archives of the Planning Commission very useful. How-
ever, when it comes to publications by government agencies, one may directly ad-
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